Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002428
(HU/00679/24)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

8th October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

FILIP STASIUK
(no anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

For the Appellant: -
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

At: Manchester Magistrates’ Court on 28 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Poland born 19 October 1999. In this appeal he seeks to resist, on human rights grounds, the decision of the Respondent to deport him.

Case History and Matters in Issue
2. The Appellant has lived in the United Kingdom since he was 8 years old, having come here with his mother and other family members in early 2008. He was granted indefinite leave to remain in 11 June 2021.
3. The Appellant has, by his own admission, taken drugs since the age of 13. The First-tier Tribunal recorded that he “commenced dealing drugs when he was 17 and did so on and off until he was caught when he was 23”. This arrest led to his conviction, at Chester Crown Court on the 30 July 2023, of possession of class A drugs (heroin and crack) with intent to supply. The Appellant was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment.
4. The length of the Appellant’s sentence meant that as a matter of law he was subject to ‘automatic deportation’: s32 UK Borders Act 2007. The Respondent signed a deportation order on 9 October 2023. The Appellant was entitled to appeal against that decision, but could only succeed on limited grounds, by showing that one or more of the ‘exceptions’ to deportation set out at s33 UKBA 2007 applied to him.
5. When the appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal it heard oral evidence from the Appellant and his mother, Mrs Katarzyna Ciszak. Having had regard to their credible evidence, and the supportive statements of numerous other family members, it decided to allow the appeal on two grounds. It concluded that the Appellant qualified for leave to remain on ‘family life’ grounds because it found that his deportation would be ‘unduly harsh’ for his then partner. The Tribunal also found that the Appellant met all of the requirements to be permitted to remain in the UK on ‘private life grounds’. This involved the application of a three-part test: he had to show that he had been in the UK lawfully for most of his life, that he was ‘socially and culturally integrated’ in the UK, and that there were ‘very significant obstacles to his re-integration’ in Poland.
6. The Secretary of State sought, and on the 9 July 2025 obtained, permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. In a decision dated 7 November 2025 Deputy Chamber President Plimmer found that the First-tier Tribunal had failed to adequately reason its findings on family life. She set that part of the First-tier Tribunal aside. The relationship that the Appellant relied upon before the First-tier Tribunal has now sadly broken down, so the Appellant no longer pursues that limb of his appeal. In respect of private life, the Secretary of State accepted that the Appellant had lived lawfully in the UK for most of his life so he met the first requirement of the three-part test. She had however challenged the conclusions in respect of the second and third questions. Judge Plimmer found that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in its approach to the Appellant’s prospects of integration in Poland; specifically, it had failed to have regard to the fact that Poland was a highly developed European country with social mores and cultural practices very similar to our own. She set that part of the decision to be remade.
7. In respect of whether the Appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the UK, Judge Plimmer did not think that there had been anything wrong with the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning on that front. There was however new evidence available to her that had not been before the First-tier Tribunal. That was that after his deportation appeal was heard, and after he was released on licence from his sentence, the Appellant had committed yet more criminal offences. He was convicted, at Cheshire Magistrates Court on the 7 June 2025, of possession of both class A and B drugs with the intent to supply. He was also convicted of arson, relating to an incident when he was in prison and had set fire to his cell. The Appellant was sentenced to 4 months imprisonment for the class B drugs, 10 months for the arson and 28 months for the supply of class A (again, heroin), all to be served concurrently. In light of these new convictions, Judge Plimmer gave permission for the matter of social and cultural integration to be revisited when the decision in the appeal is remade.
8. The matters in issue before me are therefore:
i) Whether the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK;
ii) Whether there are very significant obstacles to his integration in Poland;
If the Appellant meets both of these requirements, his appeal will be allowed. If he cannot, he could still succeed if he is able to show that the decision is in any event disproportionate. That is however a very high hurdle, expressed in the law as:
iii) Whether there are ‘very compelling circumstances over and above’ the exceptions.
9. It has taken a long time for this matter to come back to court following the decision of Judge Plimmer. A number of hearings had to be adjourned, primarily because of difficulties in facilitating the Appellant’s attendance, either remotely or in person. Because the Appellant is in prison he needs to be brought to a secure court and for some reason this proved to be very difficult to arrange. On at least two occasions the Appellant’s entire family came, as requested, to Manchester Magistrates’ court only to be turned away by staff who did not know that the case was listed that day. For that they have my sincere apologies. I know how stressful this has been for them, and the confusion around the hearings cannot have helped. As to the delay more generally, that apology is also extended to the Respondent.
10. At the hearing on the I heard oral evidence from the Appellant, his mother Ms Ciszak and his sister Julia Ciszak. I heard submissions from Mr Tan, and from the Appellant. I reserved my decision, which I now give.

