Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002577
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02622/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3 March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

E E
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Adejumobi, Optimum Immigration Law (by CVP)
For the Respondent: Ms S Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre (hybrid hearing) on 1 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Nigeria. She appeals with permission against the decision of a judge of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FTJ”) promulgated on 11 April 2025 dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s refusal of 2 May 2024 of her international protection claim made on 7 February 2023.
Anonymity
2. I continue the anonymity order made in the First-Tier Tribunal. I consider the public interest in open justice is outweighed by the need for confidentiality in the asylum process, particularly where, as here, the appellant has two children who are dependents on her claim and the claim includes accepted allegations of domestic abuse.
Background
3. A judge in the First-Tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal the FTJ’s decision. The heading of the decision read, “Permission to appeal is granted”. The body of the decision under “reasons for decision” by contrast, read “Permission to appeal is granted on grounds 2 and 3”.
4. The appellant applied to the Upper Tribunal to renew grounds 1 and 4 and added an additional ground relating to the best interests of the appellant’s children. Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato refused permission on the additional ground and pointed out that following the case of Safi and others (permission to appeal decisions) [2018] UKUT 00388, as the section of the grant containing the decision was unlimited, the appellant already had permission to appeal on the four original grounds. I therefore explained to the representatives at the hearing that I was considering all four grounds.
The grounds and their development at the hearing
5. Ground 1 – it was averred that the FTJ had conflated the lower real risk standard with the higher burden of the balance of probabilities. The FTJ had described himself as not being satisfied that the appellant feared persecution in Nigeria due to any imputed political opinion [38] but then when considering humanitarian protection had used the phrase “as set out above” [40] referring to his earlier consideration on asylum grounds, thereby conflating the two standards.
6. Mr Adejumobi did not develop ground 1 any further at the hearing. Ms Simbi responded that the FTJ when concluding against the appellant on asylum had made findings about the appellant’s subjective fear and the reference had to be seen in that context.
7. Ground 2 – it was averred that the FTJ had failed to make a clear finding on a material matter, namely whether the appellant’s husband was a member of, or involved with IPOB. The FTJ had rejected the conclusion that the photograph showing the appellant’s husband with other members of IPOB was doctored and although he had noted that there was no information about the extent of the husband’s activities and only one photograph which even supported his membership, the appellant was left to guess as to what exactly the core finding was as it related to her case on asylum grounds. Mr Adejumobi added in submissions which developed his skeleton argument, that the respondent accepted that there was no clear finding. The FTJ was not accurate about the first time the issue of the appellant being at greater risk due to her husband’s membership of IPOB had arisen and it had not simply arisen upon submission of the ASA. There had only been two questions in the asylum interview at [75] and [76] about the IPOB and that had been the only opportunity the appellant had in interview to speak about the IPOB. It had been suggested that another interview would be rescheduled, but it never had been. The FTJ’s comment at [37] did not take into account the seemingly inconclusive nature of the appellant’s asylum interview. That underscored the need for a clear finding, he submitted.
8. In the rule 24 response, the respondent had accepted that the FTJ had erred in failing to make a specific finding about IPOB but averred immateriality. However the respondent continued that even if the appellant’s husband were a member of IPOB, as highlighted by the FTJ at [35] it did not follow that the appellant herself would be at risk and at [36] the FTJ had provided a lawful and rational conclusion that she would not be at risk. The risk arising from the husband’s claim to IPOB membership only became a central feature on submission of the ASA and it was therefore open to the FTJ to treat this as undermining the credibility of the claim. Ms Simbi submitted that the outcome would be the same even if the FTJ had concluded that the appellant’s husband was a member of the IPOB.
9. Ground 3 – this was linked to ground 2. It was averred that the FTJ had failed to consider paragraph 9.1.10 from the CPIN of March 2022 on separatist groups in the South-East, which indicated that the security services were rounding up young men and their family members and taking them away for questioning. Mr Adejumobi in submissions pointed to that part of the CPIN and said that highlighted the issue of risk.
