Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002453

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67769/2023 LP/05561/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SYMES

Between

JR
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Turner
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Presenting Officer (error of law hearing)
Ms A Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer (continuation hearing)

Heard at Field House on 19 January 2026
(following an error of law hearing on 30 September 2025)

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the appeal of JR, a citizen of Namibia born against the First-tier Tribunal’s decision of 14 November 2024, dismissing her appeal which she had brought against the Respondent’s decision of 12 December 2023. Anonymity was ordered below and the Upper Tribunal continues to make such an order given this is an international protection appeal.
Background
2. The Appellant's asylum claim (accepted on all sides as potentially involving Humanitarian Protection only, there being no Refugee Convention reason present) was essentially as follows. She had been involved in a long-term intermittent abusive relationship with her cousin, OU, a police officer who had repeatedly raped her. He first raped her in 1997, and she suffered a miscarriage in 2002 as a result of his ongoing sexual abuse.
3. She formed a genuine relationship with a partner which lasted from 2007 to March 2012 meaning she could escape the family home where she had lived and thus also her cousin’s abuse; but after that relationship ended in 2011, she had to return there and the rapes and abuse continued until 2018. She told some of her family members of the abuse and reported one incident to the police in October 2020, but withdrew that complaint under pressure from her mother and an uncle who said this should be a matter for the Traditional Authorities.
4. An informal settlement was agreed between her and her cousin, but he subsequently tracked her down and threatened her again. For a while her friendship with a policewoman kept him at bay until the policewoman’s death, after which the threats resumed even though she moved to another location. She felt unsafe and made arrangements to come to the UK, a country for which at time Namibian citizens did not require visas; she flew here in November 2021 and claimed asylum shortly after her arrival.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
5. The First-tier Tribunal accepted the Appellant's account of historical facts, noting the report of the same expert witness which identified the practice of Otjiramue, followed by male cousins of female family members of the Herero tribe, by which the former considered themselves entitled to have sexual relations with the latter. However, the Judge considered that the Appellant had not established that state protection was unavailable. Amongst the evidence upon which the Appellant relied was a report by the expert witness Dr Karekwaivanane setting out his opinion that state protection would not be available against that practice. Notwithstanding that opinion, the Judge concluded that the Appellant's voluntary withdrawal of her police complaint had deprived the authorities of any meaningful opportunity to respond to her allegations. At the “error of law” appeal hearing, it was established that the Judge below had erred in law in effectively treating the Appellant’s withdrawal of her police complaint as determinative of the availability of protection in the face of expert evidence to the contrary.
6. For the continuation hearing further evidence was provided and admitted:
(a) A witness statement from the Appellant stating that she felt her experiences had had a profound impact on her physical and psychological health. Her work in healthcare allowed her to contribute positively to the community giving her a sense of purpose and stability while continuing her recovery. She had attended twelve sessions at the Vine Centre for psychological and physical trauma from August 2022 to January 2023 and continued to attend social events there. She had completed a similar number of sessions with the Rape and Sexual Abuse Support Centre with a view to rebuilding her trust in others and herself. She was now registered with the Recovery College for trauma-related support. She lived in constant fear of re-encountering her abuser. She felt unable to trust the Namibian authorities to protect her. Her pleas for assistance from her family had previously been ignored leaving her feeling silenced and unsafe. Her child remained in Namibia and had had to recently leave school to avoid their abuser’s attentions.
(b) An updated report by Dr Karekwaivanane in which he emphasised his continued opinion that she would be at risk from the Herero practice of Otjiramue which rendered girls and women vulnerable to abuse by their male cousins. Marriage between cross-cousins remained a preferred union in that society. The Appellant was particularly vulnerable to this having grown up in her uncle’s household and there was a very high rate of violence against women in Namibia. In his view the Namibian police were not able to provide adequate protection to someone in her position due to severe understaffing within the force (an Inspector General was on record as repeatedly warning that some regions were at quarter strength), leading to very high caseloads for investigators of a multiple of the standard requirement, and inadequate training to handle gender-based violence cases. Many protection orders under the domestic violence legislation were ineffectual because of administrative difficulties in obtaining them and police failures to take action when they were breached; a surprisingly high number were withdrawn which suggested coercion or intimidation. Were she to be attacked again, it was very unlikely that the incident would be investigated expeditiously or the perpetrator brought to book. Corruption had been acknowledged at all levels of the police force. Namibia had a weak social welfare system and as she had not had a formal job, she would not be eligible for any support from the contributory social protection schemes. The Gender Based Violence Investigation Units, intended as a one-stop centre where victims could get medical, psycho-social and police support, had limited resources and did not operate as expected; the staff were inadequately trained and supported; there were very limited womens’ shelter places and the available evidence indicated that a pilot project of new shelters had not come into operation; besides, the short 21-day stays envisaged would offer only brief respite in a context where the underlying crimes were not being investigated.
(c) A report by a Consultant Psychologist, Michael Gerard Smyth, of December 2025, setting out the reasoning for his conclusion that the Appellant suffered from a recurrent and extreme Major Depressive Disorder, and that her internalised shame and anger resulted from her previous traumatic experiences causing feelings of worthlessness and her passive suicidal ideation; alongside a diagnosis of co-morbid Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Severe Generalised Anxiety Disorder. Her mood dysregulation, self-deprecation and shame, current forgetfulness and confusion, inability to recall events accurately or adequately control her life, heightened fears, hyper-vigilance and occasional lapses of presence and concentration, collectively placed her at Moderate Risk of self-harm. Her precarious mental health was at risk of further decline. She was currently awaiting more supportive counselling sessions and NHS support and was likely to require intensive multidisciplinary support from specialist services for an extended period.
