Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002598

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/02048/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEACH

Between

CORNELIU FLORIN IONITA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr A. Gilbert, counsel instructed by Lex Sterling Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr N. Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 August 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Romania who was born on 06 July 2003. He appealed the respondent’s decision dated 18 October 2024 to refuse a human rights claim in the context of deportation proceedings.
First-tier Tribunal decision
2. First-tier Tribunal Judge Aldridge (‘the judge’) dismissed the appeal in a decision sent on 13 May 2025. The judge summarised the appellant’s immigration history. He noted that the appellant said that he first came to the UK in 2014 [2] although later this date seems to have been amended to 2016 [23][26]. The appellant was granted settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme rules on 07 October 2021.
3. The appellant was convicted and sentenced to 2 years 6 months imprisonment on 31 July 2024 for a series of dangerous driving offences that took place between 18-29 July 2023. The most serious of those offences was the last offence, which caused serious injuries to another driver. The appellant conducted an overtaking manoeuvre in a 40 mile an hour zone at speeds in excess of 75 miles an hour. He attempted to overtake two cars while approaching a hidden dip in the road. The appellant’s 2 younger sisters, aged 14 years and 9 years old at the time, were in the car with him. The appellant swerved to avoid a vehicle and collided with another car. The driver of the other car suffered life changing injuries. The appellant himself suffered a broken arm, but thankfully the children were not seriously injured. The sentencing judge found that the fact that there were children in the car was an aggravating factor.
4. The judge took a structured approach to the factors a court or tribunal is required to consider under section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘the NIAA 2002’). The judge noted that the legal framework stated that it was in the public interest to deport a person who was sentenced to a period of at least 12 months imprisonment [34].
5. Although the private life exception to deportation contained in section 117C(4) was not pursued, nevertheless the judge made findings to explain why the appellant did not meet the requirements [35]. He found that the appellant had not been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life. Although it was accepted that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom [20], the judge concluded that he would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Romania. He was familiar with the language, customs and culture of the country. The appellant had transferrable skills and qualifications that would enable him to find work and to ‘rekindle ties’ that he had there.
6. The judge turned to consider whether it would be ‘unduly harsh’ for the appellant’s partner to live in Romania (the ‘go’ scenario) or to remain in the UK (the ‘stay’ scenario) for the purpose of section 117C(5) [36]-[39]. The respondent’s decision letter did not suggest that it would be reasonable for his partner to live in Romania. The judge found that it would not be unduly harsh to expect the appellant’s partner to remain in the UK without him. She was a British citizen who could access support. He did not live with his partner nor was there any evidence to show that she was financially dependent on him.
7. Having found that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the exceptions to deportation, the judge went on to consider whether there were ‘very compelling circumstances’ to outweigh the public interest in deportation. He directed himself to the relevant cases of Hesham Ali (Iraq) v SSHD [2016] UKSC 60 and HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22.
8. In conducting the balancing exercise for the purpose of the assessment of Article 8(2), the judge began by considering what weight should be placed on the public interest in deportation [41]-[43]. He considered the serious nature of the offence, the consequences for the victim, and the fact that the offence was aggravated by his younger sisters being in the car. The judge also took into account the fact that the appellant was previously of good character, appeared to show genuine remorse, and was immature at the date of the offence. However, he also found that the most serious offence was not a ‘one-off’ but formed part of a course of conduct [41]. The judge went on to make the following findings at [42]-[44]:
’42. The negative effects of dangerous driving causing injury upon society are well documented and need not be rehearsed in this judgment. There is a public interest in the deportation of criminals based not only on the need to protect the public from further offending by the foreign criminal in question but also the wider policy considerations of deterrence and public concern.
43. I turn to the question of rehabilitation. I do accept that there is evidence presented to the tribunal of the positive character of the appellant both before and after the commission of the index offence. The appellant is considered to be a low risk of reoffending and has completed work in respect of victim awareness and digital skills. I accept the course that the appellant states that he has completed. There has been contrition shown by the appellant during his oral evidence to the tribunal which is also reflected through his friends and family who have stepped forward to speak positively on his behalf. The appellant pleaded guilty to these offences and did not seek to avoid his responsibility. Whilst noting that there is relatively little time between the sentence of the appellant and todays date and that he has not had the opportunity of demonstrating his life improvements by living in the community after his release from prison, I do accept that the evidence points in favour of the appellant demonstrating remorse, understanding and rehabilitation since the commission of the offences which weights in his favour when considering this matter.
