Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002446

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00326/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 22nd of October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

EV
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr B Bundock, counsel instructed by TRP Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant, his wife and stepson are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant, his wife and stepson. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, who is a national of Albania, appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge G Clarke (“the judge”) promulgated on 28 February 2025 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 6 February 2024 refusing his human rights claim and confirming that he would be deported from the UK.
2. For the reasons set out below, I dismiss this appeal.
Anonymity
3. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in respect of the appellant on the basis of sensitive issues relating to the mental health of his wife and stepson. While Mr Terrell submitted that it was open to the Tribunal to revoke the anonymity order, he did not make a formal application for it to be revoked; he merely stated that the respondent was neutral on the issue While I recognise the strong factors in favour of open justice, especially in cases involving the deportation of foreign offenders, in the present case I am satisfied that it is appropriate to continue the anonymity order given that the vulnerability of the appellant’s wife and stepson.
Background
4. The appellant was born in Albania in 1992. It is unclear when the appellant first entered the UK, but he evidently did so clandestinely. He was first encountered by the authorities on 3 April 2018 when he was arrested by the police. On 6 April 2018, he made an asylum claim which he then withdrew on 21 May 2018 having told the Home Office that he wished to return to Albania. The appellant was then removed from the UK on 6 June 2018.
5. However, according to the appellant, he re-entered the UK illegally in September 2018. On 11 June 2020, the appellant was arrested by the police on suspicion of possession of an offensive weapon for which he received a caution. On 25 August 2020, he applied for leave under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) as the partner of an EEA national. On 29 March 2021, the appellant married his partner, who is a citizen of Romania. However, his EUSS application was refused on 1 June 2021. In 2022, the appellant’s child was born.
6. On 12 August 2022, the appellant was convicted at Gloucester Crown Court of conspiracy to supply a controlled Class A drug (cocaine) and, on 28 April 2023, he was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. As a result of his conviction, on 29 November 2023 he was served with a Stage 1 deportation decision inviting him to provide any reasons as to why he should not be deported to Albania. The appellant failed to respond to that notice. On 6 February 2024, the respondent made a Stage 2 decision concluding that the appellant’s deportation would not breach his human rights.
The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal
7. The appeal against the respondent’s decision was heard by the First-tier Tribunal on 3 February 2025. However, in a decision promulgated on 28 February 2025 the judge dismissed the appeal. The judge found that while it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s family to remain in the UK without him, they could reasonably be expected to relocate with him to Albania and that there were no very compelling circumstances to outweigh the strong public interest in his deportation.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. On 21 July 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge O’Brien granted the appellant permission to appeal on two grounds:
a. The judge erred in his assessment of the appellant’s family’s ability to relocate to Albania as by failing to take into account material considerations, namely (i) that the appellant’s wife is the victim of serious domestic abuse at the hands of her ex-partner and the impact this has had on her mental health; and (ii) the evidence “albeit relatively modest” relating to the appellant’s own mental health.
b. The judge erred in his assessment of the appellant’s social and cultural integration in the UK by treating social and cultural integration as two distinct tests rather than a single one, by failing to take into account his good behaviour in prison, and by impermissibly taking into account the impact of his criminal offending.
The hearing
9. I heard submissions from both Mr Bundock and Mr Terrell. These are recorded in the record of proceedings and are not rehearsed here except where necessary to do so.
10. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Findings – Error of Law
Ground 1: The ability of the family to relocate to Albania as a unit
11. Under s.117C(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, because of the length of his prison sentence, the appellant was required to demonstrate very compelling circumstances to his case over and above those described under Exceptions 1 (private life) and 2 (family life). Nevertheless, before carrying out an assessment of whether there were any very compelling circumstances, the judge correctly first considered whether the appellant did meet the requirements of Exceptions 1 and 2. With respect to Exception 2, the judge accepted that the appellant had genuine and subsisting relationships with his wife (GM) and his stepson: see [61] and [65].
