Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002517

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/62563/2023
LH/01922/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MONSON

Between

NURAZZAMAN CHOWDHURY
(ANONYMITY ORDER not MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Richardson, Counsel instructed by Kamran & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision of Fierst-tier Tribunal Judge CJT Lester promulgated on 14 January 2025 (“the Decision”). By the Decision, Judge Lester dismissed on human rights grounds the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent to refuse to grant him leave to remain as the unmarried partner of a British national, with whom he had developed a relationship as an overstayer.

Relevant Background
2. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh, whose date of birth is 19 March 1997. He apparently entered the UK on 19 March 2014 with his mother on a visit visa which was valid until 19 September 2014. His mother then returned to Bangladesh, leaving the appellant in the care of family members in Cardiff, who supported him financially until his Islamic marriage in the UK in 2019.
3. On 23 August 2023, the appellant applied for leave to remain as the unmarried partner of a British national, whose date of birth is 5 May 1998, and with whom the appellant was cohabiting in Cardiff. In their covering letter, the appellant’s previous solicitors said that the appellant and the sponsor had met through social media on 19 March 2017 and they had met in person on 31 March 2018, and since then had regularly met every month in Birmingham where the sponsor used to reside. They decided to get married Islamically on 1 November 2019 in Birmingham, followed by an intimate reception with friends and family. The sponsor had been trying to conceive and was currently under fertility treatment in the UK. The sponsor was a British citizen of Pakistani origin. The appellant’s family in Bangladesh had not approved of the Islamic marriage due to the sponsor’s ethnicity, and therefore it was not possible for the appellant and the sponsor to relocate to Bangladesh.
4. In a letter dated 22 August 2023, the sponsor said that if her husband was asked to leave the UK, it would have an adverse impact upon their relationship and married life. They were currently in discussion about IVF and other medical procedures to fulfil their wishes to have children. She was in constant communication with her immediate family in the UK on a regular basis. She had a close bond with her parents and siblings. Without this family life, life would be exceedingly difficult for her. She received both material and emotional support from her family. She had become accustomed to life and culture in the UK. The thought of living anywhere other than the UK was stressful for her. When she was under stress, she was more prone to depression. She could not go to Bangladesh because this would endanger them, as her husband’s family were angry that they had got married without their approval.
The Reasons for Refusal
5. In the Reasons for Refusal Letter (RFRL) dated 10 October 2023, the respondent said that the appellant had provided no evidence that there were insurmountable obstacles in accordance with paragraph EX.2 of Appendix FM to him or his partner continuing their family life together outside the UK in Bangladesh.
The Appellant’s Case on Appeal
6. In an appeal skeleton argument (ASA) dated 11 April 2024, Ms Heybroek of Counsel submitted that the partner had been a victim of domestic violence in a previous relationship. She suffered from PTSD, depression and anxiety. This had been exacerbated by the respondent’s decision to refuse the appellant’s application, resulting with her being signed off from work from August 2023 to February 2024 due to ill-health. Although she had tried to reintegrate into work part-time, she was signed off from work again on 7 March 2024. Her mental health was also exacerbated by her inability to conceive a child.
7. The appellant’s family in Bangladesh had cut off all ties with him as a result of his marriage to a person they perceived to be Pakistani. Her partner’s family was originally from Pakistan. They had been unsupportive of the relationship, given the appellant’s immigration issues. They did not wish her to marry, and they had cut off ties with her.
8. The appellant relied upon a psychiatric report from Dr Galappathie dated 6 February 2024; a cognitive behavioural psychotherapy (CBT) report from Mr Hussain dated 29 March 2024; and a medical report from Dr Waheed dated 31 March 2024.
9. The findings of the psychiatrist were (among other things) that removing the appellant from the UK would result in an exacerbation of the partner’s conditions, and would increase the risk of suicide/self-harm; if the partner was forced to go to Bangladesh to live with the appellant, this would lead to a deterioration in her mental health; and that the partner’s mental health was likely to improve if the appellant could remain in the UK with her.
10. The findings of the CBT report included that the appellant was providing “considerable psychological safety” to his partner, and that his removal would have a gross detrimental impact on her.
11. The findings of Dr Waheed were that it was highly likely that the partner’s mental health would deteriorate significantly even if she was temporarily separated from the appellant; that there were significant obstacles to her relocating to Bangladesh, even temporarily; and the partner was more likely to benefit from pharmacological and psychological interventions if the appellant was allowed to remain with her in the UK, and this would inevitably improve her mental health.
