Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002452
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64678/2023
LP/09488/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

RZ
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Schwenk, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Newton, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 19 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background

1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iran. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.

2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 9 December 2024, of a judge of the FtT (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.

3. The appeal arose in the context of a protection claim based on the appellant’s Kurdish ethnicity, his past activities as a kolbar and his sur place political activities in the United Kingdom, including his attendance at demonstrations and his Facebook activity.

The FtT Decision

4. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s refusal of his protection claim. The appeal was heard on 4 December 2024 and dismissed in a decision promulgated on 9 December 2024.

5. The judge rejected the core aspects of the appellant’s factual account as lacking in credibility including his claim to have come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities during an ambush when he was involved in smuggling a political activist into the country.

6. The judge accepted that the appellant worked as a kolbar and had smuggled cigarettes and alcohol but concluded that this did not give rise to a real risk of persecution or treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR.

7. The judge accepted that the appellant participated in several demonstrations in the United Kingdom and had posted anti-regime material on Facebook. However, the judge found that these activities were found not to be genuinely motivated by political opinion but were undertaken to bolster a weak protection claim.

8. It was ultimately concluded that the appellant had not come to the attention of the Iranian authorities and would not do so on return. It was found to be open to the appellant to delete his Facebook account and to refrain from disclosing his activities if questioned on return.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

9. The appellant applied for permission to appeal on six grounds of appeal. Several of these grounds are unfocussed, involve a considerable degree of overlap and were repetitive. From the grounds and the oral arguments advanced before me at the error of law hearing, I distil the following broad issues which call for resolution in this appeal:

i. Issue 1 – Did the judge lawfully and adequately assess the overall factual matrix in assessing risk on return?

ii. Issue 2 – Did the judge address his mind to whether the appellant’s Facebook posts criticising the Iranian authorities’ conduct towards kolbars was an expression of genuinely-held political opinion which he could not be expected to delete on return?

iii. Issue 3 – Did the judge resolve the question of what the appellant would do in advance of, and during, the returns process in respect to the deletion of his Facebook profile – or was the matter left unlawfully open?

10. In a decision dated 29 September 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi granted permission for all grounds to be argued.

11. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.

Discussion

12. In MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485, the Court of Appeal set out the principles which should guide the analysis of whether judicial reasons are lawfully adequate. Between [34] and [36], Dove LJ drew together the leading authorities:

[34] […] The question which then arises is by what standard those reasons are to be judged in order to determine whether or not they are legally adequate. Whilst given in a different public law context, the observations of Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood in South Bucks County Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at paragraph 36 provide an important statement of principle applicable in the current context:

“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”

[35] Accompanying these principles, it is also necessary to observe that the decision, in this case the FtTIAC determination, must be read as a whole and in context. Part of that context is that examining the determination’s reasons should be approached and undertaken purposefully, with the object of obtaining an understanding of the decision and its basis. It should not be read or construed in a manner more appropriate to a contract or statute. It requires what Lord Bingham MR described as a “straightforward down to earth reading” of the determination which seeks to identify whether there is “room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt” as to what has been decided and why (see Clarke Homes Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and East Staffordshire District Council [1993] 66 P&CR 263).

[36] This approach to the standard of reasons required as a matter of law can be set in the general understanding of approaches to appeals in respect of tribunals within the Immigration and Asylum Chamber provided by Lord Hamblen at paragraph 72 of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] 1 WLR 3784; [2022] UKSC 22:

“72. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probably that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65, para 45 per Sir John Dyson JSC.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] 2 AC 48, para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead DPSC.”

13. In addition to the above statements of principle, the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide whether an FTT decision involved a material error of law was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055. At [26], Green LJ summarised the applicable principles (we have not reproduced those principles which are reflected above in MN (Vietnam) to similar effect):  

[26] Sections 11 and 12 of the TCEA 2007 restrict the UT's jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:  
 
[…]
 
(iv)  The issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at [27];  

(v)  Judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] 4 WLR 145 at para 34;  

(vi)  It is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see R (MM (Lebanon)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 771 at para 107.  

14. In DPP Law Ltd v Paul Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672, the Court of Appeal, in the context of employment proceedings, considered adequacy of reasoning as an error of law. Popplewell LJ, stressed, at [57], the need to consider judicial reasons fairly and as whole without being hypercritical. Appellate restraint is required to read reasons benevolently. “Simple, clear and concise” reasoning was to be encouraged to enable to parties to broadly understand why they had won or lost. Further, it should not be assumed that an element of the evidence which was not expressly discussed was left out of account. While these observations were made in the context of employment proceedings, they are of relevance in the immigration and asylum sphere because this is also a jurisdiction in which decisions are made by expert tribunals attenuated by the need to give appeals anxious scrutiny.

