Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002581
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01403/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Directions Issued:

On 24th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant

and

R R
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K. Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms N. Fegan, Counsel instructed by Orwillo & Co, Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 6 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the Upper Tribunal’). The Upper Tribunal is an independent decision-making body with powers given to it by an Act of Parliament.
2. For the sake of clarity, the parties are referred to as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
3. This decision is made in the context of the Upper Tribunal’s role in considering statutory appeals from decisions made by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the First-tier Tribunal’).
4. The losing party in an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal can apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. If permission is granted, the Upper Tribunal will consider the legal arguments put forward by both sides in the appeal. The Upper Tribunal only has power to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal if it concludes that the arguments put forward by the party that applied to appeal show that the decision involved the making of an error of law: see section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (‘TCEA 2007’).
5. If the Upper Tribunal finds that a decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, the First-tier Tribunal decision will stand. If a decision of the First-tier Tribunal is found to involve the making of an error of law the Upper Tribunal has power to set aside the decision. The Upper Tribunal will then decide whether it will retain the appeal and remake the decision or whether the appeal might need to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard afresh.
6. This decision should be read in conjunction with the decision issued on 09 October 2025 in which the Upper Tribunal found that the First-tier Tribunal had materially erred in law. The First-tier Tribunal decision promulgated on 28 January 2025 was set aside with preserved findings and the appellant’s appeal was adjourned to be re-heard (remade) on a later date by the Upper Tribunal.
Anonymity
7. An anonymity direction was made previously in connection with the error of law hearing and is continued.
Factual Background
8. The following is a brief non-contentious summary of the background which sets the context for this remaking hearing.
9. The appellant is a national of Barbados. He entered the UK on 8 July 2006 with leave to enter, valid until 8 January 2007. He became an overstayer. On 11 April 2014, the appellant was convicted of criminal damage, for which he received a conditional discharge and was made subject to a restraining order and required to pay compensation. On 5 February 2019, the appellant made a successful human rights claim and was granted leave on family life grounds valid initially until 7 February 2022 and extended until 2 June 2025.
10. On 15 November 2022, the appellant committed the criminal offence of grievous bodily harm with intent (‘the index offence’) for which he was convicted at Reading Crown Court on 19 May 2023, following a guilty plea and sentenced to 54 months imprisonment. The appellant was released from prison on or about 18 November 2025.
11. On 31 October 2023, the respondent made a decision to deport the appellant pursuant to section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007. The appellant successfully appealed against the deportation order to the First-tier Tribunal which allowed his appeal on human rights grounds under Article 8 ECHR. The First-tier Tribunal found there were ‘very compelling circumstances’ which made the deportation decision disproportionate and an interference with the appellant’s and his family’s Article 8 right to family life.
12. On 09 October 2025, following an appeal with permission lodged by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Upper Tribunal found an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and set aside the decision, preserving paragraphs 16-42 of the decision for the remaking hearing.
13. The chronology of this appeal and the outcomes of the previous hearings are set out in the error of law decision and need no repetition.
The Remaking Hearing
14. The matter now comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the appellant’s deportation from the United Kingdom would amount to a breach of Article 8 ECHR with reference to section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘NIAA 2002’).
15. Although a compressed bundle was prepared by the appellant’s solicitors comprising the core documents in the appeal, including bundles previously before the First-tier Tribunal and up to date evidence, it was not properly served on the respondent with the result that the hearing had to be briefly adjourned, wasting at least one hour of Tribunal time to allow for the documents to be sent and reviewed by the respondent before commencing substantive submissions.
16. The appellant’s solicitors further failed to file a rule 15 (2A) application in accordance with the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to admit new evidence (a text message) that was not before the First-tier Tribunal. All of these procedural failures are detrimental to the administration of justice by causing unnecessary and avoidable delays at a time of constrained judicial resources.
17. The appellant previously submitted a very helpful skeleton prepared by Mr Matthew Sowerby of counsel.
18. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties, as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions, where necessary.
