Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002543

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/02219/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREER

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

SALEH HUSSEIN HAMID
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Young, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Holmes, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Respondent

Heard at IAC on 24 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Secretary of State appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the “FtTJ”) who allowed the appeal against the decision made to refuse human rights claim made in the context of his deportation in a decision promulgated on 17 February 2025.
2. Although the Appellant in these proceedings is the Secretary of State, for convenience we will refer to the Secretary of State for the Home Department as the Respondent and to the Appellant before the FtT as “the Appellant,” thus reflecting their positions before the First-tier Tribunal.
The background:
3. The background to the appeal is set out in the evidence and in the decision of the FtTJ. The Appellant is a national of Germany, born on 19 October 2000. He entered the United Kingdom in or around 2006 as a dependent of his EEA national parents. On 15th November 2019, he was granted Indefinite Leave to Remain under the EU Settlement Scheme.
4. Between 28th June 2022 and 22nd August 2022, the Appellant was convicted of multiple offences including six counts of supplying Class A drugs, two counts of possession with intent to supply Class B drugs, and one count of dangerous driving. On 28th September 2022, he was sentenced by the Crown Court to an aggregate term of 33 months’ imprisonment.
5. On 19th December 2022, the Respondent issued a Stage 1 Notice of a decision to make a deportation order under section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007. The notice was served on the Appellant on 21st December 2022. In response, the Appellant made submissions dated 19th and 23rd January 2023, which the Respondent treated as a human rights claim.
6. On 20th November 2023, the Respondent made a deportation order and refused the Appellant’s human rights claim. The Appellant lodged an appeal against that decision on 4th December 2023, enjoying a Right of Appeal under The Immigration (Citizens' Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 and the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
7. The appeal was heard before the First Tier Tribunal at Bradford on 4th February 2025. In a determination promulgated on 17th February 2025, the First Tier Tribunal allowed the appeal on human rights grounds, finding that the Appellant met the requirements of Exception 1 under section 117C (4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, on the basis that there were very significant obstacles to his integration in Germany.
8. On 3rd March 2025, the Respondent lodged an application for permission to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, asserting that the First Tier Tribunal had made irrational findings and failed to give adequate reasons on material matters. Permission to appeal was refused by Judge of the First tier Tribunal Horton on 2nd June 2025.
9. The Respondent renewed the application to the Upper Tribunal as dated 6th June 2025. On 14th July 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst granted permission to appeal on limited grounds, namely whether the FtTJ had erred in law in concluding that there were very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Germany, and/or whether the reasoning on that issue was inadequate.
10. The appeal now comes before the Upper Tribunal for consideration of whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.
11. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, we take into account the following propositions, which are not controversial, that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and that their decisions should be respected unless it is clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. The task of the Upper Tribunal is to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal made a material error of law. We are not determining the appeal against the decision of the Respondent. When deciding whether the FtTJ's decision involved the making of a material error of law we reminded ourselves of the principles governing the approaches to such decisions which have been reviewed in a number of cases including Hamilton v Barrow and Ors [2024] EWCA Civ 888, Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at paragraph 26, Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74 at paragraph 50, and Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410 paragraphs 46 - 47 and Volpi and Anor v Volpi [2022]EWCA Civ 464.
12. The constraints to which appellate tribunals and courts are subject in relation to appeals against findings of fact were recently (re)summarised by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 in these terms, per Lewison LJ:
"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract."
13. In summary, we must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue in play.
The applicable legal framework:
14. The deportation of foreign national offenders is governed by the UK Borders Act 2007 Act ("the 2007 Act"). Section 32 provides for the automatic deportation of foreign criminals sentenced to at least 12 months' imprisonment. Section 33 sets out the exceptions to automatic deportation. For the purposes of the present appeal, this includes where the person's deportation would breach their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"): see s.33(2)(a).
15. Section 117C of the 2002 Act sets out considerations that a court or tribunal must take into account when considering the Article 8 ECHR rights of a foreign criminal appealing against a decision to deport them from the UK:
117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal ("C") who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4)  Exception 1 applies where-”
(a)  C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b)  C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c)  there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5)  Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6)  In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7)  The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.
