Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002568

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02601/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

SIA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hussain, Legal Representative at Fountain Solicitors, Walsall.
For the Respondent: Mrs Abdulkarim, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at the Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 12 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this direction.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
Introduction
2. A panel of the Upper Tribunal comprising Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Saini in a decision sealed on 17 November 2025 had concluded there was an error of law in the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Marshall. The panel that the matter ought to be further considered here at the Upper Tribunal.
3. Therefore, I am dealing with the remaking of the decision in respect of the Appellant’s appeal. I do so pursuant to section 12 (2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision to reject his international protection and human rights claim. The remaking decision requires me to consider matters with certain retained findings.
Preliminary Matters
4. Directions were provided that there be a bundle from the Appellant in compliance with the directions made for this case. Instead, Mr Hussain said he relied on the error of law bundle comprising 125 pages which had been provided previously.
5. Mr Hussain also said that he did not propose to call any evidence and that this case would be dealt with by way of submissions only. Therefore, I was told that there was no additional oral or written evidence for me to consider.
6. Mrs Abdulkarim relied on the Respondent’s County Policy and Information Note for Iraq dated October 2025.
7. The parties are agreed that although the Upper Tribunal decision starts at paragraph 16, that is an error because there is no missing paragraph before paragraph 16. Similarly, where the Upper Tribunal decision says that the Appellant is a citizen of Iran, that is a typographical error because the Appellant is a national of Iraq. Nothing turns on this typographical error. A copy of the panel’s Error of Law decision will be appended to this decision.
8. The decision of the panel had recorded as follows:
“34 In summary, we find that the judge failed to perform a cumulative assessment of all the relevant factors in SMO & KSP before taking a holistic view and reaching a conclusion upon the possibility of the Appellant relocating to the IKR and re-establishing contact with his brother and obtaining accommodation and employment there. Conclusion 35 In light of our above findings, we find that the above errors represent material error of law requiring the decision to be set aside in relation to the infected passages, namely paragraph 32.
36 Given that the Respondent has not sought to challenge the Judge’s assessment at paragraphs 1- 31, we preserve those paragraphs, they being free from error.
37 Given the limited scope of the issue that remains in relation to risk upon, and feasibility of, return to Iraq, we retain this matter in the Upper Tribunal for re-hearing.”
The Hearing Before Me:
9. The basis of the reconsideration was set out within the Upper Tribunal’s decision, at paragraphs 39 to 41. The Upper Tribunal said that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision from paragraphs 1 to 31 were preserved and that the issue that the Upper Tribunal would be dealing with was to be limited in scope: “the issue that remains in relation to risk upon, and feasibility of, return to Iraq”.
10. Therefore, it is helpful to highlight from the outset the narrow basis upon which I am remaking the decision today.
11. Mr Hussain assisted me greatly earlier this morning when he focused his submissions on the factual matrix which was relevant. It can be put succinctly as follows.
12. Mr Hussain said it was not possible for the Appellant to seek to look to the assistance of his brother because it was not reasonably likely that he would find his brother in Iraq and therefore such assistance would not be available.
13. I interpolate here to say that Mrs Abdulkarim on behalf of the Respondent, took a fair approach and conceded that even though there is some evidence that the Appellant’s brother may be somewhere in Iraq, perhaps living in a camp, it is not reasonable to expect that the Appellant would be able to find him.
14. Therefore, the only real issue before me is whether the Appellant can reasonably be expected to relocate within Iraq without family assistance. Internal relocation is a principle well known to the Appellant and his solicitors because it has been set out within the Respondent’s Reasons for Refusal Letter and in the decisions in this case by the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal.
Consideration and Analysis
15. At the Error of Law hearing, the Upper Tribunal said at paragraph 31 of its decision:
“31. Concerning ground 2 and the complaint that the judge failed to apply SMO & KSP in relation to internal relocation, turning to [34] of SMO & KSP, we note that the judge has failed to adequately consider whether the Appellant is able to secure employment taking into account the six listed factors. In relation to those factors, we do not set out our view of their applicability but we note that the judge did take into account (iii) that the Appellant cannot access a CSID, but note that she failed to take into account (ii), that the unemployment rate in the IKR is high at 70%, (iv) whether the Appellant has links which could have enabled him to access employment, (v) the judge was aware that the Appellant had no education but failed to consider he worked as a car mechanic and whether this could assist him or not, albeit she considered he is ‘able bodied’, and finally (vi) whether the Appellant is from an area associated with ISIL (albeit Ms Sepulveda rightly acknowledged that returnees from the UK would dispel concerns of coming from an ISIL area)”.
16. The House of Lords decision in AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] 1 AC 678 deals with internal relocation. It is necessary to consider the reasonableness and viability of internal relocation.
17. The case law in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 sets out Country Guidance, including that it is necessary for an individual to have a CSID or an INID in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 ECHR, for example at the checkpoints. At paragraph 33 the Upper Tribunal said:
“33. For Kurds without the assistance of family in the IKR the accommodation options are limited:
(i) Absent special circumstances it is not reasonably likely that P will be able to gain access to one of the refugee camps in the IKR; these camps are already extremely overcrowded and are closed to newcomers. 64% of IDPs are accommodated in private settings with the vast majority living with family members;
(ii) If P cannot live with a family member, apartments in a modern block in a new neighbourhood are available for rent at a cost of between $300 and $400 per month;
(iii) P could resort to a ‘critical shelter arrangement’, living in an unfinished or abandoned structure, makeshift shelter, tent, mosque, church or squatting in a government building. It would be unduly harsh to require P to relocate to the IKR if P will live in a critical housing shelter without access to basic necessities such as food, clean water and clothing;