10. Ms Simbi responded that it could not possibly be found that the appellant would be at harm or at risk of harm because of her former husband’s affiliations. The appellant had now been in the UK for some time and there was simply a gap in the evidence and the background material so nothing to suggest that she could be at risk on return. Mr Adejumobi responded that it was right that the appellant was divorced but there was nothing to indicate that would affect the risk to the appellant.
11. Ground 4 – the FTJ had erred by failing to consider whether the appellant was a vulnerable witness when assessing her credibility. There were clear indicators of vulnerability, namely an acceptance that the appellant had been subjected to domestic abuse (detailed in the evidence) and a letter from Leicester Mammas supporting that the appellant was struggling with her mental health. There was also medical evidence that the appellant had been treated for depression and panic attacks. The Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 was clear that the decision should record whether the appellant was accepted to be a vulnerable witness and if so, the effect that vulnerability had in terms of the evidence. The FTJ had not done either of those things. It was right that no application for a vulnerability direction had been made by a previous representative, but the guidance recognised that representatives might fail to recognise vulnerability and the ultimate responsibility lay with the tribunal in this respect. If the FTJ had treated the appellant as a vulnerable witness, then it was arguable that his adverse credibility finding at [37] may have been different.
12. The rule 24 response relied on the failure of the appellant’s former representatives to make any application and that permission had been refused. It added that the vulnerability did not account for the omission of evidence central to the core claim. Ms Simbi added at the hearing that it was not alleged what measures would have been put in place if the appellant had found to be vulnerable which could have affected the outcome of the appeal. It was simply not clear how the appellant’s vulnerability was relevant to the issues.
Discussion; conclusions
13. The Court of Appeal have relatively recently, in the case of Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 set out a reminder of the principles on which the Upper Tribunal should apply its jurisdiction as to errors of law. I set out the first four, which are relevant to this case:
“(i) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];
(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27]…”
14. I consider grounds 1 and 4 first, because they potentially affect all the evidence.
Ground 1
15. As far as ground 1 is concerned, the FTJ set out the correct legal framework as to the burden and standard of proof (see [13] – [15]).
16. At paragraphs [35] – [38] he was considering whether the appellant feared persecution for her imputed political opinion and concluded at [38] that she had not shown on the balance of probabilities that she feared persecution in Nigeria due to any imputed political opinion. That is, he concluded that the appellant did not have a subjective fear of persecution.
17. When considering humanitarian protection, it is right that the judge did conclude [40] “As set out above, I am not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the Appellant’s imputed political opinion would lead to a real risk of her suffering serious harm.” The only matter the FTJ had considered “above” however was the appellant’s subjective fear of persecution (see self-direction at [13 (b)]). He had not come to any explicit conclusion “above” about risk because he had not yet reached that stage. The beginning of [40] could be better worded therefore, but what the FTJ was saying was that he was not satisfied even to the lower standard that the appellant would be at real risk. He does not give specific reasons, but it can be deduced his reasons can be found at [36] and [37] (as they are the paragraphs above) and he meant that taking those matters into account he was not satisfied of risk even to the lower standard.
18. Bearing in mind that the FTJ had correctly directed himself as to the law, indeed had set out again at [40] the appropriate standard of proof, and bearing in mind the third and fourth principles I have set out at [13] above, that a judge does not misdirect themselves just because every step in their reasoning is not fully set out and that the basis on which the judge reaches their decision can be set out by inference, I conclude that the judge did not err in law as averred in ground 1; he did not apply the wrong standard of proof to the consideration of humanitarian protection.
Ground 4
19. There were clear indications of the appellant’s vulnerability as has been set out in the grounds. However the appellant’s former representatives did not refer to her vulnerability.
20. It is right that the ultimate responsibility in conducting a fair hearing lies with the judge, but there is nothing to indicate that there were specific arrangements which needed to be made so that the appellant could participate fairly in the hearing because of her vulnerability. There is simply nothing to indicate that the appellant could not put her case properly or have it assessed properly.