12. There is no challenge to the judge’s findings in relation to the stepson. With regards to the appellant’s wife, the judge considered whether it would be unduly harsh for GM to remain in the UK without the appellant (“the Stay scenario”) at [86] to [89]. The judge took into account that GM suffers from mental health problems and that the appellant’s imprisonment had had a detrimental impact on her. The judge also found that the stepson suffered from behavioural issues as a result of the appellant’s imprisonment and that these would intensify if the appellant was deported. Were the appellant to be deported, the judge found, it would be difficult for GM to deal with her children’s emotional problems while struggling with her own mental health issues. The judge therefore concluded that it would be unduly harsh to expect GM and her children to remain in the UK without the appellant.
13. The judge then proceeded to consider whether GM (and her children) could relocate to Albania with the appellant (“the Go scenario”): see [90] to [95]. The judge found that it would not be unduly harsh for her to do so. The judge said that while GM was not Albanian and had never lived there, and while there would at first be cultural and linguistic barriers, she, the appellant, and the children could lead a family life there. In particular, the judge found that GM would have the “practical and emotional support of the Appellant as she seeks to adjust to life in a new country” and that while this might be “difficult, and inconvenient” there was “no credible evidence…why she could not go to Albania with her children”: see [92]. At [94], the judge said:
“I find that no credible evidence has been advanced before me that Ms GM would be unable to access medical treatment or that medical treatment or medication is not available for any of her conditions [in Albania].”
14. Mr Bundock submitted that while the judge took into account GM’s mental health issues when considering the Stay scenario, he had failed to consider it as part of his assessment of the Go scenario. I am not satisfied that is the case. Having found that it would be unduly harsh for GM to remain in the UK without the appellant at [89], the judge begins his consideration of the Go Scenario at [90] with the following words: “However, I find that it will not be unduly harsh for Ms GM to go with the Appellant and her sons to Albania.” I am satisfied that the use of the word “However” demonstrates that the judge’s findings in relation to the Go scenario were a continuation of his findings in respect of the Stay scenario. Consequently, there was no need for the judge to expressly repeat his findings in relation to GM’s mental health. It is clear from reading [89] that he was well aware that GM suffers from mental health problems.
15. Furthermore, at [94], the judge expressly dealt with GM’s ability to obtain medical treatment in Albania. In his skeleton argument, Mr Bundock argues that the judge was not addressing GM’s mental health in that paragraph because there “was no suggestion that GM was currently receiving medical treatment for her mental health [in the UK], but there was evidence that GM has been experiencing intense back pain and headaches, for which she has been prescribed morphine”. That argument is unpersuasive. At [94] the judge referred to the lack of credible evidence that GM would be unable to obtain treatment in Albania “for any of her conditions.” On a plain reading, the reference to “any” of her conditions must have encompassed both GM’s mental and physical health problems.
16. While the judge acknowledged that it would be unduly harsh for GM to remain in the UK under the Stay scenario, that was because he accepted that her (and the appellant’s stepson’s) mental health would deteriorate without the appellant’s support. But as Mr Terrell submitted, if GM was to relocate to Albania, she would not be separated from the appellant, who could provide her and her children with support. I am satisfied that finding was reasonably open to the judge on the evidence before him.
17. With regards to the judge’s purported failure to take into account the appellant’s own mental health issues, as the grounds of appeal acknowledge, the evidence of this was “relatively modest”. This included references in the independent social worker’s (ISW) report to the appellant self-reporting that his “mental health is not good”, that he did not sleep well and that he was worried “about being deported and missing my family.” The appellant also told the ISW that if he was deported “my mental health would be bad and I would become very depressed.” However, there appears to have been no formal medical diagnosis or prognosis in the appellant’s bundle before the judge and no suggestion that his condition was serious enough that he was receiving treatment on the date of hearing. Furthermore, it is clear from reading the ISW’s report that much of the appellant’s concerns were be based on his fear of being separated from his family and his belief that he would be unable to reintegrate and find work in Albania. The fact that the judge did not expressly mention the “modest” evidence relating to the appellant’s mental health does not mean that he did not consider it: see Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2(iii)]. But, moreover, given the judge found that the appellant’s family would be able to relocate to Albania with him, and that he rejected the appellant’s claim that there were very significant obstacles to his reintegration into Albanian society (see [52] to [60]), I am satisfied that the judge’s failure to expressly refer to the appellant’s own mental health issues was immaterial to his conclusions in respect of Exception 2 and the very compelling circumstances test.