19. The appellant attended the hearing remotely from the Colnbrook Immigration Detention Centre. There were no difficulties concerning the clarity of the appellant’s live evidence being received over the cloud video link (‘CVP’). The appellant’s partner attended the hearing in person.
20. At the end of the hearing, I reserved the decision and now give my reasons below.
Relevant Law
21. This appeal turns on the statutory provisions contained in Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘NIAA 2002’). Since for the present purposes the meaning of Section 117C of the NIAA 2002 is relevant to this appeal, I set it out in full. Section 117C provides:
117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (‘C’) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C’s deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where -
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C’s life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C’s integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.”
22. Where a foreign criminal has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of at least four years, which is the case in this appeal, the effect of section 117C(6) is that deportation of that person will be justified in the public interest unless it is demonstrated that there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2 that outweigh the public interest.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
23. I have not set out the submissions of Ms Fegan and Mr Ojo. However, my analysis of the case reflects the submissions they made. I wish to express my gratitude for the high quality of their submissions.
24. I start by recalling the decision of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22. Lord Hamblen stated at [51]:
‘When considering whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 and 2, all the relevant circumstances of the case will be considered and weighed against the very strong public interest in deportation. As explained by Lord Reed in Hesham Ali at paras [24] to [35], relevant factors will include those identified by the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) as being relevant to the Article 8 proportionality assessment.’
25. Lord Hamblen went on to identify the relevant factors developed by the caselaw as comprising the following:
• the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant;
• the length of the applicant’s stay in the country from which he of she is to be expelled;
• the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant’s conduct during that period;
• the applicant’s family situation, such as the length of the marriage and other factors expressing the effectiveness of the couples’ family life;
• whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship;
• whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age, and
• the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled;
• the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular, the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and
• the solidity of social, cultural, and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.
26. In the above context, it is instructive to recall the preserved findings at paragraphs [16]–[42] of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The preserved findings listed below address many of the above-mentioned factors, and need to be taken into account when considering the question of very compelling circumstances.
Preserved Findings
At [22] of the decision, it recalls there is a significant public interest in the appellant’s deportation. The appellant was convicted of a very serious criminal offence for which he received a lengthy prison sentence.
At [25] the appellant previously overstayed in the UK for a period of around 13 years during which time he was convicted of a criminal offence, albeit not a particularly serious offence, which attracted a sentence of a conditional discharge. His overstaying and criminal offence taken together increases the public interest.
Exceptions 1 & 2
At [30] the focus of the appellant’s case under the child exception relates to his daughter (‘child A’) although he contends that all five of his children are affected by his absence. Child A shares a particularly close relationship with the appellant, who has been ever present in the life of all of his children since birth. Child A has found it hard to regulate her emotions since the appellant was imprisoned and has gone from a calm child to lashing out, resulting in outbursts at school where she has attacked other children, leading to her suspension, and incidents at home where she has self-harmed.
At [32] the appellant has been a key parental figure for child A and has always been a source of emotional and financial support for her. The impact of the appellant’s imprisonment on child A has been very severe.
At [33] I find it more likely than not that child A’s negative behaviours will continue, and if anything, worsen if the appellant were to be deported.
At [34] the consequences for child A if she were to remain in the UK upon the appellant’s deportation would be ‘unduly harsh’.
At [35] the appellant meets the requirements for Exception 2 in section 117C(5) NIAA 2002 in respect of child A only.
At [37] the ‘stay’ scenario would not be ‘unduly harsh’ for the other four children although the consequences of the appellant’s deportation would still be significant.
At [38] despite the difficulties facing the appellant’s partner, she is managing and confirmed that she has a support network of her mother, brothers, aunties, and cousins. I am not satisfied that it has been shown that this support network would not be able to step in to help her raise the children upon the appellant deportation.
At [39] the consequences of the appellant’s deportation on the appellant’s partner would be harsh but they do not meet the unduly harsh threshold and therefore the appellant does not satisfy the partner exception in section 117C(5) NIAA 2002.
At [40] the relationship between the appellant and his partner was established at a time when the appellant was unlawfully in the UK, however, the appellant secured leave in 2019 and their family life is particularly strong, having developed over 10 years with three children.
