Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002546

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68136/2023
LP/02462/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 5th of November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

Between

B J H A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Wood, Legal Representative
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer, Home Office

Heard via CVP at Field House on 15 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This appeal was heard remotely via cloud video platform (CVP). I checked from the outset with all participants to ensure that they could hear and see each other clearly before proceeding to hear submissions.
2. The appellant is a national of Iraq. By these proceedings he appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal by which his protection appeal was dismissed.
3. On 2 December 2021, the appellant claimed asylum in the United Kingdom. The respondent refused that claim in a letter dated 14 December 2023, and the appellant brought an appeal. In a determination dated 15 April 2025 the appellant’s appeal was dismissed, following an oral hearing, by First-tier Tribunal Judge Swinnerton (‘the Judge’). This is the decision under appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
4. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Farmer on 9 June 2025.
5. The matter now comes before me to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal erred in law, and if so whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
6. The appellant and respondent were ably represented by Mr Wood and Ms Clewley, respectively. I am grateful to them for their very helpful submissions.
7. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘FTTJ’) made an anonymity direction and that direction is maintained.
Grounds
8. There appellant submits two grounds of appeal:
(i) Failure to provide any or adequate reasons for findings of fact on material matters. By this ground, the appellant submits that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law by failing to provide any or adequate reasons as to why the complaint document at [20] of the determination was given little or no weight. Additionally, the appellant notes that a medical document/note in support of his account of his father suffering an injury as a consequence of an attack on the family home in March 2024 appears not to have been considered by the Judge with no reasoned finding provided.
(ii) Making a material misdirection in law: By this ground, the appellant submits that the First-tier Tribunal misdirected itself when appraising the appellant’s evidence. This ground has several strands. At [19] of the determination, the Judge rejected the appellant’s account on the basis that there had been a period of inactivity in terms of the blood feud involving the appellant. It is argued that the Judge failed to consider the appellant’s account in the appropriate context of events in Iraq within the respondent’s own Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) - Iraq: Blood Feuds, Honour Crimes and Tribal Violence (July 2024) which states that ‘Blood feuds can lead to prolonged cycles of retaliatory violence and revenge, sometimes escalating after years of inactivity.’
(iii) The appellant’s evidence was that there was a demand made of his father for ‘blood money’ in the sum of $120K by Diako’s father. It is submitted that this demand is consistent with the CPIN description of blood money at paragraph 10.1.4. which states ‘Compensation can be requested in the case of waiving the infliction of the similar harm on the perpetrator.’
(iv) Finally, at [15] of the determination, the Judge rejected the appellant’s account on the basis that it was implausible stating ’At the hearing, the appellant gave evidence that Diako had died after the appellant had been detained for one month. The appellant stated that Diako’s family elongated the detention process for the appellant to give them a greater opportunity to arrange for harm to be done to the appellant whilst he was in detention. I did not find this explanation to be in any way credible. The appellant would have been at much more risk from action by the family of Diako were he not in detention. I did not find the appellant’s account of being held in detention and of bail being denied by the family of Diako to be at all credible.’ It is argued that the appellant cannot account for the logic or otherwise of those who wish to persecute him: see Kasolo v Secretary of State for the Home Department [13190].
9. Granting permission, First-tier Tribunal Judge Farmer stated in relation to Ground 1 ‘…..the Judge gave no indication as to why this document was given little weight. It is insufficient to simply reject a document without giving some explanation as to why it is rejected.’ In relation to Ground 2, he stated ‘….no reference is made to the background evidence at any point of the decision, and this discloses an arguable material error of law.’
10. It is against this background the appellant appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
Submissions
11. Regarding Ground 1, Mr Wood for the appellant submitted that the Judge only mentioned one document at [20] and gave little or no weight to it. No mention was made of the medical document provided. Even though the Judge accepted the respondent’s view that the action taken against those involved in the claimed attack on the appellant’s home appeared to contradict his account that the Diako family had significant influence and power in Iraq, that could not have been the reason for impugning the complaint document. This was because the Judge clearly stated, ‘I agree’ and then went on to say, ‘In any event, I give little or no weight to the complaint document provided.’
