Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002438
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01565/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28th of April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SEELHOFF

Between

AJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr B Lams, Counsel instructed by KBP Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Nappey, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Iran who came to the UK and claimed asylum on the 19th November 2021. The Appellant is accepted to be a Kurd and claims that his father was arrested for distributing pro KDPI material and that he was also wanted as a result. The application was refused on the 19th November 2021.
Appeal Before the First-tier
2. The appeal came before Judge Finnerty on the 21st February 2025. Judge Finnerty dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on the 14th March 2025. Judge Finnerty comprehensively rejected the Appellant’s account of events in Iran and found that his political activities in the UK were low level and did not reflect sincerely held political beliefs.
Applications for Permission to Appeal
3. A First-tier Judge refused permission to appeal on the 7th May 2025 and the application was renewed to the Upper Tribunal. Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien granted permission on all grounds noting that a transcript of the hearing would likely be required to consider aspects of the grounds in full.
The Hearing
4. At the hearing Mr Nappey confirmed that the Respondent continued to resist the appeal. We confirmed that the stitched bundle contained all relevant documents and that Mr Lams had provided an updated skeleton argument.
5. I heard detailed submissions from both parties and then reserved my decision.
Reasons
6. Ground 1 argues that the judge erred by drawing an adverse inference on a lack of supporting evidence from the Appellant’s family primarily an uncle in Iraq with whom the Appellant continued to be in contact and family in Iran who he contacted through that uncle.
7. I consider that much of the impugned portion of paragraph 24 rather than representing findings is actually legitimate observations about the evidence. The judge then moved on to consider who the Appellant was in contact with. The Judge expressly did not treat the lack of corroborative evidence as a determining factor but as one factor relevant to the overall assessment of credibility. The judge directed themself to the guiding authority and relevant legal provisions.
“Whilst there is no general requirement of corroboration in asylum cases (see e.g. MAH (Egypt) V SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216), I am entitled to attach weight to the absence of corroboration when it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not doing so. I have also considered paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules.” [24]
8. We reviewed the transcript of the hearing before the First-tier. I note that the oral evidence suggested that the Appellant was in current and ongoing contact with his uncle and could contact him relatively easily;
“Q. You say in your asylum interview, and for references, this is question 73, judge, that you sometimes contact your family. Your family have not provided you with any documents to confirm that the authorities have an interest in you, have they?
A. So I cannot contact my family directly, my son (myself), so I contact my family through my uncle in Iraq. So, the only members of family left in Iran is my [Relationship A] who is very old and my [Relationship C] I've not seen for ten years now.
….
JUDGE FINNERTY: I just have one question, how do you communicate with your uncle in Iraq?
WITNESS: Facebook, Facebook Messenger”
9. From paragraph 24 it appears that the judge was entirely aware of the extent of the contact that the Appellant had with his family through that uncle. It is not relevant that the evidence of the uncle may have proven to have been of limited value, the Judge was entitled to take account of the failure to explore a possible avenue to obtain further evidence from the uncle and possibly from the wider family care of that uncle. The weight to be attached to that was a matter for the Judge. The judge did not make an error of law in the approach to this issue.
10. In ground 2 it is argued that the judge erred in that he placed little weight on the Appellant’s account because it was;
“entirely based on hearsay and speculation”[24]
11. It is correct to note that there is no bar on relying on hearsay evidence in proceedings before the First-tier, however the fact that evidence is “hearsay” is a relevant consideration when deciding the weight to be attached to that evidence and weight would normally be a matter for the Judge. Mr Lams accepted that the Appellant did not have direct knowledge of the events of his case which the Judge was discussing. Mr Lams suggested that the characterisation of the Appellant’s evidence as “speculation” was unreasonable in the context of the caselaw. Whilst there may be evidence that family members of those suspected of political evidence are often targeted it was not unreasonable to describe this as speculation in the circumstances of the case.
