Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2025-002516
UI-2025-002518
UI-2025-002520

First-tier Tribunal Nos:
HU/52662/2024, LH/00329/2025
HU/52663/2024, LH/00330/2025
HU/52664/2024, LH/00331/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 3rd of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOSHI

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

(1) AM
(2) TM
(3) BM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondents

Representation:
For the Secretary of State: Mr Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer, via CVP
For the Respondents: Mr Schwenk, counsel, instructed by Amicus Solicitors, via CVP

Heard at Field House on 10 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Respondents (who were the Appellants in the First-tier Tribunal) and their Sponsor are all granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them, including their names or addresses. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. This appeal first came before me for an error of law hearing on 16 October 2025. By an error of law decision issued on 13 November 2025, I found that the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s 12 April 2025 decision contained material errors of law. I set aside §§18-20 and 29-34 of the decision. The remaining findings were all preserved.

2. I retained the appeal in the Upper Tribunal, with the decision to be remade following a further hearing. This is the remaking decision following that further hearing, which took place on 10 February 2026 via CVP.

Background

3. The background to the appeal was set out at §§3-14 of my error of law decision. So that this may be read as a stand-alone decision, it is repeated below. It is then brought up to date.

4. The Respondents are all nationals and residents of Afghanistan (aged 69, 61 and 32, respectively). They are a husband and wife and their daughter, respectively.

5. The Sponsor is national of Afghanistan (aged 26). He is the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ son and the 3rd Respondent’s brother. He holds 5 years’ leave to remain in the UK as a refugee, granted on 6 January 2023.

6. The factual basis for the Sponsor’s Refugee Convention claim was that he was in an unmarried romantic relationship with a woman from a religious extremist family with ties to the Taliban. When they discovered the relationship, the Sponsor’s partner’s family killed her and threatened also to kill him – he fled Afghanistan before they were able to locate him and make good this threat.

7. On 11 December 2023, the Respondents applied for leave to enter the UK in order to join the Sponsor, as his adult dependent relatives. At that time, the stated factual basis for their application was that they were at risk from the Taliban because of their association with the Sponsor.

8. The Secretary of State refused the applications. In respect of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, but not the 3rd Respondent, the Secretary of State accepted that the relationship requirements of §4.1 Appendix Adult Dependant Relative Immigration Rules (‘Appendix ADR’) were met. In respect of all three Respondents, the Secretary of State did not accept that the dependency requirements (§§5.1-5.2 Appendix ADR) or the accommodation and maintenance requirements (§§6.1-6.5 Appendix ADR) were met, or that there were any exceptional circumstances rendering the refusal of leave to enter a breach of Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences (§7.1 Appendix ADR).

9. The Respondents appealed by way of the present proceedings. On appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, the factual basis for their applications developed and became more detailed. They maintained that they were at risk from the Taliban because of their association with the Sponsor. Further, it was said that each Respondent had serious medical conditions which, when considered in the context of Afghanistan’s crumbling medical system, meant that they met the dependency requirements of the Appendix ADR. They also provided further evidence to seek to demonstrate that they met the accommodation and maintenance requirements of Appendix ADR.

10. In their undated appeal skeleton argument for their First-tier Tribunal appeal, the Respondents identified the disputed issues as being the following:

a. Whether the dependency requirements of §§5.1-5.2 Appendix ADR were met.

b. Whether the accommodation and maintenance requirements of §§6.1-6.5 Appendix ADR were met.

c. Whether there were any exceptional circumstances rendering the refusal of leave to enter a breach of Article 8 ECHR because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences (i.e. §7.1 Appendix ADR).

11. In her 20 December 2024 review for the Respondents’ First-tier Tribunal appeal, the Secretary of State maintained the refusals and made submissions on each of the three disputed issues identified in the Respondents’ appeal skeleton argument (see the preceding paragraph). She did not identify any further disputed issues (notably, the review did not seek to raise as a disputed issue whether the 3rd Respondent met the relationship requirements of §4.1 Appendix ADR).