44. The appellant has resided in the UK for around 8 years, and I accept that he has worked and has positive working reference and personal partner, family and friend references. He became involved in [a] course of conduct with regards to his driving which fell far below the standards of a reasonable driver on numerous occasions. I cannot overlook that it was considered that this course of conduct resulted in the inevitable accident that took place for which the appellant was highly culpable and which caused a high level of harm. I do consider that this was serious offending behaviour. Whilst I note that weight can be attached to his integration in the UK which I have already assessed earlier[,] I do not accept that the appellant would suffer very significant obstacles relocating to Romania. He is familiar with the culture, customs, language and social norms of that country. He has an ability to work and find employment within that country. He is a capable man who should be able to adapt to the environment with which he is familiar. It is reasonable to suggest that he would be able to contact friends and family and call upon them for assistance when and if required.’
9. The judge went on to consider other factors relating to the appellant’s personal circumstances. He considered the best interests of the appellant’s minor siblings. He said that he had considered the evidence in this respect [45]. Earlier in the decision he had noted that there was a letter from his older sister’s teacher [31]. The judge acknowledged that the appellant’s sisters would no doubt be distressed by their brother having to leave the UK. However, he concluded that there was no evidence to show deportation would be ‘unduly harsh’ on them within the meaning of that stringent test.
10. The position of other family members was considered [46]. The judge noted that the appellant’s mother had suffered from cancer and that the family as a whole were struggling financially. However, he took into account the fact that they had been able to get by while he was in prison and that his grandmother also earned some income. The family unit might be entitled to state benefits if eligible. He concluded that they could maintain contact with the appellant through modern means of communication and visits to Romania.
11. Having weighed factors relating to the public interest and factors relating to the appellant’s personal circumstances, the judge came to the following conclusion at [47]:
’47. Whilst I do note and take into account the positive aspects to this appellant concerning this matter, I do find that the appellant is an individual for which it is in the public interest to deport due to his offending behaviour which has resulted in a custodial sentence of more than 12 months and less than 4 years. I do not find very compelling circumstances over and above exceptions 1 and 2 have been met.’
Upper Tribunal proceedings
12. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the following grounds:
(i) The judge erred in his assessment of the weight to be placed on the public interest when assessing whether there were ‘very compelling circumstances’ to outweigh the public interest in deportation.
It was argued that the weight to be placed on the public interest in preventing crime was reduced in light of the judge’s findings. For this reason the judge ‘must have attributed more significant weight to the two other matters he identified in the public interest of deterrence and public concern.’ The first ground cited the dissenting opinion of Lord Kerr in Hesham Ali [165]-[168] and obiter comments made by Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) [59]. The first ground argued that the judge had erroneously attributed weight to deterrence and public concern, which was ‘no longer a valid facet of the public interest’.
(ii) The second ground argued that the judge failed to give adequate consideration to the correspondence from the appellant’s sister’s teacher in assessing whether deportation would be unduly harsh. The teacher said that his older sister, ‘M’, was struggling while her brother was ‘away’. She could become overwhelmed and emotional in lessons, which has had a massive impact on her work. M had gone from a ‘bubbly young lady to a quiet withdrawn girl’. Her teacher was worried about how this was affecting M mentally and emotionally.
13. The First-tier Tribunal refused permission to appeal in an order dated 05 June 2025. However, the Upper Tribunal subsequently granted permission to appeal in an order dated 13 June 2025.
14. We have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions because they are a matter of record, but we will refer to any relevant arguments in our decision.
15. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19. We have kept these considerations in mind when coming to our decision.
Decision and Reasons
Ground 1 – weight to be given to the public interest
16. The starting point for the judge’s consideration of the weight to be placed on the public interest was the fact that the appellant was subject to automatic deportation by operation of the UK Borders Act 2007. Section 32(5) states that the Secretary of State must make a deportation order in respect of a ‘foreign criminal’ who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months (subject to the exceptions contained in section 33). Section 32(4) makes clear that deportation of a foreign criminal is conducive to the public good.
17. Other aspects of the statutory scheme relating to deportation also place inherent weight on the public interest in the deportation of a foreign criminal. Section 117A(2) of Part 5 NIAA 2002 states that, when considering the public interest question, a court or tribunal must have regard to the considerations listed in section 117C. Section 117C(1) states that the deportation of a foreign criminal is in the public interest. Section 117C(2) states that the more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation.
18. In Hesham Ali the Supreme Court considered the legal position with reference to paragraphs 398 and 399A of the immigration rules relating to deportation in force at the relevant time. Although some aspects of the broad framework initially set out in the immigration rules were subsequently transferred into the statutory provisions, the legal framework considered by the Supreme Court in Hesham Ali pre-dated the introduction of Part 5 NIAA 2002. The rules considered by the Supreme Court said that if a person did not meet the requirements of paragraph 399 (family life with child/partner) or 399A (private life), which were later reformulated as ‘exceptions’ to deportation, then it would only be in ‘exceptional circumstances’ that the public interest in deportation will be outweighed by other factors.