12. Ms Heybroek went on to discuss the respondent’s CPIN on Bangladesh: Medical treatment and health care, Version 2.0, July 2022.
13. In the light of the above evidence, she submitted that EX.1 was met. The effect upon the partner’s mental health, should she be forced to continue to family life with the appellant in Bangladesh - even for a short period of time - was such as to amount to an insurmountable obstacle. It was clear from the CPIN that she would be unlikely to access adequate mental health care, even if she and the appellant were able to afford private medical fees.
14. In the alternative, addressing the Chikwamba question, it was clear from the expert reports that even a temporary period of separation would exacerbate the partner’s already serious mental health condition, and this would amount to a disproportionate breach of the partner’s Article 8 rights.
The Respondent’s Review (R1)
15. In a Review dated 14 May 2024, the respondent challenged the case put forward in the ASA as to the timing of the onset of the partner’s symptoms and as to their causation. There had been no mention of health issues in the application, and there was no mention of mental ill-health in the partner’s GP records before May 2023. The diagnoses were also called into question by the fact that the medical records indicated that the appellant was given sick leave in August 2023 due to an incident at work, and not because of anxiety and depression.
Post -Review Evidence
16. In August 2024, the appellant’s solicitors uploaded to the CCD file an attendance letter from A&E; a letter from the partner’s GP; and an addendum report from Dr Galappathie dated 30 August 2024. The A&E attendance letter dated 16 August 2024 said that the partner had attended following an intentional acute Paracetamol overdose. She had taken 20 Paracetamol tablets whilst her husband was at home. He reported that she had been struggling with her mental health over the last year due to his visa application being rejected and fertility issues. She had been recently started on Mirtazapine by her GP. The partner stated that the overdose was spontaneous and not planned, despite regular thoughts about suicide. She had an episode of coughing and one episode of vomiting before arriving. She currently regretted overdosing and did not think that she would do it again.
The Respondent’s Further Review (R2)
17. In a further Review dated 4 November 2024, the respondent accepted (in the light of the A&E attendance letter) that the appellant’s partner required treatment for her mental health conditions. However, notwithstanding the arguments made in the addendum report, the respondent maintained that the partner would be able to access appropriate treatment in Bangladesh, were she to return there with the appellant in the event of the appeal being dismissed, having regard to the CPIN on Bangladesh: Medical treatment and health care, Version 2.0, July 2022.
18. The respondent did not accept that the appellant did not have familial support available to him in Bangladesh. The fact that the partner did not speak Bengali would not prevent her from accessing treatment in Bangladesh. In addition to the arguments made on this point, at para 17 of the Review(R1), the respondent submitted that, as a native speaker of Bengali. the appellant would be able to communicate with medical professionals on behalf of his partner.
19. The respondent also did not accept that the partner’s own family no longer offered her support. Given that the partner’s witness statement dated 22 August 2023 was prepared for the purposes of the appellant’s application for leave to remain, it was not accepted that her family would withdraw their support because of the appellant’s immigration status.
The Hearing Before, and the Decision of, the First-Tier Tribunal
20. The appellant’s appeal came before Judge Lester sitting at Columbus House, Newport, on 21 January 2025. The hearing was conducted remotely on the Cloud Video Platform. Ms Heybroek appeared on behalf of the appellant, and the respondent was represented by a Home Office Presenting Officer. Both the appellant and his partner gave oral evidence, and were cross-examined.
21. At paras [7]-[9] of the Decision, the Judge said that at the outset of the hearing the parties agreed that the issues were as set out in R1. The first issue was whether there were insurmountable obstacles to the appellant and his wife relocating to Bangladesh such that EX.1 of Appendix FM was satisfied. If not, the second issue was whether the appellant had demonstrated any exceptional circumstances which would breach Article 8, with reference to GEN 3.2 of Appendix FM.
22. At para [13] the Judge said that the parties were well aware of the issues and the evidence, and so it was not necessary to explore every aspect of the case in detail. Accordingly, he was going to focus upon those facts and matters which appeared to him to be the key issues and most relevant to his decisions and reasons. For the avoidance of doubt, he confirmed that he had considered all the evidence and the submissions, even if they were not explicitly referred to in this judgment.
23. At para [14] the Judge reminded himself of the vulnerable witness direction that he had given in relation to the wife’s evidence.
24. At para [16] the Judge listed the medical evidence that had been provided, and stated that at the start of the hearing an additional letter dated 24 October 2024 was uploaded in relation to the termination of the appellant’s employment. He said that he gave all of this evidence and the various conclusions of the reports appropriate weight.