At [41] the appellant has lived in the UK for over 18 years and has established social and cultural ties to the country, notwithstanding his offending.
At [42] the appellant no longer has any family in Barbados, but the fact is that he has lived most of his life there. He understands the culture and way of life there and would not face any considerable obstacles to integration on return to Barbados.
27. At the remaking hearing, the Upper Tribunal received live evidence from the appellant’s partner.
28. The appellant stated that he was released from prison on licence on 18 November 2025. He initially stayed at the home of his partner’s mother and after 3-4 weeks, moved back to live with his partner and their three children. He said he was allowed to stay at the family home.
29. While staying with his partner and the children, the appellant said there was an incident which involved taking away child A’s mobile phone. His action upset child A who later told her school that the appellant had hit her resulting in the appellant being recalled to prison. Following an investigation, the police determined that no further action (NFA) was required because it was revealed that child A had lied about being hit by the appellant and previously had made false allegations against others, including her mother and a social worker.
30. The appellant was also asked about the facts surrounding the index offence relating to his conviction for grievous bodily harm. The appellant stated that he did not invite the victim into his home on the day of the incident and that he simply turned up. He continued to question why the victim had come to his home. He was aware that the victim was a friend of his co-defendant who had just dropped the appellant home when they encountered the victim at his house. The co-defendant told the appellant that the victim had said something about him being owed money.
31. I have had regard to the sentencing remarks of His Honour Judge Burgess KC dated 19 May 2023 which clearly contradicts the appellant’s account. The sentencing judge stated:
‘This was a nasty incident. The extent to which the violence was premeditated is difficult to calculate. I accept his evidence [victim] that he was invited round to speak to you both. I accept his evidence that he [victim] expected that to relate to money that was owing to him. I accept his evidence [victim] that that was in the context of the illicit trade in controlled drugs.’
32. In light of the sentencing judge’s remarks, it is clear that the appellant remains in denial regarding the proven facts upon which his sentence is based.
33. Mr Ojo also asked the appellant about whether his partner and children had met the victim on the day of the incident. After an initial denial followed by some clarifying questions, the appellant accepted that his partner and three children had encountered the victim at their home on the date of the incident when the appellant was not at home. In this regard, Mr Ojo referenced the Reading Borough Council Single Assessment Report dated 16 September 2025 which records that his partner stated that when the incident happened, she was not at home with the children. However, she confirmed the victim had attended her home on the day of the incident asking for the appellant who was not at home at the time. The victim stated that he wanted to hurt her and the appellant and that he had a knife and started banging on her car windows as she drove off to her mother’s home with the children.
34. The appellant was also asked about whether he hit the victim with a weapon. He replied ‘No’ and that he was defending himself but confirmed that the victim was not charged with any offence. Again, based on the sentencing judge’s remarks, it is clear that the appellant remains in denial about his proven culpability. The sentencing judge stated:
‘You Mr [RR], then struck him at least three times with a fairly rusty metal implement. Whether that was a machete or something similar, it is difficult to say, but it was potentially a highly dangerous weapon and it is fortuitous that he wasn’t injured much more seriously than he was. Two relatively minor wounds to his head, one relatively minor defence wound to his hand where he had raised that hand to protect his head from further blows. It stopped there so far as the use of that metal weapon was concerned. Nevertheless, the use of violence by you both was one continuous seamless joint unlawful attack upon him pushing him into the house. Inside the house, you [Mr G] produced an imitation firearm …. and struck a number of blows with it to his face and head area. His evidence Mr [RR], was that you were continuing to punch him at the same time.’
‘They [injuries] did not of themselves, all taken together, amount to grievous bodily harm but what makes it serious and therefore within the section 18 guideline is the intent to cause grievous bodily harm.’
‘I can’t say there was a significant degree of planning or premeditation, but the weapons used were highly dangerous. This was a group activity. It was a persistent assault. I can’t say there was revenge in mind, but as I say it seems to me there was an element of teaching this man a lesson.’
35. The appellant stated in evidence that if he is released, he intended to stay at his partner’s home but was waiting on a decision from the Probation services.
