Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002456

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/59200/2023
LP/05795/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

SI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Alban of Counsel, instructed by Seren Legal Practice
For the Respondent: Ms Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals with permission of the First-tier Tribunal Judge Handler against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Clarkson (“the judge”) dated 4 June 2025.
2. For ease of reference hereafter the parties will be referred to as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
3. I am satisfied that the anonymity order should be maintained. Neither party asked for me to discharge it. The appellant claims to be at risk of harm in Iraq. I am satisfied that the potential risk of harm upon identification and maintaining the integrity of the UK asylum system justify derogation from the principle of open justice.
Background
4. The appellant, an Iraqi national, arrived in the UK on 21 December 2021 and claimed asylum. The basis of his asylum claim is that he is at risk from the father of H, a woman who (wrongly) accused him of sexual assault. The father of H is the bodyguard of the former chief of the Kurdish Security Organisation.
5. The respondent refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claim in a letter dated 17 October 2023. She accepts that the appellant is from Iraq and that he is Kurdish, but considered that the appellant’s evidence lacks sufficiency and specificity of detail and that his claim was inconsistent. She was not satisfied that the appellant faced a real risk of persecution on return to Iraq.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
6. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his protection and human rights claim and the appeal came before the judge on 3 March 2025. Ms Alban of Counsel represented the appellant and Ms Harrison, a Home Office Presenting Officer represented the respondent. The appellant gave evidence using a Kurdish Sorani interpreter.
7. The judge concluded that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant is at risk from H’s father and that due to the familial and tribal nature of political affiliation in Iraq, he would be able to act with immunity so the appellant could not access state protection or internally relocate to avoid the risk.
8. The judge considered that the appellant would not be at risk on account of his sur place activities and the judge concluded that the appellant would be able to obtain the necessary documentation and to return to his home without risk arising from lack of documentation.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. The respondent applied for permission to appeal against the judge’s decision.
10. As identified in the limited grant of permission the respondent’s grounds are unparticularised and do not comply with the guidance in Rai v DAM (Ground of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150.
11. The grant of permission was limited to the following:
“Ground 1 at paragraphs 8 and 9 is arguable. It is arguable that the Judge has not provided adequate reasons to explain what weight was attached to the CPIN. It is arguable that this is a material error because the Judge has not adequately explained their approach to the CPIN in circumstances where the facts found regarding the appellant’s situation is arguably not analogous with that set out in the CPIN. In these circumstances, it is arguable that the Judge’s overall assessment of credibility has been materially affected by this matter.”
12. The ground that the respondent was granted permission on is as follows:
“8. The respondent submits that the FTJ has made a material error in interpretation of the CPIN IRQ CPIN Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence - July 2024 (incorrectly referred to as ‘housing’ crimes at [37]). The passage cited by the FTJ states (emphasis added):
3.2.3 In general, a male who has engaged in a premarital or extramarital relationship with a female is not at risk of serious harm or persecution from his own family. This is because a male who has engaged in a premarital or extramarital relationship with a female is not perceived to have stained his own honour.
9. With respect, the evidence in this appeal does not support the FTJ’s findings that given the appellant has not engaged in any pre or extra-marital relationship with H. The FTJ conclusions are therefore misconceived as the appellant does not meet the risk factors identified. This is considered material given the FTJ later relies on the CPIN risk factors at [44] despite acknowledging here: ‘that the Appellant has not provided objective evidence to show that the father of H is the man in the photos’. The FTJ states they have had “regard to the cultural context in regard to family honour and blood feuds as set out in the CPIN”. The Respondent relies on the same CPIN and reiterates there has been no allegation in this appeal of any pre or extra-marital relationships – the risk factors relied upon are not engaged.”
13. The appellant relied on a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 that was submitted to the Upper Tribunal and the respondent the day before the hearing.
14. At the hearing I heard submissions from Ms Alban on behalf of the appellant and Ms Nolan on behalf of the respondent. I reserved my decision, which I now give.
Discussion
15. The relevant CPIN is titled “Iraq: Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence, Iraq” and was published in July 2024. In the executive summary it addresses women fearing honour crimes, male potential victims of honour crimes and men fearing retribution for engaging in a premarital or extramarital relationship with the family’s daughter. It also refers to blood feuds and tribal disputes.
16. As outlined in the respondent’s grounds the judge cites paragraph 3.2.3 of the CPIN in the decision. This paragraph is in the respondent’s “assessment” section of the CPIN where the respondent outlines her assessment of the country information. Although the judge cites the respondent’s assessment the judge did not expressly apply it to the appellant.
17. It is the appellant’s case, which the judge accepted, that he has been (wrongly) accused of sexual assault by H and he is at risk because of that accusation.
18. It is clear from reading the decision as a whole and in particular paragraphs 41 and 44 that the judge was aware that the appellant did not fit within the paragraph 3.2.3 of the CPIN and was not applying it to the appellant’s claim.
19. The judge states:
“41. …‘I accept, having considered the CPIN, that there is the possibility that if H had reported to her father and her mother had reported to her father that the Appellant had behaved in an inappropriate way to her, that her father may seek revenge to restore honour to his family.”
[…]
“44. …’Having regard to the cultural context in regard to family honour and blood feuds as set out in the CPIN I accept there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would be at risk from H, H’s father. In accepting this position, due to the familial and tribal nature of political affiliation in Iraq I accept that any actions on his part would likely be with impunity and there would be an absence of state protection making internal relocation an unfeasible alternative.”
20. The judge found that if H had reported to her parents that the appellant had behaved in inappropriate way towards her that it may prompt a revenge attack. The judge considered that this chimed with the country background evidence contained within the CPIN. Having reviewed the CPIN I am satisfied that the judge was correct to consider that it was relevant to the cultural context in regard to family honour and supported the appellant’s claim. I am satisfied that the judge did not err in law.
21. The respondent misunderstood the judge’s application of the CPIN and what aspects of it the judge considered relevant to the appellant’s case.
22. For the above reasons I do not find the respondent’s grounds to be made out. I conclude that the judge’s decision should stand and accordingly uphold the judge’s decision.
Notice of Decision
23. The respondent’s appeal is dismissed. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
24. The decision allowing the appellant’s appeal stands.

G. Loughran

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 November 2025