25. The Judge embarked on an extensive discussion of the oral evidence that had been given by the couple. At para [30] the Judge said that he had found the assertion by the appellant and his wife that her family never asked if he worked not to be credible. On the evidence of his partner, due to the domestic abuse which arose within her first relationship, she had developed the mental health issues which continued and had developed to this day. At the time of the original application, she said that she was fully supported by her family and had a very strong relationship with them. When all these points were considered in the round, it was not credible that her family would never has asked if the appellant worked, and by implication whether he was able to support his wife, given her difficulties.
26. At paras [31] and [32] the Judge addressed the oral evidence of the couple that once his wife’s family found out that his application for leave to remain had been refused, her family had stopped all contact with them. The Judge held that this was not credible as the wife became aware of his immigration status at the start of their relationship; and it was not credible that his immigration status was never raised or mentioned to her family given the closeness of the relationship with her family which had existed since the relationship had commenced. He did not find it credible that her family were previously unaware of his immigration status and he did not find it credible that her family had ceased to be in contact with them and had ceased to support them.
27. At para [33], the Judge gave reasons for rejecting the assertion by the appellant that he was no longer in contact with his mother and siblings in Bangladesh.
28. At para [34], the Judge held that the appellant remained in contact with, and had the support of, his family in Bangladesh as well as the support of his sister and brother-in-law in Cardiff, and reiterated that his wife remained in contact with, and had the support of, her family in the UK.
29. At para [35], the Judge concluded that if the appellant were to return to Bangladesh, his family would support him. It was a matter for his wife as to whether she went to Bangladesh with him or not. But if she did so, her family would be supportive as well.
30. At para [36], the Judge said that he bore in mind the contents and conclusions of the medical evidence. Both the appellant and his wife gave evidence of the support which the appellant provided his wife in the UK. This included cooking, cleaning, going for walks together, attending medical appointments, and assisting his wife with her medication, alongside physical and emotional support.
31. The Judge went on to consider the availability of medical treatment in Bangladesh, as highlighted in the respondent’s first review (R1) and in the respondent’s further review (R2). The Judge referred to the CPIN on Bangladesh: Medical treatment and health care, Version 2.0, July 2022. At para [37] the Judge said that psychiatric treatment for PTSD and severe depressive episodes was available at numerous hospitals, according to para 10.1.3 of the CPIN. At para [38] the Judge said that R2 noted that the medication being currently prescribed to the wife was Mirtazapine, and that this and other antidepressant medications were available at Dhaka Medical College hospital which was a public facility that provided psychiatric treatment, according to para 10.1.4 of the CPIN; and that there were other public facilities providing psychiatric treatment according to para 10.1.5 of the CPIN.
32. At paras [39] and [40] the Judge addressed the appellant’s oral evidence that he wished to remain in the UK to assist his wife with her medical treatment and her infertility issues. The Judge referred to the case of Erimako [2008] cited in R1, where, in the absence of a life-abbreviating illness or a life-threatening illness, it was held that the infertility issues of the wife were not a compelling circumstance. Additionally, he observed, the wife was a British citizen, and any decision in relation the appellant did not oblige her to leave the UK. On the evidence of the wife set out in the initial statement in support of the application, the relationship started via social media, and even once they were meeting in person, social media contact remained a significant part of their relationship. The Judge found that this was something, therefore, they could use again.
33. The Judge then went on to state his conclusions. He found at para [45] that the appellant had not established that there were insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in Bangladesh. At paras [46] to [53] the Judge considered the second agreed issue, and at para [54] the Judge concluded that the decision of the respondent did not amount to a disproportionate interference.
The Grounds of Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
34. The grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal were settled by a colleague of Ms Heybrook.
35. Ground 1, in summary, was that the Judge had failed to give proper consideration to the expert medical evidence as to the effect of the appellant’s removal on his partner’s mental health, or to assess the proportionality of the appellant’s removal in the light of that evidence.
36. Ground 2, in summary, was that the Judge’s credibility findings were based upon a mischaracterisation of the evidence of the appellant and his partner, and on non-existent inconsistencies in their evidence.
37. Ground 3, in summary, was that the Judge did not address or determine the Chikwamba-type argument that it was disproportionate to require the appellant to return to Bangladesh to make an entry clearance application which would almost certainly succeed.