12. In their 12 April 2025 decision on the Respondents’ First-tier Tribunal appeal, the Judge made findings on each of the disputed issues identified by the parties as follows:

a. The dependency requirements of Appendix ADR (at §§8-15 of the Judge’s decision). The Respondents each met the dependency requirements of Appendix ADR, i.e. due to age, illness, or disability they each required long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks and they were unable, even with the practical and financial help of the Sponsor, to obtain the required level of care in Afghanistan (§9). Specifically, the Judge was satisfied on the evidence that the Respondents each required: “complex medical intervention and ongoing care due to their poor health (physical and mental) and consequent vulnerability due to non-existent complex heath care provision in Afghanistan and their inability to leave home/access care due to adverse interest from the Taliban” (§9 – and see generally §§9-14).

b. The accommodation and maintenance requirements of Appendix ADR (at §§16-17 of the Judge’s decision). The Respondents could not meet the financial requirements at the date of application (§16). However, they could meet the financial and accommodation requirements at the date of the hearing (§17).

c. Article 8 ECHR (§§18-34 of the Judge’s decision). Applying Kugathas v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 31, [2003] INLR 170, there was a family life relationship between the Respondents and the Sponsor, and Article 8 ECHR was engaged by the refusal of entry clearance (§§23-6). The interference with the Respondents’ rights was in accordance with the law and had legitimate aims (specifically, the economic well-being of the country) (§§27-8). The interference was disproportionate (§§29-34), in particular because there were exceptional circumstances in this case that would result in unjustifiably harsh consequence, i.e. (1) the risk from the Taliban and (2) the Respondents’ chronic health needs (§§18-20).

13. The Secretary of State’s grounds of appeal raised two grounds. I summarise them as follows:

a. Ground 1. The Judge had provided inadequate reasons for concluding that the accommodation and maintenance requirements of Appendix ADR would be met if a further application were to be made, in particular because there was no evidence that the Respondents would be able to maintain themselves without recourse to public funds given their significant ill-health and the Sponsor had not provided signed maintenance undertakings in accordance with §6.4 Appendix ADR.

b. Ground 2. The Judge had misdirected themselves in law in the assessment of proportionality under Article 8 ECHR, in particular by stating that the requirements of the Immigration Rules would be met if a further application were to be made and by failing to consider that the Respondents would be unlikely to be able to contribute to the economic well-being of the UK due to their ill-health and, rather, would likely become a burden on the National Health Service (‘NHS’).

14. On 15 January 2025, the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal on both grounds.

15. On 8 July 2025, the Respondents filed a document titled “Response to Grant of Permission” (I note that it appears that this document was not properly served on the Secretary of State at that time). Although it did not refer to rule 24, this document was in substance a rule 24 response. In it, the Respondents defended the Secretary of State’s appeal on both grounds, in particular on the basis that “NHS treatment does not fall within the definition of public funds for immigration purposes” (according to the Secretary of State’s own published guidance, ‘Public Funds’, dated 9 April 2025).

16. At the error of law hearing before me on 16 October 2025, Ms Young appeared for the Secretary of State and made the following express concessions:

a. There was no challenge to the Judge’s conclusion that the dependency requirements of §§5.1-5.2 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules were met.

b. It was accepted that the likely costs of the Respondents’ NHS treatment were not a relevant consideration for the purposes of assessing whether the Sponsor could adequately accommodate and maintain them without recourse to public funds under §6.1 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules.

c. There was no challenge to the Judge’s conclusion that the financial and accommodation requirements of §§6.1-6.3 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules were met at the date of the hearing.

d. The only requirement of Appendix ADR Immigration Rules that was not met at the date of the First-tier Tribunal hearing (and was still not met at the date of the error of law hearing) was the requirement for the Sponsor to provide signed maintenance undertakings in accordance with §6.4 Appendix ADR.

e. There was no challenge to the Judge’s conclusion that the there was a family life relationship between the Sponsor and the Respondents and that Article 8 ECHR was engaged by the refusal of entry clearance.