12. Most importantly, the decision has to be read in the round. Reading the decision as a whole it is clear that the Judge did not make findings on credibility at 24. This paragraph is better characterised as observations on aspects of the evidence. There are further observations on credibility [25-28] and the judge then proceeded to consider credibility in the round and make the actual findings later in the decision [29 and 30].
13. In light of my findings above, I find that there was no error of law in respect of ground 2.
14. Ground 3 complains that the judge relied on a selective quotation from a relevant CPIN which meant that an adverse inference was wrongly drawn as a consequence of the Appellant’s mother not being arrested [26].
15. The Judge treated this as a factor relevant to the assessment of credibility in the round and the judge did not find that the account was necessarily untrue as a consequence of this only that the credibility was “undermined”. This is not an error of law but part of an assessment of credibility in the round carried out later in the decision [29 and 30].
16. Ground 4 asserts that;
“The judge erred at determination at [25][CB42] in stating that it was improbable that the father would keep sensitive material at home, in not having regard to the Appellant’s answer when the point about the fathers activities being dangerous was put in the interview at AIR38 [CB1650]. The Appellant said of his father’s motivation that ‘it was a matter of patriotism, it was patriotic for the nation because the nation was oppressed”
17. When reading the paragraph as a whole, the Judge actually placed reliance on the contradiction between the father not telling the Appellant what was in the bags of political materials to protect him, but still keeping those bags in the home. That is contradictory irrespective of the father’s motivation for any political activity and it was for the judge to decide what weight to attach to that contradiction
18. Whilst the reference to this being “improbable” suggests that the wrong standard may have been applied, I am satisfied that this is properly characterised as another observation on the evidence with the actual findings being made later in the decision on the correct standard [29 and 30]. This does not constitute an error of law.
19. Ground 5 complains that the finding that the Appellant could reasonably be expected to delete his Facebook account on return to Iran at [39] is inadequately reasoned.
20. The decision has to be read in the round. The finding is consequential to findings set out earlier in the decision [35-38] where the Judge found that the Appellant had not established that his posting on Facebook or his attendance at events reflected genuinely held political beliefs and protests. These findings were not challenged. When I raised this at the hearing Mr Lams suggested that a challenge to the earlier findings was implicit in ground 5 and that it is obvious that a Kurd would oppose the regime. I do not agree that this is implicit to ground 5. The grounds do not anywhere challenge the following finding;
“I am not therefore persuaded that A’s political activity in the UK is genuine. It has begun only since he came to the UK and made his asylum claim here. His activity is not detailed and is of a low level. I consider that it is reasonably likely that he is partaking in these activities to bolster his asylum claim.” [38]
21. In the absence of a challenge to the finding at [38] ground 5 is not made out.
22. Ground 6 argues that the Judge materially erred in failing to make a finding as to whether the Appellant would continue his low level political activities in Iran. Whilst not set out in terms the answer to that is again to be found in the unchallenged finding at [38] and also the unchallenged finding at [43];
“I find the extent of A’s Facebook posts, his limited attendance at a small number of demonstrations where he played no particular role and his lack of political activity in Iran or Sweden prior to his departure for the UK, leads me to a conclusion that he is not a genuine activist with genuinely held political views.”
23. To the extent that the failure to make a finding as to whether the Appellant would continue his activities in Iran, is an error of law it is not material as the only finding that the Judge could have made in light of the other findings would be that the Appellant would not carry out those activities in Iran because he was only doing them in the UK to bolster his asylum claim.
24. Ground 7 argues that the judge applied too high a standard of proof when observing;
“I cannot be certain that the downloaded material is complete”
25. I am satisfied that that was an observation o the evidence and not a finding. It is part of a series of observations on the evidence. The finding on the Facebook evidence is at [38] and has not been challenged and as a consequence this is not an error of law.
Conclusions
26. The grounds do not separately or collectively disclose a material error of law and the decision must therefor stand.

Notice of Decision
The decision does not contain a material error of law and the appeal is dismissed.

A. Seelhoff

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24th April 2026