The Reasons for the Grant of Permission to Appeal
38. In a decision dated 16 July 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst gave reasons for granting permission to appeal on all grounds raised. Grounds 1 and 2 were arguable. In relation to Ground 3, the First-tier Tribunal in refusing permission asserted that the Chikwamba point was not identified as an issue. In addition, it was doubtful as to whether any error was material in the light of the Court of Appeal decisions in Alam -v- SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 30, and Butt -v- SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 189, as to the limited scope of Chikwamba. However, all grounds might be argued.
The Hearing in the Upper Tribunal
39. The hearing before me to determine whether an error of law was made out was a hybrid one, with me being present in the courtroom at Field House, whereas the representatives attended remotely via video link.
40. Although the respondent had not filed a Rule 24 response, Ms Everett confirmed that the appeal was opposed. Mr Richardson developed and expanded on the grounds of appeal.
41. As to Ground 1, Ms Everett submitted that the Judge had adequately engaged with the medical evidence and had made a sustainable finding that the partner could relocate to Bangladesh with her husband’s support. As to Ground 2, while she had some sympathy with the proposition that the Judge had found an inconsistency in the evidence where there was none, nonetheless it was open to the Judge to find that it was not credible that the partner’s parents had changed their attitude towards the appellant after the refusal decision. As to Ground 3, she relied on the observations made by UTJ Hirst when granting permission.
42. In reply, Mr Richardson submitted that an irredeemable defect in the Decision was that it did not mention the appellant’s suicide attempt in August 2024.
Discussion and Conclusions
43. I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953 at para [36]. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC). Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…”
44. I also take into account the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at para [2]:
“i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for the judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
45. I find it convenient to address the grounds of appeal in the same order as they were developed by Mr Richardson.
Ground 2
46. Ground 2 is that the Judge’s adverse credibility findings between paras [24] and [34] are flawed, as they are based upon a misinterpretation of the couple’s evidence and an inadmissible imposition of personal assumptions about their conduct.
47. One of the issues explored at the hearing was the credibility of the claim that the partner’s family had rejected her after the refusal decision because of the appellant’s immigration status. As well as relying on the fact that this claim was contradicted by the statement that the partner had made in support of the application in August 2023, it is clear that the Presenting Officer sought to test this claim by probing the parents’ prior state of knowledge, to which end he asked both the appellant and the partner whether the parents knew he was not working, and if so, why he was not working.
48. The partner’s oral evidence was that her parents knew at all material times that he was not working, but that they did not ask her why. Although there was no inconsistency in this evidence as a matter of logic (hence the concession made by Ms Everett in oral argument), it was open to the Judge to find at para [25] that her evidence was inconsistent in the context of the overarching assertion by the couple that the partner’s family was unaware of the appellant’s immigration status in the period up to and including the Islamic marriage, and had remained unaware of his immigration status until after the refusal decision, despite the partner having a very close bond with her family.
49. The Judge returned to the issue at para [30], where he held that the assertion by the appellant and his wife that her family never asked if (my emphasis) he worked was not credible, given the closeness of the relationship between the partner and her family, and the importance of the appellant having the ability to support the partner, due to her mental health issues.
50. It is submitted that the Judge mischaracterised the couple’s evidence at the beginning of para [30]. But I consider that the Judge was picking up on the appellant’s oral evidence referenced at para [24] which was that his partner’s family had never asked him if he worked or how he supported himself and his partner financially. It was open to the Judge to find that this was not credible for the reasons which he gave.
51. It is submitted that at para [32] the Judge improperly imposed his own subjective expectation as to how the couple should have conducted themselves, and that there was nothing inherently implausible about the partner choosing not to disclose the appellant’s immigration status to her family, particularly given her awareness that they would react negatively, as they ultimately did.
52. There is no merit in this submission. It was clearly open to the Judge to find that the couple’s evidence on the issue was not credible for the reasons which he gave, including, “the closeness of the relationship with her family which had existed since the relationship had commenced.”
53. In para 22 of the grounds, it is submitted that by wrongly concluding that the couple’s account lacked credibility, the Judge failed to properly consider the real-world consequences of the removal, including the absence of familial support and the impact of the appellant’s removal on the partner’s mental health. However, as the Judge’s adverse credibility findings are sustainable for the reasons I have given above, this criticism falls away.
Ground 1
54. The first criticism is that the Judge’s failure to refer to any of the key conclusions of the expert reports is an error of law.
55. The second criticism is that the Judge erred in law in his assessment of the impact of the appellant’s removal on the partner by only considering the availability of mental health care in Bangladesh, relying on the CPIN. It is submitted that the Judge erred in law in failing to engage with the expert evidence regarding the severity of the partner’s condition and the fact that her condition would worsen significantly if the appellant was removed.
