Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002620
First tier number: HU/53780/2024
LH/00587/2025

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/53780/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th of September 2025

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
ALI RAZA ASAD
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the appellant: Mr A Bandegani, Counsel, instructed by Nasim & Co
For the respondent: Ms N Kerr, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 August 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant, a citizen of Pakistan, appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Gibbs (“the judge”), dated 14 March 2025. By that decision, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim.

2. The appellant arrived in United Kingdom in March 2011 as a student. He sought to extend his studies in this country, but two colleges at which he attended had their licences revoked by the respondent. Two applications for leave was subsequently made and refused. On 21 July 2023, the appellant made his human rights claim and this was refused by a decision dated 26 March 2024. The refusal decision concluded that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to reintegration into Pakistani society and therefore could not meet paragraph PL 5.1 of Appendix Private Life to the Immigration Rules. Further, it was said that there were no exceptional circumstances in the appellant’s case.

The judge’s decision in summary
3. The scope of the appellant’s appeal was relatively narrow: he sought to demonstrate that there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration into Pakistani society, or alternatively that his removal would be disproportionate. There was no freestanding Article 3 claim and no protection-related matters were relied on: [4].

4. The judge found the appellant to be a credible witness. She accepted that he held a genuine belief that he would be stigmatised in Pakistan as result of mental health problems. The judge found that the appellant would face no difficulties in obtaining employment in Pakistan and that he would have support from family members: [9]. She did not accept that he suffered from PTSD (there was no medical evidence to support that assertion), but did accept that he suffered from Generalised Anxiety Disorder: [10]. Having accepted that the appellant was in receipt of anti-depressant medication, occasional sleeping tablets, and had attended a limited course of talking therapy, at [14], she found that there was “no evidence before me that he will be unable to access such in Pakistan.” The precariousness of the appellant’s immigration status in this country (he had been here unlawfully since January 2015) was a contributory factor as regards the state of his mental health: [11].

5. The judge addressed the issue of stigmatisation at [15] and concluded that the appellant would not face significant problems in that regard because he would not be identified as being “different”. In saying this, the judge relied on medical evidence and the appellant’s presentation at the hearing: [15]-[16].

6. Ultimately, the judge concluded that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that there would be very significant obstacles to his re-integration into Pakistani society: [17].

7. The judge then conducted a proportionality balancing exercise. One of the factors relied on by the appellant had been the claimed “historical injustice” caused to him by the revocation of the colleges’ licences. This had prevented him from completing his education and that caused him real prejudice. The judge rejected that particular submission, finding that the revocation had not been the fault of “any other person/body” (which must presumably have included the respondent). Weighing all of the relevant factors in the balance, the judge concluded that removal would not constitute a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s private life: [21].

8. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

The grounds of appeal
9. In summary, the four grounds of appeal on which permission was granted are as follows. First, the judge failed to have regard to country evidence (in the form of academic articles from a variety of journals) indicating that mental health treatment in Pakistan was inadequate. That evidence supported the claim that the appellant would not be able to access appropriate treatment on return. Secondly, the judge failed to have regard to relevant country evidence relating to the stigmatisation of those with mental health conditions. Thirdly, she overlooked medical evidence regarding the deterioration of the appellant’s mental health were he to be returned to Pakistan. Fourthly, she failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the “historical injustice” argument.

Rule 24
10. The respondent has not provided a rule 24 response in this case.

The hearing
11. Mr Bandegani relied on the grounds of appeal and expanded on grounds 1-3. He submitted that the judge simply failed to engage with the relevant evidence relating to the objective evidence on mental health treatment and stigmatisation, and had also failed to address the specific medical evidence indicating the risk of deterioration to the appellant’s mental health if he was returned. He described a number of the judge’s observations as amounting to “deflationary comments”. In addition to a number of other specific points, he submitted that in general there had been a lack of anxious scrutiny on the judge’s part. He did not resile from ground 4, but made no additional submissions on it.

12. Ms Kerr essentially submitted that the judge had done enough and even if there had been any omissions, they were not material to the outcome.