36. Turning to child A, the appellant stated that he thought his situation had much to do with her recent permanent expulsion from school in early March 2026. He referred to a text message found in child A’s mobile by his partner in which child A blamed herself for the appellant being in custody. I have read the text message dated 9 February 2026 sent by child A to her friend Leila.
37. The text message does not specifically refer to the appellant but mentions how sorry child A is for things that she has done and said in her life, including to her friend Leila to whom the text is addressed. Child A says her life is a ‘shambles’ and that there are things going on at home. She also says that she just does not know what to do with her life, whether to end it or go on living. I have not been referred to a response or to any other messages but note this message is dated 9 February 2026.
38. In respect of his partner, the appellant said that she does everything on her own for the children and at home although ‘sometimes’ her mother who lived about fifteen minutes away on foot would help out, but ‘not too often.’ He said his partner was unemployed and in receipt of universal credit. She had given up a cleaning job to look after the children as the appellant was not there to help her.
39. The appellant said that at that very moment his partner was being called by child A’s temporary school asking about who would be picking up child A after school. He explained that normally his partner would pick up child A but because of the hearing, arrangements had been made for child A to go by bus to her grandmother’s home and to wait there to be picked up later by his partner.
40. The appellant confirmed that child A had self-harmed, the last occasion was before he was released from prison. He could not recall the exact date.
41. In respect of his siblings, the appellant said that he had two sisters and two brothers, all living in the USA with permanent status. He had no relatives in Barbados as his grandparents had already passed away.
42. The appellant’s partner also gave live evidence. She confirmed that she had found the text message to Leila on the mobile phone of child A. She subsequently had a ‘chat and a cry’ with child A about the text message who said that everything was going wrong, and she was finding it difficult to settle at her new temporary school, where she had been sent following exclusion from her previous school.
43. The partner said an issue had arisen that same day at the school about P.E. Apparently child A had been told she could sit in the front seat of the school transportation which was later changed causing her considerable upset. The school had informed the partner that child A was not ‘emotionally regulated’. The partner said that she had arranged for child A to go to school club at her primary school after school as she needed to be constantly supervised because of her mood swings.
44. The partner referred the Tribunal to some questionnaires (‘Beck Youth Inventories for children and adolescents’) that had been undertaken by the new temporary school with child A as part of her induction process. The partner said that as a result of child A’s concerning responses, the school had agreed to provide some mental health support.
45. Looking more widely, the partner stated that the local authority, Reading Borough Council, was in the process of preparing an Education, Health, and Care (plan) or EHCP for child A. This would provide more tailored support than available through standard special educational needs support (SEN) as it combined educational, health and social care needs.
46. The partner said she had not challenged the exclusion of child A from her former school because she was not happy with how child A was being treated and at the time was looking to move child A to another school closer to home to make pick-ups easier.
47. The partner stated that child A’s behaviour was fine with her mother, but in general she was withdrawn from everything else. However, when the appellant came home after his release from prison in November 2025, it was lovely to see child A and the other children with their father. However, regarding the incident, it was clear that child A did not expect her father to take her mobile phone away. The partner said it was important for child A to understand boundaries and likewise as parents to understand child A’s autism. She observed that child A had yet to learn about how to deal with authority as the appellant had not been present and that all the children were just struggling to have a normal life.
48. In respect of available support to her, the partner stated that her mother was at the end of the phone and they always talked. However, her mother worked two jobs and was now looking after her elderly father so did not have any spare time to help with raising the children.
49. The partner also mentioned her two brothers who lived in Bracknell, about fifteen minutes way by car. One brother had three children but was caring for his middle child and the younger brother had no children. Neither of them provided any support to her. She also had one aunt who lived about thirty minutes away and cousins. She said they all had their own lives. Finally, the partner stated that she did not know how she would carry on if the appellant was deported. She could not imagine life without him.
50. I have carefully considered the updated evidence regarding the available support network to the partner as the children’s sole primary carer. I note from the preserved findings at [39] that despite the challenges facing the partner, the First-tier Tribunal found that she was managing and had a support network of her mother, brothers, aunties, and cousins. Additionally, the First-tier Tribunal Judge stated that he was not satisfied that it had been shown that the partner’s support network would not be able to step in to help her raise the children alone upon the appellant’s deportation.