15. With the above principles in mind, I turn my attention to the issues in this appeal.

Issue 1 – Did the judge lawfully and adequately assess the overall factual matrix in assessing risk on return?

16. Spread across various grounds, the appellant challenged several aspects of the judge’s fact-finding analysis and the overall risk assessment. It was suggested that the judge had not adequately addressed his mind to country background information which spoke to the dangers which an identified kolbar would face in Iran. Nor, it was contended, did he properly consider the nature and extent of the appellant’s political activities since his arrival in the UK and published footage showing him at the forefront of a Kurdish political protest in the UK.

17. The first point which falls to be made is that the appellant does not seek to challenge the lawfulness of the judge’s findings in which he emphatically rejected the centrepiece of his protection claim to have been ambushed by Iranian forces while illegally transporting a political activist. The appellant was also disbelieved about a subsequent raid on his family home where material in support of Kurdish political rights was said to have been seized and his family subjected to harsh treatment. This was the backdrop to further findings tailored to the appellant’s sur place activity in the UK. The judge was not satisfied about the appellant’s claims to have been illiterate in either English or Kurdish (Sorani) and drew upon his narrative of never having had any interest in political causes before his departure from Iran ([37]). The judge went on to express concerns about the incomplete nature of the Facebook records which were adduced in evidence and how this was out of step with the guidance in XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG) [2022] UKUT 23 (see [33] and [35] of the judge’s decision). All of these parts of the judge’s consideration of the evidence in the round undoubtedly resulted in the overall conclusion, at [38], that the appellant’s “only motive in [conducting this sur place activity] is to enhance his asylum claim and he has no political motive, however, if seen by the Iranian authorities they would impute political motive”. It is abundantly clear from the judge’s detailed reasons that he found the appellant to have fabricated the centrepiece of his primary protection claim as to the events which were said to have preceded his departure from Iran and that he had pursued his sur place activities in the UK without holding any genuine political opinion. The judge addressed the video evidence in the following way, at [39]:

[39] The Appellant has attended fourteen demonstrations since March 2022 to October 2024. He has posted his attendance on Facebook at a number of those demonstrations and claims they have attracted media attention. At page 1277 his account has been posted with a 15 second video of his attendance at a demonstration in London on 13th July 2022. The video, which was viewed at the hearing, shows demonstrators in London, accompanied by persons wearing KDP-I uniforms and has a voice over narrating the scene (in Kurdish Sorani). I find that the Appellant is at the front of the demonstration with other protestors carrying a banner and is seen for a couple of seconds of the clip. The video claims to be recorded by “TISHK” whom the Appellant claims is a TV channel popular with Kurds. No evidence has been produced in regard to TISHK and whether that is a mainstream TV channel on Kurdish TV networks or a streaming channel similar to YouTube where persons can record videos and post them. On the evidence before me I find it is the latter. I am not satisfied the video has been published by a media company and I find that it has been posted on a video streaming platform and would only come to the Iranian authorities attention if viewed at the time or if they conducted an extensive search of TISHK video libraries. I find that I have no reliable evidence that the video posting remains available on-line or can be accessed via TSHK. The quality of the image of the Appellant in the video, who is bearded, is poor and is fleeting. I am not satisfied that he would be easily recognizable from it, I have accepted it is him as I have been directed to the few seconds of footage and I have exercised anxious scrutiny of the evidence to the lower standard.

18. It could scarcely be clearer as to why the judge did not accept that the appellant had established risk on the strength of this evidence which posed many more questions than it answered. The judge was entitled to conclude that he simply did not know enough about the extent to which this footage might have reached those he feared in Iran.

19. Read fairly, contextually and purposefully, the judge has demonstrably and meaningfully assessed the central elements of the facts relied upon by the appellant and found that he was unable to rely on much of what he was told as being a reflection of reality nor that the appellant was in any way genuinely motivated by political opinions. The judge did not end his analysis of the sur place question here. He went on to assess whether the Iranian authorities might already be aware of the appellant’s disingenuous activities such that a political opinion might be imputed to him. The judge fully explained, at [40]-[42] that there was not a real prospect of such an eventuality unfolding on return.

20. These were all legitimate and lawful findings open to the judge on the evidence he had before him. I can discern no error in these aspects of the decision.

Issue 2 – Did the judge address his mind to whether the appellant’s Facebook posts criticising the Iranian authorities’ conduct towards kolbars was an expression of genuinely-held political opinion which he could not be expected to delete on return?

21. In the appellant’s grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal, and in Mr Schwenk’s oral submissions, reliance was placed on specific Facebook posts which strongly criticised the Iranian authorities’ treatment of identified kolbars. As the argument developed before me at the hearing, it was suggested that this strand of the appellant’s Facebook activity, when considered in tandem with the judge’s acceptance that he had worked as a kolbar, merited careful attention before the protection appeal could be lawfully dismissed. In short, there was said to be no obvious reason why a former kolbar would not hold strong views about the extreme punishments meted out to kolbars by the Iranian authorities. It followed that this dimension of the appellant’s sur place activity ought not to have been “lumped together” with the remaining generic anti-regime posts and attendance at protests.