Social and Cultural Integration in the UK
11. It is generally accepted that people who have lived in this country a long time, particularly since childhood, are very likely to be strongly integrated here. They will be used to life in this country, how things work and the way that people behave. They are likely, like the Appellant, to have a wide network of friends and family members, and to feel at home here. In the context of deportation appeals, however, the individual concerned has invariably involved himself in activities which are contrary to the values of the UK, in particular anti-social or criminal behaviours. The question therefore arises: are these negative behaviours capable of damaging the individual’s relationship to this country to the extent that he can no longer be said to be ‘socially and culturally integrated’? In SSHD v AA (Poland) [2024] EWCA Civ 18 Lord Justice Hamblen puts it like this [at §56]:
“Social integration refers to the extent to which a foreign criminal has become incorporated within the lawful social structure of the UK … [and] to the acceptance and assumption by the foreign criminal of the culture of the UK, its core values, ideas, customs and social behaviour. That includes acceptance of the principle of the rule of law”.
12. There have been cases, for instance Binbuga v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 551, in which the individual’s criminality, anti-social behaviour and associations have been found to have severed such integrative links. In SC Jamaica v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 15 the Supreme Court was asked to revisit this issue in the context of a man who was known to be a member of a criminal gang. Lord Stephens, with whom the rest of the Court agreed, summarised the caselaw as follows:
“51. Whether a foreign criminal is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom in section 117C(4)(b) and paragraph 399A(b) of the Immigration Rules is to be determined in accordance with common sense. As Lord Brown of Eaton-under Heywood held in Mahad v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] UKSC 16; [2010] 1 WLR 48, para 10, the Immigration Rules should:
“not … be construed with all the strictness applicable to the construction of a statute or a statutory instrument but, instead, sensibly according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, recognising that they are statements of the Secretary of State’s administrative policy.”
Leggatt LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 stated, at para 58, that:
“Relevant social ties obviously include relationships with friends and relatives, as well as ties formed through employment or other paid or unpaid work or through participation in communal activities. However, a person’s social identity is not defined solely by such particular relationships but is constituted at a deep level by familiarity with and participation in the shared customs, traditions, practices, beliefs, values, linguistic idioms and other local knowledge which situate a person in a society or social group and generate a sense of belonging. The importance of upbringing and education in the formation of a person’s social identity is well recognised, and its importance in the context of cases involving the article 8 rights of persons facing expulsion because of criminal offending has been recognised by the European Court.”
Furthermore, I agree with the formulation of the question at para 77 of CI (Nigeria) that a judge should simply ask whether, having regard to his upbringing, education, employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, relationships with family and friends, lifestyle and any other relevant factors, the individual was at the time of the hearing socially and culturally integrated in the UK”.
13. Applying that guidance to the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal in SC’s case, the Court held [at its §106] that it had properly considered all of the relevant facts when it decided that SC was still socially and culturally integrated in the UK, notwithstanding his involvement in a criminal gang.
14. Against that background, I turn to consider the evidence in this appeal.
15. The Appellant came to the UK in early 2008 with his mother. In her evidence Mrs Ciszak told me that her mother had come to this country first, because at the time the economy was so bad in Poland. She had said to Mrs Ciszak to come and see if she liked it. They visited in February. It was very sunny and she loved it, and decided to move here with her children. Her children have grown up in Liverpool and they think of themselves as being from that city. They don’t really identify with being Polish: I noted that both the Appellant and his sister speak with clear Liverpool accents.
