Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-002555
UI-2025 002556

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/52749/2024 & HU/52750/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 5th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL FTT JUDGE BLUNDELL
and
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL FTT JUDGE CHANA

Between

PAMELA GOPINATHAN
SUBBIAH GOPINATHAN
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent
Representation

For the appellant: Ms Bachu of Counsel
For the respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 August 2025
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants, who are husband and wife, are citizens of India, appealed against the respondent’s decisions dated 28 February 2024, refusing their applications for leave to remain made on 9 November 2022 on human rights grounds. FtT Judge Ladato, in a decision dated 20 March 2025, are dismissed the appellants appeals.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by FtT Judge Mulready on 4 June 2025 stating that it is arguable that the FtT Judge fell into material error because he failed to conduct a fact specific analysis of the appellants circumstances, such as there respective ages and medical diagnosis of dementia, Alzheimer’s and Parkinsons disease. This resulted in the failure to take into account relevant matters and evidence capable of informing the assessment of very significant obstacles and did not give reasons, why on the face of otherwise credible witnesses, the oral evidence of their daughter concerning her enquiries about lack of available specialist care home in India was to be rejected on account of a lack of supporting evidence. The FtT Judge also failed to consider the best interests of the appellants grandchildren.
3. The appellants entered country with visitor visas and after their arrival, the appellants daughter was sufficiently concerned about how her parents presented that she arranged for a series of specialist medical assessments. The respondent accepted that the appellants applications for leave to remain was not a cynical exercise pursued after duplicitously gaining entry clearance.
4. The FtT Judge noted that the issues for him to resolve in the appellants appeals were whether the respondent’s refusal breaches the appellants right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights which is a qualified right. Also whether there are very significant obstacles for the appellants integration on return to India and whether the appellant or any members of their family will suffer unjustifiably harsh consequences if the refusal decision stands. It was agreed by the parties at the hearing that the resolution of this appeal was likely to turn on the assessment of proportionality as it was accepted by the respondent that protected family life had been established between the appellants and their two daughters and whether the respondent’s decision was a sufficiently consequential interference with that family life.
5. The FtT Judge took into account Huang v SSHD [2007] 2 AC 167 at paragraph 20, which provided guidance as to how this issue should be assessed in that the ultimate question for the appellate immigration authority is whether the refusal of leave to enter or remain, in circumstances where the life of the family cannot reasonably be expected to be enjoyed elsewhere, taking full account of all considerations weighing in favour of the refusal, prejudices the family life of the applicant in a manner sufficiently serious to amount to a breach of the fundamental right protected by Article 8. If the answer to this question is affirmative, the refusal is unlawful and the authority must so decide. It is not necessary that the appellate immigration authority, directing itself along the lines indicated in this opinion, need ask in addition whether the case meets the test of exceptionality.
6. The FtT Judge took into account the maintenance of effective immigration controls which is in the public interest. The FtT Judge found that the appellants daughter would not have to follow her parents to India, as there was reasonable availability of care in India for the appellants. He noted that he was struck by how little evidence was provided that went to meaningful enquiries made to explore the carer arrangements which might be made in India. The FtT Judge noted that both the appellants daughters are in well-paid jobs and that he has no doubt that this family could afford to pay for care at the top end of what might be available in India. He therefore found that on the available evidence, care for the appellants is reasonably available and affordable. The FtT Judge stated that the appellants daughters will be able to provide the necessary advocacy and support with the carers for their parents from afar. He found that although there will be some hardship for all concerned, but not one which rises to the high threshold of unjustifiably harsh consequences.