16. There is no dispute that the Appellant meets the definition of a "foreign criminal" under s.32 of the 2007 Act: he is not a British citizen; he has been convicted in the UK of an offence; and he was sentenced to a period of imprisonment exceeding 12 months. Under s.32 of the 2007 Act and s.117C(1) of the 2002 Act, Parliament has made it clear that the deportation of a foreign criminal is conducive to the public good and in the public interest. Furthermore, under s.117C(2) of the 2002 Act, the more serious the offence committed, the greater the public interest is in their deportation.
17. Nevertheless, under s.117C(3), in the case of a foreign criminal who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires their deportation unless Exception 1 (private life) or Exception 2 (family life with a qualifying partner or child) is met.
18. The Appellant sought to rely on Exception 1.
Very Significant Obstacles to Integration:
19. The issue is dispute in the present appeal is whether the First Tier Tribunal made a material error of law in finding that the Appellant would face very significant obstacles to his integration upon return to Germany. The leading case on this question remains Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813, which was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Sanambar v SSHD [2021] UKSC 30. In Kamara, Lord Justice Sales said at [14]:
In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal's "integration" into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported, as set out in section 117C(4)(c) and paragraph 399A, is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of "integration" calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.
20. In AS (Iran) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1284, the Court of Appeal recognised, at [46], that it is possible for migrants with no ties to the country of destination, and no contacts there, and who cannot speak the language on arrival, to integrate and develop a private life there within a reasonable time. The court noted, at [59], that whether someone can become ‘enough of an insider’ in the Kamara sense is not to be determined (solely) by reference to their ties or links to the country of destination. Generic factors (such as good health, the ability to work, intelligence, academic abilities, ability to adapt to the local culture, and robustness of character) could be of significance and form part of the broad evaluative judgment of whether or not someone would encounter very significant obstacles to integration.
21. In Parveen v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 932, the Court of Appeal recognised at [9] that inconvenience or upheaval, or even just significant obstacles, will not be enough to satisfy the test under the statute, which imposes an elevated threshold.
22. There is nothing to stop the tribunal from looking at the identified obstacles cumulatively. The test is an objective one and requires consideration of any reasonable step that could be taken to avoid or mitigate the obstacles identified: see NC v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1379 at [25] and [26].
23. At the hearing before us, we were taken to the authority of Ackom v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 537. That decision was handed down on 30th April 2025, which is to say after the promulgation of the First Tier Tribunal’s decision in the present case. The parties did not agree as to the significance of this case. Whilst we recognise that the Court of Appeal’s findings are not determinative of factual findings in other appeals, this was the first case since the withdrawal from the UK from the EU in which the Court of Appeal was required to consider the proper approach to Section 117C(4) (c) of the 2002 Act as it applies to an EU national, when the proposed state of return is an EU state ( see paragraph 10 of the decision).
24. We consider that Ackom establishes the following principles:
i. The “very significant obstacles” test is an elevated threshold. What must be shown is that the obstacles would prevent or seriously inhibit the individual’s ability to integrate, as opposed to making integration difficult or challenging (at [31] and [49]).
ii. Factors such as a lack of ties with the country of destination, no familiarity with that country, no friends or family there to help with integration, and an inability to speak the language, might well suffice in an appropriate case to demonstrate "very serious" obstacles to integration in that country, but those factors are not unusual and they are not necessarily determinative (at {19], [45] – [46])
iii. The problems arising from a Foreign Criminal having spent time in prison and having a criminal record may be taken into account but cannot, by themselves, amount to very significant obstacles (at [47])
Discussion and analysis:
25. We have had the benefit of hearing submissions from both parties, and we are grateful for the assistance that we have received from both advocates.
26. Ms Young, on behalf of the Respondent, relied upon the grounds of appeal and directed our attention to paragraphs [12]– [20] of the First-tier Tribunal’s determination. She submitted that the reasoning therein did not adequately explain why the Secretary of State had lost, particularly in light of the guidance set out in Ackom v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 537, which concerned materially similar facts. It was her submission that the Judge failed to apply the elevated threshold required by section 117C(4)(c), namely whether the obstacles identified would prevent or seriously inhibit the Appellant’s integration in Germany. She further submitted that the conclusion at [20], that the Appellant would be “a complete outsider,” did not engage with the correct legal test and invited the Tribunal to set aside the decision.
27. Mr Holmes, on behalf of the Appellant, submitted that each case must be determined on its own facts and that the Tribunal should not be unduly influenced by the fact that the proposed country of return in Ackom was also Germany. He argued that the Judge had correctly recognised Germany as a developed Western European country with a comparable standard of living and social welfare system, as noted at [12]. To this extent, the present case can be distinguished from Ackom. Mr Holmes referred to paragraphs [9], [12], and [20], which he submitted demonstrated that the Judge had the correct legal test in mind. He further submitted that the matters identified at [12]– [19] were entitled to weight and that the reasoning at [20] was sufficient to enable the Respondent to understand why the appeal had succeeded. He urged us to uphold the First Tier Tribunal’s decision.
