Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002569

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/68864/2023
LP/14159/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

17th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHAPMAN

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
v

MD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr T Nyawanza, Solicitor, instructed by Just Legal Group

Heard at Field House on 29 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the Appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State for the Home Department.
2. The Claimant is a national of Zimbabwe, who was born on 25 November 1975. She arrived in the United Kingdom as a visitor on 15 February 2020. She states that she had been working as a youth co-ordinator for the government and in February 2019 she was transferred to Rural Ward 23 whereafter she had some issues and was seen to be supporting the MDC. Consequently she claimed that her employment was terminated on 23 April 2020 and she provided a letter to that effect which is contained at page 96 of the bundle before me. As a consequence, the Claimant said she feared persecution on return to Zimbabwe because she was perceived to support the MDC and so she made an asylum application on 1 July 2020. This application was not decided until 5 December 2023 when her asylum application was refused. She appealed and following a hearing on 9 April 2025, her appeal was allowed in a decision and reasons dated 13 April 2025.
3. The Secretary of State made an application, in time, for permission to appeal against this decision on 23 April 2025. The basis of the application was, firstly, that the judge had made a material error of law in finding that the Claimant had been identified as an MDC supporter as the termination of her employment letter gives no details concerning the reasons for her dismissal, apart from stating that the local people living in the area where she was employed had requested it. The Claimant stated there was a similar letter calling for the termination of her husband’s employment but such a letter had not been provided in the bundle. Secondly, it was submitted that if the Claimant had been identified as an MDC supporter as claimed she would be detained and questioned on return to Zimbabwe then why was she not stopped at the airport when she left Zimbabwe, and thirdly, that the finding by the judge with regard to the Claimant’s Article 8 claim was infected by the same errors of law.
4. Permission to appeal was granted in a decision dated 5 June 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge J Bowen on the following basis:
“2. The first ground asserts that the Judge erred by failing to provide adequate reasons for why the Appellant’s evidence was accepted, to include not adequately engaging with and/or weighing the documentary evidence provided (particularly in respect of the letter concerning the Appellant’s termination of employment). The second ground asserts that the Judge erred by failing to consider and/or give adequate reasons for rejecting submissions made by the Respondent as regards the consistency of the Appellant’s account. The third ground asserts that the failure to consider the aforementioned matters in respect of the protection claim has also infected/impacts the determination of the Article 8 claim.
3. I have carefully considered whether the grounds merely amount to a disagreement with the Judge’s decision. When viewing the full decision, against the Review and Reasons for Refusal Letter, I find that all three grounds are arguable”.
Hearing
5. Whilst I was present in the hearing room, the parties appeared remotely. In her submissions, Ms Lecointe for the Secretary of State asserted that the judge’s credibility findings had infected the decision and that she had failed to take sufficient account of the Respondent’s refusal decision and the Respondent’s review, which clearly made reference to credibility issues raised in the Claimant’s statement, in particular, the fact that the Claimant’s husband and son appear to have joined her in the United Kingdom, but no findings were made in respect of this. It was clarified that a marriage certificate at page 44 of the bundle had nothing to do with this particular case but related to a different person from Nigeria. Ms Lecointe stated it was not clear who had uploaded vignettes in relation to the Claimant’s husband and son and whether these were before the First-tier Tribunal Judge and that the judge should have weighed up all the evidence when assessing credibility and that there was a failure to provide a copy of the letter relating to the Claimant’s husband’s need to resign. Ms Lecointe submitted that the Article 8 claim was also infected by the same errors and there was a trickle-down effect in relation to the decision as a whole. With relation to paragraph 3 of the grounds of appeal Ms Lecointe submitted that local people had complained about the Claimant’s behaviour and using the work van for MDC activities and so she submitted that paragraph 3 should be maintained as to why the Claimant had not been stopped upon leaving Zimbabwe.
6. In his submissions, Mr Nyawanza drew attention to the letter of termination at page 95 of the stitched bundle which he submitted should be noted that it comes from the Ministry of Youth, Sport, Arts and Recreation. He submitted there was a distinction between the ZANU-PF government and the ZANU-PF political party and that the letter and indeed the employment was with the government, not the party. He submitted that this was an important distinction and the letter simply says that the Claimant was dismissed because of what was being heard from local people, the council chairman and the village about the Claimant’s duties. He submitted that the activities that had been complained about were that the Claimant seems to favour the opposition and not the ruling party. He submitted that it was accepted by the SSHD that the Claimant was a youth worker in Zimbabwe and had been dismissed from her appointment in April 2020 and the fact that she left the country prior to that time gave credence to accusations that she was pro-opposition and had left her post of her own accord. This is why her husband then stated there was surveillance in her home and in his submission it was entirely plausible and credible that this would be the case with those assumed to be opposition activists. Mr Nyawanza submitted that there was no error of law in relation to the first ground of appeal which was simply a disagreement with the judge’s conclusions given that the facts themselves had been accepted and the Claimant found to be credible.