12. Mr Wood submitted that it was clear from examining the complaint and the medical documents that they are both factually consistent. He made the point that this was not a case where there were internal inaccuracies in the police and medical documents. The Judge clearly rejected the case on plausibility and provided no reason why he choose to give little or no weight to the complaint document and to not mention the medical document at all. In summary, the Judge had failed to conduct a holistic assessment of the evidence.
13. Turning to Ground 2, Mr Wood said the Judge dismissed the case on plausibility without any consideration to the background evidence at CPIN 3.1.5 which states that ‘Blood feuds can lead to prolonged cycles of retaliatory violence and revenge, sometimes escalating after years of inactivity. Violence associated with blood feuds include armed confrontations, the shooting at or burning of homes, abductions, and killings.’
14. Mr Wood agued that a clear example of the Judge’s failure to have regard to the background evidence could be seen at [19] of the determination. Here, without any reference to the CPIN, the Judge said that he did not find it credible that more than two and half years after the appellant had left Iraq and three years after the claimed incident, the family of Diako would be attacking the appellant’s family home.
15. Similarly, the Judge dismissed the appellant’s account at [13] that his father had been asked by Diako’s father for $120K to spare the appellant’s life even though the CPIN at 10.1.4 noted that ‘Diyaa’ (blood money) as compensation can be requested in the case of waiving the infliction of the similar harm on the perpetrator.
16. In summary, Mr Wood submitted that this was a case involving a blood feud with the Judge not taking into consideration any of the background country evidence which is a misdirection in law: see AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 at [19].
17. Ms Clewley on behalf of the respondent relied on the filed Rule 24 response. She confirmed that the appeal was opposed because the Judge had directed themselves appropriately.
18. In relation to Ground 1, the Judge had agreed with the respondent’s submission and therefore it was wrong to say that no reasons had been given. There was no requirement for a Judge to give elaborate reasoning for each item of evidence in line with MK (duty to give reasons) [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) at [12].
19. The rejection of the complaint document meant that the Judge had also rejected the underlying narrative to which the medical note related. There was no requirement to refer to every item of evidence in line with Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKYT 341 (IAC).
20. In any event, the medical evidence took the Tribunal no further as the Judge had made several other findings. The Judge had holistically rejected the narrative that injury to the father could have resulted from the claimed attack and therefore even if he had engaged with the medical note, it would have made no difference.
21. Turning to Ground 2, the assertion that the Judge had failed to incorporate background country information misunderstood the nature of judicial fact finding. A CPIN did not compel acceptance of an appellant’s account merely because it was consistent with general patterns. The Judge was entitled to assess the plausibility against the specific facts advanced.
22. Furthermore, the reliance by the appellant on AM (Afghanistan) was misplaced. The authorities required the Judge to undertake a holistic approach to credibility, taking into account background material. There was no indication that the Judge had undertaken an inverted approach (credibility first, then background material) and therefore no legal misdirection had occurred. The Judge considered the CPIN at [20] and therefore his reasoning showed an integrated approach.
23. Finally, Ms Clewley submitted that the Judge had given a range of reasons for dismissing the appeal. In this regard, the determination showed far more reasoning than the Judge simply relying on inherent implausibility.
Findings and reasons
24. To deal firstly with Ground 1, the appellant’s appeal involved a protection claim. The appellant’s account before the First-tier Tribunal was that a complaint document was filed by his brother in respect of an attack on their family home on 19 March 2024 in which his father was injured. The appellant provided a certified translation of the complaint and the medical note. No challenge was made by the Judge to the ‘reliability’ of those documents. I have reviewed them in the bundle, and they appear to be factually consistent with each other with no obvious inaccuracies on their face.
25. At [11] of the determination, the Judge correctly cited the case of Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00439 but does not appear to have explicitly applied the principles of the decision to the complaint document nor the medical note. It is clear from the decision of Tanveer Ahmed that the decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should be properly placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.
26. In my view, even though the Judge accepted the respondent’s position about the claimed attack on the appellant’s home, that was no answer to the apparent failure by the Judge to also mention the medical note and to provide adequate reasoning as to why little or no weight would be given to one (or both) of the documents. The Judge stated explicitly at [20], ‘In any event, I give little or no weight to the complaint document.’ That is a clear indicator that agreement to the respondent’s position was not of itself the reason for giving little or no weight to the complaint document.