51. Even accepting that the partner’s mother now has little available time to spend with the children, I remain of the view that the preserved finding still stands as I have heard no new evidence in respect of the partner’s brothers, aunties, or cousins to change the earlier finding that support is available to her in the event that the appellant is deported. Additionally, in respect of the partner’s mother, while she may not be available to visit the children as often as she may have done previously, it is clear that she does provide some limited support as I heard on the day of the hearing that child A was going to her grandmother’s home after school where she would later be picked up by the partner. That is unarguably tangible support to child A and by extension to the appellant’s partner.
‘Very Compelling Circumstances over and above the exceptions to deportation’
52. In determining whether the appellant’s deportation would breach his Article 8 ECHR rights, I am required to have regard to sections 117A-117D of Part 5 of the NIAA 2002.
53. I say from the outset that I have taken a holistic view of the evidence. For the sake of succinctness, I do not identify every piece of evidence or point that I have considered but set out the most significant within the framework to enable the parties to understand why the minor points relied either fell away or did not affect the outcome, so as to give sufficient, rather than exhaustive explanation.
54. In considering the issue of ‘very compelling circumstances’ I remind myself of the dicta of Jackson LJ in NA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 662 at [30]
‘In the case of a serious offender who could point to circumstances in his own case which could be said to correspond to the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 & 2, but where he could only just succeed in such an argument, it would not be possible to describe his situation as involving very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. One might describe that as a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 & 2. On the other hand, if he could point to factors identified in the descriptions of Exceptions 1 & 2 of an especially compelling kind in support of an Article 8 claim, going well beyond what would be necessary to make out a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 & 2, they could in principle constitute ‘very compelling circumstances’ over and above those described in Exceptions 1 & 2, whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to application of Article 8.’
55. I also recall the judgement of Underhill LJ in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] ECWA Civ 74 which addressed the question of what is meant by ‘very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 & 2’. Underhill LJ at [57] stated:
‘NA (Pakistan) thus establishes that the effect of the over and above requirement is that, in a case where the ‘very compelling circumstances’ on which a claimant relies under section 117C(6) include an Exception-specified circumstance (‘an Exception-overlap case’), it is necessary that there be something substantially more than the minimum that would be necessary to qualify for the relevant Exception under (4) or (5); as Jackson LJ puts it at para 29, the article 8 case must be ‘especially strong’.
‘That higher threshold may be reached either because the circumstances in question is present to a degree which is ‘well beyond’ what would be sufficient to establish a ‘bare case’ or …..because it is complemented by other relevant circumstances, or because of a combination of both’. I will refer to those considerations, of whatever kind, as ‘something more’. To take a concrete example, if the Exception-related circumstance is the impact of deportation on a child (Exception 2) the something more will have to be either that the undue harshness would be of an elevated degree (‘unduly unduly harsh’?) or that it was complemented by another factor or factors … to a sufficient extent to meet the higher threshold, or as I have said, a combination of the two.’
‘There is nothing at all surprising about this, at least in the case of a serious offender. Even if the over and above requirement were not explicit, it is my view inherent in the structure of section 117C that a serious offender will need to meet a higher threshold than a medium offender in order to satisfy the test in subsection (6)’.
In Kapikanya v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 987, Bean LJ at {43] stated:
‘The judgement of Underhill LJ in Yalcin demonstrates that in order to satisfy section 117C(6) ‘something more’ is required than under Exceptions 1 or Exception 2. Underhill LJ envisages two types of case. The first where deportation would have what in a convenient shorthand phrase he describes as an ‘unduly, unduly harsh effect’ on a qualified child or partner. The second is where the appellant can point to the combination of an unduly harsh effect on a qualifying child or partner and some other factor amounting to very compelling circumstances. Underhill LJ emphasises that a serious offender will have to surmount a higher threshold than a medium offender’.