17. Mr Schwenk appeared for the Respondents and made the following express concessions:

a. It was accepted that the Respondents did not meet the financial and accommodation requirements of §§6.1-6.3 Appendix ADR Immigration Rule at the date of application or decision.

b. It was accepted that the Sponsor had never provided signed maintenance undertakings for the purposes of §6.4 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules.

18. In my error of law decision issued on 13 November 2025, I found that there were material errors of law in the Judge’s decision, in summary as follows:

a. Ground 1. I was satisfied that the Judge made an error of law in concluding that all of the requirements of Appendix ADR would be met if a further application were to be made. It was not in dispute that the Sponsor had never provided signed maintenance undertakings. Therefore, §6.4 Appendix ADR had never been met: not at the date of the application, nor at the date of the Secretary of State’s decision, nor at the date of the First-tier Tribunal hearing, nor at the date of the error of law hearing. §6.4 Appendix ADR is an important, substantive requirement of Appendix ADR, designed to safeguard the economic well-being of the UK. Thus, in circumstances where the requirements of Appendix ADR had never been met, it was rationally insupportable for the Judge to conclude that they would be met if a further application were to be made

b. Ground 2. I was satisfied that the Judge made an error of law in assessing proportionality under Article 8 ECHR. The Judge erroneously gave weight in the Respondents’ favour to the requirements of Appendix ADR being met if a further application were to be made (see Ground 1). Further, the Judge did not give any weight in their proportionality assessment to the likely cost of the Respondents’ NHS treatment, which was a part of a wider failure to give any meaningful consideration to any relevant public interest factors weighing against the Respondents.

19. I allowed the appeal to the extent that there were material errors of law in the Judge’s decision. I set aside §§18-20 and 29-34. The remaining findings were all preserved. I retained the appeal in the Upper Tribunal, with the decision to be remade following a further hearing. I made the scope of the resumed hearing clear as follows:

“32. For the avoidance of doubt, the scope of the resumed hearing will be limited to the following issues:

a. Whether the Respondents meet all of the requirements of Appendix ADR at the date of that hearing – i.e. whether they have met the requirement in §6.4 Appendix ADR by the Sponsor providing a signed maintenance undertaking for each of them (Ms Young expressly accepted that the Respondents have now met all of the remaining requirements of Appendix ADR, albeit that it is common ground that the accommodation and maintenance requirements were not met at the date of application).

b. Proportionality under Article 8 ECHR.”

20. I also made detailed case management directions in the body of my error of law decision, as follows:

“1. No later than 28 days after this error of law decision is sent out, the Respondents shall file and serve a consolidated bundle of all of the material relied on for the purposes of re-making the decision in this appeal. The contents of the bundle must be relevant to the scope of the resumed hearing, as identified in this error of law decision. If the bundle includes evidence that was not before the First-tier Tribunal, the Respondents should make a rule 15(2A) application at the same time as filing and serving it.

2. If the Sponsor is to give oral evidence and requires an interpreter for doing so, he must communicate this to the Upper Tribunal’s administrative staff promptly and no later than 28 days after this error of law decision is sent out.

3. No later than 42 days after this error of law decision is sent out, the Secretary of State may, if so advised, file and serve any additional evidence relied on.

4. No later than 7 days before the resumed hearing, the Respondents shall file and serve a skeleton argument.

5. No later than 3 days before the resumed hearing, the Secretary of State shall file and serve a skeleton argument.

6. I consider that the resumed hearing is suitable to be heard remotely. If either party wishes to request an in-person hearing, they must do so promptly and copy in the other side.

