Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Appeal No: UI-2025-002478, UI-2025-002469,
UI-2025-002476, UI-2025-002481

First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/52191/2024, LH/06190/2024
HU/52189/2024, LH/06188/2024
HU/52190/2024, LH/06191/2024
HU/52192/2024, LH/06189/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SKINNER

Between

FK (Afghanistan) and others
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J. Fathers, Counsel, instructed by DLA Piper UK LLP
For the Respondent: Mr E. Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 September 2025 and 26 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
INTRODUCTION
1. The Appellants are four members of the same family. They are nationals of Afghanistan who are resident without any legal status in Pakistan because of the situation in their home country. The first Appellant (“the Mother”) is the mother of the second, third and fourth Appellants, who are minors (collectively “the Child Appellants”).
2. The Child Appellants’ father (and the Mother’s husband) (“the Father”) has been in the UK since 1999. He has indefinite leave to remain. Also in the UK, and living with the Father, is a further son of the Mother and the Father, who was the sponsor for the Appellants’ application for entry clearance which gives rise to this appeal. I shall refer to him as “S”. S was born in 2002 and left Afghanistan in 2017 after refusing to carry out a suicide bombing for the Taliban. He arrived in the UK in 2020 and has refugee status.
3. The Appellants’ claim is, in short, that it constitutes a breach of their, the Father’s and S’s right to respect for family life under Article 8 for the Appellants not to be permitted to come to the UK to join the Father and S.
4. Their application having been refused by the Respondent, the Appellants appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”). However, by a decision promulgated on 12 March 2025, the FTT held that the Appellants did not enjoy family life within the meaning of Article 8 with either the Father or S and it accordingly dismissed their appeal.
5. This appeal originally came before me for hearing on an expedited basis on 15 September 2025, in light of the difficult and precarious situation of the Appellants in Pakistan. At that hearing, I heard detailed submissions from Ms Fathers and Mr Terrell and I reserved my decision. However, shortly after the hearing, I became aware that the Court of Appeal was due to hear argument in relation to the proper test for assessing whether there is family life between adult relatives – a central question in this appeal. It handed down its decision (IA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516) on 26 November 2025. Having read that decision, I decided, for reasons set out in my directions of that date and notwithstanding the desirability of this appeal being resolved expeditiously, that it was appropriate to hear submissions on the effect of IA on the present appeal. I therefore directed the parties to file skeleton arguments on it and listed the appeal for a further hearing on 26 January 2026, which was my next sitting day.
6. At that adjourned hearing I heard again from Ms Fathers for the Appellants and Mr Terrell for the Respondent, principally on the impact of IA, although inevitably the submissions covered some of the same ground already addressed at the hearing in September. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.
7. I am grateful to both representatives for their assistance.
THE FTT DECISION
8. The FTT, after introducing the appeal, set out the Background at paras. 6-9 as follows:
“6. The First Appellant married XX (“the Father“) in Pakistan in 1997. The First Appellant and the Father both originate from Afghanistan and are Afghan nationals. The Father fled to Pakistan in 1992 to escape from the Mujahadeen. He left Pakistan in 1998 to escape from the Taliban who were trying to recruit Afghans from the refugee camps. His brother was, and still is, a Taliban commander. He was granted exceptional leave to remain in 1999 and indefinite leave to remain in 2003. He has lived in this country since then.
7. The Sponsor was born on 31st December 2002 and is an Afghan national. He left Afghanistan in 2017 after refusing to comply with his paternal uncle’s instructions to carry out a suicide bombing. He arrived in this country on 15th January 2020 and was granted refugee status on 27th June 2022.
8. The Second, Third and Fourth Appellants were born on, respectively, 5th March 2010, 1st April 2009 and 15th May 2012. The Appellants remained in Afghanistan after the Sponsor left the country, living with the First Appellant's brother and his family until they went to Pakistan in 2023 to make their applications for entry clearance. They initially stayed there with a friend of the Father, Ali Khan.
9. The Father went to Pakistan last year to arrange alternative accommodation for the Appellants because Ali Khan was mistreating them and started to demand money for looking after them. The First Appellant’s brother has now died. The First Appellant had a heart attack while the Father was in Pakistan. On 3rd October 2023, the Pakistan Government ordered all those living in Pakistan without documentation to leave the country by 1st November or face deportation.”
9. The FTT then set out the basis of the Respondent’s refusals to grant entry clearance, the evidence and the submissions. The FTT’s reasons for its decision then start at para.43. At para.43 it was noted that the first two questions which must be answered are whether family life exists, and, if so, whether the Respondent’s decision interferes with that family life sufficiently to be capable of engaging Article 8, both of which were in issue. The Respondent, it was noted, did not dispute that family life between the Father and the Appellants could be considered.
10. At para.44, the FTT accepted that the Appellants, the Father and S were related as claimed.
11. At para.45, the FTT stated that “The question of whether family life exists between relatives is about the nature of their relationships and is not about effect which family reunion would have on anyone’s health, or about ways of improving the quality of anyone’s life, or about the best interests of minor children or about ameliorating the Appellants’ circumstances in Pakistan. These and related questions become relevant later when proportionality is considered - provided that family life and an interference with any such family life are first established.” At paras. 46-49, the FTT summarised and set out certain domestic authorities considering the test for establishing family life between adult relatives. On the basis of those authorities, the FTT at para.50 stated,
“The first question is, therefore, whether the Appellants can show that there are probably stronger ties between them and the Sponsor and/or between them and the Father than the ordinary emotional ties which exist between adult relatives in terms of love, affection and concern for each other because they provide real, committed or effective support to the Sponsor and/or Father or the Sponsor and/or Father provides them with such support.”