18. I therefore find that Ground 1 is not made out.
Ground 2: The judge’s assessment of the appellant’s social and cultural integration
19. Mr Bundock submitted that there were three strands to this ground: (i) the judge’s failure to consider the appellant’s social and cultural integration as a composite test; (ii) the judge’s failure to engage with the positive evidence of the appellant’s conduct in prison; and (iii) the judge fell into error at [50] by focussing on the impact of the appellant’s criminal behaviour on society which amounted to a “double counting” of this factor.
20. Under s.117B(4) of the 2002 Act, in deportation appeals the private life exception, Exception 1, requires the court or tribunal to consider whether the appellant meets three criteria:
a. the appellant has been lawfully resident in the UK for most of their life;
b. the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK; and
c. whether there are any very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into the country to which they are to be deported.
21. It is not disputed that the appellant, who has never had a lawful basis to reside in the UK, did not meet the first criterion. Neither does the appellant seek to challenge the judge’s finding that he failed to meet the third criterion. The appellant does though seek to challenge the judge’s application of the second criterion.
22. At [49], the judge accepted that the appellant was socially integrated into the UK because he was in a relationship with GM and they have a child together. However, at [50] the judge found that the appellant was not culturally integrated because of the nature of his criminal offending, which involved the appellant running a county lines drugs gang, which he found to be contrary to British values.
23. With regards to the first strand of the ground, Mr Bundock submitted that the judge erred by considering social and cultural integration separately and then by treating the appellant’s offending of determinative of the second limb of Exception 1. I accept, as Mr Bundock argued, that the social and cultural integration test is “a composite one, used to denote the totality of human relationships and aspects of social identity which are protected by the right to respect for private life”: see CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 at [78]. However, in his rule 24 response, Mr Terrell relies upon Binbuga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 551 at [56] and [57] (per Hamblen LJ with whom Floyd LJ agreed):
“56…social integration refers to the extent to which a foreign criminal has become incorporated within the lawful structure of the UK. This includes various incidents of society such as clubs, societies, workplaces or places of study, but no association with pro-criminal peers.
57. Similarly, cultural integration refers to the acceptance and assumptions by the foreign criminal of the culture of the UK, its core values, ideas, customs and social behaviour. This includes acceptance of the principle of the rule of law. Membership of a pro-criminal gang shows a lack of such acceptance. It demonstrates disdain for the rule of law and indeed undermines it.”
24. Mr Terrell submitted that the judge was entitled to consider social and cultural ties separately because they are two distinct aspects of the composite test and the Court of Appeal in CI (Nigeria) did not suggest that it was wrong for a judge to take such an approach. In any event, he argued it was difficult to see how the judge’s approach was material given that the appellant did not meet the first and third limbs of Exception 1. Mr Terrell also submitted that the real error made by the judge was to find that the appellant was socially integrated into lawful society given his lack of immigration status and criminal offending, although he said this had no impact on the outcome.
25. On the materiality point, Mr Bundock acknowledged that the appellant could not meet all the requirements of Exception 1, but he argued that the judge’s findings on the second limb were material to his consideration of the very compelling circumstances test.