7. The parties may apply to vary these directions. They must do so promptly and copy in the other side.”

21. The Respondents failed to comply with these case management directions. Once the Respondents’ deadline had passed, the Secretary of State filed a skeleton argument defending the appeal (including on the basis that the Sponsor had still not filed the requisite signed maintenance undertakings). As the date of the hearing approached, the Tribunal sent two emails to the Respondents’ representatives (including once at my instigation) to make enquiries about their apparent failure to comply with the Tribunal’s directions. As far as I was aware, there was no response. Then, at 9.30am on the morning of the resumed hearing, an email from the Respondents’ representatives attaching a bundle of documents was forwarded to me (it had been sent to the Tribunal’s correspondence address a few days earlier, but it had not been correctly filed on CE-file). The email did not contain any explanation for the delay. This new bundle did not have an index and so its content was not readily apparent – however, it did contain signed maintenance undertakings from the Sponsor for each of the Respondents.

Re-making hearing

22. Mr Schwenk applied for the new bundle to be admitted. I asked him to explain why it had been filed so late in breach of directions without any explanation, why there was no index, why there was no rule 15(2A) application, and why it had not been correctly filed. Having taken instructions, he was able to offer apologies on behalf of those instructing him and state that a rule 15(2A) notice had now been uploaded (and, indeed, it was also emailed to me and Mr Simpson). However, he could provide no meaningful explanation for the various failings. Mr Simpson took a pragmatic view – he had received the new bundle a few days earlier and had been able to prepare, and so he was not opposing its admission. However, he asked that it be recorded in the decision that it had not been correctly served on the Secretary of State either.

23. The Respondents’ representatives’ various failings (including failing to comply with directions, failing properly to communicate with the Tribunal and the Secretary of State, and failing correctly to file and serve the new bundle) were obviously extremely regrettable. These were serious failings for which no good reason was provided. However, in all the circumstances, in particular because there were preserved findings that the Respondents were at risk from the Taliban and the Secretary of State was not opposing application, I decide that it was in the interests of justice to grant the application to admit the new bundle.

24. Mr Schwenk confirmed that, in respect of the content of the new bundle, he was relying only on the three signed maintenance undertakings. Beyond that, the relevant papers were all in the consolidated bundle of 490 pages filed by the Secretary of State in advance of the error of law hearing (in addition to the Secretary of State’s skeleton argument).

25. Mr Schwenk applied for an anonymity order for the Respondents. Mr Simpson did not oppose the application. I acknowledge the importance of the principle of open justice. However, I have decided to make an anonymity order because the Respondents are in a very vulnerable position in Afghanistan because they are already at risk from the Taliban, and I consider that disclosing their identity, or the Sponsor’s identity, could potentially increase that risk and cause them to come to harm.

26. Mr Schwenk confirmed that he was not calling the Sponsor to give evidence, and therefore the hearing proceeded by way of submissions only.

27. Mr Simpson’s submissions may be summarised as follows:

a. Issue 1. The requirements of §6.4 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules were still not met because the signed maintenance undertakings were defective. The forms used expressly required evidence of the Sponsor’s address to be provided and yet it had not been, and the forms had not been countersigned on behalf of the Secretary of State in any event.

b. Issue 2. If the requirements of §6.4 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules were still not met, the decision was certainly not disproportionate. The ongoing failure to meet those Rules was a weighty factor weighing against the Respondents. The inevitable and significant cost of NHS treatment was also a weighty factor weighing against them. Even if the requirements of §6.4 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules were now met, it was common ground that they were not met at the date of the application or decision – hence, this remained an ‘outside the Rules’ case. Thus, in view of the strong public interest factors weighing against the Respondents, there were no unjustifiably harsh consequences and the decision was proportionate (I note that, in this context, he relied on the recent Court of Appeal authority IA v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516).