13. In reply, Mr Bandegani submitted that some of what Ms Kerr has said amount to “retro-reasoning”. The judge should have, but did not, undertake anxious evaluative assessment of all the evidence, both subjective and objective.

14. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.

Conclusions
15. When deciding whether or not the judge has made any material errors of law, I have kept very much in mind the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with findings and conclusions reached by the first-instance tribunal. I have taken into account the various pronouncements from the higher courts to that effect. I have read the judge’s decision sensibly and holistically.

Ground 1
16. The first ground is focused squarely on what the judge said in the final sentence of [14]: “There is no evidence before me that [the appellant] will be unable to access [treatment] in Pakistan.”

17. Use of the phrase “no evidence” can sometimes give rise to a concern that a judge is stating that there was literally no evidence of any kind in relation to a particular issue. However, in my judgment, the judge in this case was not intending that and the appellant’s argument fails to appreciate proper context of her observation.

18. The judge had accepted that the appellant was in receipt of anti-present medication, occasional sleeping tablets, and had attended a limited course of talking therapy. The medical evidence before her indicated that the anti-depressant medication concerned was sertraline (a first-line SSRI. Mirtazapine have been described to help with sleep). The medical evidence also showed that the appellant had completed talking therapy sessions in June 2023. It appears from the evidence as though the appellant was on a waiting list for further talking therapy.

19. Therefore, the only relevant treatment which the appellant was in receipt of as at the date of the hearing was sertraline. The respondent’s CPIN (which was before the judge – see [3]) confirmed that sertraline was available in Pakistan: Annex A to the CPIN. The burden of proof was on the appellant to satisfy the judge that relevant treatment (i.e. sertraline or an equivalent) was simply not available in Pakistan, or, if it was, that it would be unaffordable.

20. Seen in that context, the judge was entitled to conclude that there was “no evidence” by which the appellant could demonstrate that relevant treatment was unavailable or unaffordable. The academic articles did not (as far as I can see from the passages cited in the grounds of appeal) confirm that sertraline was simply unavailable. As to the issue of cost, none of the articles indicated that the cost of sertraline would be prohibitively expensive to all but the wealthy. The judge had already found that the appellant would be able to obtain employment and would have support from family members. It would be nonsensical to read what the judge said at [14] in complete isolation from what she had previously found and it would be wrong to assume that she had simply excluded the finding on employment from her assessment of whether treatment was available and accessible.

21. There is no error of law in respect of the availability and accessibility of medication.

22. As to talking therapy, the last sessions had seemingly concluded in June 2023. The feelings of anxiety recorded in the GP letter of 18 February 2025, in which the referral for talking therapy is mentioned, was concerned with the delay in the appellant’s appeal being determined and his uncertain immigration status, the latter being a factor which the judge specifically referred to at [11]. The judge was correct to note that Dr Hussain’s report from July 2023 made no mention of precarious status as constituting a contributory factor. Further, Dr Hussain’s recommendations (which I am satisfied the judge was well-aware of) only went so far as to suggest that CBT “may” have assisted the appellant. There was no medical evidence confirming that talking therapy was an essential component of the appellant’s treatment. The judge will also have been aware that the appellant was not under the care of a psychiatrist or psychologist. The CPIN included evidence that mental health treatment (in addition to medication) was available, albeit at a cost and with limited geographical coverage.

23. Stepping back, I am satisfied that the judge had all the evidence before her in mind, including that cited in the grounds of appeal. I am satisfied that her conclusion that there was “no evidence” to show that treatment was unavailable was intended to mean that there was “no evidence” which satisfied her that, in this instance, talking therapy would not be available or affordable.

24. There is no error of law in respect of the availability and accessibility of talking therapy.

25. There can be no serious complaint about the judge’s decision in respect of the availability of medication for sleeping.

26. Even if I were to conclude that the judge had overlooked the academic articles, or had failed to provide reasons for why it was not sufficient, any error would be immaterial to the outcome. If that evidence had been taken into account, it is inevitable that the judge would nonetheless have concluded that the relevant medication (sertraline) was available, albeit at a cost. She would inevitably have factored in her finding that the appellant could obtain employment and be able to afford the medication. It is inevitable that the judge would have either (a) concluded that talking therapy was available, albeit a cost, and that the appellant could have afforded it, or (b) that talking therapy was not an essential aspect of treatment required and that its absence would not have constituted a material consideration in the assessment of very significant obstacles or Article 8 on a wider basis.

