Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002439
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51487/2024
LP/02278/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 23rd of April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

NI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Yong, counsel instructed by Barnes Harrild and Dyer Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dated 10 April 2025 (the decision) refusing the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the respondent dated 28 December 2023. The appellant sought asylum on the basis that he fears persecution in Iran on account of his political opinion. He states that he printed and distributed leaflets for a Kurdish opposition party and that a person who also distributed the leaflets was detained and tortured.
2. The appellant was granted permission to appeal and I heard the appeal on the following grounds:
a. One. The FtT made factual errors impacting on the consideration of credibility
i. Erring in assuming the printer is the appellant’s
ii. Erring in finding it odd that the appellant was not detained when M, the person distributing leaflets with him, was
iii. Misunderstanding where the appellant lived or distributed leaflets;
b. Two. The FtT erred in the assessment of risk
i. Erred in saying at [46] that “Whether or not the Iranian authorities have noted him in particular is a matter which is moot, but is probably unlikely, as he is not an organiser.”
ii. Found that the appellant had not been involved in relevant sur place activities, a finding at odds with earlier findings;
c. Three. The FtT erred in consideration of the evidence by identifying his name is not on the relevant Facebook account but fails to note that the appellant’s face is the profile picture, and finds they are not entirely sure the Iranian authorities would consider the Facebook account to be the appellant’s; and
d. Four. The FtT placed weight on irrelevant matters.
3. I had available to me written and oral submissions by both parties. I remind myself of the need to respect the finding of the FtT where cases are heard by judges with extensive skills and experience in this specialist jurisdiction. My function is to consider any errors of law, not preference of style or approach.
4. With regards to the first ground, the appellant submits that the evidence set out that the appellant’s cousin brought the printer and asked for it to be placed on the appellant’s farm. It is therefore clear why the printer was at his farm and the FtT erred in finding that the appellant claimed the printer was his. The appellant points to [41] of the FtT decision where, the appellant says, the FtT comments that the account of having a printer on his farm does not make sense but, says the appellant, this is based upon a misunderstanding of the facts of the case.
5. Looking at the FtT analysis of the evidence, the FtT at [41] does not work on the basis that the appellant claims the printer is his, rather the FtT analyses how likely it is that a printer would be brought to a location with no internet access.
6. On appeal before me, the appellant states that his evidence was not that he was with M when M was detained, and the FtT erred in finding it lacking in credibility that M was detained and the appellant was not at a time when they were together. The respondent submitted that the fact the appellant had to direct me to specific parts of the evidence indicates that this is merely a disagreement with the FtT’s finding.
7. In considering the appellant’s submission on this point, I note that there is no transcript of the hearing in the FtT supplied to me. I have considered the written evidence of the appellant available to the FtT and I note that he does not state that he was with M when he was arrested. That appears to be at odds with the FtT summary of the appellant’s evidence in person which is recorded at [31] as being “His cousin brought [M] together with the appellant and they distributed the papers at night. He found out [M] had been arrested from [K]… The appellant was informed that [M] was arrested and the appellant did not go home”. This reads as the appellant giving evidence that he and M were distributing leaflets together when M was arrested.
8. I find it appropriate for the FtT at [42] to address the version of events given in oral evidence by the appellant and come to a conclusion on its credibility. The FtT might have chosen to compare this with his written evidence, but as that would have only highlighted an inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence on this point (which was already considered lacking credibility by the FtT) there is arguably no benefit in doing so and I do not consider it an error to have chosen not to do so.
9. The appellant submits that the FtT erred in finding at [44] that it did not make sense for the appellant to go to an unknown, more urban, environment to distribute leaflets because the appellant lived in a village and not on the farm. The FtT finding is that it does not make sense for the appellant to take the leaflets from the area he works as a shepherd to more urban environments. Even if the evidence was that the appellant lived in a more urban environment (and it is unclear to me that this was the evidence), it is reasonable for the FtT to conclude that taking the leaflets from where he works to a more urban environment than that does not makes sense in light of the risk that goes with it and in light of the FtT’s view that the appellant would not know the urban area well enough to identify the appropriate places to distribute the leaflets.
10. It is convenient for me to deal with the fourth ground here. I do not read the FtT’s reasons as indicating that corroboration was required by the FtT for the appellant’s account. However, I do agree that it appears the appellant was not asked at any stage to explain how (or whether) there was an electricity connection where the printer was kept. The FtT does consider that a lack of this evidence undermines the credibility of the appellant’s case. The lack of this evidence seems to play a significant part in the FtT’s assessment of that element of the appellant’s case. I find that it is an error for the FtT to reach that conclusion without the parties having been given an opportunity to bring evidence or make submissions on it.
11. With respect to the second ground, the appellant submits that “The risk does not simply arise if he is asked to open his Facebook account, as is mentioned at §47, but if he has already been identified”. The FtT does, at [54], make findings that it is not feasible for the Iranian authorities to have been able to pick him out at the demonstrations he has attended. The FtT also found at [54] that the appellant had not proved the Facebook account advanced as being his was in fact his.
12. I agree that the reason for saying that whether the Iranian authorities have identified the appellant was “moot” is unclear, but that does not represent an error given that the FtT goes on to consider the level of involvement of the appellant and to find that it is unlikely the Iranian authorities would have identified the appellant.
13. I do find that the FtT has sufficiently assessed, in the context of this case, the identification risk as outlined in [4] of the judicial headnote to BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) [2011] UKUT 36. The analysis of those factors may not be collected together in a list, but it has been done. I find no error on the second ground.
14. The third ground points to the FtT’s finding that the FtT is “not entirely sure that the Iranian authorities would considering that the person in the Facebook account is the same person as the appellant”. The FtT appears to be applying a higher standard of proof (one of “entirely sure”) than ought to be applied in this case. The Facebook account is considered at a number of points in the FtT determination, and the analysis and findings elsewhere in the determination do not negate the reference to “entirely sure”. I find that this amounts to an error in law.
15. The FtT’s error on the fourth ground is, I find, material because a different standard of proof may have altered the FtT’s findings of fact, and this may have tipped the balance on part of the assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
16. I assess that the errors identified above are material because a different decision might have been arrived at had they not have been made. The parties both submit that it would be appropriate to remit the case to the FtT if a material error is found. I set aside the decision of the FtT and do not retain any findings of fact. I remit the case to the FtT.
Notice of Decision
The determination of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law.
I allow the appeal.
I remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings of fact retained.

D Cotton

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 April 2026