7. The Grounds argue that the FtT Judge failed to take into account material evidence and failed to give adequate reasons for his findings. The FtT Judge erred at paragraph 19 when he compared the appellants age-related conditions to other aged citizens of India, with similar conditions, and stated that the appellants would in essence be no different to other elderly citizens of India, with similar conditions within Indian society. It was argued that this shows that the FtT Judge’s failed to make a fact specific analysis of the appellants accepted health conditions and circumstances and failed to take into account the appellants ages of 88 and 76 years respectively. He failed to take into account that the appellants prior to coming to the United Kingdom were living alone in rented accommodation in India. The FtT Judge failed to consider that the appellants have established a strong dependency on their daughters in this country. There was before the FtT Judge unchallenged medical evidence which pointed to the potential impact of any change to the appellants living arrangements which would impact on their well-being. It was not open to the FtT Judge on the evidence before him, to find that the test of very significant obstacles was not met because of the availability, in principle, physical care homes and the potential for external carer arrangements in India.
8. The FtT Judge did not perform a broad evaluative FtT Judgement required under Appendix private life and whether the care could easily be provided with the required level in India and the standard of care for the appellants which is capable of embracing the psychological and emotional needs. Whilst the FtT Judge directed himself to the case of BRITCITS v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 368 (§13), he failed to address the relevant question, whether the care available in India was objectively reasonable for the appellants, bearing in mind their emotional and psychological needs. This in turn impacted on whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellants integration in India and the wider Article 8 ECHR proportionality exercise, which, on the evidence, fell on the positive side of the balance.
9. The FtT Judge failed to take to consider the best interests of the appellants grandchildren, aged 12 and 6 years. There was evidence before the FtT Judge of the appellants relationship with their grandchildren’s in the appellants joint witness statement and also had the benefit of a hand written letter from the eldest grandchild detailing their relationship with their grandparents and the adverse impact on all of them.
Discussion and Analysis
10. In deciding whether the FtT Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, it is helpful to remind ourselves of the principles set out within the case law and in particular at paragraph 26 of Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201. We remind ourselves that the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal and that where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account. Further, when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out, as recently confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51]. Further, we remind ourselves that an appeal court should assume, unless it detects an express or implicit misdirection of law, that the specialist tribunal knows and has applied the relevant law as set out in Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47].
11. The FtT Judge directed himself appropriately at the beginning of his decision and stated that appellant must establish on the balance of probabilities the factual circumstances on which they rely and that Article 8 (1) is engaged. If it is, then I have to decide whether the interference with the appellant’s right is justified under Article 8 (2). If an appellant does not meet the immigration rules, the public interest is normally in refusing leave to enter or remain. The exception is where refusal results in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or a family member such that refusal is not proportionate.
12. The FtT Judge found, on the evidence the appellants do not meet the requirements of the immigration rules because they would not face very significant obstacles to reintegration into India. The complaint against the FtT Judge is that he did not consider the appellants specific circumstances but made a generalised statement the appellants circumstances would not be any different to other elderly citizens in India who have the same age-related conditions as the appellants. This is clearly wrong because the FtT Judge set out the medical evidence, in detail and some parts were set out in verbatim, at paragraphs 15-18 of the decision. It is evident that the FtT Judge engaged with the opinions of the specialists doctors and therefore was fully cognisant of appellants ages, medical conditions and their personal circumstances. We find that the FtT Judge referring to other aged citizens of India, by no means detracts from his fact sensitive analysis of the appellants circumstances in the round.
13. The FtT Judge found that the appellants can relocate and reintegrate in to India, having lived there until 2022, with the help of their daughters in the United Kingdom. The evidence before the FtT Judge was that the appellants and their daughters had lived apart for many years and had conducted their family life from a distance. The FtT Judge stated that the daughters have good jobs and earn a good wage, in this country. There is no error in his finding that the appellants daughters can support their parents, as they have done in the past, in a care home of the highest quality available in India. We find that on the evidence, there is no material error in this conclusion.
14. It is argued in the grounds of appeal that the care available in India, will not be of the same quality as that available to them in the United Kingdom, in the family home in the United Kingdom. In support of the argument that the care in India would not meet their required level of care the appellants rely on the judgment of the Master of the Rolls in BRITCITS v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 368.