22. It is correct to say that the judge did not address these particular posts in his reasons. However, it seems to me that this is hardly surprising when the skeleton argument relied upon before the FtT is considered. The specific posts which were copied into the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal are nowhere to be seen in the skeleton argument nor is this somewhat nuanced argument ventilated in any substance. If it is now suggested that the kolbar posts conferred a separate basis for finding that these particular expressions were genuinely politically motivated, it is surprising that the point was not expressly set out in the skeleton argument. The advent of issues-based reasoning is germane here.

23. In Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC), a Presidential panel emphasised the fundamental importance of the parties’ engagement in a process to define and narrow the issues in dispute. The substantive hearing was treated as an important juncture by which time the parties should have a clear understanding of their respective cases and the principal controversial issues to be resolved by the tribunal. It was made clear that judges are not expected to trawl through the papers to interrogate the positions adopted by the parties, the implication being that the parties in this specialist jurisdiction are to be trusted to know what their cases are and to be aware of the relevant legal principles. An exception to this general approach would be where a judge has overlooked a Robinson-obvious point of law. At [34], the panel said this:

[34] We consider that there exists a duty upon the parties to identify relevant issues of their own motion. There is no place for hiding a jewel of a submission in the hope that it will purchase favour on appeal. A party that fails to identify an issue before the FtT that it subsequently asserts to have been essential for a judge to consider is unlikely to have a good ground of appeal before UTIAC. None of this is to say that a FtT judge is to entirely lack curiosity in relation to an aspect of a case that the judge requires further assistance with or which the judge considers should be examined as part of the evaluation of the case. Where, as here, a point has not been identified by the parties, and nor is it one which has independently drawn the attention of the judge, it is not an issue which can be appropriately raised for the first time in the context of an appeal to UTIAC.

24. In a further Presidential panel, observations to much the same effect were made in TC (PS compliance - "issues-based" reasoning) Zimbabwe [2023]UKUT 00164 (IAC) where it was emphasised that the procedural machinery of Practice Statement No 1 of 2022, including the provision of an issues-based skeleton argument, was designed to promote focussed attention on the genuinely disputed issues so as to produce proportionately efficient proceedings.

25. The Senior President of Tribunal’s Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal begins with a reassertion of the principles decided in Lata and TC and provides as follows, at [1.3]:

[1.3] The disputed issues represent the parameters, or scope, of the appeal and will operate as the foundation and structure for all judicial decisions. Subject to ‘Robinson obvious’ matters and the need for extra care when litigants in person are involved in proceedings, judges should not be expected to infer issues which have not been clearly identified and articulated by the parties. The Tribunal will not tolerate a rolling consideration of issues and will not permit the issues to evolve at will for procedural advantage.

26. Assessed against the procedural guidance summarised above, I am not persuaded that the judge fell into error in how he approached the sur place evidence. He was not required to isolate and analyse individual posts to assess whether this or that posting was an expression of genuine political opinion. Were this the nuanced case advanced by the appellant, his representatives ought to have made it clear to the judge, not produce it later on appeal. In any event, reading the judge’s findings fairly, contextually and purposefully, it is clear that the judge reached the conclusion that the appellant’s outpouring of political opinion since his arrival in the UK was not a manifestation of genuine political opinion. It would require the most strained of analysis to conclude that he might have reached a different conclusion about the posts specifically related to the treatment of kolbars because of his former work. The obvious inference to be drawn is that the judge would not have distinguished between these posts and the remaining posts which were regarded as artificial constructs designed to erect a false platform on which asylum might be granted.

Issue 3 – Did the judge resolve the question of what the appellant would do in advance of, and during, the returns process in respect to the deletion of his Facebook profile – or was the matter left unlawfully open?

27. This challenge to the risk assessment undertaken by the judge hinges on a single sentence in paragraph [41]: “It is open to the Appellant therefore to delete his Facebook account prior to applying for an electronic travel document to return to Iran”. Again, this observation must be read fairly, benevolently and in its proper context. As discussed above, the judge found, across several densely reasoned paragraphs that the appellant was not remotely motivated by political beliefs in maintaining a Facebook account which was overtly critical of the Iranian regime. XX (PJAK) provides guidance as to how judges should assess such evidence. At [6] and [9] of the headnote, the following guidance was given:

[6] The timely closure of an account neutralises the risk consequential on having had a "critical" Facebook account, provided that someone's Facebook account was not specifically monitored prior to closure.

