Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002445

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57162/2023
LP/09919/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
13th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

Between

AP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Swain, instructed by Mayfairs Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Albania. By these proceedings she appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing her protection claim.
2. The appellant came to the UK illegally by lorry on 20 December 2019 and claimed asylum. The application for asylum was refused on 25 August 2023, as well as leave to remain on humanitarian protection or human rights grounds.
3. On 26 September 2023, the appellant appealed the respondent’s refusal decision to the First-tier Tribunal. That appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Hill (‘the Judge’). The First-tier Tribunal accepted that the appellant had been trafficked into prostitution in Albania to pay off her father’s debt; that she had escaped her traffickers within two months; had been pressured into a marriage which later broke down while she was in Germany, and that her brother who remained in Albania had received threats in 2019.
4. The First-tier Tribunal also found that the appellant would not be without support if returned to Albania and that she would have access to a shelter. Additionally, the First-tier Tribunal found that there was not a reasonable risk of re-trafficking because her original trafficking had arisen because of her father’s debt and not because of some general vulnerability on her part. Alternatively, there was sufficient state protection available in Albania. Accordingly, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s protection appeal.
5. The appellant appealed the First-tier Tribunal decision to the Upper Tribunal. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick on 23 August 2025.
6. The matter now comes before me to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal erred in law, and if so whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
7. The appellant and respondent were ably represented by Mr Swain and Mr Terrell, respectively. I am grateful to them for their very helpful submissions.
Grounds
8. The appellant brings five grounds of appeal against the First-tier Tribunal’s decision: (i) failure to give adequate reasons for considering that there were ‘good reasons’ that the persecution would not be repeated; (ii) failure to engage with the appellant’s argument about why her traffickers would continue to target her; (iii) erred by requiring evidence that the appellant was at ‘particular risk’ given that Immigration Rule 339K applied (‘IR 339K’); (iv) erred in its approach to TD and AD (trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92; and (v) erred in failing to take into account the mental health of the appellant as a factor when considering the risk to the appellant or her re-trafficking after leaving a shelter.
9. Granting permission, Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick considered that Ground 1 was not arguable alone; Grounds 2 & 3 were arguable, and Grounds 4 & 5 were less persuasive.
Submissions
Grounds 1-3
10. Mr Swain on behalf of the appellant relied on his skeleton argument and explained that Grounds 1-3 were primarily focused on the application of IR 339K, which states, ‘The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of a person’s well founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.’
11. In brief, Mr Swain submitted that as the parties had accepted the substance of the appellant’s account concerning her sexual abuse and trafficking, her father’s debt remaining unpaid as result of her escape, her violent family background and her movements in recent years, there were good reasons to show under IR 339K that she was at continued risk. There was a starting presumption that the appellant would continue to be targeted by the gang as the debt remained outstanding at the time of her escape. There was no evidence that the gang had accepted the debt had been repaid. She was a single woman at the time of the trafficking and remained so but was now pregnant and still at risk.
12. It was further submitted that the appellant’s inside knowledge of the gang and the people within it would render her at risk of continued adverse interest. Her brother was targeted in 2019 which showed there was ongoing interest in her. The gang had never targeted her married sister.
13. In conclusion, Mr Swain submitted that the Judge had erred in applying IR 339K by failing to appreciate the very strong presumption of future risk given the prior persecution. The Judge’s finding at [39] that the appellant would no longer be at risk given that the debt which caused her enslavement belonged to her father was not on any analysis, a reasonable basis to find an absence of an ongoing risk. It could not fairly or rationally be said that there were ‘good reasons’ to rebut the strong presumption of future risk as the gang considered the appellant an equal debtor to her father.
14. Mr Terrell on behalf of the respondent took me to paragraph (h) of the headnote of TD and AD (trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC) which states:
(h) Trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone. Whether they are at risk of persecution on account of such membership and whether they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances, including but not limited to the following:
1) The social status and economic standing of her family
2) The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family
3) The victim of trafficking’s state of health, particularly her mental health
4) The presence of an illegitimate child
5) The area of origin
6) Age
7) What support network will be available
15. Mr Terrell stated that the Judge had clearly analysed the ‘support network’ available to the appellant at [37]. She had properly applied paragraph (h)(7) of TD and AD [37] to find that although the appellant’s network was not strong or significant she nonetheless had some support on her return to Albania as both her sister and mother were sympathetic regarding her trafficking and the same was true of her aunt who lived in London. The Judge was aware that the appellant’s mother was currently living in Germany and her sister in Albania. In this respect, the Judge observed that the appellant had not been altogether transparent about her social network if returned to Albania as she had stated she would be ‘a lone women with no family network or acquaintances.’ That was not the true position.
16. Mr Terrell further observed that the Judge did not find there was a ‘particular risk’ to the appellant of being identified or being re-trafficked as compared to others in her position [39].
17. At [40] the Judge conducted an analysis of the factors in TD and AD specifically in relation to the appellant. Mr Terrell’s view was that paragraph [44] of the decision was the answer to the appellant’s arguments regarding 339K. Here, the Judge stated that if she was wrong about the applicant’s fear of persecution on return not being objectively well-founded, in the alternative, sufficiency of protection was available to the appellant should she become subject to persecution by non-state actors.
Grounds 4-5
18. Turning to Grounds 4-5, Mr Swain’s overarching submission was that the Judge’s analysis regarding sufficiency of protection was flawed and could not stand. He relied on paragraph (h) of the headnote of TD and AD and questioned where was the safety net for the appellant.