26. On consideration, I am satisfied that the judge did not make a material error of law. While the judge did consider social and cultural integration separately, as the Court of Appeal acknowledged in Binbuga, these do mean two different things, although the judge was of course obliged to consider them as part of a composite test. The fact that having found the appellant was socially integrated at [49], the judge begins [50] with the words, “However, I find that the Appellant cannot be said to be culturally integrated” does lend some superficial support to the appellant’s argument that the judge found that the appellant’s criminal offending overrode his social integration rather than considering them holistically. But reading [49] and [50] together I am satisfied that the judge was not obviously departing from the composite test. Furthermore, I am not persuaded by Mr Bundock’s argument that had the judge properly carried out a composite assessment, he may have reached a different conclusion on the second limb. As paragraph 25 of the appellant’s skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal reveals, it was not argued that he met Exception 1. The focus was on the purported difficulties in his reintegration into Albania society rather than his integration in the UK. The evidence of the appellant’s integration was predicated on his relationship with GM and the children. It was however open to the judge to find that the appellant’s criminal offending was serious enough to mean that he was not culturally integrated and, having considered the evidence in the round, I am satisfied that it was inevitable on the facts that the judge would have concluded that the appellant did not meet the second limb of Exception 1.
27. I would add that, while immaterial, I agree with Mr Terrell that if the judge did err, it was in respect of finding that the relationship with GM and the children was itself sufficient to show that the appellant was socially integrated within the lawful structure of the UK in circumstances where he had entered the country illegally, he had no leave to enter or remain and was involved in a serious criminal enterprise.
28. The second strand of Ground 2 is whether the judge erred by failing to take into account the appellant’s good behaviour in prison when assessing whether he was socially and culturally integrated in the UK. However, while the judge did not expressly consider the appellant’s behaviour as part of the second limb of Exception 1, he did address it when considering very compelling circumstances: see [117] to [122]. This was clearly a factor the judge took into account in making his decision, yet he still concluded that there were no very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in the appellant’s deportation: see [141] and [145]. I am therefore satisfied that the judge’s failure to take this into account as part of his consideration of social and cultural integration was not only immaterial to his findings on the private life exception given the appellant failed meet the first and third limbs, but also to the outcome of the very compelling circumstances assessment.
29. Finally, I address the third strand identified by Mr Bundock. He did not seek to argue that the judge was wrong to take into account that the appellant had been convicted of a criminal offence. That unarguably was a relevant factor: see Binbuga. But he argued that, at [50], the judge impermissibly took into account the impact of the appellant’s offending:
“However, I find that the Appellant cannot be said to be culturally integrated into the United Kingdom. In my view, someone who was responsible for operating a county line is not culturally integrated into the United Kingdom. The drugs trade is abhorrent to the majority of the British people. It wrecks the lives of users, their families and friends, communities and society at large. It takes the lives of addicts, preys on the vulnerable and is often associated with knife crime, guns and gang violence. It has a huge impact on the public purse in terms of the expense to the NHS, the police, Probation, the Courts and prisons. The appellant may be socially integrated into the United Kingdom but his drug dealing and his involvement in running a county line led me to conclude that he is not culturally integrated.”
30. Mr Bundock argued that the judge was double counting the appellant’s criminal offending contrary to what is said at [79] and [80] of CI (Nigeria). There, Leggatt LJ (with whom Hickinbottom LJ agreed) held that taking into account the duration and seriousness of the appellant’s criminal offending and the length of his prison sentences “potentially” involved double counting. Those matters were relevant to the strength of the public interest in deportation but, for the purposes of the second limb of Exception 1, a tribunal “should be concerned solely with the person’s social and cultural affiliations and identify.”
31. However, reading [50] as a whole, I am satisfied that the judge was not discussing the impact of the drugs trade as a factor that acted as a counterweight to the appellant’s social and cultural ties to the UK. Instead, the judge was simply explaining why the nature of the appellant’s offending was inimical to British values. There was no double counting.
32. I therefore find that Ground 2 is also not made out.
Conclusion – Error of Law
33. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the judge’s decision is not vitiated by a material error of law. It shall therefore stand.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9th October 2025