The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
FIELD HOUSE Case No: UI-2025-002531
PA/00656/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 4th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE IQBAL

Between:

HAE
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Atas, Counsel instructed by Hadeel Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Everett, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant seeks to appeal the First-tier Tribunal’s decision promulgated on 16 March 2025, in which the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 11 January 2024.
2. The appellant in this case is an Egyptian national, born in 2003. He left Egypt in 2022 arriving in the United Kingdom on 13 September 2022, claiming asylum on 18 September 2022. The basis of the appellant's claim was his father's membership of the Muslim Brotherhood which led to adverse attention from the authorities for him.
3. The respondent accepted the appellant's identity and nationality appellant, as well as the fact that his claim raised an imputed political opinion. However, the respondent did not accept he had come to adverse attention from the authorities due to his father's association with the Muslim Brotherhood given the inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation as well as lack of detail. It was noted that section 8(4) of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 (credibility) assessment applied.
The First-tier Tribunal’s Decision
4. The appeal came before First-tier tribunal Judge on 14 March 2025, who dismissed the appeal for the following reason:
• [10] – The appellant's answers in the interview and during his evidence were vague and lacked detail in particular with respect to his father's activities and how he became aware of them. The judge found had his father been as active as claimed with the Muslim Brotherhood, the appellant would have been more informed about them.
• The judge noted the documents produced by the appellant provided by a lawyer relating to his father's prosecution, conviction and sentencing were not supported by a witness the statement or evidence as to how the documents were obtained, nor was there a statement from the translator to confirm they were an accurate translation. Further the judge recorded there was no note corroborating press reporting suggesting an actual trial took place or any expert evidence to corroborate documents were genuine [11].
• [12] - The judge noted the letter of support from Mr AE stated that the appellant was attending meetings and activities of the Muslim Brotherhood however, the Appellant had stated this was not correct and as the author of the letter did not attend the judge concluded the document could be given no weight.
• [13] - The judge noted the appellant was able to leave Egypt through the airport without any adverse difficulties therefore could not be of interest to the authorities.
• [14] – [15] – The judge concluded the appellant had failed to meet the evidential burden having considered his evidence in the round his account was not credible.
• [16] – [17] - In relation to surplus activities, the judge considered the evidence in relation to the appellant’s attendance and concluded it was considered purely to create a photographic record to assist his appeal.
• [18] - The judge concluded he had only attended a small number of rallies where he had no significant role and no evidence that such attendance would bring him to the adverse attention of the Egyptian authorities.
• [19] – The judge found it was unclear what the appellant's beliefs were, given he took part in no political activities whilst in Egypt. Whilst his attendance in demonstrations in the United Kingdom were noted, these were limited to three demonstrations. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
Grounds of Appeal
5. The Appellant sought permission on a number of issues and the judge granting permission, for ease of reference summarised these at [2] as follows:
a) The judge failed to engage with reasons for refusal from the and the appellant's rebuttal of these reasons.
b) The judge made an error of law in failing to properly address documents lodged by the appellant to show the origin and translation of documents relating to court proceedings in Egypt.
c) The judge's finding on the evidence of the appellant's surplus activities were speculative and ran counter to established the case law on the issue.
6. The judge accordingly concluded that ground b) was arguable in so far as it identified the fact that the judge erred in finding there was no evidence to say how the Egyptian documentation was obtained and translated. Such an error would be an error of fact and law.
7. At this juncture, I note as did the judge granting permission that the grounds lacked concision and were unduly prolix. Ms Atas on behalf of the appellant, who was not the author of the grounds, indicated she would relay this back to those who had authored the grounds. Notwithstanding that, permission was granted on 1 May 2025, limited to the single ground identified above.
Error of law hearing
8. Ms Everett, on behalf of the respondent, confirmed that no Rule 24 response had been filed and that, during preliminary discussions, she had been able to canvass the grounds on which permission had been granted, with Ms Atas. Following those discussions, Ms Everett properly conceded that the First-tier Tribunal Judge had erred on the face of the decision in relation to the documents concerning the conviction of the appellant’s father.
9. She noted that the evidence had plainly been produced by a lawyer, Mr HAAAE, by way of a declaration in which he stated that he was registered with the Egyptian Bar Association and had been instructed by Mrs FGGE to obtain a certified true copy of the original judgment sentencing the appellant’s father to 10 years’ imprisonment. Ms Everett further observed that the translation had been certified by a different individual, identified on the ‘certificate of translation’ stamp as Mr AA (also referred to as AKA), who, in a further stamp, described himself as an ‘attorney at law, accredited legal translator’. The Judge had therefore conflated the roles of the lawyer and the translator. In those circumstances, Ms Everett submitted that this mistake of fact therefore disclosed an error of law.
10. Ms Everett further submitted that, whilst the Judge had made otherwise comprehensive findings, in light of the challenge to the provenance of the documents it was difficult to maintain that the identified factual error was not material. In that context, Ms Atas made no further submissions.
11. Having reviewed the decision in light of the grounds, I am satisfied that the identified error is both established and material, and that the concession made by Ms Everett was properly made. The Judge’s assessment of the documentary evidence concerning the appellant’s father’s prosecution, conviction and sentencing was vitiated by a factual mistake, in that the roles of the lawyer and the translator were conflated and the provenance of the documents misunderstood. That evidence was capable of corroborating the appellant’s account yet was rejected on an erroneous basis.
12. Therefore as the father’s conviction, arising from his asserted involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood, lies at the core of the claim and underpins the appellant’s case as to why he has come to the adverse attention of the authorities, the error materially undermines the reliability of the findings.
Disposal
13. Having therefore considered paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Directions and having due regard to what was said by the Court of Appeal in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I carefully consider whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal.
14. In relation to disposal, Ms Everett submitted that the findings concerning the alleged sur place activities should be preserved. Ms Atas, by contrast, invited remittal to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing. She submitted that, given that more than a year had elapsed since the hearing and that she held no instructions as to any subsequent developments, it would be unfair to preserve findings on those activities in isolation.
15. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the appropriate course is for the appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by a judge other than the judge who previously determined the matter. The appeal shall be heard de novo.
Notice of Decision
i. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
ii. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
iii. The appeal is remitted, de novo, to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by a different judge.


Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


S Iqbal
26th May 2026