12. At paras. 52-55, the FTT considered expert psychiatric evidence in relation to S, accepting that he suffers from a single episode depressive disorder and PTSD, resulting from his kidnapping, beating and threats to cut off his ears and nose and cut out his eyes in Iran, beating by the Bulgarian army and threats received from a man with a gun and being stabbed while in Pakistan in 2024. The evidence was that, while his mental health continues to be affected by his separation from the Appellants, S was able to understand his current situation and could participate in the Tribunal proceedings, though his memory, recall and consistency might be affected. At para.55, the Judge notes that S did not display any difficulty in understanding the questions asked or in answering them appropriately.
13. The FTT also accepted the psychiatric evidence in relation to the Father, who is suffering from a single episode depressive disorder, whose mental health has worsened as a result of his separation from the Appellants. The psychiatric evidence records the Father describing a close relationship with the Appellants, that he greatly missed them and felt anxious and fearful for their safety.
14. At paras. 57-80, the FTT considered whether there was family life between the Appellants and S. It turns, at paras. 81-92, to whether there is family life between the Appellants and the Father.
Family life with S
15. In relation to family life with S the FTT accepted that there was family life between them when they lived together in Afghanistan as a family unit. The FTT notes that S left Afghanistan when he was about 15. At that time, S had not formed an independent life. At para.58 however, the FTT considered that that changed once S had left Afghanistan. As this paragraph is criticised in the grounds of appeal, it is worth setting out the FTT’s reasons fully. It stated,
“[S] left Afghanistan in circumstances where it was unlikely that he would return to his family there. There is no evidence that there was any plan for the Appellants to join him in this country. The Appellants had not made an application to join the Father. The Sponsor embarked on a lengthy journey because he did not arrive here until January 2020. He faced many harrowing ordeals during the journey. By the time he arrived here, he must have realised that he would have to make a new life for himself with the Father after he arrived in this country. He has started to do this because he has been to college, has learnt English, obtained a security guard’s licence and is looking for employment. He is now a young adult who is 23 years old. He is able to take responsibility because he said in his second statement that he acts as the Father’s informal carer as he looks after the Father, cooks and shops for him and accompanies him on medical and other appointments. He also says that he chose their flat.”
16. The FTT therefore considered that the question was whether family life had been re-established. As to this, the FTT accepted that S’s mental health problems were affecting his ability to develop a full social life and that there was no evidence that he had yet formed a relationship. However, it did not follow, the FTT said, that he had probably become dependent on the Appellants again or that he was probably supported emotionally by them. Nor had family life been re-established because of the Appellants’ problems in Pakistan and Afghanistan or because of S’s mental health problems. At para.60, the FTT accepted evidence from a Mr Spencer about the relationship between the Appellants and S, including that they had always been close, that the Third Appellant displayed clear affection for S and that the Appellants appear to be heavily emotionally dependent on S. He records frequent contact between S and the Appellants.
17. At para.62, the FTT noted the evidence given by Ms Ward. This was primarily concerned with S and her interactions with him. The FTT noted that she said that he was so happy to spend time with his siblings. The FTT however considered these to be “manifestations of the ordinary emotions which exist between close relatives”.
Financial dependency
18. At paras. 63-69, the FTT considered the claimed financial dependency of the Appellants. S’s evidence, the FTT records, was that the Father mainly sent money to them once in two months. This was however difficult to reconcile with the Father’s evidence that he was not able to send the Appellants money because he was not working. Mr Spencer appeared to have been told that S sends the Appellants between £100 and £200 whenever they tell him that they have run out of money for essentials, but he did not state how often that was or who told him this. There was also a discrepancy between the amount that it was said that S had to borrow to pay for his flight to Pakistan. As to the documentary evidence, there were nine remittances but only two identified S as the payer, and on those the dates were illegible and on one so too was the name of the beneficiary. The identity of the other beneficiary was not explained. The documentary evidence did not therefore add to what the Tribunal was told about financial dependency. When considering S’s ability to provide financial support, the FTT took account of the fact that the Sponsor appears to have little spare cash. In the circumstances, the FTT was not satisfied that there was financial dependency on S by the Appellants.
Emotional dependency
19. As to emotional dependency, the FTT first summarised S’s evidence: that he had a strong relationship with the Mother because he had only lived with her in Afghanistan as the Father was already in the UK and he loved her very much; he referred to the decline in her mental and physical health and that he had borrowed money last year so that he could visit her after she had a heart attack; he said that she depends on him a lot for emotional support because she did not want to burden the Father because of his own health problems, but did not describe how he had supported her emotionally since they re-established contact or in what respect she depended on him for emotional support. The Father’s evidence was that the Mother and S spoke regularly and she confided in S about her worries, but he did not elaborate further.
20. The FTT accepted that S visited the Appellant’s after the Mother’s heart attack, but there was little evidence about what he did for her while he was in Pakistan, either while she was in hospital or after she was discharged. The FTT considered that S had not given any ground for believing that he had assumed any significant responsibility for her care. He also did not explain who now provides any care which he might have provided. There was similarly no suggestion that she provides him with any support in connection with his mental health problems or that she helps him to try to overcome them or otherwise helps him lead his life while he is in the UK.