56. The third criticism is that the Judge failed to assess the proportionality of the appellant’s removal in the light of the partner’s mental health condition. The evidence indicated that the appellant would be able to return to the UK as a spouse, as he met all the relevant requirements other than immigration status. In practical terms, the appellant would be returning to the UK shortly after his removal. The Judge ought to have assessed the proportionality of exposing the partner to a severe and unnecessary decline in her mental health, only for the couple to end up in the same position as they were now.
57. As to the first criticism, given that the issues with respect to the medical evidence had narrowed by the time of the hearing, I consider that it was open to the Judge to incorporate by reference the submissions made in the ASA as to the significance of the expert reports relied on.
58. If the respondent had adhered to the position taken in R1, whereby extensive reasons were given for challenging the reliability of the expert reports, it would have been incumbent on the Judge to grapple with the issues thereby raised. But in the light of the partner’s suicide attempt in August 2024, the respondent ceased to dispute the medical evidence, and accepted that the partner required treatment for her mental health conditions.
59. In the circumstances, it was open to the Judge to take the concession made in R2 as his starting point, and to focus on the principal controversial issue arising under EX.1, which was the availability and accessibility of appropriate medical treatment in Bangladesh.
60. As to the second criticism, I consider that the Judge gave adequate reasons for finding that the partner’s mental health condition did not constitute an insurmountable obstacle (as defined in EX.2) to the couple carrying on family life together in Bangladesh, and that the arguments to the contrary set out in para 14 of the grounds are no more than an expression of disagreement with a conclusion that was reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence for the reasons which he gave.
61. The Judge did not err in law in not making express reference to the partner’s suicide attempt. No supplementary ASA was filed alongside the Post-Review evidence, and so ostensibly the appellant’s case on EX.1 remained as it was previously. In any event, the fact that the partner had taken an overdose of Paracetamol in the UK when the appellant was present in the household was logically incapable of fortifying the appellant’s case under EX.1, which fell to be determined on the objective evidence about the availability and accessibility of appropriate medical treatment in Bangladesh and the subjective evidence about the availability of support in Bangladesh from (a) the appellant’s family members in Bangladesh, (b) from his sister and brother-in-law in Cardiff and (c) the partner’s family.
62. Mr Richardson criticises the Judge for not conducting a cumulative assessment of all the material considerations bearing upon the question as to whether EX.1 was satisfied. However, the case advanced in the ASA was simply that, despite having the appellant with her to support her, there was an insurmountable obstacle to family life being carried on in Bangladesh because the partner would not be able to access adequate treatment, which would lead to a deterioration in her mental health. In addition, it was submitted that the couple would be without funding and support as both their families disapproved of their relationship. The Judge gave adequate reasons for rejecting both these propositions, and his finding under EX.1 is fully sustainable. The Judge did not err in law in not referring to every material consideration bearing upon EX.1, such as the partner’s inability to speak Bengali.
63. The third criticism references Ground 3, and I will address it under that heading.
Ground 3
64. The Judge was not asked to address a Chikwamba-type argument in the terms set out in Ground 3. It was not submitted in the ASA that an entry clearance application was almost bound to succeed. In addition, by the date of hearing the partner had been dismissed from her employment due to her persistent ill-health, and so the MIR was not going to be satisfied for the foreseeable future. It is thus entirely credible that, as stated by Judge Lester when refusing permission to appeal against his own decision, a Chikwamba-type argument was not pursued at the hearing.
65. Nonetheless, I accept that it was submitted that the impact of the appellant’s removal on the partner would be unjustifiably harsh.
66. It was open to the Judge to find that the partner was not credible in her evidence that she had been cut off by her family, and that therefore she would be able to look to them for support if she decided not to accompany the appellant to Bangladesh either on a permanent basis or while he made an application for entry clearance.
67. It was also open to the Judge to find that the couple’s physical separation would be alleviated by them maintaining contact through social media, which had remained a significant part of their relationship even once they were meeting in person.
68. Although, as highlighted by Mr Richardson in oral argument, the Judge did not make express reference to the partner’s mental ill-health in his balancing exercise, it is tolerably clear from the Judge’s earlier findings that the Judge took her mental ill-health into account in reaching the sustainable conclusion that the removal of the appellant would not have unjustifiably harsh consequences such as to breach Article 8 ECHR.
Conclusion
69. For the reasons given above, I find that no material error of law is made out.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain an error of law, and accordingly the decision stands. This appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Andrew Monson
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
29 November 2025