28. Mr Schwenk’s submissions may be summarised as follows:

a. Issue 1. The requirements of §6.4 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules were now met. The signed maintenance undertakings had been provided. Acceptable proof of the Sponsor’s address had also been provided (Mr Schwenk found this evidence in the bundle – Mr Simpson accepted this but observed that it had not been provided together with the undertakings). The Respondents had no control over whether or not the Secretary of State countersigned the forms – they had done everything in their power substantively to comply with §6.4.

b. Issue 2. If the requirements of §6.4 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules were now met, then the decision was clearly disproportionate. In light of the preserved findings as to the risk from the Taliban and the Respondents’ ill-health, requiring them to make a further application that would certainly succeed would be unjustifiably harsh. Even if the requirements of §6.4 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules were still not met, the decision would be disproportionate in light of the extraordinary facts of this case. The obvious difference between this case and IA was the strength of the family life bonds here.

29. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision.

Findings and reasoning

Legal framework

30. Article 8 ECHR is a qualified right. The individual must first establish that Article 8(1) is engaged. If it is, then the Tribunal must decide whether the interference with the individual’s rights is justified under Article 8(2). If they do not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, the public interest will normally lie in refusing them leave to enter or remain. The exception is where refusal results in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the individual or an affected family member such that refusal is disproportionate. 

31. In making this assessment, the Tribunal must balance the public interest factors relied on by the Secretary of State (including but not limited to the factors set out in section 117B Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002) against the factors relied on by the individual.

Issue 1 - §6.4 Appendix ADR

32. Applying the balance of probabilities standard with the burden on the Respondents, I am satisfied that they met §6.4 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules at the date of the re-making hearing. Each of them had provided the Secretary of State with signed maintenance undertakings and the Secretary of State had also been provided with acceptable proof of the Sponsor’s address (in my view it is neither here nor there that the proof was provided separately to the forms – what matters is that it was provided).

33. In my view, in order for Mr Simpson’s argument about the forms not being countersigned by the Secretary of State to have had any prospect of succeeding, he would have needed to provide a good reason for her to refuse to do so. He did not seek to do so. In such circumstances, the Secretary of State was effectively seeking to invalidate otherwise entirely valid undertakings simply by refusing to sign them. I do not consider that to be a course of action that is properly open to her. Further, Mr Simpson did not provide any authority to support his argument in this regard. Therefore, in circumstances where §6.4 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules says nothing about using a particular form or the Secretary of State countersigning that form, I do not accept that it is necessary for the Secretary of State to countersign undertakings in order for them to be valid.

34. As I have said, at the error of law hearing, Ms Young conceded that the only requirement of Appendix ADR Immigration Rules that was not met was the requirement for the Sponsor to provide signed maintenance undertakings in accordance with §6.4. Mr Simpson did not seek to resile from this concession.

35. Therefore, having found that §6.4 Appendix ADR Immigration Rules is now also met, I am satisfied that all of the requirements of Appendix ADR are now met. Therefore, if the Respondents were now to make fresh applications for leave to enter under Appendix ADR, there is no good reason to consider that they would not be granted.

Issue 2 – Article 8 ECHR proportionality

36. As I have said, at the error of law hearing, Ms Young conceded that there was no challenge to the Judge’s conclusion that the there was a family life relationship between the Sponsor and the Respondents and that Article 8 ECHR was engaged by the refusal of entry clearance. Mr Simpson did not seek to resile from this concession.

37. It is not in dispute that the Respondents did not meet the requirements of Appendix ADR Immigration Rules at the date of application or decision. I acknowledge that if an individual does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, the public interest normally lies in refusing leave to enter or remain. The exception is where refusal results in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the individual or an affected family member such that refusal is not proportionate.

38. I find that this is such case. The proposed interference with the Sponsor’s and Respondents’ Article 8 ECHR rights is disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued for the following reasons: 

a. The maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest (section 117B(1) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002).  Therefore, the refusal of entry clearance is in the public interest because the Respondents did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules at the date of application or decision. However, I give this public interest factor less weight in circumstances where, if the Respondents were now to make fresh applications for leave to enter under Appendix ADR, there is no good reason to consider that they would not be granted.

b. Ordinarily, all things being equal, it is in the public interest and not disproportionate to require individuals who meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules only post-decision to make fresh applications in the usual way (see e.g. MS (Pakistan) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1776).