21. At para.72, the FTT noted that Mr Spencer’s report states that the Mother told him that S encourages and helps her and that he helps them financially and emotionally, but did not say how. He recorded the Mother telling him that S looks after the Father and helped look after the children when he was in Pakistan and does his best to make them happy. In respect of the Child Appellants, S had said that they depended on him when they lived together because he was their eldest brother and the Father did not live with them and that they were still close to each other because of what they have been through, that they speak to each other regularly and that they still depend on him for emotional support, because they are confined to one room and his sisters are worried about their future. He did not however explain how he supports them emotionally except that he tries to reassure them and that he wants them to be happy. The FTT noted at para.74 that there was a degree of confusion in the evidence about the extent of S’s contact with the Appellants.
22. At para.76, the FTT concluded that it could derive little assistance from WhatsApp printouts that had been adduced. At para.78, the FTT accepted that there were severe limitations on what S can do for the Appellant and vice versa because they live in different parts of the world, S had limited means, they have problems in communicating with each other and because of the cost of visiting Pakistan. The FTT considered that these may explain the absence or shortage of certain manifestations of family life but do not dispense with the need to establish its existence.
23. At paras. 79-80, the FTT looked at the evidence in the round. It was not satisfied that S provides real, committed or effective emotional support to any of the Appellant or that he has done so since he arrived in this country. The FTT’s reasoning in this regard merits setting out in full. It was:
“because I do not accept that the evidence shows anything more than manifestations of the ordinary emotional ties which exist between close relatives. There are many references in the evidence to emotional support but there is very little detail of what this support consists of and how it is provided. Concern, worry, encouragement and reassurance are all manifestations of the ordinary emotional ties which close relatives have for each other. Close relatives are often in frequent contact with each other without having family life together. This may continue over a prolonged period, especially for example where there is illness or there are other concerns about their wellbeing.
80. The Sponsor has every reason to be very worried about the Appellants because they live in very difficult circumstances and this may well adversely affect his mental health but they are not the only cause of his problems. They say that they are living in Pakistan illegally and that they fear being deported to Afghanistan, which results in them leading a reclusive life. The [Mother] has recently had serious physical health problems, including a heart attack. I accept that the Sponsor went to Pakistan after the heart attack, that he borrowed money to pay for his air ticket and that he stayed in Pakistan for as long as he could but this is what families do when there is serious illness. They similarly help to look after younger members of the family when their primary carer is ill. Consequently, I am not satisfied that this probably anything more than a manifestation of the ordinary emotional ties between close relatives which are based on their love, affection and concern for each other’s wellbeing.
Family life with the Father
24. At para.81, the FTT noted that “there is a presumption that family life exists between spouses and between a parent and his or her minor children”. However, the FTT noted that the Father left the Mother in Pakistan within about a year of their marriage when he came to the UK in 1998 and has never resumed cohabitation on a permanent basis since then. His children were all born after he came to the UK, with the result that they have never lived with him as a family on a permanent basis. No explanation had been provided why heshe uynable had not returned to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, or why the Appellants had not applied to join him as his family members after he was granted ILR in 2003.
25. At para.82, it was noted that the Father did not give evidence at the hearing and the FTT was not satisfied that his failure to do so was adequately explained on health grounds. This detracted from the weight to be given to his written evidence. There was very little evidence about how the Father enjoyed his family life with the Appellants in the period up to the applications being made, “apart from what can be discerned from the fact that the Sponsor and his siblings were born between 2002 and 2012”. The FTT noted that the Father’s evidence was that in a five-year period, he would visit the Appellants about 3-4 times, but he did not produce his travel documents to substantiate this and there was no evidence of the duration of the visits. He also said that he could only speak to the family 3-4 times a year because of connection problems and he was not able to send them money because he was not working. In view of this limited evidence, the FTT was not satisfied that family life continued to exist between the Father and the Appellants up to the time when he went to Pakistan last year.
26. At para.84, the FTT noted that this inevitably affected the way in which the Father’s visit to Pakistan had to be viewed. The Father’s evidence was that he was in Pakistan from January to June 2024. There was a visa showing that he was granted a multiple entry visa from 1 January to 30 June 2024. There was a travel document, without the name of the person to whom it was issued, with an entry stamp for Pakistan on 20 January 2024, a Pakistan exit stamp on 15 February 2024 and part of a stamp dated 16 February 2024 but which did not give the name of the country or say what it signified. The Father said that he returned to Pakistan on 16 February, but there was no further exit stamp for Pakistan.
27. At para. 85, the FTT considered that it was possible that this visit led to the resumption of family life, particularly if it lasted for six months, but it did not necessarily do so. There was no description of how they lived their lives while in Pakistan, and in particular whether they did so as a united family or what role the Father played in looking after the Mother while she was in hospital and after she was discharged or who had taken over this role since he had left Pakistan. There was said to be WhatsApp and telephone contact after the Father left Pakistan, but the FTT was unable to give any significant weight to this. There was also very little documentary evidence to show that the Father had been sending money to the Appellants or their landlords, because the remittance advices did not show the name of the remitting party. It was said that the Father gave money to a friend who then made remittances to the Appellants, but little weight was given to them.
28. There were, the FTT concluded, significant gaps and shortcomings in the evidence about financial and emotional dependency and questions which needed to be answered by the Father. On the basis of the available evidence, the Appellants had not satisfied the FTT that family life exists between any of them and the Father, whether because of financial dependency, emotional dependency or a combination of them or otherwise.
Interference
29. At para.93, the FTT held in the alternative that the Respondent’s decisions did not interfere with any family life which the Father might have with any of the Appellants because the decisions preserve the position which, in the case of the Mother, had existed since the Father left Pakistan in 1998, and, in the case of the Child Appellants, had existed all their lives: namely that they cannot enjoy any family life in this country. The FTT considered that “The interference is caused by the Government of Pakistan’s decision to enforce Pakistan’s immigration rules by removing illegal entrants, which means that the Appellants consider that it is unsafe for them to see him in Pakistan.”