(iv) In considering whether P would be able to access basic necessities, account must be taken of the fact that failed asylum seekers are entitled to apply for a grant under the Voluntary Returns Scheme, which could give P access to £1500. Consideration should also be given to whether P can obtain financial support from other sources such as (a) employment, (b) remittances from relatives abroad, (c) the availability of ad hoc charity or by being able to access PDS rations.
34. Whether P is able to secure employment must be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking the following matters into account:
(i) Gender. Lone women are very unlikely to be able to secure legitimate employment;
(ii) The unemployment rate for Iraqi IDPs living in the IKR is 70%;
(iii) P cannot work without a CSID or INID;
(iv) Patronage and nepotism continue to be important factors in securing employment. A returnee with family connections to the region will have a significant advantage in that he would ordinarily be able to call upon those contacts to make introductions to prospective employers and to vouch for him;
(v) Skills, education and experience. Unskilled workers are at the greatest disadvantage, with the decline in the construction industry reducing the number of labouring jobs available;
(vi) If P is from an area with a marked association with ISIL, that may deter prospective employers”.
18. This Appellant is not realistically able to rely on family members so I exclude completely from my consideration that any family members might be able to assist him, they will not be able to do so.
19. I therefore go through the other considerations which had been set out within SMO. It is clear that the Appellant cannot be reasonably expected to live in the refugee camps in the IKR, Nor would critical shelter arrangements meet internal relocation standards when following the case law in AH (Sudan) and Januzi.
20. What remains is that this Appellant would be able to access £1,500 from the Respondent’s Voluntary Returns Scheme. SMO makes clear that the Appellant will be able to rent a flat in a modern block at a rental cost of between $300 and $400 per month. Mr Hussain said to me during his submissions that £1,500 would last perhaps a year using those figures with the conversion of Pound Sterling to the US Dollar and vice vera. Mr Hussain submitted that it would not be reasonable in the circumstances for the Appellant to return to Iraq because he would only have enough money for a year.
21. In my judgment what also needs to be considered though are the further aspects set out within SMO. I go through paragraph 34 of SMO in full:
(i) The Appellant is male and therefore the ‘lone woman’ categorisation does not apply to him. There is no need to consider this further.
(ii) The unemployment rate for IDPs (internally displaced persons), in the IKR is 70%. That does apply to this Appellant either because he is not an IDP, but I take into account that the unemployment rate is extremely high.
(iii) The Appellant does have a CSID, he is documented and that is accepted by the Appellant and so that is not an issue before me.
(iv) Patronage and nepotism will work against the Appellant because he does not have family connections in the region. This is a matter I give consideration to. The Appellant will be ‘on his own’.
(v) In relation to skills, education and experiences, this Appellant is not educated but he is not unskilled. That is because it is accepted by the Appellant that he has skills. He is a car mechanic which skills he had brought with him when he came to the UK.
(vi) The Appellant is from an area which is previously associated with ISIL but as Mr Hussain explained that was at a different time now. ISIL, as it were, ‘are no longer around’ In my judgment very little turns on the ISIL aspects in any event. Especially since I had invited Mr Hussain to deal with the Upper Tribunal’s decision at paragraph 31 where it had specifically stated as follows and to which I received no response:
“Whether P would be at particular risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Additional factors that may increase risk include: (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL, (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL, and (iii) being a single male of fighting age. P is likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK which would dispel any suggestion of having arrived direct from ISIL territory”.
22. On return all that the Appellant has to do is to refer to his original basis of claiming asylum. Namely that he fled Iraq because of what ISIL were doing and the difficulty which his father had with ISIL. In any event the Appellant would reasonably have with him documentation which he would be able to take from the UK to show that he feared ISIL and that he was not part of them. Getting it interpreted before he leaves the UK will be a simple task. Namely he could take his asylum claim documents, duly translated, which show he fled Iraq fearing ISIL. He will immediately be able to show he is not part of or connected to ISIL. That is if he really considers it necessary to do so.
23. It is fanciful in my view in any event to suggest that there would be an issue with the Appellant gaining work because of connections to ISIL.
24. Taking stock, the position is as follows. The Appellant will not have any family members to assist him on return. He will have money though. That will be £1,500 that he would be able to take with him as part of the returns package. Mr Hussan said that £1500 will last the Appellant about one year. Even if Mr Hussain is wrong and the money lasts him 8 to 10 months, in that time period in my judgment this Appellant will be able to use his not inconsiderable experience and skills whether as a mechanic and/or his time in the UK to be able to secure employment. That will enable the Appellant to also to continue to access accommodation. I take into account the case law in relation to internal relocation and I conclude that this documented Appellant has a reasonable and viable internal relocation alternative.
Conclusion
25. The Appellant is a fit, young man. I see no basis upon which it can be said he would not be able to secure a home, employment and safe passage on return. In any event, as is made clear in SMO (2), there is the returns package open to the Appellant. What the Appellant submits through Mr Hussain are in reality matters that have been extensively dealt with in the Country Guidance. That Country Guidance remains binding on me. I am aware that the Appellant may have limited education, but that is not unusual and of itself means little in terms of being able to live in Iraq or in the IKR.
26. Any further specifics in terms of the evidence were matters fully known to the Appellant. He knew the case that he had to meet. The issues- based approach to cases in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber is not new and there must be appropriate procedural rigour. There is not some form of rolling consideration of claims, even when the issues at stake are as serious as the ones that I am dealing with.
27. Therefore, in the circumstances, despite the helpful submissions made by Mr Hussain, I am unable to agree with him. I dismiss the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds including asylum, humanitarian protection, and Articles 2, 3 and 8.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law and was set aside.
I remake the decision.
I dismiss the appeal on all grounds including protection grounds, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
The Anonymity Order is continued because the matters raise international protection.

Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 January 2026