56. Following the preserved findings at [35] of the First-tier Tribunal decision, I accept that the appellant meets the requirements of the child exception in section 117C(5) NIAA 2002. However, as the First-tier Tribunal noted that is not determinative of the appellant’s appeal as he received a term of imprisonment of at least four years for the index offence and is therefore a ‘serious offender’.
57. The duration of the appellant’s sentence as a foreign criminal places him directly within section 117C(6) NIAA 2002. This provides that the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 & 2.
58. I am reminded that the weight to be given to the public interest arising from criminality is not fixed but is fact specific. In short, foreign offenders, such as the appellant, who have received sentences of at least four years must be dealt with on the basis that considerable weight should generally be given to the public interest in deportation but that can be outweighed, applying a proportionality test, by very compelling circumstances: in other words by a very strong Article 8 ECHR claim.
59. Accordingly, the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals has a moveable, rather than a fixed quality: see Akinyemi v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 2098 at [39]. I must therefore consider whether the particular circumstances of the appellant are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation.
60. In this case, I find the public interest in the deportation of the appellant is not based only on the need to protect the public from further offending by him but on the wider policy considerations of deterrence and public concern. I find given the seriousness of the offence as reflected in the sentencing judge’s remarks I have referred to above, that there is a strong public interest in or considerable weight to be attached to the appellant’s deportation.
61. The issue for me is whether or not the appellant’s circumstances sufficiently outweigh that position. I bring forward all of the preserved findings together with my own findings above to this consideration taking into account the relevant factors stated by Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq).
62. As noted above, the focus of the appellant’s submissions regarding ‘very compelling circumstances’ rests primarily on the impact that the appellant’s deportation would have on child A based on the stay scenario.
63. Ms Fegan on behalf of the appellant submits that the First-tier Tribunal already found at [32] that child A was displaying extremely concerning behaviours, including self harming and that the availability of support was not preventing this behaviour.
64. She argues that child A’s behaviour has in fact worsened since the date of the First-tier Tribunal decision of 25 January 2025, as demonstrated by child A’s permanent exclusion from school. Ms Fegan took me to the last sentence of school’s exclusion letter dated 5 March 2026 which states ‘Evidence indicates the impact of trauma’. She argues that the ‘trauma’ mentioned is the appellant’s incarceration which would only be deepened in the event of his deportation.
65. She further argues that child A’s behaviours have escalated as shown by her self-harming and that the responses to the questionnaires and the text message sent to Leila demonstrates that her father’s absence triggers negative thoughts of self-harm and her wish that she were dead.
66. Ms Fegan took me to a note written by child A (at page 96 of the bundle which was before the First-tier Tribunal) where she states that everything changed when her father went away. She also referred me to the Reading Borough Council’s Single Assessment Report (at page 67) where child A said that her stressors for self-harming included her volume of work at school, friends, or anything.
67. In summary, Ms Fegan argues that there is a clear link between child A’s emotions about her father and those about herself, and that her outbursts paint a clear picture that her self-harming will elevate if the appellant is deported. That elevated risk Ms Fegan submits is ‘unduly unduly harsh’ within the caselaw cited and that the timing of the text message to Leila is suggestive of child A’s awareness of the appellant’s recall to prison and deportation which exacerbates her risk of self-harm.
68. Ms Fegan further submits that the potential consequences on child A and the wider family, if the appellant is deported, would be ‘unduly unduly harsh.’
69. Mr Ojo on behalf of the respondent formally relied on the refusal letter dated 12 March 2024 rejecting the appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim. He made several additional submissions. In relation to Exception 2, he stated that it was important to consider the safety of the children.
70. In this respect, Mr Ojo pointed to the OASys Assessment dated 11 November 2024. This recorded that the appellant posed a ‘high risk’ to the public, especially male members of the public or known adults with whom the appellant has an unsettled dispute, likely to be an associate or an already known individual to the appellant. In respect of the safety of the children, Mr Ojo stated that although the OASys report identified a low risk, the report also stated that there was a risk of emotional or psychological harm should the children witness any domestic dispute between the appellant and an intimate partner in the home.