30. The FTT accordingly dismissed the appeals.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
31. The Appellants sought and were granted permission to appeal on six grounds. Ms Fathers in her helpful skeleton argument has expressly abandoned ground 2 and grouped the remaining grounds as follows:
a. Error in determining that there was no family life in that there was (i) a failure to have regard to all material facts, (ii) application of too high a test as to the existence of family life, and (iii) irrationality (Grounds 1, 3 and 6).
b. Failure to make findings on key issues (Ground 5).
c. Misdirection as to jurisdiction (Ground 4)
32. The Respondent filed a detailed response to the appeal pursuant to rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
33. In accordance with my directions after the hearing on 15 September 2025, the parties both filed skeleton arguments in relation to the impact of IA on these appeals.
34. I set out the parties’ respective submissions in greater detail in my analysis of the grounds to which I now turn.
ANALYSIS
35. Notwithstanding Ms Fathers’ cogent grouping of the grounds, it is convenient to take them out of order. I start with ground 4, because it can be shortly dealt with and is broadly agreed between the parties. I then consider grounds 3 and 6, because they formed the focus of the argument before me and there is to some extent an overlap between them. I therefore deal with Grounds 1 and 5 last.
Misdirection as to jurisdiction (Ground 4)
36. Ground 4 takes issue with the Judge’s conclusion that there was no interference, assuming there to be family life. It is said by Ms Fathers that the finding that any interference with family life “is caused by the Government of Pakistan’s decision to enforce Pakistan’s immigration rules by removing illegal entrants, which means that the Appellants consider that it is unsafe for them to see him in Pakistan” is outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which was hearing an appeal brought against the decision of the Entry Clearance Officer not to reunite this family. The Appellants further submit that it is insufficient that this is aimed at the question of “interference” at stage 2 of the Razgar 5-stage test. This was because, in circumstances where the FTT accepted that the Appellants were at risk of being returned to Afghanistan or that there would be difficulties in the family’s ability to meet in Pakistan, it is not sufficient to sidestep this issue by considering or concluding whether the Government of Pakistan is breaching the Appellants’ Article 8 rights.
37. In my judgment the Appellant’s characterisation of this paragraph of the FTT’s decision as an error of jurisdiction is misplaced, but this paragraph does (as Mr Terrell accepted) contain an error of law, but one which (as Ms Father accepted) is only material if the Appellants succeed on other grounds.
38. To explain:
a. The Strasbourg caselaw clearly and consistently draws a distinction between the removal of settled migrants and other cases. Whereas the withdrawal of a right of residence (by which it means, in the UK context, indefinite leave to remain) that has already been granted to an individual involves an interference by the state with an established Article 8 right, other cases involve the question whether, having regard to the circumstances as a whole, the state authorities are under a positive duty pursuant to Article 8 to grant a residence permit. See e.g. Jeunesse v The Netherlands (2015) 60 EHRR 17 at [103]-[105].
b. In the context of the removal of non-settled migrants, the Supreme Court has, on a number of occasions held that whether the situation is analysed in terms of positive or negative obligations is unlikely to be of substantial importance in the context of the removal of non-settled migrants and that the structured approach to proportionality established in Huang should be followed in cases involving both the removal of settled and non-settled migrants. See e.g. Hesham Ali [2016] UKSC 60 at [32]; Agyarko [2017] UKSC 11 at [40]-[41].
c. Two points are worth underlining:
i. First, none of these cases were entry clearance cases, and they did not consider, still less, lay down any binding precedent in respect of, the approach to be taken in such cases. I note that in Ali v The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chambers) [2024] EWCA Civ 372, Andrews LJ uses the terminology of interference in relation to entry clearance. However, the question of whether interference was a necessary part of the analysis was not before the Court (the question was whether someone’s Article 8 private life could be engaged while outside the jurisdiction) and the word interference, it respectfully seems to me, was either being used as a shorthand (particularly when preceded by the word “disproportionate”) to mean “violation” or to mean that Article 8 was engaged.
ii. Second, what was said by the Supreme Court was that in cases involving the removal of non-settled migrants, the structured approach to proportionality should be followed. They do not seem to me to lay down any requirement to consider the question of whether there is an interference (which, in a negative obligation case, is three stages of analysis prior to considering proportionality) where Strasbourg would not do so.
d. This distinction between positive and negative obligation cases and whether it is necessary for there to have been an ‘interference’ may at first seem arid, but on proper analysis it may have important consequences. The requirement to show, before one gets to issues of proportionality, that there has been an interference by the UK with family life will in many cases introduce a threshold question of which state is causally responsible for the family’s separation (as it did here). That is, so far as I am aware, absent from the Strasbourg jurisprudence and which is therefore likely to lead to the UK failing to “keep pace with” the Strasbourg Court, as is required: Ullah [2004] UKHL 26 at [20].
e. That is not to say of course that the reason why individuals or families find themselves in the position they do will not be relevant to Article 8 analysis. It may well be, but it is relevant, in my judgment, as part of the question of where a fair balance is struck between the various interests, not as a threshold requirement. What weight is to be given to it will no doubt vary from case to case.
f. For these reasons therefore, and as Mr Terrell agreed, the FTT was wrong to consider the question of interference at all.
g. This is not however a question of the FTT considering a question which was outside its jurisdiction (save in the broad Anisminic sense of jurisdiction). As already noted, the reason for the state of affairs under consideration may be relevant to whether a fair balance between the various interests requires the UK to admit someone. The fact that the relevant state of affairs may be caused by another government’s actions does not preclude consideration of that issue and, when it is considered, it does not comprise an assessment, as the Appellants suggested, of whether the relevant foreign government was itself in breach of Article 8 ECHR.
h. Notwithstanding that the FTT erred in considering whether there was an interference, given that the Appellants have been found not to have family life within the meaning of Article 8 with either S or the Father, as Ms Fathers accepted, this issue adds nothing unless the Appellants can show that the FTT erred in that respect also.