[9] In deciding the issue of risk on return involving a Facebook account, a decision maker may legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to application for an ETD: HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. It is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution, as there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform, as opposed to the right to political neutrality. Whether such an inquiry is too speculative needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

28. The above parts of the headnote fall to be considered together with the relevant part of the body of the decision in which the following observations were made at [98] – [102]:

To what extent can a person be expected not to volunteer the fact of having previously had a Facebook account, on return to his country of origin?

[98] Our answer is in two parts. The first is whether the law prevents a decision maker from asking if a person will volunteer to the Iranian authorities the fact of a previous lie to the UK authorities, such as a protection claim made on fabricated grounds, or a deleted Facebook account. We conclude that the law does not prevent such a question, in this case. Whilst we consider Mr Jaffey's suggestion that Lord Kerr had specifically counselled against asking the question at §72 of RT (Zimbabwe), that was in a very different context, namely where political loyalty, as opposed to neutrality, was required by the Zimbabwean regime. In that case, the relevant facts included the risk of persecution because of the activities of ill-disciplined militia at road blocks. The means used by those manning road blocks to test whether someone was loyal to the ruling Zanu-PF party included requiring them to produce a Zanu-PF card or to sing the latest Zanu-PF campaign song. An inability to do these things would be taken as evidence of disloyalty, where even political neutrality (as opposed to opposition) would result in a real risk of serious harm (§16). In that context, Lord Kerr regarded an analysis of whether a person could avoid persecution by fabricating loyalty as unattractive. He raised practical concerns in evaluating whether lying to a group of ill-disciplined and unpredictable militia would be successful (§72) but made clear that his comments were by way of "incidental preamble," as the critical question was whether the appellant in that case had the right to political neutrality (§(73).

[99] The key differences in our case are that the Iranian authorities do not persecute people because of their political neutrality, or perceived neutrality; and a returnee to Iran will not face an unpredictable militia, but a highly organised state. In our case, a decision maker is not falling into the trap of applying a test of what a claimant "ought to do," in cases of imputed political opinion. That was counselled against by Beatson LJ in SSHD v MSM (Somalia) and UNHCR [2016] EWCA Civ 715.

[100] Instead, in deciding the issue of risk on return involving a Facebook account, a decision maker may legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to the application for an ETD: HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. If the person will refrain from engaging in a particular activity, that may nullify their claim that they would be at risk, unless the reason for their restraint is suppression of a characteristic that they have a right not to be required to suppress, because if the suppression was at the instance of another it might amount to persecution. It is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution in this sense, because there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform, as opposed to the right to political neutrality.

[101] The second part of our answer relates to Lord Kerr's concern about whether an analysis of what a person will do is too speculative or artificial an exercise. We accept Mr Jaffey's submission that there may be cases where the exercise is too speculative, particularly in the context of a volatile militia. That is not the case here.

[102] We consider that it may be perfectly permissible for a decision maker to ask what a returnee to Iran will do, in relation to a contrived Facebook account or fabricated protection claim. Whether such an inquiry is too speculative needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis, but factors which may point to that question not being impermissibly speculative include: where a person has a past history of destroying material, such as identification documents, or deception or dishonesty in relation to dealings with state officials; whether the government has well-established methods of questioning (in the Iranian state's case, these are well-documented and therefore predictable); and whether the risks around discovery of social media material, prior to account deletion, are minimal, because a personal's social graph or social media activities are limited.

29. It is no answer to point to an unreported decision of SIAC, as the appellant did in the context of ground 4, in an effort to cast doubt on this binding country guidance. The above considered and authoritative guidance reveals the fallacy in the argument advanced before me that the appellant could not be expected to delete, or lie about, a political opinion which might be imputed to him irrespective of whether it was in fact held by him. XX (PJAK) is clear that a judge faced with a disingenuous sur place claim is entitled to consider whether the evidence of that activity may be effectively disposed of and not volunteered. In observing that it was open to this appellant to do just that, the judge might have expressed himself with greater clarity and precision but the essential meaning is difficult to mistake. Seen within its proper context, the judge was finding that the appellant could delete his Facebook profile, that this would not breach the Refugee Convention and that there was no reason to think he would not mitigate the risk of a political opinion being imputed to him by the Iranian authorities upon his return. It was suggested that the judge was duty bound to expressly consider the appellant’s assertion in his witness statement that he would not delete his Facebook account. This must be seen in the context of his overall claim to have been genuinely motivated by political beliefs. Upon the rejection of that foundation, it is difficult to understand the basis on which it might be suggested he would refuse to delete the account as it would be demonstrably against his interests and would not be in defence of genuine political opinions. Seen in totality, I infer that the judge was satisfied that the appellant would delete a Facebook profile populated with posts designed to provide a false basis for remaining in the UK.

Conclusion

30. The judge’s decision did not involve errors of law and I dismiss the appeal.

Notice of Decision

The judge’s decision did not involve errors of law and I dismiss the appeal. The FtT decision will stand undisturbed.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 June 2026