27. As noted earlier, this was a protection appeal. The complaint and medical documents not only go to the issue of the claimed attack on the appellant’s home, but importantly to the central issue of the protection appeal itself, namely, whether or not the appellant would be at risk on return to Iraq. The Judge did not engage with the documents and did not even mention the medical note.
28. While I accept that the weight to be accorded to evidence is the quintessential matter for the Tribunal, and that the cited authorities do not require a Judge to elaborate their reasoning or cite every item of evidence, a Judge is nonetheless expected to give some explanation as to why a document is rejected, especially where the document goes directly to a central issue in the appeal.
29. In the circumstances, I do not accept the respondent’s submission that even if the Judge had reviewed the medical note, it would have made no difference because he had rejected the central narrative about how the injury to the father was occasioned. The challenge for the respondent is that for her to succeed on that submission, she must show that the Judge would have reached the same conclusion without the error. In other words, an error of law will be regarded as material unless the decision maker must have reached the same conclusion without the error: Detamu v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] ECWA Civ 604. I cannot say with confidence that the respondent has met that high standard on the issue of materiality.
30. The basic fact is that the Judge appears not to have reviewed the complaint and the medical note together or at all and provided no adequate reasoning for the little to no weight assigned to the complaint document, and for not mentioning the medical note. The determination shows that there has been no proper holistic assessment of the evidence.
31. For the foregoing reasons, I find that Ground 1 discloses a material error of law.
32. Turning to Ground 2. At [19] the Judge stated that he did not find it credible that more then two and half years after the appellant had left Iraq and three years after the claimed incident that the Diako family would attack the appellant’s family home. Likewise, the Judge dismissed the appellant’s account that his father was asked to pay the Diako family $120K as blood money.
33. In assessing an appellant’s credibility, it is trite that the decision maker must adopt a holistic approach taking account of background evidence. In Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] ECWA Civ 1223 at [25] Keene LJ stated that it was important for the Immigration Adjudicator ‘to view an appellant’s account of events .. in the context of conditions in the country from which the appellant comes.’ At [27] he stated, ‘In essence he must look through the spectacles provided by the information he has about conditions in the country in question.’
34. That said, at [26], Keene LJ accepted the point put by Lord Brodie in Awala [2005] CSOH 73 which was ‘….while a decision on credibility must be reached rationally, in doing so the decision maker is entitled to draw on his common sense and his ability, as a practical and informed person, to identify what is and what is not plausible’.
35. Applying these principles to Ground 2, there was background information about blood feuds in Iraq provided in CPIN – Iraq: Blood Feuds, Honour crimes, and Tribal violence July 2024. This noted at 3.1.5. that blood feuds can lead to prolonged cycles of retaliatory violence and revenge, sometime escalating after years of inactivity. Likewise at paragraph 10.1.4 of the CPIN, it refers to ‘Diyaa (Blood money) noting that compensation can be requested in the case to waive infliction of similar harm on the perpetrator.
36. In reaching his findings about the appellant’s credibility at [15] and [19] the Judge makes no reference to having had regard to the relevant CPIN. His findings are in fact inconsistent with the background information contained in the CPIN. This suggests that the Judge has not undertaken a holistic assessment of the evidence but has reached his findings by placing too much weight on the plausibility of the appellant’s account which is inappropriate and amounts to an error of law.
37. An assessment of credibility should be made on the basis of a holistic assessment of all the evidence in which supporting background evidence, such as country information reports, background evidence and witness evidence is weighed. That appears not to have been done in this case. At the core of this case is the question of whether a blood feud is in existence, yet the Judge fails to have regard to the relevant background material on that very key issue.
38. In the circumstances, I agree with the appellant that the Judge misdirected himself in law when appraising the appellant’s evidence by failing to adopt a holistic approach taking into account background country evidence which is a material error law.
39. It follows that the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Swinnerton contained material errors of law and must be set aside.
40. I canvassed the parties in respect of further steps in view of a finding of a material error of law. The parties agreed that as the error of law goes to the credibility of the appellant that on balance the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing. That is my view also. Given the critical nature of the conclusions on credibility no part of the determination can be preserved.
Notice of decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Swinnerton of 15 April 2025 did involve the making of errors of law and is set aside. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing before a differently constituted tribunal with no findings of fact preserved.

K.A Khan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 October 2025