39. I now therefore turn to the issues concerned with whether the FTT erred in concluding that there was no family life.
Too high a test (Ground 3)
40. The FTT directed itself as to the test to be applied as between adult relatives by reference to the domestic authorities as they stood at that time, including the need for “additional elements of dependence beyond normal emotional ties” and “real, effective or committed support”. Since then, IA has made clear that “real, effective or committed support” is in fact not the test. Rather, the test is the “additional elements of dependency” test, in respect of which real, effective or committed support may be relevant. Unlike in IA however, it has not been suggested here that in referring to the authorities suggesting that this can be met where there is real, effective or committed support, the FTT applied some lower test than the additional elements of dependency test. Rather, the Appellants’ case is that regardless of the FTT’s self-direction and regardless of what the proper test is, the FTT applied, in practice, a different and more stringent test.
41. In relation to the relationship between S and the Appellants, Ms Fathers submitted that the FTT was searching for an extraordinary or exceptional feature of the Appellants’ dependence on S as a necessary determinant of the existence of family life, rather than conducting an appropriately contextualised fact-sensitive exercise. In her skeleton argument, she makes three more particular points:
a. First, Ms Fathers suggests that the unduly elevated threshold is seen in the use of the phrase “more than manifestations of the ordinary emotional ties between close relatives” (the word close not appearing in the way the test is normally expressed).
b. Second, she criticises the way in which the FTT in, for example, paras.79-80 adopts a baseline of behaviour which relatives with normal emotional ties exhibit. Thus, in para.79, the FTT said, “Close relatives are often in frequent contact with each other without having family life together. This may continue over a prolonged period, especially where there is illness or there are other concerns about their wellbeing.” And in para. 80, it was said, “I accept that [S] went to Pakistan after the [Mother’s] heart attack, that he borrowed money to pay for his air ticket and that he stayed in Pakistan for as long as he could but this is what families do when there is serious illness.” In support of this submission, the Appellants rely on the unreported decision of AA UI-2024-004700, which I granted permission to be relied on. In that case, Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce held, inter alia, that the FTT had misunderstood what was meant by ‘normal’ emotional ties. In particular, at [19], she held that ‘normal’ in this context does not mean ‘normal for someone similarly situated’, so it is not correct to consider whether “a ‘normal’ Afghan family separated by war, forced migration, trauma, years and thousands of miles would be similarly overjoyed to see each other … since that would not be a family living in ‘normal’ circumstances.” Likewise, in relation to families brought closer together by serious illness, Judge Bruce considered that “Again, that is not a ‘normal’ state of affairs. That is a paradigm situation in which Article 8 may be engaged: for instance, where an adult child has to look after an ailing parent. The Tribunal’s search for some ever more extreme emotional attachment meant it failed to stand back and ask itself the simple question: is there here evidence of real, effective, committed support?” I consider this authority further below.
c. Third, the Appellants suggest that the Respondent’s reliance in the rule 24 response on Kumari (as to which see further below) is misplaced because the facts were different, and this is not an adult dependent relative case.
42. In relation to the relationship between the Father and the Appellants, Ms Fathers submitted that in Sen v The Netherlands (2003) 36 EHRR 7 at [28], the ECtHR explained that the bond between a parent and child exists from the moment of birth and will only be broken in exceptional circumstances. There was no requirement for more than normal emotional ties and the Judge was bound to conclude that family life exists between the Father and the Child Appellants.
43. The principles which I am bound to apply in considering these submissions include that:
a. I must assume that the FTT, as a specialist tribunal knows, and has applied the relevant law, unless I detect an express misdirection or unless I am confident from the express reasoning that it must be based on an implicit misdirection;
b. Questions of fact and of evaluation are for the FTT, unless its approach is Wednesbury unreasonable; and
c. I must be cautious against rushing to find a misdirection or error of law merely because I might have reached a different conclusion on the facts.
See ASO (Iraq) [2023] EWCA Civ 1283 at [41] and KM [2021] EWCA Civ 693 at [77(1)].
44. Applying those principles, and not without some real hesitation, I am unable to accept the Appellants’ submissions. This is in my judgment a case where I consider it possible that some judges would have concluded that family life exists, and indeed I might well have done so. That is however not the test and, for the reasons which follow, I am unable to detect an error of law.
45. As to the relationship between S and the Appellants, I do not accept that the FTT failed to conduct an appropriately contextual fact-sensitive exercise or searching for some exceptional feature. Read as a whole, the FTT’s decision comprises a detailed consideration of the facts of this case which seeks to determine whether, on the evidence which the Appellants had adduced, they had demonstrated the necessary degree of dependence.