16. No fewer than 12 different members of the Appellant’ extended family have come to court on various occasions to support him. This number includes his mother and stepfather, sister, his maternal grandmother, stepgrandmother, aunt, uncle, cousins and partners. Both Mrs Ciszak and her daughter Julia spoke movingly about their concern for him, their regret at the poor choices he has made, and their belief that he can be rehabilitated and resume a normal life when he gets out of prison. Mrs Ciszak has not been well in recent years (a matter known to both parties so I need not give the details here). This has been very challenging for her and in his oral evidence the Appellant spoke of his deep regret at not being able to support his mum through her illness. In her evidence Julia spoke about how difficult it has been for her, and how she feels that the Appellant has left her on her own to cope with the various challenges that illness, and family life in general, can bring. Their grandmother has also been ill. She feels that her brother is upset about this and that he knows he has let everyone down. In his evidence he agreed with this statement. He told me “I realise now how much I have wasted my life – I just want to be there for my mum and grandma”.
17. The Appellant attended school in Liverpool. He obtained GCSEs in Maths, English, History, ICT and sciences. After leaving school the Appellant got an apprenticeship as a bricklayer and has his ‘red card’ enabling him to work on building sites. The Appellant told me that he has continued his education whilst inside. He has done a painting and decorating course, and obtained a certificate in biohazard clearance which could help him get work on sites once he is out. He also did a traffic management course which could help him get work on the motorways if he decides not to go back to the building trade.
18. All of that evidence very strongly points to the Appellant being socially and culturally integrated in the UK. He has nevertheless committed a series of crimes, including dealing in class A drugs which are well known to have a hugely detrimental impact not just on the people who use them, but on the community as a whole. I must consider whether those crimes are such that the Appellant can no longer be said to be integrated.
19. The First-tier Tribunal found, and I agree, that the Appellant speaks about his experiences in a very open and candid manner. He explains that he started using cannabis as a teenager, and one thing led to another. He told me that in his area of Liverpool there is a lot of drug use. In oral evidence the Appellant told me that he has started drug dealing again after getting out of jail because he had felt so frustrated at not being able to work and contribute to the household. His permission to work had been withdrawn by the Home Office so even though he had his ‘red card’ and training, he was unable to get work in the construction industry as planned. He said that he hadn’t wanted to let his mum down; he agreed that in going back to dealing he had let her down even more. He told me that he deeply regrets that choice. He understands that it has made it harder for him to win his appeal; he has caused his family further pain and upset, and it resulted in the breakdown of his relationship with his long term girlfriend, who had attended the First-tier Tribunal and spoken in support of his appeal. The Appellant told me that he is now more committed than ever to getting away from drugs. He has been clean in prison and has undertaken several courses. He has completed the ‘Stop Supplying’ workbook, attended a drug awareness course and studied Relapse Prevention.
20. In respect of the arson the Appellant told me that this had arisen out of his frustration and fear in prison. There had been an incident on his wing which meant it had to be cleared. He was put in a cell in a wing where they did not have enough staff to deal with any more inmates and as a result he was left in his cell for days on end without being allowed out for exercise or showering or even food – other prisoners were passing him food through the hatch. He had felt overwhelmed a set fire to his bin in an effort to get out. Mr Tan pointed out that the sentencing remarks refer to him having been on ‘spice’ during the incident. The Appellant denied that he had been using spice. He wrongly thought if he said he was on spice and had set the fire accidentally, the prison wouldn’t involve the police and would just deal with it internally.
21. I have had regard to all of that. The Appellant is a repeat offender, who has now been to prison twice, with significant sentences for someone so young. I accept Mr Tan’s submission that broadly speaking involvement with class A drugs over a long period of time, and offending whilst still on licence, are both matters indicative of a rejection of the rule of law, and of society’s values more generally. The Appellant spoke openly in his evidence about the prevalence of drugs use – and dealing – in his home area and this is, I accept, another indication of his normalisation of anti-social behaviours. However when standing back and looking at his life as a whole, his strong relationships with his law abiding family members and wider social circle, his education, his training and his intention to work, I am satisfied that the Appellant’s offending and anti-social associations have not broken his integrative links. He has been in this country since he was a young child, and I have no hesitation in accepting the evidence that he thinks of himself as a Liverpudlian rather than being Polish. He has a strong understanding of the shared customs, traditions, practices, beliefs, values and linguistic idioms of that city and these have, as it is put in CI (Nigeria), generated a “sense of belonging”.
22. I accept that the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK.