19. At [44] of the decision, he said the Judge had not appreciated that the appellant’s mother was in Germany and her aunt was in the UK. In this regard, while noting the appellant’s mental vulnerability, the Judge had ignored the issue of support and had failed to take into account the medical evidence which demonstrated the appellant’s deteriorating mental health. This was relevant to the issue of accessing sufficiency of protection under paragraph (h)(3) of the headnote of TD and AD.
20. In response, Mr Terrell submitted that the key analysis was to be found in paragraphs [32] [37] [38] [40] [49] & [50] of the decision.
21. At [32] applying CPIN ‘Albania: Human Trafficking (July 2024) and TD and AD the Judge found that mental health provision was generally available in Albania, including in-person and online therapy. At [37] the Judge was aware that the appellant’s mother was currently in Germany and her aunt in London [37] with her sister living in Albania.
22. At [38] the Judge found applying the country guidance that the appellant would be able to access a shelter with support that would improve her prospects of establishing herself; and, at [40] & [49], the Judge recognised that the appellant was currently suffering from enduring mental health issues which she observed was sadly not uncommon in the context of trafficking victims, and that her mental health was likely to deteriorate if she was required to return to Albania.
23. At [44] & [50], the Judge concluded that with family support, the appellant would be able to access sufficiency of protection and with the support of the relevant services she would be able to access accommodation, training, and mental health treatment.
24. In conclusion, Mr Terrell submitted that the respondent considered the appellant was a person who could access state protection without any insurmountable obstacles.
Discussion and reasons
25. The appellant’s Grounds 1-3 are characterised in the grounds and by Mr Swain as constituting a failure to give adequate reasons and/or as a rationality challenge. Despite Mr Swain’s spirited submissions, I have no hesitation in concluding that these grounds do not disclose an error of law.
26. Many of the points raised in the skeleton argument and orally constitute little more than a re-argument of the case without identifying an arguable error of law. The Judge made a proper self-direction at [39] regarding paragraph 339K. She recalled that the appellant’s abduction and imprisonment took place in 2017 (some 7.5 years ago) and even though her brother received threats in 2019 she did not accept that there was any likelihood of an extant threat against the appellant now. These were clearly findings that were open on the evidence.
27. The appellant takes issue with the Judge’s characterisation of the threat made to her brother in 2019 as being ‘asserted’ when it was accepted evidence. She further complains that the consequent weighing of the evidence must be flawed. This submission is not persuasive as it is clear that the Judge took the appellant’s account at its highest and correctly noted that several years had passed since 2019 without any incident. There is nothing to suggest that the Judge did not give appropriate weight to the incident in 2019.
28. The appellant also takes issue with the finding that the appellant’s trafficking was ‘highly specific’ because she was trafficked because of a debt owed by her father and not because of some wider vulnerability. In my view, the Judge’s finding was factually correct because the primary source of the gang’s grievance was with the appellant’s father and not with the appellant.
29. At [40] the Judge properly addressed her mind to the factors of TD and AD applying them to the appellant’s specific circumstances. In particular, she found the appellant did have a ‘support network’ albeit not a strong or significant one and that she would likely reside in a shelter on return to Albania which would offer her additional support to reduce the prospects of re-trafficking.
30. It is not disputed that paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules establishes an alleviating evidentiary rule for cases where an appellant has established to the requisite standard that they have already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm. Such fact will be regarded as indicative of future risk, unless there are ‘good reasons’ to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.
31. Having reviewed the decision, it is detailed and comprehensive and carefully reasoned. The Judge provided ‘good reasons’ in the decision that were open to her on the evidence to rebut the presumption of a continued risk under paragraph 339K which I have mentioned. Her findings were plainly rational and well reasoned. There is nothing perverse in the findings as submitted by Mr Swain. Accordingly, I find no error of law in the Judge’s overall conclusion at [43] that the appellant’s fear of persecution was not objectively well-founded.
32. In any event, even if the Judge was in error, paragraph [44] of the decision clearly answers the grounds in the alternative as they relate to IR 339K. Here, the Judge applied headnote (h) of TD and AD and found that the Albanian authorities could provide the appellant with sufficient protection from non-state actors (her previous traffickers or her own family). The Judge unarguably properly considered and applied the country guidance to conclude that notwithstanding the appellant’s vulnerability and concerns about going to the authorities that with moral support from her sister, mother and aunt (accessed remotely or in person) she would be able to access the protection she required. Such findings were clearly open to the Judge on the information before her.
33. Turning to Ground 4-5, the decision cannot be faulted in its careful analysis of the several issues that were before the Judge. At paragraphs [32] [37] [38] [40] [49] & [50] of the decision, the Judge addresses several issues, including the appellant’s mental health vulnerability and notes that this will likely deteriorate if returned to Albania but that there is mental health provision to support her. It is therefore wrong to state that the Judge was not aware of the appellant’s mental health vulnerability and medical evidence.
34. The Judge was also well aware that some of the available support network would likely have to be provided remotely because her mother lived in Germany, her aunt in London and only her sister living in Albania. Again, it is wrong to state that the Judge was not aware that the mother was living in Germany.
35. Finally, the decision shows that the Judge carefully applied the factors listed at paragraph (h) of the headnote of TD and AD to find that the appellant could access sufficiency of protection with the support of her family; and, would also receive additional support while residing in a shelter which would further reduce the prospects of re-trafficking.
36. Overall, the decision cannot be faulted on the basis of the five appeal grounds advanced. It follows that none of the grounds are made out. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.
Notice of decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hill of 20 January 2025 did not involve the making of an error of law. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

K. A. Khan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6th November 2025