c. However, in this particular case, I consider that to do so would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Sponsor and Respondents. That is because:

i. There are preserved findings that the Respondents are actively at risk of direct, targeted ill-treatment by the Taliban (as a result of the same factual matrix that gave rise to the Sponsor’s successful Refugee Convention claim) and that they are confined to their home as a result (First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision, §13).

ii. There are preserved findings that the Respondents are in an extremely vulnerable position because they each “require complex medical intervention and ongoing care due to their poor health (physical and mental)” which is not available to them because of “non-existent complex heath care provision in Afghanistan and their inability to leave home/access care due to adverse interest from the Taliban” (First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision, §9 – and see generally §§9-14).

iii. In such circumstances, remaining in Afghanistan is potentially extremely dangerous for the Respondents, both in terms of the risks they face from the Taliban and the risks they face as a result of their health conditions remaining untreated. They applied for entry clearance more than 2 years ago. Yet further delay now (even if for a relatively short period) could have adverse consequences of the utmost gravity for them. It may result serious harm to them – indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that it may cost them their lives. At the very least, further delay will cause the Sponsor and the Respondents immense worry and distress and prolong the ongoing cleave in their accepted family life relationships.

iv. The Sponsor cannot be expected to return to Afghanistan, even to visit, because he is a refugee. Thus, the only place where the accepted family life relationships between the Sponsor and the Respondents can realistically resume is the UK.

v. I consider these to be the paradigm of unjustifiably harsh consequences, in particular in circumstances where the requirements of the Immigration Rules are now substantively met (i.e. but for the making of a further application).

vi. Collectively, I give these matters substantial weight in favour of the Respondents.

d. The Respondents cannot speak English for the purposes of section 117B(2), which increases the public interest in refusing entry clearance. However, I give this public interest factor less weight in circumstances where the Immigration Rules that they would meet if they were to make a further application (Appendix ADR) do not require them to be able to speak English.

e. The Respondents are (or would be) self-sufficient financially for the purposes of section 117B(3) because they meet the accommodation and maintenance requirements of Appendix ADR. However, this is only capable of being a neutral factor (AM (S 117B) Malawi [2015] UKUT 260 (IAC)).

f. None of the other section 117B factors are engaged on the particular facts of this case.

g. I acknowledge that the inevitable and likely significant costs to the NHS are a public interest factor weighing against the Respondents. Of course, the UK cannot be the hospital of the world. However, I give this public interest factor less weight in circumstances where NHS treatment is ‘baked-in’ to the Immigration Rules that the Respondents would meet if they were to make a further application (Appendix ADR). That is, it is acknowledged to be in the public interest for the Secretary of State to grant leave to enter if the requirements of Appendix ADR are met, notwithstanding that doing so is highly likely to result in potentially significant costs to the NHS.

h. I have carefully considered IA. In my view, on its facts, it is very different to the Respondents’ case. Notably, unlike in IA, in this case: (1) the family life relationships are very long-standing and deeply entrenched and involved cohabitation as a single family unit until the Sponsor was required to flee Afghanistan to avoid persecution; (2) thus, the Respondents made applications for entry clearance to resume their family life with the Sponsor in short order after he had been granted leave to remain as a refugee; (3) the Respondents would meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules if they were to make a fresh application; (4) the harm that the Respondents fear includes direct, targeted ill-treatment; and (5) the Respondents here are all in very poor health and unable to get the treatment they require in Afghanistan.

39. In conclusion, having carefully weighed all of the public interest factors weighing against the Respondents against all of the factors weighing in their favour, I have come to the conclusion that this is a clear-cut case. I am satisfied that the refusal of entry clearance would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Sponsor and the Respondents and is therefore disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

Conclusion

40. On the basis of my findings above, I allow the Respondents’ appeals on Article 8 ECHR grounds.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is remade. The appeal is allowed on Article 8 ECHR grounds.

B. Hoshi

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 February 2026