19. When the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test was considered in the early case of MF (Nigeria) v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 1192 the Court of Appeal found that, where a person did not meet the requirements of paragraphs 399 and 399A of the immigration rules then ‘very compelling reasons’ would be required to outweigh the public interest in deportation. Those compelling reasons were the ‘exceptional circumstances’ [43]. This wording was then repeated by Lord Reed, giving the lead judgment in Hesham Ali, when he said that: ‘countervailing considerations must be very compelling in order to outweigh the general public interest in the deportation of such offenders, as assessed by Parliament and the Secretary of State’ [38].
20. The wording initially used in MF (Nigeria) later found its way to section 117C(6) when Part 5 NIAA 2002 was introduced. Where a person did not meet the requirements of the exceptions to deportation found in section 117C(4) (private life) and section 117C(5) (family life) or had been convicted of an offence of at least 4 years imprisonment section 117C(6) states that the public interest requires deportation unless there are ‘very compelling circumstances’ over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
21. The Supreme Court in Hesham Ali made clear that it is the duty of a tribunal to make its own assessment of the proportionality of deportation on the facts and the relevant law. However, where the Secretary of State has adopted a policy based on a general assessment of proportionality, ‘considerable weight’ should be attached to that assessment [46]. In Akinyemi v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2098 the Court of Appeal made clear that the weight to be placed on the public interest has a ‘moveable rather than fixed quality’. We observe that this much is recognised by the wording of section 117C(2) (see [17] above). Although the Court of Appeal in Akinyemi urged decision makers to approach the public interest flexibly, it recognised that, having regard to the legislation and the immigration rules, the number of cases that might outweigh the public interest in deportation would be few [39].
22. The Supreme Court in Hesham Ali and HA (Iraq) reiterated that the relevant factors to be taken into account were outlined in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. These cases include Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50, Üner v Netherlands (2006) 45 EHRR 14, Maslov v Austria [2009] INLR 47, Jeunesse v Netherlands (2014) 60 EHRR 17, and Unuane v United Kingdom (2021) 72 EHRR 24. In summary, relevant factors to be considered may include the nature and seriousness of the offence, the person’s length of residence, whether the person is a lawfully settled migrant or not, the time elapsed since the offence was committed, the nationalities of the various people concerned, the family situation, the best interests of the person’s children, and the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.
23. Having summarised the statutory framework and the relevant case law, we turn to consider the arguments made in the first ground of appeal. We acknowledge that Mr Gilbert was not the author of those grounds but did his best to draw out what he could from those arguments at the hearing.
24. The first ground, as originally pleaded, must be placed in proper context. The appellant did not pursue the argument that he met the requirements of Exception 1 (section 117C(4)) with reference to his private life. None of the judge’s findings relating to Exception 1 (private life) or Exception 2 (family life/partner) have been challenged in the grounds of appeal. The findings that the appellant is seeking to challenge only relate to the judge’s assessment of the more stringent test of whether there were ‘very compelling circumstances’ to outweigh the public interest in deportation contained in section 117C(6).
25. The first ground appears to be premised on an assumption that the judge’s finding at [42], that there was some positive evidence of remorse and rehabilitation, was sufficient to extinguish any connection to the legitimate aim of preventing crime and disorder. Having made that assumption the first ground sought to place the next block in the argument based on a further assumption that the judge ‘must have attributed more significant weight to the two other matters he identified in the public interest of deterrence and public concern’.
26. Based on these two unsupported assumptions the first ground then went on to rely on comments made by Lord Kerr in his dissenting opinion in Hesham Ali about the weight that should be given to the public interest when a person is assessed to pose a low risk of reoffending. Lord Kerr went on to question whether ‘deterrence’ was a relevant component of the public interest in so far as settled migrants were concerned. The arguments went on to cite comments made by Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) who noted that the wider public interest consideration of ‘public concern’ might be open to question on the ground that it might not be relevant to the legitimate aim of the prevention of crime and disorder [59]. However, it is clear even from the passage quoted in the first ground that this point did not fall to be determined in that appeal and is not a binding part of the judgment.
27. The first ground is misconceived. It fails to take into account the broader legal framework contained in the statute and the binding majority judgments of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal as set out above. Instead, it relies on dissenting or obiter opinions that were not binding on the First-tier Tribunal. The foundational assumptions upon which the argument is premised are not made out either in law or on the face of the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal.
28. The Supreme Court has made clear significant weight should given to the respondent’s assessment of the public interest in deportation as outlined in the statutory scheme and the immigration rules. It has also made clear that the public interest might include broader considerations.