46. It is important to recall that the threshold which the ECtHR applies (which the domestic courts have consistently sought to follow (see IA at [61]) in this context is a relatively exacting one where the relationship is between adult relatives. For present purposes it suffices to refer to the decision in Kumari v The Netherlands (App no. 44051/20, 10 December 2024) and IA. As the Court noted at [34] of Kumari, the question of the existence or non-existence of family life is “essentially a question of fact depending upon the existence of close personal ties.” Whether there are additional elements of dependency is to be decided on a case-by-case basis; it will often be the result of a combination of elements: [37]. In cases where adults had a physical or mental disability or illness of sufficient seriousness and who needed constant care and support from other family members, the Court has accepted such dependency, but in a number of cases, serious medical conditions were held not to be serious enough, either alone or in combination with other factors, to warrant a finding of dependency. This was because they were not “entirely incapacitating” or “while very serious, did not incapacitate the applicant to the extent that he was compelled to rely on his family’s care and support in his daily life”: [38]-[39]. In Kumari itself, the Court accepted that the death of the son’s daughter had caused a great impact on his mental well-being, there was no evidence to suggest that his PTSD was so severe as to entirely incapacitate him and he was able to function in his everyday life (see [48]). As regards the mother’s dependence on the son, the Court accepted that she suffered from various health issues, but there were no indications that she was unable to get by with medical care and other forms of care, support and assistance available to her from others in India. Likewise, in the subsequent case of Demirci v Hungary (No 48302/21, 6 May 2025), the Court held that the third applicant suffered from eyesight problems, “it ha[d] not been demonstrated that the condition was sufficiently serious for her to require constant care and assistance from the first applicant in order to cope with her everyday life”. While the Strasbourg authorities do not establish that, where medical issues are relied upon, constant care and support as a result of that condition is a necessary prerequisite to a finding of sufficient dependency (and as the Court of Appeal held in IA at [120] it is not necessary to show complete reliance), it is clearly an important factor in the analysis and the degree of care or other support that is required as a result is plainly a relatively important one.
47. In my view, the test which the FTT applied in substance was that laid down by the Strasbourg jurisprudence. It carefully considered what the evidence demonstrated and then considered whether the findings that it was able to make on the basis of that evidence showed the relevant degree of dependence. I am unable to discern any misdirection in this.
48. Turning to Ms Fathers’ more specific submissions, set out in paras. 41(a)-(c) above,
a. I respectfully do not think there is anything in Ms Fathers’ point about the FTT’s use of the phrase “close relatives”. The additional elements of dependency test classically applies as between parents and their adult children and between adult siblings, which are axiomatically relationships between close relatives. The addition of the word “close” therefore seems to me to add nothing.
b. I have considered with care whether the FTT’s reasoning, whereby it considered what behaviours those with normal emotional ties would display and then to discount those behaviours as not giving rise to the necessary degree of dependency, was erroneous. Having considered, in particular, the Strasbourg cases, in my judgment it was not. For example, in Kumari, having considered the degree of the son’s ability to function, the Court stated ([48]) that it did “not consider it unusual for parents to provide support to their adult children when they are going through a grieving process.” This process of comparing the care or support provided in the case before the FTT with that which it is normal or usual to be provided is a process of reasoning which the Strasbourg court itself adopts.
c. I also do not consider that the AA decision is of assistance. The FTT did not in this case consider whether there was dependence beyond what was normal for someone in the Appellant’s situation. It considered whether the sorts of behaviours relied on as showing dependence were demonstrative of normal emotional ties for adult family members generally. In relation to Judge Bruce’s comments in relation to families brought closer together by serious illness, I accept, as demonstrated by the examples given in Kumari, that this can give rise to a situation of dependence, but it does not follow that it will always do. It all depends on the facts. I do not read Judge Bruce’s judgment as seeking to suggest otherwise – being brought closer by illness was, she said, a paradigm situation in which Article 8 may be engaged. To the extent that Judge Bruce was, contrary to my view, suggesting that there was some hard-and-fast rule in this respect, that cannot survive the Court of Appeal’s decision in IA, at [124] of which the Court held that “it is undesirable to lay down hard and fast rules as to how the additional elements of dependency test should be applied.”
d. Finally, I cannot accept that reliance on Kumari is misplaced because it is a factually different case to the present. That is of course correct, but Kumari is not being relied on for its facts, but for the principles which it clarifies apply in this area.
49. As to the relationship between the Father and the Appellants, the FTT addressed this at paras. 81-83, as noted above. The FTT began by reminding itself of the existence of the presumption of family life as between spouses and between parents and minor children. As the Appellants acknowledge however, this presumption is rebuttable where there are exceptional circumstance and the FTT then went on to consider that it was appropriate to depart from that presumption in the circumstances of this case for the reasons it then set out. It is correct to note that the FTT did not expressly refer to the need for exceptional circumstances, but the principles surrounding the application of Article 8 ECHR are well known to the FTT and there is nothing in the FTT’s express reasoning to indicate expressly or implicitly that it was applying some lesser threshold.
50. For these reasons I do not consider that the FTT applied too high a threshold in considering whether there was family life within the autonomous meaning of Article 8 between the Appellants and S and/or the Father.
Irrationality (Ground 6)
51. Under this ground, the Appellants submit, first, that it was perverse and/or irrational to conclude that there was no family life between S and the Appellants in the context where the FTT found or accepted that: (a) the family are close, that there were consistencies in relation to the evidence about difficulties in communication with the family in Pakistan, (b) that S’s mental health continues to be negatively affected by his separation from the Appellants and that this is affecting his ability to develop a full social life and (c) that S had to borrow money to stay in Pakistan for as long as he could when his mother was hospitalised.
52. I do not accept this. None of these factors individually or cumulatively demonstrate, on any rational view, that there is the level of dependence on S by the Appellants needed to establish family life between them. Nor do they provide a context in which the FTT’s other findings mean that the only rational conclusion that the FTT could have reached was that there was sufficient dependence to amount to family life within the meaning of Article 8.