Very Significant Obstacles to Integration
23. This, the final element of the three-part test applied in private life cases, appears in both immigration rules and statute. Drafted by the Secretary of State, and approved by parliament, the test is intended to reflect the caselaw from the European Court of Human Rights on where the ‘balance should be struck’ in such cases. Thus while the first two limbs are concerned with the extent and quality of the individual’s life in this country, the final matter is concerned with whether they would be able to re-establish, within a reasonable time frame, a new private life for themselves elsewhere. In Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813 Lord Justice Sales put it as follows [at §14]:
“… the concept of a foreign criminal’s ‘integration’ into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported, as set out in section 117C(4)(c) and paragraph 399A, is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of ‘integration’ calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life.”
24. More recently, in Ackom v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 537, the Court of Appeal was asked to consider how these principles were to be applied in cases where the destination was another European country, where society closely resembles our own. It was the decision in Ackom which led Judge Plimmer to set the decision of the First-tier Tribunal aside. Although the First-tier Tribunal did not have the benefit of that decision (it was handed down after the Appellant’s appeal was heard), the reasoning in Ackom explains why the First-tier Tribunal had conducted too narrow an enquiry. The First-tier Tribunal had looked at the strong ties that the Appellant has to the UK, and in essence reasoned that he must have lost, or could not re-establish, the equivalent ties to Poland. Judge Plimmer held, looking at the reasoning in Ackom, that this was not enough.
25. That is because it is very often going to be the case that someone who has strong ties to the UK, having spent more than half there life there, is going to lack the equivalent connections to their country of nationality: they may lack friends or family there, and may not even speak the language. Anyone subject to this test will have criminal convictions which might make it difficult to obtain employment. It cannot be the case, reasoned the Court in Ackom, that these factors in and of themselves will be enough to meet the test: otherwise the third requirement of the rule would be pointless. Judges considering this rule must therefore identify specific reasons why that individual will be unable to overcome the specific obstacles in the country to which he being sent. Lady Justice Andrews, giving the lead judgment in Ackom, explains that “much will depend on the country and on the nature and character of the individual concerned”. Where the country concerned is a European country, where life is not so different from life in the UK, that will be a relevant consideration. Analysing the facts in that case, Andrews LJ says this:
“48. What does not emerge clearly from the decision is why the FtT judge reached the conclusion that a fit, reasonably intelligent young man in his twenties, who had good educational qualifications and had been employed, and who was willing to undergo courses in prison to equip him with new skills, even if he were forced to live on benefits for a time, would be precluded from integration, in the sense explained in Kamara, by the current lack of any friends or family in Germany, the fact that he had not been back to Germany since he left at the age of 7, and the fact that he did not yet speak German. I do not accept that it is to be inferred that the judge considered the respondent's ability to learn German, let alone that she must have concluded that he would have been unable to do so within a reasonable time. Yet if she was going to place as much weight as she did on the impact of his inability to speak the language, that was plainly a material consideration in terms of mitigating the immediate disadvantage”.
26. With this guidance in mind, I have had regard to all of the potential difficulties identified by the Appellant and his family members as causing them concern should the Appellant be sent to Poland.
27. In his oral evidence the Appellant told me that the last time he was in Poland was 2014. He went for a holiday but mainly to visit his paternal grandmother, with whom his mother has maintained contact since she split from his father. Mrs Ciszak told me that the Appellant’s grandparents on his father’s side are both unwell with cancer, and they would not be in a position to offer him much by way of support. Neither she nor the Appellant have any contact with his father. In answer to Mr Tan’s questions the Appellant confirmed that his family here are all Polish and that his mum and stepdad speak Polish to each other at home but he is unable to understand a lot of it. His stepfather has a daughter who lived here for a bit but she has gone back to Poland now. She has a partner and a young child. In fact, Mrs Ciszak told me, her husband has two daughters living in Poland, but the Appellant does not know them well and they would not be in a position to assist him. I accept all of that evidence.
28. There is some suggestion in the evidence that the Appellant has attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and I am prepared to accept that he does. This can make it more difficult for him to adjust and cope with change.
29. Mrs Ciszak accepted that things in Poland were not necessarily as they were when she left, but said that she is very concerned about the Appellant’s ability to engage with people there. She said that people are not open like they are in the UK and that without anyone to help him settle in he will find it very hard to integrate.
30. I have considered all of this against what I have learned about the Appellant. He is, as his school qualifications and continued learning demonstrate, capable of being an intelligent and hard working young man. He cannot speak very good Polish but bearing in mind that he gained fluency in English within a year of arriving here, I see no reason to suppose that he would not be able to regain or surpass the level of Polish he had when he was 8. Given the Appellant’s chosen career in the UK – construction work – I do not consider that the lack of fluent Polish would be much of a barrier in obtaining employment. It will no doubt take a while for the Appellant to be able to stand on his own two feet; perhaps it could even take months before he finds employment. I must however have regard to the fact that Poland is an EU Member State and a developed country, with similar societal and cultural norms to the UK; as a Polish national the Appellant would be entitled to unemployment and social support. His family here, his mother in particular, would no doubt be willing to assist him financially and emotionally, and maybe even practically through visits.
31. The Appellant and his mother both stressed that he would “simply not know where to start” his life in Poland, but that is the reality faced by many young migrants across the world who make their way in new countries, quickly establishing lives for themselves in new and sometimes challenging environments. I accept that ADHD is a condition that can make it more difficult to navigate some situations, but this is a young man who has twice been to prison, and who has, on his own admission, worked on ‘the streets’ as a drug dealer over quite a long period of time. I have no doubt that he would be able to cope. I had the opportunity to hear quite extensively from the Appellant at the hearing. He is a likeable and pleasant young man, able to express himself well. I am sure it is no comfort to him to find that these qualities end up weighing against him, but the reality is that I am wholly satisfied that he would be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in Poland, and within a reasonable time to be accepted by others, to make friends and eventually, other relationships that would give substance to his private life. Looking at all of the evidence I have been shown, having had regard to the situation in Poland and the character of the Appellant, I am unable to find that there are very significant obstacles to his integration in Poland.