29. The assumption that rehabilitation might extinguish any public interest in the prevention of disorder or crime is also undermined by the relevant case law on this issue. In HA (Iraq) the Supreme Court made clear that the weight to be given to any particular factor will be a matter for the fact finding tribunal. The fact that a person had not committed any further crime was likely to be of little or no material weight in the balancing exercise. However, if there is evidence of positive rehabilitation which reduces the risk of further offending then that ‘may have some weight as it bears on one element of the public interest in deportation, namely the protection of the public from further offending’ [58]. Lord Hamblen went on to endorse Lord Justice Underhill’s judgment in HA (Iraq) in the Court of Appeal at [141]:
‘141. … Where a tribunal is able to make an assessment that the foreign criminal is unlikely to re-offend, that is a factor which can carry some weight in the balance when considering very compelling circumstances. The weight which it will bear will vary from case to case, but it will rarely be of great weight bearing in mind that… the public interest in the deportation of criminals is not based only on the need to protect the public from further offending by the foreign criminal in question but also on wider policy considerations of deterrence and public concern.’ [our emphasis]
30. What becomes clear from these authorities is that although positive rehabilitation is a factor that can be taken into account in assessing what weight should be placed on the public interest in the prevention of disorder or crime, it is a factor that will rarely be given great weight and more often than not will only be capable of being given some weight.
31. It is clear from the First-tier Tribunal decision that the judge had regard to the weight to be given to the broader policy framework relating to the weight to be placed on the public interest set out in Part 5 NIAA 2002. He made structured findings with reference to each aspect of the legal framework.
32. Having found that the appellant did not meet the requirements of the exceptions to deportation the judge went on to consider whether there were very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in deportation. It was open to him to find that these were serious offences, the last of which caused serious injuries to another driver. The offence was considered to be at the highest level of harm and was aggravated by the fact that children were in the car [41]. It was open to the judge to take into account the broader effect that dangerous driving has on society and to take into account the fact that the public interest not only includes the need to protect the public from further offending by the foreign criminal but also the wider policy considerations relating to deterrence and public concern [42].
33. Although the judge found that there was some evidence to show that the appellant expressed remorse and was considered to present a low risk of reoffending, his findings at [43] were tempered by the fact that little time had passed between the appellant’s release from prison and the hearing. The appellant had not yet had the opportunity to demonstrate improvements in the community. It is clear that the judge gave ‘some weight’ to these positive improvements, but his findings did not suggest that he considered that there was no risk of reoffending such that it might extinguish the weight to be given to the public interest.
34. The foundations of the first ground crumble when faced with a correct interpretation of the law and an overall reading of the reasons given by the judge. The judge gave careful consideration to all the relevant factors (see [22] above) which needed to be considered in the balancing exercise. It is not arguable that the fact that the appellant showed contrition and was considered to present a low risk of reoffending were sufficiently strong factors to reduce the weight to be placed on the public interest when the appellant failed to meet the requirements of the exceptions to deportation and needed to show that there were ‘very compelling circumstances’ that might outweigh the public interest in deportation. The judge’s findings were within a range of reasonable responses to the evidence and do not disclose an error of law that would have made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal.
Ground 2 – best interests of children (siblings)
35. The second ground fails to identify any error of law that would have made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal. The appellant’s skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal did not seek to argue that deportation of a sibling would be unduly harsh on the appellant’s sisters. No doubt the appellant and his sisters have the normal emotional ties of loving sibling relationships, but the familial relationship is not the same as a parent and a child. Another part of the picture was that the index offence was aggravated by the fact that the appellant had endangered his minor siblings by driving dangerously with them in the car.
36. Even if the evidence from the teacher is taken at its highest, it was a brief observation of some emotional distress caused by the appellant’s incarceration. There was no evidence to suggest that the teacher had considered any of the safeguarding factors arising from the offence. Nor is there any merit in the assertion that the judge failed to consider this evidence. The judge made reference to it at [31] when summarising the submissions made on behalf of the appellant. The judge’s acknowledgment that the appellant’s removal was likely to cause some distress to his siblings was consistent with the information provided by the teacher [45]. The appellant’s bundle did not appear to contain any evidence from the appellant’s sisters, even though his eldest sister was likely to be nearly 16 years old at the date of the hearing. The evidence contained in the appellant’s witness statement was limited to a general assertion that it would be difficult to be separated from his family in the UK. His mother’s statement said that the appellant provided love and support to his sisters. It had effected them emotionally and financially since he was sent to prison. However, no detailed examples seemed to have been provided apart from those generalised statements. The email from the teacher was only a couple of paragraphs long and did not observe anything more than what was noted by the judge.
37. For these reasons, we conclude that the judge’s findings relating to the best interests of the appellant’s siblings were within a range of reasonable responses to rather weak evidence relating to the likely effect of deportation on the children. In circumstances where the judge had found that family life could be continued through modern methods of communication and visits to Romania, the evidence was not capable of reaching the stringent threshold required to show that deportation would be ‘unduly harsh’ on the appellant’s sisters.
38. For the reasons given above, we conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law
The decision shall stand

M. Canavan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 August 2025