53. Second, the Appellants submit that in all the circumstances and on the evidence before the FTT, including unchallenged and accepted expert medical and social work evidence, the FTT was bound to conclude that there was family life between this family. They rely in particular on the assessment of Mr Spencer that “the family relationship between (the Sponsor and the Father) in the UK and (the Appellants) in Pakistan are genuine, strong and close. It is my assessment that the family in Pakistan are completely dependent on (the Appellant and the Father): financially, practically and emotionally. In my opinion, the impact of separation on all family members is having a severe adverse impact, in particular on family members’ mental health.” The difficulty with this submission is that it is not for an expert to opine on the ultimate question for the Tribunal and, where an expert does so, the Tribunal is not bound to accept it. That would be to delegate decision-making responsibility from the Tribunal to the expert. In any event, here the FTT rejected in significant respects the factual basis on which this assessment was based. Financial dependency, for example, was not, in the FTT’s view, sufficiently evidenced. This submission is, in reality, an attempt to cherry pick the evidence considered most helpful, or, as it is put in some of the cases, “island hopping”. That is not a permissible way to approach the decision of the FTT. Considered holistically, I consider that the FTT reached a conclusion which was properly open to it, even if it may be a decision which other Judges would not have reached.
54. Third, the Appellants suggest that “It is entirely unclear from this decision what more this family could do, in the circumstances they find themselves in, to demonstrate that they have more than normal emotional ties with each other and that they are dependent on each other.” Respectfully, this misses the point. The question for the FTT was whether the Appellants had demonstrated that they had the necessary degree of dependency. Where an appellant fails to do so, but they have done all they can do reasonably to attempt to do so, it does not follow that a finding in their favour must rationally be made. It may be, in an appropriate case, that certain inferences can be drawn, or that where attempts have been made to obtain evidence, an individual’s uncorroborated oral evidence will be more readily accepted, but this is all a matter of assessment for the first instance judge, not a point which demonstrates irrationality.
55. Fourth, the Appellants submit that the FTT was irrational to conclude that family life did not resume “in the six months the Father was in Pakistan at [§85] in circumstances where the evidence was clear that the family are in hiding in Pakistan and that the Father was present to support the family in finding alternative accommodation after the family was mistreated by Ali Khan and to provide care for the family [499] as well as the evidence from the Father in his second statement including driving AA to A&E, collecting medication and shopping and providing gifts for his wife and children.” However, the FTT considered that there were significant gaps and shortcomings in the evidence about dependency and questions which needed to be answered by the Father (see para.92). The Father did not however give evidence and was accordingly unable to do so. In those circumstances, I do not consider that any irrationality is shown by the conclusion that the Appellants had not demonstrated that family life within the meaning of Article 8 resumed while the Father was in Pakistan.
56. Finally, it is said to be perverse for the FTT to have concluded that the interference with the Appellants’ family life was caused by the Government of Pakistan’s decision to remove illegal entrants, while also concluding that there was no family life to be interfered with. This submission is based on a misreading of the FTT’s decision. The FTT did not find both that there was no family life and that there was an interference with family life. It found (at para.93) that there was no family life, and then considered alternatively (“in any event”) that the Respondent’s decision did not interfere with “any” family life which they might have. In other words, the FTT was considering what the position was if it was wrong in its conclusion about family life.
57. It follows from the above that this Ground does not succeed.
Failure to have regard to material facts (Ground 1)
58. The Appellants submit that the FTT left out of consideration seven material facts: (i) the circumstances in which S fled Afghanistan, (ii) the independent social worker report, and (iii) that contact with the Appellants was limited by internet issues; (iv) the Appellants’ need for safety and protection and history of persecution once S fled Afghanistan; (v) S’s circumstances in the UK as a refugee with his own mental health issues, limited financial resources and caring responsibilities; (vi) the financial circumstances of the family as a whole; and (vii) the Appellants’ circumstances in Pakistan.
The circumstances in which S fled Afghanistan
59. The Appellants submit that the Judge failed to take into account the circumstances in which S fled Afghanistan as a child and the consequent disruption to his family life.
60. While this was framed as a failure to take into account material facts, the central criticism that the Appellants make is in my judgment that the way in which the Judge took them into account was contrary to authority. In this regard, the Appellants rely on comments made by Arden LJ in Kugathas [2003] EWCA Civ 31 at [22] and by Ouseley J in AH (Somalia) [2004] UKAIT 00027 at [14].
61. In the paragraph of Kugathas relied on, Arden LJ said “I agree that the facts as found by the adjudicator, read as Mr Gill rightly submits in the context of the adjudicator's decision, could not amount to a family life for the purpose of Article 8. The appellant is a single man of about 38 years old who has lived here since 1999. Previously to that, since about 1985, he was in Germany. His nearest family is his mother, his brother, his sister and her family, who are all living in Germany. They are refugees and after the appellant left Sri Lanka his father was shot dead in Sri Lanka. Those facts are, to say the least, life-changing experiences and part of the context within which this case must be decided.” In her skeleton argument, Ms Father’s sought to define “those facts” in the final sentence as “of being a refugee”. Arden LJ’s final sentence in this paragraph is not however about the fact of being a refugee. It is about the specific circumstances pertaining to Mr Kugathas. It does not seek to establish any general principle about how a Tribunal is to take account of someone’s background history in considering whether there is family life within the meaning of Article 8.
