Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002648
UI-2025-002649

First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/62524/2023
LH/07345/2024
HU/62522/2023
LH/07346/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9th December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

ARULPRAGASAM ARTHUR ARULANNARAJAH
PUSHPADEVI ARULANNARAJAH
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr A. Slatter, instructed by Liyon Legal
For the Respondent: Ms N. Kerr, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellants are a married couple, both born in 1940. They are citizens of Sri Lanka. They continue to live in Sri Lanka, but all of their children and grandchildren are settled in the UK and most of them are British citizens. The appellants have applied under the Immigration Rules for permission to join their family here.
2. The Immigration Rules provide a route for the dependent relatives of British citizens to join them in the UK. This is set out in Appendix Adult Dependent Relative (ADR). The current ADR rules are substantially the same as those first introduced in 2012. They set strict criteria for a grant of entry clearance. The applicant must be living abroad and must show that, as a result of age, illness or disability, they require long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks and that they cannot obtain that care in the country where they live. The sponsor must be in the UK and must be a British citizen, settled in the UK with Indefinite Leave to Remain, have protection status, or be an EEA national with leave under Appendix EU. The sponsor must also show they will be able to support their relative financially and provide them with adequate accommodation, without recourse to public funds. If these criteria are not met, the Rules provide that a grant of entry clearance may still be required, but only if a refusal would “result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family”.
3. On 9 August 2023, the appellants applied for entry clearance under the ADR Rules. Their eldest son, a British citizen, acted as their sponsor. On 26 September 2023, the respondent refused their applications. The respondent accepted that both appellants required long term personal care to perform everyday tasks, but she found that they were receiving care in Sri Lanka and that there was no reason that they could not continue to do so. The respondent also found that their sponsor would not be able to maintain and accommodate them without recourse to public funds.
4. The appellants appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”), and before the appeal was heard, the respondent reviewed the evidence and agreed that the sponsor would, in fact, be able to maintain and accommodate his parents without recourse to public funds.
5. The appeal was then heard before the FTT on 14 March 2025. There were three issues for the FTT to determine:
(i) Were the appellants able to obtain the long-term care they needed in Sri Lanka? If not, they would meet all of the eligibility requirements of the Rules;
(ii) If they were able to obtain the care they needed in Sri Lanka, were there other reasons that refusing them entry clearance would have unjustifiably harsh consequences for them or their family? If so, they would meet the requirements for a grant of entry clearance under Para. ADR 7.1 of the Rules; and
(iii) If the Rules were not met, did article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) require that they nonetheless be granted entry clearance? This required a two-part consideration: first, did the relationship between the appellants and their sponsor meet the legal definition of “family life”? If it did not, they could not rely on article 8 in the appeal. Second, if the relationship did meet the definition of “family life”, would refusing entry clearance be a disproportionate interference with that family life?
6. In a decision dated 18 March 2025, the FTT decided that the appellants had failed to demonstrate that they would be unable to obtain the care they needed in Sri Lanka. This was for two reasons: first, because they were receiving nursing care at home and there was no reason that could not continue, and second, because in the alternative, care would be available in a residential care home. It also decided that the relationship between the appellants and their son did not meet the legal definition of “family life”. Finally, the FTT found that even if the relationship did meet the legal definition of family life, there were no exceptional circumstances that would render refusal of entry clearance a disproportionate interference with that family life.
7. On 11 August 2025, the appellants were granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against that decision.
The grounds of appeal
8. The appellants appeal on two grounds. Ground One is that the FTT erred by failing to take into account important evidence before it when deciding that care would be available in Sri Lanka. Three aspects of the evidence were said to have been overlooked:
(i) Medical evidence showing that Mrs Arulannarajah had suffered a stroke in January 2025, which had left her bedridden. This was obviously relevant to the level of care she required;
(ii) The sponsor’s oral evidence about why the personal care his parents were receiving in their home was inadequate and could not continue in the long term; and
(iii) Evidence that residential care would be inadequate. This evidence consisted, first, of the statements of the appellants and the sponsor describing their personal experience of the poor quality care that had been provided to Mrs Arulannarajah’s older sister prior to her death in a care home in, second, of independent evidence in the respondent’s CPIN, Sri Lanka: Healthcare and medical treatment, Version 2.0.
9. Ground Two challenges the FTT’s findings on article 8. First, it is said that the FTT gave insufficient reasons for its conclusions on both article 8 issues: that the relationship between the sponsor and his parents did not meet the legal definition of family life for article 8 purposes and that even if it did, refusing entry clearance would not be disproportionate. Second, it is said that the FTT failed to take into account a range of factors that the appellants had put forward as relevant to the article 8 consideration.