15. The test is not whether the care provided in India is at the same level as that provided in the United Kingdom. It is apparent from the Rules and the Guidance, the focus is on whether the care required by the appellant can be “reasonably” provided and to “the required level” in their home country. The provision of care in the home country must be reasonable both from the perspective of the provider and the perspective of the applicant. The FtT Judge clearly paid attention to the standard of care which would be necessary and reasonably available to the appellants and made the appropriate objective assessment. The FtT Judge found that the care available to the appellants in India is reasonable, affordable and available to the appellants in India. The FtT Judge was entitled to so find, on the evidence before him.
16. The FtT Judge found that there is no doubt that the appellants would find it difficult to return to India and adjust to the caring arrangements which would need to be established. He properly found that the appellant would not encounter very significant obstacles to integration and their physical, mental and age-related conditions would not be likely to cause them to be anything but insiders in Indian society. The FtT Judge noted that the appellants had lived in India all their lives and have the deepest understanding of how the society they have lived in most of their lives operates. The FtT Judge on the evidence was entitled to so find.
17. The FtT Judge referred to a report dated 29 July 2024, by chartered physiotherapist, Faeez Aujoyeb who stated that the second appellant had made significant progress with his mobility issues which appeared to be aligned with his mood and frame of mind. The concern was expressed as to how he might fare in India without the support of his children. The appellant disengaged from the treatment plan as she become ever more anxious at the prospect of being returned to India. We find that anxiousness is a common feature amongst a those who have to leave the country. It is expected that once they return and settle down, the anxiousness will decrease.
18. In respect of proportionality, and in the balancing exercise, consideration has been given to the appellant’s particular set of circumstances to decide whether the interference with the appellant’s private life is proportionate. In that balancing exercise, the FtT Judge considered section 117 A (2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum act 2002 to have regard to the competing public interest considerations and that maintenance of effective immigration controls being in the public interest. The FtT Judge came to the conclusion that the appellants have always been precarious footing and that respondent’s interest must prevail over those of the appellants and there is no material error in that finding.
19. The second issue that was raised was that the FtT Judge erred in the Article 8 balancing exercise because he did not consider, the best interests of the appellants two grandchildren. The family life with the grand children was not directly raised as an issue before the First Tier FtT Judge. It is argued that there was evidence before the FtT Judge, such as the appellants joint statements and a handwritten letter from the appellant’s eldest grandson and that the FtT Judge was duty-bound to take the grandchildren’s best interests into account. The FtT Judge cannot be criticised for not taking into account an issue which was not before him to decide. Unless a point was one which was Robinson obvious, a FtT Judge's decision cannot be alleged to contain an error of law on the basis that a FtT Judge failed to take account of a point that was never raised for their consideration as an issue in an appeal. It is clear therefore this was not considered to be a matter of importance to the appellants or that it was of material significance in the context of the proportionality exercise overall. Such an approach would undermine the principles clearly laid out in the Procedure Rules.
20. In any event, even if the Article 8 family life had been argued before the FtT Judge, and even if the decision of the respondent has an adverse emotional impact upon the appellant’s grandchildren, this does not mean it would have a adverse impact upon their best interests. The grandchildren are living with their parents and there is no evidence that their best interests have not been met by their parents. We find that the best interests of the grandchildren would not have made a material difference to the decision.
21. We therefore find that the FtT Judge’s findings and conclusion were fully justified and therefore we reject the challenge to the first-tier Tribunal and uphold the FtT Judge’s dismissal of the appeal, as it is unimpeachable. The appellants appeals are no more than a quarrel with the FtT Judge’s findings which he was entitled to make on the evidence before him. We conclude that the challenge is no more than a disagreement with the findings made.
Notice of Decision
22. The First-tier Tribunal did not materially err in law and fact, in dismissing the appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds. We find that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision stands.

Signed by

A Deputy FtT Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Ms S Chana Dated this 18th day of August 2025