(d) A letter from a gardening project for whom the Appellant had worked for eighteen months until December 2023.
7. For the Respondent Ms Nolan submitted that the country evidence disclosed the availability of state protection, as summed up by the CPIN’s conclusion that victims of a rogue state actor and/or a non-state actor were likely to be able to obtain protection from the state, as shown by the identification of seventeen gender-based violence protection units and the existence of investigation units at hospitals to provide forensic examinations of victims of sexual violence. Alternatively internal relocation would be reasonably available to her: absent legal restrictions on moving around the country, many people had done so from rural to urban areas in search of work, better access to healthcare and education, and improved living conditions; there were ostensibly no practical barriers to single women doing so too, and she had been able to work in this country.
8. For the Appellant Mr Turner submitted that there was no reason to imagine her situation would be different in the future from the past, such that there were no good reasons to consider the persecution she had previously suffered would not be repeated in the future (having regard to the principle identified in Immigration Rule 339K). State protection was aspirational rather than effective.
Analysis
9. This appeal primarily turns on the Appellant's Humanitarian Protection claim. Should that fail, there is also the question of private life under the Rules in the sense of whether she, if her claim to face serious harm were to be rejected, would nevertheless face very significant obstacles to integration in Namibia.
10. As there was no challenge to the factual findings of the First-tier Tribunal, it is appropriate to take them as the starting point for the final determination of the appeal. I therefore accept all the historical facts advanced by the Appellant as summarised above. On that basis I accept that she would, subject to considerations of state protection and internal relocation, suffer a recurrence of the same abuse in the future that she has so long endured in the past: Immigration Rule 339K requires her past experiences to be treated as a serious indication of future real risk of suffering serious harm absent good reasons to consider this will not be repeated. If required to live, or near, her family in her home area, she would inevitably come to her abusive cousin’s attention once again.
11. I accept that the report from Mr Smyth is reliable given he had access to extended health records and was based on a personal interview combined with psychometric assessment tests. I therefore accept that the Appellant suffers from Major Depressive Disorder, co-morbid Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Severe Generalised Anxiety Disorder, which together clearly threaten her ability to function independently, particularly if under increased stress, as would foreseeably result from a return to the country where she suffered many years of sexual exploitation and rape.
12. Ultimately this appeal comes down to the evidence relating to the availability of state protection and internal relocation. The Respondent’s CPIN Namibia: Women fearing gender-based violence concludes that adequate state protection is readily available. However, it is difficult to reconcile that conclusion with many of the sources cited elsewhere in the document. Thus the CPIN notes that the UN and NGOs had criticised the legal system’s effectiveness due to structural bottlenecks hampering co-ordination between the health, protection, law enforcement and justice systems, dysfunctional protection units, a lack of specialised training for service providers and a lack of human resources including doctors, police and social workers and difficulties in accessing protection and assistance for women in rural areas; the UN has raised concerns about low rates of reporting of incidents of GBV, arrests and prosecutions, and the low number of convictions for perpetrators. Somewhat disconcertingly these concerns are addressed thus: “There may be various sound reasons why criminals may not be brought to justice. “ Doubtless that is true, though on the face of the available evidence it would seem that one likely reason is the concerns just adumbrated.
13. Overall I prefer the conclusions on the actual functioning of the potential protection system from the expert witness Dr Karekwaivanane given that it is based on closely-analysed evidence and is in fact consistent with many of the sources cited by the CPIN. The CPIN in the bundle before me itself recognises that “Victims can also be influenced by family or their community to withdraw cases, or so they can be settled through traditional dispute resolution”. This in fact is consistent with the Appellant's own experience whereby her family pressured her to withdraw her complaint and rely on the local traditional authorities. However given the cultural acceptance of Otjiramue amongst the Herero, in the light of her own lengthy exposure to abuse, it is very difficult to see those traditional authorities would offer meaningful assistance.
14. I therefore conclude there would be no effective and accessible state protection available to the Appellant.
15. That leaves the question of internal relocation. One might wonder if this is available even in theory given the accepted evidence that her child was recently forced to leave school because of her cousin’s ongoing attention. But even if it is available, it must be reasonable in the sense of not requiring her to live in unduly harsh conditions.
16. The CPIN posits it as more likely to be viable if the woman can access accommodation and support networks, or is educated, skilled or wealthy enough to be able to support herself. It notes that if required to rely on a government or NGO shelter it will be necessary to assess the situation a woman then faces after leaving the centre. I have already noted various difficulties in even accessing those shelters in the first place above. The Appellant cannot reasonably be seen as educated, skilled or wealthy enough to live independently; she has no experience of so doing and she suffers from the various psychological conditions set out above, which will foreseeably deteriorate if she is forced to live in precarious conditions. Her ability to briefly work for a supportive charity in the UK cannot reasonably be equated to the harsher challenge she would face in negotiating life alone in a major urban centre with which she is unfamiliar. In the UK she has had professional support as well as the assistance of a friendly charity which took her on for some voluntary work; there is no evidence of any equivalent in Namibia. I have also noted the expert’s view on her inability to access the social welfare system absent a contribution history. Overall I conclude that there would be a danger that she would be forced to leave any safe haven she found, and thus would either have to return to her abusive family in order to find support, or would have to live in degrading conditions without access to any reliable source of funds and suffering a significant decline in her already fragile mental health, worsened by her inability to adequately care for her child. I conclude therefore that she would face unduly harsh conditions and has thus established there is no reasonable internal relocation alternative to her.
17. Thus the appeal falls to be allowed.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on Humanitarian Protection grounds.

Mark Symes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
19 February 2026