27. Ground 1 fails.

Ground 2
28. The objective evidence in respect of which the judge allegedly failed to have regard comprised a single article in the International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, published in 2020. Its contents, combined with the fact that the appellant’s brother had made a FIR against him because of an unpaid debt, is said in the grounds to represent an “extraordinary level of shame and stigma” which would in turn arguably make it “impossible or very difficult for [the appellant] to establish within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships in order to give substance to his private or family life”.

29. There are several significant problems with this aspect of the appellant’s challenge.

30. First, the judge was not required to set out all of the evidence relied on by the appellant and which she had considered.

31. Secondly, the article was based on a study of educated young people in the rural Kyber Paktunkhwa province (formerly known as the North West Frontier Province). The appellant came from Multan, a large urban area in Punjab Province. The extracts from the article set out in the grounds do not appear to indicate that serious societal stigma applied throughout the whole of Pakistan.

32. Thirdly, the extracts relate to the attitudes of the families of the unemployed young people, not to society as a whole.

33. Fourthly, the judge expressly acknowledged that the evidence relied on before her indicated that “attitudes to mental health in Pakistan can be problematic”: [15]. That general recognition was part and parcel of her overall fact-sensitive assessment of the appellant’s case.

34. Fifthly, the judge had acknowledged the appellant’s genuine feelings of unworthiness, but had found as a fact that the appellant would have the support of family members in Pakistan, in particular his mother: That of itself significantly undermines the appellant’s challenge: [9].

35. Sixthly the judge had found that the appellant could obtain employment on return to Pakistan and that that would allow him to repay his brother: [9] That is a finding of fact which was open to her on the evidence. It undermined the asserted level of “shame and stigma” which would face the appellant on return.

36. Seventhly, the judge was rationally entitled to take account of the evidence of the appellant’s manner and functionality. It was open to her at [15] to refer to passages in Dr Hussain’s report indicating that the appellant was engaged, well-kept, orientated in time, place and person, and that he did not present with any psychotic symptoms. The passages did mention irritable mood and lowering of concentration at times, matters which I have no doubt the judge was cognisant of. Beyond the report, the judge was also entitled to observe that the appellant was calm and coherent at the hearing, and also that he had stated a desire to complete educational studies in this country. It was open to the judge to interpret that letter intention as constituting evidence of self-confidence in the appellant’s own abilities, despite the mental health problems: [16].

37. Ground 2 fails.

Ground 3
38. The focus of the third ground is what the judge said at [15] and the contents of Dr Hussain’s 2023 report. It is, as acknowledged by Mr Bandegani at the hearing, intertwined with grounds 1 and 2 in as much as it relates to relevant treatment in Pakistan and social stigmatisation.

39. As with grounds 1 and, to an extent, 2, the appellant’s argument fails to acknowledge the overall context of the judge’s assessment and findings. She was entitled to find that the appellant could obtain employment, would have familial support, and had not lost ties with the culture and social norms of Pakistan. She was entitled to find that there had been an element of catastrophising on the appellant’s part: he had claimed to have been diagnosed with PTSD when that was simply not the case. The judge was entitled to find that a factor in the appellant’s poor mental health was his highly precarious immigration status and that he had been willing to live with social isolation and bullying in the United Kingdom as result of that status when he could have returned to Pakistan sooner.

40. I am satisfied that the judge had all of the above in mind when considering Dr Hussain’s report as a whole.

41. The reliance in the grounds on [10] of Dr Hussain’s report to support the alleged error of law is misplaced. I am entirely satisfied that the judge had considered the entirety of that report, including [10] and the prognosis stated therein. It is to be remembered that a judge need not set out each and every aspect of the evidence when explaining their decision.