21. As far as the assessment of the evidence is concerned, the FTJ referred to the evidence in specific terms and explained he had considered all of it [4]. He would therefore have been aware that the evidence included medical letters from Nigeria setting out that as well as having treatment for physical conditions, the appellant had been treated for depression and panic attacks following the domestic abuse. There is however no medical evidence to set out the effect that the appellant’s mental health condition might have on her in respect of such matters as her memory and giving evidence. The appellant explained in her witness statement that she had not taken any medication in the UK or informed her GP because she was trying to stay strong through the process even though she often felt stressed and sometimes felt depressed and worried about her children in Nigeria (paragraph 12). In the witness statement she also engaged with the reasons for refusal letter and explained why there was no inconsistency as referred to by the Home Office in the refusal letter (paragraph 43). She did not suggest that any inconsistency was due to her mental health or other vulnerability.
22. Against that background, it is not said even in the renewed grounds or in submissions before me, how the appellant’s vulnerability is relevant to the inconsistency the judge identified at [37]. Indeed Mr Adejumobi’s suggestion at the hearing was that there was not a real inconsistency, or it was not fair to hold the inconsistency against the appellant because she had begun to identify the issue in asylum interview and then the interview was stopped through lack of time and another was never scheduled. That was not related to the appellant’s vulnerability.
23. The fact that the judge did not expressly record the appellant to be a vulnerable witness or the effect that vulnerability had in terms of the evidence does not, I conclude, mean of itself that the judge erred in law despite the terms of vulnerable witness guidance. That it has not been submitted what adjustments should have been made or how making those adjustments would have affected the fairness of proceedings or how the appellant’s vulnerability was relevant to the specific adverse credibility findings is an indication that there was no error of law. There is nothing to indicate other than that the proceedings before the FTJ were fair and I conclude that there was no error of law. I observe that the FTJ did not simply make conclusions adverse to the appellant. For example, he took express account of the language difficulties the appellant might have had [27], and he did not accept the respondent’s conclusion that a critical photograph was doctored [33].
24. I am fortified in my conclusion on the point by the case of Khan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 148 handed down very recently, in which Lewis LJ held at [37]:
“I am satisfied that the Guidance Note is intended to provide guidance to ensure that parties are able effectively to participate in proceedings and to ensure that their evidence is properly and fairly considered. It is intended to assist the tribunal to deal with a case fairly and justly. The Guidance Note does not impose a set of free-standing legal obligations on a tribunal. The fact that a tribunal has not taken the steps set out in the Guidance Note does not necessarily mean that the tribunal has erred in law, still less that its decision on an appeal is legally flawed. The issue will ultimately be whether the proceedings were procedurally fair so that there was a proper opportunity to give evidence and have that evidence properly and fairly assessed”.
25. I conclude therefore the FTJ made no error of law; the appellant had a proper opportunity to give evidence, and her evidence was properly and fairly assessed.
Grounds 2 and 3
26. The FTJ should have been more explicit about his conclusions about the appellant’s husband and IPOB. He did not need to make an explicit finding if he had been clear throughout that he was taking the case at its highest, so considering the case as if the appellant’s husband were a member of IPOB. He obviously was taking the case at its highest at [34], but at [36] the paragraph deals both with the lack of interest by the authorities in the appellant but also about there being only one photograph supporting the husband’s membership. It is not clear whether the FTJ was using the photograph point as undermining the fact of membership or indicating that there was little information about the extent of the husband’s activities which might of course go to the authorities’ interest in him, or knowledge of his political opinion. That the FTJ had not made conclusive findings about the husband’s membership is clear from [43] where he refers to the husband’s “alleged” membership of IPOB.