62. In AH (Somalia) the sponsor fled as a result of her having been raped by two men who had also shot her mother and brother, in the context of the ongoing civil war at that time. The Adjudicator in essence equated the sponsor’s decision to flee in those circumstances with the normal circumstances in which children leave home as they grow older (see the passage quoted by the AIT at [12]). The criticism of that, which was accepted on appeal, was that “viewed against the correct assessment of the evidence, namely that the sponsor came to the United Kingdom as a refugee forced to flee from Somalia, the disruption to the family life that then ensued could not be treated properly in the way in which the Adjudicator had treated it.” The AIT added, “It cannot be right to approach the disruption to family life which is caused by someone having to flee persecution as a refugee as if it were of the same nature as someone who voluntarily leaves, or leaves in the normal course of the changes to family life which naturally occur as children grow up.” This, in my view, is wholly uncontroversial. The way in which and reasons why a person leaves their family is plainly capable of affecting an assessment of whether family life is maintained and must be assessed on their own terms, and not by a false comparison with other factual scenarios. But this does not in my judgment establish a general proposition beyond that it is necessary to decide each case on its own facts and, more specifically, AH does not require a decision-maker to find that, because someone left their family in urgent and unwanted circumstances, they have not ceased to have family life with their family. Provided the FTT considers how the actual circumstances in which a family member left their family home interact with whether there remains family life, they will not thereby commit an error of law.
63. Here, I do not consider that the FTT erred. It was plainly aware of the circumstances in which S fled Afghanistan. They are referred to at para. 7. How those circumstances inter-related with the maintenance of family life between S and the Appellants on the facts of this case was assessed in para.58, quoted above.
The independent social work report
64. Ms Fathers submitted that the FTT failed to consider properly the expert opinion of Mr Spencer. Her submission was that at para.72, the FTT “put the report to one side”, which, had it not done so, would have required it to consider Mr Spencer’s evidence that (a) in Afghanistan, S stepped up to take a father-like role for the Child Appellants, which was said by Mr Spencer to mean that their relationship extended far beyond the normal relationship between siblings, (b) the bond with S and the Appellants remains close, genuine and one that the Appellants are very dependent on, (c) the family appear to be very heavily emotionally dependent on S, (d) the difficulties and fears S and the Father face to further travel to Pakistan, and (e) the profound impact of separation of S and the Father from the Appellants, including that two of the Child Appellants are essentially young carers for the Mother.
65. I am unable to accept that the FTT omitted any of the above from its consideration. There is no compelling reason to consider that it did so (as is required: Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2(iii)]). The role played by S in Afghanistan is of limited relevance given the FTT’s acceptance that S and the Appellants had family life while he was in Afghanistan. The bond between S and the Appellants and the latter’s emotional dependence on A were expressly taken into account at paras. 60-61. As to the matters referred to in paragraph 46(d)-(e) above, these may not have been mentioned, but given their limited relevance to the question of whether there is family life between the Appellant and S or the Father, that is unsurprising and provides no proper basis for considering that it was left out of account.
Internet issues
66. I do not accept that the suggestion that the FTT omitted from consideration that contact with the Appellant is on occasion limited by internet issues. This was considered by the FTT at paras.75-76 and the FTT’s reasoning in respect of it is adequate and cogent.
Need for safety and circumstances in Pakistan
67. I do not accept that the Appellant’s need for safety etc were omitted from the FTT’s consideration. The Appellants’ difficulties in Pakistan and Afghanistan were expressly referred to in para.59.
Financial circumstances of family as a whole
68. The Appellant submits that “if the As are not financially (and practically) dependent on S and the Father, the Judge has not considered how they are able to support themselves practically and financially while in hiding in Pakistan”. In other words, the Appellants submit that the FTT was required to infer dependency on S and/or the Father by reason of the absence of their own means. I do not consider that it was a legal error not to make such an inference. The burden was on the Appellants to prove the necessary degree of dependence, and the drawing of inferences from the evidence which is before the Tribunal is a matter of ordinary rationality: see Royal Mail Group v Efobi [2021] UKSC 33 at [41]. I do not consider that the FTT came close to acting irrationally in not making the inference suggested, in circumstances where their case was that financial dependence was demonstrable via remittance receipts, in respect of which there were a number of flaws, as identified by the FTT.
69. In the circumstances Ground 1 falls to be dismissed.
Failure to make findings on key issues (Ground 5)
70. Under this Ground, the Appellants submit that on the basis of the unchallenged and expressly accepted medical evidence in relation to the effect on the mental health of both S and the Father of the family’s continued separation, the FTT was obliged to find that the decisions under appeal engaged their private life. It is said that S’s private life was addressed in submissions to the Tribunal in the Appeal Skeleton Argument at paras. 63-64.
71. As to this, the task of the FTT is to deal with the issues that have been identified by the parties: see Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) India [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC). It is not however suggested that any submissions were directed to the Father’s private life. As to S, the submissions in paras. 63-64 of the ASA were directed to the question whether, under the Immigration Rules, there were unjustifiably harsh consequences for S as a result of the decisions, not whether there was an interference with his private life rights. To the extent that this might be said to be a reference to S’s private life, it is oblique, and this is not sufficient in my judgment to raise this as an issue for determination by the FTT. In any event, S’s private life right was not a matter considered in the Respondent’s refusals and it has not been suggested that the Respondent has ever consented for this new matter to be raised, as is required under s.85 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 before the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider it. This was therefore not an issue which the FTT was empowered, still less required, to determine.
CONCLUSION
72. It follows from the above that this appeal falls to be dismissed.
Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge N J Bennett dated 12 March 2025 does not involve the making of an error of law and shall stand.

Paul Skinner
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 February 2026