10. On 23 September 2025, the respondent filed a Rule 24 response defending the FTT’s decision.
11. On 29 October 2025, the appellants filed a bundle of documents in five sections, totalling 651 pages.
The hearing
12. At the beginning of the hearing before me, Ms Kerr said that she had not seen the bundle prepared by the appellants for the error of law hearing, but she did have access to the parties’ bundles before the FTT and believed she was ready to proceed.
13. Mr Slatter then explained that when he was instructed, he had noted that the appellants had relied in their grounds of appeal on their counsel’s note of the sponsor’s oral evidence at the appeal. Even though the respondent had not disputed what was said in the grounds, he had advised those instructing him that they should provide a witness statement from Reuben Solomon, who had appeared for the appellants before the FTT. This had been done, but only on the morning of the hearing. He apologised for the lateness. He had provided Ms Kerr with a copy of the witness statement by email, and Ms Kerr confirmed that its contents were not disputed. I was also subsequently provided with a copy.
14. Finally, Mr Slatter helpfully identified the precise evidence that the appellants said had been overlooked it in both the UT and the FTT bundles. In addition to the oral evidence of the sponsor and the CPIN, this was:
(i) A letter from Lanka Hospitals, dated 20 February 2025;
(ii) A diagnostic summary from Lanka Hospitals, dated 14 February 2025;
(iii) The appellants’ Appendix 1 (VAF4A) Forms, in which it was stated:
“there is no one to do things for us here, after experiancing [sic] main applicant’s wife’s sister’s death, the care she received was very poor and do not want to go through that – standard of care cannot be expected to get emotional support.”
(iv) The sponsor’s statement in support of his parents’ visa applications, dated 31 July 2023, in which he stated that his parents had taken care of his mother’s elder sister until they were no longer able to do so. They had then placed her in a care home, where she passed away in 2021. “During that time, my mother had experienced the care provided by the elderly home to her sister to be very low standard”.
(v) The sponsor’s witness statement for the appeal, in which he said at [15] that it was his parents’ “wish not to be placed in a nursing home as they associate nursing home with the decline and death of my Aunty”;
(vi) A letter from Dr M Ganesan, MD (Psy) of Lanka Hospitals, dated 16 May 2023, setting out the Mrs Arulannarajah had been under his care for an anxiety disorder, and that her anxiety was increased by being separated from her children and grandchildren.
15. After a brief adjournment to allow for further consideration of this specific evidence, I heard submissions from both representatives, which I have taken into account in making my decision.
16. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision, which I now give with my reasons.
Legal framework
17. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I have reminded myself of the need for appellant restraint, and of the specific guidance set out in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4].
18. The first issue before the FTT was whether the appellants met the requirements of Para. of ADR 5.2 of the Immigration Rules:
“[T]he applicant, or if the applicant is applying as a parent or grandparent, the applicant’s partner, must be unable to obtain the required level of care in the country where they are living, even with the financial help of the sponsor because either:
(a) the care is not available and there is no person in that country who can reasonably provide it; or
(b) the care is not affordable.”
19. The leading case on the “required level of care” is BRITCITS. It established:
“[T]he focus is on whether the care required by the ADR applicant can be “reasonably” provided and to “the required level” in their home country. […] the provision of care in the home country must be reasonable both from the perspective of the provider and the perspective of the applicant, and the standard of such care must be what is required for that particular applicant. It is possible that insufficient attention has been paid in the past to these considerations, which focus on what care is both necessary and reasonable for the applicant to receive in their home country. Those considerations include issues as to the accessibility and geographical location of the provision of care and the standard of care. They are capable of embracing emotional and psychological requirements verified by expert medical evidence. What is reasonable is, of course, to be objectively assessed.” [59]
“[R]ejection on the basis of the availability of adequate care in the ADR’s home country turns upon whether the care which is available is reasonable for the ADR to receive and of the level required for that applicant. Contrary to the submission of the appellant, those considerations are capable, with appropriate evidence, of embracing the psychological and emotional needs of elderly parents.” [76] [emphasis added]
20. The respondent’s current published guidance, Family Policy: Adult dependent relatives, Version 6.0 (16 July 2025), is broadly in line with BRITCITS:
“The “required level of care” is a matter to be objectively assessed, with reference to the specific needs of the applicant. The level of long-term personal care must be what is required by the individual applicant to perform everyday tasks, in light of their physical needs and any emotional or psychological needs, in each case as established by evidence provided by a doctor or other health professional […]
“The provision of the care in the applicant’s home country must be reasonable both from the perspective of the provider of the care and the perspective of the applicant.