27. Mr Adejumobi took issue with the FTJ’s conclusion that the appellant had been inconsistent in the basis of her asylum claim. It is therefore proper to examine how the appellant put her claim. In screening interview she only referred to the general situation in Nigeria. In her witness statement before the asylum interview she mentioned her husband’s abuse and that her husband belonged to the IPOB but only in the context that as a member of that group he had a lot of influence with the authorities so that she could not register a complaint of his abuse to her. In interview when asked for her main reason for claiming asylum she described the domestic abuse from her husband (AIR qn 14) and said she feared her husband, and the country was not good as there were killings and kidnaps every now and then (AIR qn 16). She was asked if she feared anything and anyone else and she said no. It was then put to her that she had informed the Home Office that she was also a member of IPOB and she said she was (AIR qn 20). She was not asked any further questions about this until question 75 when she said that she was an affiliate member of IPOB because of her husband’s membership and she did not attend the meetings, it was because of her loyalty to her husband (AIR qn 76). It was there that the interview stopped. Her witness statement in the proceedings of March 2025 is lengthy and describes the domestic abuse in detail. The first mention of IPOB is at paragraph 42 and that is to say that her ex-husband is a member of IPOB and the Nigerian government is targeting people associated with IPOB even their spouses who have no connection to the group “because I was married to him, I could be seen as a supporter and face serious harm.”
28. The FTJ summarised the appellant’s case in almost exactly the same way [19] – [25]. It is right that in asylum interview the appellant did not refer to IPOB in terms of suggesting that his membership of it meant that her husband had influence, but the FTJ must be taken to have understood what he had just summarised and his point remains a good one, in that the appellant’s first claim to be at greater risk due to her husband’s membership of IPOB (as opposed to not being able to obtain protection because of her husband’s influence as a member of IPOB) was in her March 2025 witness statement. Of course as Mr Adejumobi submits, the appellant was expecting to be asked further about the IPOB topic as she was left expecting another interview, but the FTJ’s point was not that the appellant never mentioned risk based on imputed political opinion due to her husband’s membership of IPOB, rather that it was only referred to at a later stage. The point was one that was perfectly open to him; the appellant did indeed only refer to it a later stage; one would have expected a claim which was central to her case to have been mentioned in her first statement and front and centre of her expressed fears in asylum interview.
29. It is said that the FTJ failed to take account of material country evidence about risk to family members of IPOB members. A specific part of the CPIN, paragraph 9.1.10 is relied upon. I observe that paragraph was not referred to in the appellant’s skeleton argument. It is difficult to see how the FTJ can be at fault for not dealing with a specific paragraph when he was not directly pointed to it. The FTJ considered paragraph 2.4.29 of the CPIN which highlights that one of the factors to take into account when assessing risk is the profile and activities of family members. Even had the FTJ been referred to and specifically considered paragraph 9.1.10 it could not have made any difference. The material relied upon is a small section of a paragraph which is based on an article from May 2021 in an online website “the Sahara reporter” which says that local people were saying that the security services were conducting house to house searches in certain states with large Igbo populations and rounding up “young men and their family members”. If that source is taken at face value that obviously reinforced that family members could at least in certain circumstances be at risk but then the FTJ had referred himself to paragraph 2.4.29 so that he knew that activities of family members could be relevant. The paragraph relied on in background material does not suggest that family members are always at risk in any circumstances.
30. Taking a step back, I have considered that the FTJ should have made a clear finding about whether the appellant’s husband was a member of IPOB. However, given his other sustainable findings I conclude that the error is not material – see ASO (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1282 (at [43]). On the other sustainable findings made by the FTJ, a rational tribunal must have come to the same conclusion, that the appellant’s claim for international protection could not succeed, even had they been satisfied that the appellant’s husband was a member of IPOB. There was no information about the appellant’s husband’s activities, the appellant herself had not conducted any activities and she was not wanted, neither had she come to the attention of the authorities [36] (I observe that self-evidently neither she nor her husband had been rounded up in the searches which are said to have taken place in May 2021 and no further specific material about risk to family members was pointed to). That the appellant was at risk based on imputed political opinion because of her husband’s activities had not been the focus of the appellant’s claim from the beginning [37] which the FTJ found relevant to a subjective fear of persecution and is relevant to actual risk. In those circumstances the FTJ could not possibly have rationally found that the appellant returning to Nigeria after a couple of years in the UK and no longer with her husband, could be at real risk of suffering serious harm due to imputed political opinion. Any risk would be merely speculative.
31. Accordingly the FTJ made no material error of law and the appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains no material error of law and stands. The appellant’s appeal fails and is dismissed.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25 February 2026