71. Additionally, Mr Ojo argued that while the appellant himself may not pose a risk to the family in general, there was a specific risk to them from the appellant’s criminal associations/associates who may wish to harm the family, as was the case when the victim encountered the appellant’s partner and the children. In this regard, the sentencing judge found the incident to have occurred in the context of the illicit trade in controlled drugs.
72. In respect of the reference to ‘trauma’ in the school exclusion letter, Mr Ojo submitted that the letter stated ‘indicates’ trauma. He argued that there was no certainty about it and in any event, it was just speculation that child A’s ‘trauma’ was because of the appellant’s incarceration.
73. Turning to the assertion that child A faces an ‘elevated risk’ of self-harm if the appellant is deported, Mr Ojo stated this was pure speculation. The appellant had failed to provide any updated independent evidence from a social services professional to support the assertion that the impact of the appellant’s incarceration was linked to an elevated risk of self-harm to child A. Mr Ojo observed that the last report from an Independent Social Worker, Ms Meek, was on 11 November 2024 and much had changed since then.
74. Turning to the partner and her ability to cope without the appellant’s support, Mr Ojo relied on the Reading Borough Single Assessment Report. This stated (at page 66) under the section ‘What’s working well’ that the partner had been able to provide for all her children’s basic needs while the appellant was in prison and that she was a ‘protective factor’, having insight to protect her children.
75. At page 64 of the same report, it stated that the partner had a great relationship with her mother and who helped her with emotional and practical support.
76. At page 67 of the same report, Mr Ojo noted that child A admitted to sometimes missing her father and said that she wanted him to come back home. However, when asked if missing her father was one of her stress triggers, child A said ‘No.’
77. Mr Ojo also took me to the Berkshire Healthcare Autism Assessment Report dated 30 September 2025. He referred to page 38 under the section ‘Parents/Carer’s views’. He noted that this section recorded concerns about child A, but at no point was anything mentioned by the appellant’s partner about any impact the appellant’s incarceration was having on child A, as claimed by the appellant. Further, under the section relating to child A’s views, again there is nothing recorded by child A about any impact on her arising from the appellant’s incarceration.
78. In summary, Mr Ojo submitted that the appellant had failed to show that if he is deported that the impact would be elevated beyond Exception 2 to become ‘unduly unduly harsh’ on child A. In other words, applying the case law the appellant had failed to show the ‘something more’ over and above Exceptions 1 & 2.
79. I have carefully considered the evidence and am grateful to Mr Ojo and Ms Fegan for their submissions. Additionally, I have considered the appellant’s letter dated 26 March 2026 addressed to the ‘Judge’. In that letter, the appellant claims he is the main source of support to child A and that his presence is important to support child A given her additional needs and daily challenges.
80. The appellant’s case, in essence, is that there are additional factors relevant to Article 8 ECHR which when taken with Exception 2, would constitute ‘very compelling circumstances’ over and above Exceptions 1 & 2. Those additional factors are said to include the ‘elevated risk’ of self harm to child A that would likely materialise if the appellant were deported and the consequential wider impact on the family unit which would be ‘unduly unduly harsh.’
81. I accept that child A’s behaviour appears to have worsened since the decision of the First-tier Tribunal evidenced by her permanent exclusion from school. I also accept that the text message sent to Leila suggests that child A has negative feelings about herself and her behaviours indicating mental health concerns. However, I do not accept that the appellant has demonstrated that the worsening of child A’s behaviours, including her self harming is because of the appellant’s incarceration or if he is to be deported. In other words, I do not find the evidence shows that the factual matrix of child A is sufficient to demonstrate very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 & 2.
82. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons. The assertion of an elevated risk to child A should the appellant be deported is wholly speculative and overstated in my view. The appellant has not provided an updated social services report. The most recent reports from Berkshire Healthcare NHS Foundation dated 30 June 2025 and Reading Borough Council dated 22 October 2025 identifies no specific linkage between the appellant’s incarceration and child A’s behaviours. In fact, child A who is autistic, when asked as recently as 16 September 2025 if missing her father was one of her stress triggers for self harming stated ‘No’.