28. We accept Mr Holmes’ submission that the Judge was aware of the statutory test. The references to section 117C (4) and the citation of Kamara at [9], together with the references to the statutory wording at [12] and [20], support that conclusion. However, the issue before us is not whether the Judge was aware of the test, but whether it was applied correctly in substance and whether there was an error in approach as well as whether adequate reasons were given to support the conclusion reached. For the reasons that follow, we are satisfied that the First tier Tribunal’s decision is infected with material legal error.
29. The reasoning at [13] and [15]– [17] focuses on the Appellant’s lack of ties, lack of language, absence of family support, and unfamiliarity with German society. These are potentially relevant considerations, but as the Court of Appeal made clear in Kamara and reaffirmed in Ackom, the absence of existing ties is not necessarily determinative. Integration is not assessed by reference to whether the individual arrives in the country to which deportation is proposed already integrated, but whether they have the capacity to become part of society within a reasonable time. The FtTJ made a finding that in respect of language he could “over time” learn the language but concluded that his inability to speak the language was an obstacle to his integration. We are satisfied that the FtTJ did not apply the applicable test and whether the time taken to learn a language could be done within a “reasonable time” (we refer to paragraph 38 of Ackom).
30. At [12], the Judge acknowledges that Germany has a comparable standard of living and social welfare system to the UK. At [14], the Judge accepts that the Appellant could learn German over time. At [18], the Judge finds that Germany is a largely tolerant society where the Appellant could freely practise his faith, and at [19], the Judge rejects the submission that far-right violence is more prevalent in Germany than in the UK. These findings tend to support the proposition that the Appellant would not be prevented or seriously inhibited from integrating. They also reflect the observation made in Ackom at [50], that where the country of return is not significantly different from the UK, the bar for establishing “very significant obstacles” is correspondingly high.
31. The conclusion at [20], that, “the culture in Germany is unfamiliar,” is difficult to reconcile with the findings at [12], [14], [18], and [19], which describe Germany in terms that suggest the Appellant could reasonably be expected to adapt. It was common ground between the parties that the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, to which he moved when he was a child and of which he is not a national. The Judge did not explain why, despite being young, fit, educated to some degree, capable of learning the language, and having the capacity to integrate in the United Kingdom, the Appellant could not reasonably be expected to overcome the challenge of not currently being integrated in German society. The omission to assess the Appellant’s resilience and adaptive capacity was itself a material error, as highlighted in Ackom at [48].
32. Nor did the Judge provide a clear cumulative analysis at [20]. The various disadvantages identified were listed but not shown, in combination, to reach the elevated threshold of obstacles that would prevent or seriously inhibit integration. A mere accumulation of ordinary obstacles such as absence of ties, lack of recent residence, or language barriers is insufficient to cross the elevated threshold. The dismissal of positive indicators of integration in favour of the broad conclusion that the Appellant would be, “a complete outsider,” discloses inadequate reasoning and fails to reconcile the findings made.
33. Whilst it was submitted on behalf of the Appellant that grounds were no more than a disagreement with the outcome, we do not agree. We have considered the grounds of challenge, both the original grounds and those which were renewed and have done so in the context of the submissions made by both advocates. We take into account that an evaluation of the facts is often a matter of degree upon which judges can legitimately differ. However, the question we must ask ourselves is whether the decision is wrong by reason of some identifiable flaws in the judge’s treatment of the question to be decided which undermines the cogency of the conclusions reached. For the reasons that we have set out above we are satisfied that the Respondent has demonstrated that the decision of the FtTJ involved the making of an error on a point of law.
34. Accordingly, having considered the FtTJ’s reasoning at [12]– [20], we are satisfied that the Tribunal did not adequately engage with the elevated threshold required by section 117C(4)(c). While the FtTJ referred to the statutory test, the analysis did not demonstrate why the cumulative factors identified would prevent or seriously inhibit integration, rather than merely render it difficult. The decision is therefore set aside for material error of law.
Disposal
35. Both parties submitted that if an error of law was found that the appeal should be remitted to the FtT for afresh hearing. We take into account the Court of Appeal's decision in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC) and 7.2 of the Senior President's Practice Statements. Sub-paragraph (a) deals with where the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party's case to be put to and considered by the FtT, whereas sub-paragraph (b) directs us to consider whether we are satisfied that the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal. The extent of judicial fact-finding necessary, particularly in relation to the Appellant’s resilience, capacity to adapt, and current personal circumstances, is such that it is appropriate for the matter to be determined afresh by the First-tier Tribunal. None of the findings of fact are preserved.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law; the decision of the FtT is set aside and is remitted to the FtT to hear afresh.

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Greer

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Greer

Dated: 22 October 2025