Very Compelling Circumstances
32. Where people facing automatic deportation are unable to meet any of the ‘exceptions’, the law provides that they can still succeed on appeal if they are able to show that there are “very compelling circumstances over and above” the exceptions. The phrase “over and above” should not be read as meaning the exception is met plus something else; otherwise there would be no point in the rule. It can only be read as meaning something else very compelling which is of greater weight in the balancing exercise than the public interest. The difficulty for the Appellant is that the ‘public interest’ in his deportation is, at this stage, something which attracts a great deal of weight. Even disregarding his lesser offences, he has dealt in class A drugs, something which is profoundly damaging to the individuals who take those drugs, and to the wider society that they live in because of the high risk of associated crime and anti-social behaviour. There is no suggestion that the Appellant has himself been directly involved in violence, but violence, or the threat of it, has almost certainly been a feature of the supply chain in which he has involved himself. Having been released on licence, and having persuaded the First-tier Tribunal to allow his appeal, the Appellant showed further disregard for the law and public interest by going back to street dealing.
33. There are certainly factors in this case which legitimately weigh in the Appellant’s favour in showing the deportation to be disproportionate. He has a supportive and law abiding family; I have no doubt at all that each of them is wholly committed to helping him get ‘back on track’ and avoid any further trouble. That he has caused his family significant heartache was not lost on the Appellant and I accept that he fully understands the anguish he has caused his mother, sister and grandmother in particular.
34. The Appellant had a difficult relationship with his father as a child, and his dislocation from him as a teenager no doubt contributed to the path he went down. He made the mistake, as the cliché goes, of ‘falling in with a bad crowd’ and as a teenager establishing a pattern of behaviour that I am sure he now regrets. Taking drugs from the age of 13 no doubt skewed his judgment. I accept that the Appellant is now committed to ceasing his drug use.
35. The First-tier Tribunal accepted that the Appellant has a younger brother who is autistic. Mrs Ciszak told me that she shields him from a lot of things. She has not, for instance told him that she is ill; nor has she told him that his brother is in prison. She believes, however that he does understand the reality of the situation, he just doesn’t want to hear it. I have not heard any specific evidence on the point but I am prepared to accept that this child would benefit from the Appellant being returned to the family home, if only because this would relieve the stress on his mother.
36. The Appellant’s mother and grandmother have both been ill in recent years, and continue to be so. I saw first hand the impact that this had had on the family in the emotional evidence of Julia, who spoke movingly about how she wished that her brother was able to be there to support her mum in what are very difficult times for the family. I also heard his evidence, and as I record above, have absolutely no reason to doubt what he says about his regrets and hopes for the future. The Appellant has made some efforts towards, and I believe is committed to, his rehabilitation. He has passed a qualification in bricklaying and other practical skills, and I accept that he has undertaken a lot of work in prison, in particular completing workbooks and courses aimed at drug intervention. He pleaded guilty in respect of all of the charges levied against him and court and it goes to his credit that he did so.
37. I have weighed all of that in the balance against the public interest. The ‘very compelling circumstances’ test presents a formidably high hurdle, and with some regret I conclude that the evidence in this case, even considered cumulatively, does not come close to surmounting it. The Appellant will undoubtedly face some hardship if he is deported, but not of the magnitude that would be required here. That being the case, I must dismiss the appeal.

Decisions
38. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal has been set aside to the extent identified above and in the decision of DCP Plimmer.
39. I remake the decision in the appeal by dismissing it on human rights grounds.
40. There is no order for anonymity.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
4 October 2026