42. The passage at [10] states:

“There is a risk of deterioration in Mr Asad’s mental health if he fails to comply with the treatment recommended. Also, further exposure to any stressful situation, which he is likely to face if his forced return to Pakistan becomes imminent, may aggravate his symptoms of depression and anxiety significantly. However, should he complied fully with his current and recommended treatment, and if he fears of returning to Pakistan, where he is at risk of facing embarrassment and being identified as a failure, are removed, his prognosis is likely to be satisfactory.”

43. It is clear from the above that the central premise of Dr Hussain’s relatively speculative conclusion on the risk of deterioration is that the appellant might not comply with treatment. Yet, the judge had already found that treatment (in particular, the appropriate medication) was available and accessible in Pakistan and there was no evidence (literally, no evidence) before the judge to show that he would not take medication if it was available. The evidence which was before the judge demonstrated that he had been compliant with medication whilst in the United Kingdom over the course of time. Thus, Dr Hussain’s premise was not borne out.

44. The other matters referred to at [10] of Dr Hussain’s report had already been addressed by the judge. She had found that the appellant could obtain employment, which in turn would provide him with funds and undermined a view of him being a failure, and had considered the question of stigmatisation.

45. Ground 3 fails.

Ground 4
46. For the following reasons, the judge was entitled to conclude that there had been no historical injustice against the appellant as result of the revocation of the colleges’ licences.

47. There is nothing of substance in the judge’s use of the phrase “historic injustice”: that this does not in any way demonstrate that she was unaware of the substance of the “historical injustice” argument.

48. The judge was not only entitled to conclude at [20] that there was no evidence that the revocations were the fault of the respondent (use of the phrase “any other person/body” is of no material significance - it is clear that she had the respondent in mind), but that she was undoubtedly correct in reaching that conclusion. There was no basis on which the appellant could demonstrate that the respondent had committed any public law error in respect of the operation of her immigration functions: Ahmed (historical injustice explained) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00165 (IAC), at [50].

49. The judge acknowledged that the revocation of licences was not the fault of the appellant, but that of itself could not have established any historical injustice.

50. It is, and was before the judge, wholly speculative to suggest that the absence of details as to why the licences were revoked prevented an assessment of whether the respondent had acted unlawfully. It is, and was, equally speculative to suggest that the absence of details meant that the respondent might have acted unlawfully. There is nothing to indicate that the appellant had sought to obtain details about why the licences were revoked. There was apparently no challenge by either the colleges or the appellant at the time of the revocations.

51. The alternative argument, namely that the “actions” of the colleges resulted in exceptional prejudice to the appellant, does not stand up to scrutiny. First, it is abundantly clear that the application of any material relevance arising from actions other than those of the respondent will be “rare” or “exceptional”: Mansur (immigration adviser’s failings: Article 8) Bangladesh [2018] UKUT 00274 (IAC) and Patel (historic injustice; NIAA Part 5A) [2020] UKUT 00351 (IAC), at [81]. Secondly, there was no statistical evidence before the judge to indicate that the revocation of colleges’ licences was a “rare” or “exceptional” occurrence. Thirdly, any failure by the colleges as to their licence requirements cannot properly have been equated to the “blatant” failure of legal representatives to follow specific instructions, as occurred in Mansur. There was no evidence before the judge that the colleges made any specific errors in relation to the appellant’s studies by, for example, ignoring any requests or representations made by him or otherwise providing the respondent with inaccurate information about his circumstances.

52. I acknowledge that this alternative historical injustice argument was not specifically addressed by the judge at [20] of her decision. Having said that, I am satisfied that she had taken account of the submission. It had been clearly stated in the appellant’s skeleton argument, which itself had been referred to by the judge at [3]. I remind myself that a judge need not set out each and every submission made by a party, nor each and every step of the reasoning leading to the overall conclusion.

53. Even if the judge had overlooked this particular argument, I am satisfied that any error was immaterial. In light of the relevant case-law, the facts of this case, and what I have said at [51], above, it is inevitable that the judge would have rejected the submission based on Mansur.

54. Ground 4 fails.

Anonymity
55. There is no basis on which to make an anonymity direction in this case.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law.

In the exercise of my discretion under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, I do not set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.
H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 1 September 2025