“The ECO should bear in mind any relevant cultural factors, such as in countries where women are unlikely to be able to provide support in some circumstances.” [emphasis added]
21. It is clear from this caselaw and guidance that the assessment of whether an appellant can obtain the “required level of care” in their home country must be individualised and fact-specific. It is not enough that care is available. It must be to the level and standard that the particular individual requires. What that level and standard is must be determined objectively, and normally on the basis of medical evidence.
Discussion
22. Having read the decision and the evidence before the FTT with care, I agree with the appellants that the FTT did not conduct a sufficiently fact-sensitive, individualised assessment of the level of care the appellants required before determining that care was available.
23. In the first place, this is because I consider it clear that vital updating evidence about a significant deterioration in Mrs Arulannajah’s care needs was overlooked. The FTT’s findings about the appellants’ care needs was set out at [13]-[15] of the determination. At [13], it set out the various medical conditions recorded in separate certificates regarding each appellant, issued by Lanka Hospitals on 5 July 2023. At [14], it set out an excerpt from a letter from Lanka Hospitals regarding Mr Arulannarajah, dated 20 February 2025. This confirmed that he had developed acute heart failure following an episode of bronchopneumonia in November 2024 and been hospitalised for six days. He was described as having made a “good recovery” but being unable to climb stairs without getting short or breath. The FFT concluded, “I accept and find that the medical conditions of the Appellants are as stated in the medical records.”
24. There is no reference here to the updating evidence of a significant decline in Mrs Arulannajah’s health between 5 July 2023 and the appeal. This was contained in a diagnostic summary issued by Lanka Hospitals on 14 February 2025 and the letter from Lanka Hospitals dated 20 February 2025, at PDF pages 948 and 921 of the FTT bundle. The first gives a diagnosis for Mrs Arulannarajah of urosepsis, aspiration pneumonia and stroke. The second is entitled “Update on the Medical condition of Mr A. A. Arulannarajah” but is written by a consultant physician at the same hospital. It states, “his wife is bed bound following a stroke and other related medical conditions.”
25. It is trite that FTT judges are not required to refer to each item of evidence before them. However, as set out above, the question of whether care is obtainable in Sri Lanka cannot be decided without a prior identification of what care each of the appellants required. Moreover, the FTT specifically stated that it accepted the appellants’ medical evidence, and its description of the contents of that evidence is careful and detailed. Given this careful approach, I consider it highly unlikely that the FTT had taken into account the medical evidence that Mrs Arulannarajah was now bedridden as the result of a stroke and decided that this was not material. I conclude that the evidence was, unfortunately, simply overlooked. Given the amount of medical evidence and the level of detail it contained, this is understandable.
26. I therefore find that the FTT erred by failing to properly identify Mrs Arulannarjah’s current care needs before considering whether those needs could be met in Sri Lanka. There was force to Ms Kerr’s submission, however, that it was for the appellants to show that the significant increase in Mrs Arulannarajah’s care needs made a material difference to whether the required level of care was obtainable in Sri Lanka. It could not be assumed that the nurses who were providing 24-hour in-home care would not be able to address these increased needs. I agree. If this had been only error in the FTT’s consideration of the evidence, it would not have been material unless there was some evidence that Mrs Arulannarajah’s care needs could no longer be met.
27. It was accepted below that the sponsor had arranged for the appellants to receive 24-hour care in their home. A central question for the FTT to answer was whether this care was at the “level required”. The FTT recorded at [5] that, in answer to questions from the Judge, the sponsor said in his oral evidence that “a nurse was present all of the time (24 hours each day) to care for his parents, and that the care was principally for his mother.” It was noted that “there was brief follow up questioning” from the appellant’s counsel, but the content of what was said was not set out. The FTT then recorded at [7] that Mr Solomon had submitted that “[t]he current care arrangements are not adequate”, but at [16], the FTT stated that it had not been “provided with any reasons why that round-the-clock care could not continue to be provided”. It concluded “I find that such round-the-clock care can continue to be provided.”
28. The appellants say in the grounds of appeal that the FTT was provided with reasons why the care arrangements then in place could not continue, contrary to what was said at [16]. These were provided by the sponsor in his oral evidence. The content of that evidence is set out in the grounds of appeal and in Mr Solomon’s statement and, as noted above, Ms Kerr accepted that this is the evidence that the sponsor gave at the hearing. He said that the care “can’t continue” because the nurse was inadequately supervised and unreliable, his father was too frail to manage the situation himself, and he and his wife could not manage it remotely.