83. While it is concerning that child A’s behaviour appears to have worsened, I have only been able to identify one instance of actual self-harming while at school before the appellant’s release from prison which was already considered before the First-tier Tribunal. While there are several references to self-harming in the documentation this would appear to be based on the threats made by child A to self harm, as reflected in the text message to Leila, rather than actual additional instances of self harm. While clearly distressing nonetheless, the evidence of the partner was that child A was able to access mental health support from her current school and will shortly receive tailored support through an EHCP which is being taken forward by the local authority.
84. The appellant stated as recently as 26 March 2026 that he is child A’s main source of support’. That statement is clearly overstated. The appellant was released from a lengthy custodial sentence only in November 2025 and was then recalled on 12 January 2026 and is now in immigration detention. The evidence unarguably shows that it is his partner who has been the main source of support to child A and her siblings during his incarceration and continues to be their main source of support in meeting their basic needs.
85. While I accept that the appellant’s partner has lost some support from her mother in helping to look after the children, her overall situation since the case was before the First-tier Tribunal has not materially changed and the preserved facts in respect of her support network remains extant. I accept that she would wish for the appellant to return to the family home, but the reality is that she continues to cope and manage herself and the children without the appellant. Furthermore, there is no decision currently in place from probation services confirming that if released, it would be appropriate for the appellant to return to the home address to live with his partner and the children given the appellant’s current risk profile.
86. Overall, for the forgoing reasons, the evidence does not indicate to me that the appellant’s particular circumstances is sufficient to demonstrate very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 & 2. The ‘something more’ which is described by Ms Fegan to be the ‘elevated risk’ of self harm to child A, that would likely arise from the impact of the appellant’s deportation is wholly speculative and unsubstantiated.
87. The claimed ‘something more’ over and above Exceptions 1 & 2, namely, the elevated risk of self-harming, is arguably nothing more than was already identified to meet Exception 2 before the First-tier Tribunal; and, child A’s apparent worsening behaviour would appear not to be linked to the appellant’s incarceration, but arguably to child A’s autistic condition.
88. I have also considered the appellant’s remorse and rehabilitation which the appellant claims weighs in his favour. To his credit, the appellant achieved the status of an enhanced prisoner with no adjudications. However, the reality is that he is not fully rehabilitated. The OASys Assessment (the Assessment’) identifies some problems regarding the appellant’s attitudes and states that even though he is ‘quite motivated’ to address his offending behaviour there are nonetheless ‘some problems’ in respect of pro-criminal attitudes.
89. The Assessment also records that there may be some ‘minimisation’ in relation to the index offence as the appellant’s account of his involvement with others and his lifestyle are disputed by other accounts which indicates a more entrenched involvement with drug dealing behaviour and criminal associates. For these reasons, the Assessment identifies this area is linked to risk of harm and risk of reoffending. The Assessment also records that the appellant has not demonstrated victim empathy and this is an area for development.
90. As noted earlier in this decision, the Assessment records the appellant’s risk to the public and known adults (the victim and his ex-partner) as ‘High.’ Importantly, the Assessment notes that the appellant needs to be ‘tested’ once out in the community before he can be assessed a medium risk.
91. It is also important to recall that the index offence marked an escalation in the appellant’s offending from the relatively minor conviction on 11 April 2014 for destroying and damaging property to grievous bodily harm.
92. In terms of his likely integration in Barbados, the preserved facts at [41] and [42] of the First-tier Tribunal recall that the appellant has lived in the UK for over 18 years and has established social and cultural ties to the country, notwithstanding his offending. However, although the appellant no longer has any family in Barbados, he has lived most of his life there and understands the culture and way of life there and would not face any considerable obstacles to integration on return to Barbados.
93. Looking at the appellant’s circumstances in the round, I do not find that there are very compelling circumstances that outweigh the high public interest in the appellant’s deportation.
94. For all these reasons, the appellant’s grounds based on Article 8 ECHR fails and the respondent’s appeal is allowed.

Notice of Decision
The respondent’s appeal is allowed.
There are currently no barriers to the appellant’s deportation.

K.A.Khan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 May 2026