7. Mr Nyawanza submitted in relation to Article 8 that this would stand or fall with the other grounds of appeal. He confirmed that the Claimant’s husband and son had followed her to the UK utilising a skilled worker visa and that they were living together as a family unit. I asked Mr Nyawanza for clarification as to the evidential basis of the judge’s finding at [18] that: “I accept as one who worked for the state her name and details would be in the system and it is likely her association with the opposition recorded”. Mr Nyawanza submitted that, as he said to the judge at that hearing, the nature of the regime in Zimbabwe is that with all oppressive regimes there are a lot of resources placed on surveillance and keeping vast records of people suspected of opposition. As a consequence, the Claimant’s details would be in the records and he drew attention to the fact at [16] the judge accepted that the Claimant had come to the attention of the local Member of Parliament who sits in the national legislature.
8. In response, Ms Lecointe submitted that she accepted the judge was repeating submissions made to her by the Claimant’s representatives on the day of the hearing. The judge made no further reference to case law other than the fact she had considered the country guidance decision in CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 (IAC). Ms Lecointe’s submission was that if the judge accepted that the Claimant has an MDC profile then her consideration of the Claimant’s credibility was flawed and this has infected the remainder of the decision. Ms Lecointe submitted every case needs to be taken on its merits and the decision making judge is required to give reasons as to why they have accepted the Claimant’s oral evidence as against the Secretary of State’s assertions to the contrary, the timing of the documents provided and whether the evidence put forward did in fact provide clarification, though in her submission it all came down to a flawed credibility assessment.
9. I reserved my decision which I now give with my reasons.
Findings and reasons
10. The SSHD’s grounds of appeal assert at [2] that the letter terminating the Claimant’s employment gives no reasons for her dismissal beyond stating that local people living in the area where she was employed had requested it.
11. I have considered the letter of termination at SB 95 which states that the Claimant’s contract with the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Recreation has been terminated with immediate effect following a series of reports that have reached the office from the Ward Chairman and village head about the way the Claimant has conducted her duties in ward 23 and that a call had also been received from the MP Hon Chidhakwa on 22 April 2020 as to what was being done about it. I note that this letter appears to be on the same headed notepaper from the Ministry of Youth, Sports, Arts & Recreation as the letter at SB 96 dated 15 January 2019 transferring the Claimant from Ward 10 urban to Ward 23 rural with effect from 1 February 2019.
12. The FtTJ made express reference to these letters at [13]. The FtTJ went on to find at [15] that whilst the Claimant was in the UK, the locals put pressure on her employers to dismiss her. No allegation as to the genuineness or otherwise of the letters appears to have been made by the SSHD. The grounds of appeal fail to acknowledge that the local MP, the village head and the ward chairman also raised queries about the Claimant’s conduct of her duties.
13. I find no error of law in the approach of the FtTJ, who considered the letter of termination along with a previous letter from the Ministry and gave clear and sustainable reasons at [17] for finding the Claimant’s account to be credible.
14. Whilst at [2] the SSHD’s grounds make reference to the fact that no letter referring to the termination of her husband’s employment had been provided, I find this is not of any real relevance to the Claimant’s case and that in any event the FtTJ at [15] found that locals contacted her husband’s employers and pressured them to terminate his employment also.
15. The SSHD’s grounds of appeal assert at [3] that the FtTJ has: “failed to consider if the appellant had been identified as an MDC supporter as claimed, such that she would be detained and questioned on return to Zimbabwe, why she was not stopped at the airport when she left Zimbabwe.”
16. I find there is no substance to this ground of appeal in that, at the time the Claimant left Zimbabwe on 15 February 2020, her employment had not been terminated. In fact, as the FtTJ found, the fact that she left Zimbabwe in order to visit her brother in the UK as the pressure had made her unwell [14] refers, meant that she confirmed the suspicion by locals that she was an MDC supporter: [18] refers and this seems to have played a role in the decision to terminate her employment. Further, the SSHD failed to provide any evidence to show that suspected MDC supporters are stopped at the airport when departing from Zimbabwe.
17. [4] of the SSHD’s grounds of appeal asserted that the finding on article 8 is infected by the same error.
18. The FtTJ held with regard to article 8 at [24]:
“In light of my findings above, I find the appellant has shown that there would be very significant obstacles to her integration on return to Zimbabwe. Given the appellant meets the immigration rules, I find the decision disproportionately interferes with the appellant’s article 8 rights.”
19. Given that I have found no error of law in the FtTJ’s approach to the Claimant’s asylum claim, it follows that in the absence of any additional arguments in relation to article 8 that I find no error of law in that respect either.
Notice of Decision
20. I find no material errors of law in the decision and reasons of the First tier Tribunal Judge, whose decision is upheld. It follows that the appeal by the SSHD is dismissed.

Rebecca Chapman

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 November 2025