29. The FTT was not required to accept this evidence as sufficient to establish that adequate care was “not available”. It could have rejected the sponsor’s credibility, for example, or found that what he was describing was no more than his and his parents’ personal distress, and that this did not constitute objective evidence that the care was, in fact, less than what the appellants “required”. The problem is that it said there had been no such evidence (“ I was not provided with any reasons”.) Given that the adequacy of the care the appellants were receiving at the date of the appeal was a central for the FTT to determine, and that the sponsor’s oral evidence was the only evidence before the FTT that addressed that issue, I find that the FTT was required to engage with the sponsor’s oral evidence and give reasons for putting no weight on it.
30. As both parties accepted at the hearing before me, in order to succeed under the Rules, the appellants would have had to establish that their care needs could not be met anywhere in Sri Lanka (see: Ribeli). If the FTT erred in overlooking the oral evidence as to why in-home care was not to the level required, that error would not have been material if residential care had been available. I agree with the appellants, however, that here, too, the FTT did not engage with material aspects of the evidence before it. The appellants say that Mr Solomon relied in his submissions on the appellant’s CPIN, and this is not disputed by the respondent. This reports:
“Both residents and caregivers reported insufficient financial support on infrastructure, supplying medication and employing human resources as barriers to implementing quality care. Additionally, lack of referring system facilities, caregivers’, and residents’ insufficient knowledge of gerontological care and geriatric syndromes, lack of interest in being a caregiver at the ACHs [aged care homes], and lack of in-service programmes for caregivers were identified as barriers for quality care. Meanwhile, donations from philanthropists, supportive leadership, welfare benefits from the government authorities, and positive institutional values were the reported facilitators for quality care in ACHs. The available human and physical resources are insufficient to address the demanding needs of residents in ACHs, apart from the received donations and welfare benefits.”
31. This evidence, too, appears to have been entirely overlooked. The sponsor’s and the appellants’ concerns about the quality of care were also overlooked. The FTT approached the question as if the only impediment to the appellants being cared for in a residential care home was that it was not considered culturally appropriate.
32. For these reasons, Ground One is made out.
33. Ground Two is that the FTT gave insufficient reasons when determining the article 8 aspects of the appeal. The scope of the duty to give reasons was set out MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) and reiterated in Joseph (permission to appeal requirements) [2022] UKUT 00218 (IAC) at [43]:
“[The duty to give reasons] does not mean that every factor which weighed with the Judge in his appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained. But the issues the resolution of which were vital to the Judge’s conclusion should be identified and the manner in which he resolved them explained. […] It need not involve a lengthy judgment. It does require the Judge to identify and record those matters which were critical to his decision.”
34. I find that this ground is also made out. The entire consideration of article 8 is contained within [20]:
“The Appellants have always lived in Sri Lanka. The sponsor has lived in the UK for the past 26 years since 1999. The sponsor has visited the Appellants, most recently in 2020, 2023 and subsequently. The starting point and overall framework for an assessment of Article 8 of the ECHR outside the Immigration Rules is the case of R (Razgar) v SSHD [2004] UKHL in which the House of Lords set out 5 steps. I do not find that family life is engaged in this case. In any event, taking account of all of the circumstances of this case and taking into account section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, I do not accept that the facts of the case support a finding of any exceptional circumstances that would render refusal a disproportionate breach of the rights of the Appellants under Article 8 of the ECHR. “
35. This is simply a statement of the FTT’s conclusions. The FTT does not explain why the relationship between the sponsor and his parents does not constitute family life or why the consequences of refusing the appellants entry clearance would not be unjustifiably harsh. I have reminded myself that the FTT was not required to set out every step in its reasoning, and I have considered whether the reasoning can be inferred from what has been said elsewhere in the decision. However, the only factual findings relevant to the existence of family life in the decision are that the sponsor has lived in the UK since 1999 and visits his parents. This is not a sufficient reason for finding that family life does not exist; the respondent’s own policy, as set out at ADR 7.1, is that family life may exist between applicants for entry clearance to the UK and a sponsor who is settled here. As to the alternative finding that the refusal of entry clearance would not have unjustifiably harsh consequences, here, too, the FTT only sets out its conclusion. Although the FTT states that it was taken into account “all of the circumstances” and the “facts of the case”, it is not clear what it considers the relevant facts and circumstances to be. Again, it is not possible to understand the FTT’s reasoning by reading the decision as a whole, because there are no findings on any relevant factors other than the availability of care and the sponsor’s residence in the UK.
36. For these reasons, the decision of the FTT contained material errors of law requiring it to be set aside.
37. I have taken into account the guidance set out in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, as well as the Practice Statement of 11 June 2018, and I consider that remittal is appropriate given the extensive fact-finding required.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 18 March 2025 is set aside with no findings preserved.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing on all issues, before any other judge.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 December 2025