Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002654

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55503/2022
LP/00520/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

MZ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Ahmad, Counsel instructed by Hanson Law
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iran who entered the United Kingdom without permission aged 16 in Augst 2021 and made a claim for protection. That claim was refused by the respondent in November 2022 and an appeal against the respondent’s decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana (the Judge) in January 2025. Following a further appeal by the appellant, I set aside Judge Chana’s decision on 20 August 2025 because it contained an error of law. A copy of my decision to set-aside is annexed at the end of this decision for ease of reference.
2. The error of law in the Judge decision involved a material mistake of fact about appellant’s sur place activities in the United Kingdom. When setting aside the Judge’s decision, I preserved findings she made that were not infected by an error of law, including her finding that the appellant’s account of events in Iran was not credible and that he did not come to the attention of the Iranian authorities while he was living in that country.
3. In this decision I assess the evidence concerning the appellant’s activities while in the United Kingdom in order to re-make the decision concerning the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his protection claim. The appellant has served a supplementary bundle of evidence containing evidence of the appellant’s activities since the Judge’s decision was made nine months ago. I admitted that evidence applying rule 15(2A) of The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. The appellant also gave oral evidence and was subject to cross examination in the hearing before me.
4. Mr Parar and Mr Ahmad agreed that there are two live issues to be determined and made helpful submissions on those issues which were :
(i) Whether it is reasonably likely that the appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom will lead to him being persecuted by the Iranian authorities on his return to that country.
(ii) Applying the principles set out in HJ (Iran), whether it is reasonably likely that the appellant is a genuine supporter of Kurdish independence from Iran and if so would he be discreet about that support on return to Iran and if so, would the reason for being discrete be to avoid persecution?
5. I now provide my findings of fact and legal conclusions on those issues having considered all the evidence in the round and with anxious scrutiny. I have reminded myself that the burden is on the appellant to establish his case and the standard of proof to be applied when considering whether he has done that is the lower standard of a reasonable likelihood.
Findings of Fact
The appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom
6. The appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom must be considered in the context of the preserved findings of the Judge, that his account of events in Iran was not credible and that the appellant did not come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities while he was living in Iran. His account must also be considered in the context of the evidence about Iran, including the binding country guidance findings that Kurds in Iran face discrimination and are viewed with increasing suspicion by the Iranian authorities.
7. In his most recent witness statement the appellant lists twenty demonstrations against the Iranian authorities which he says he has attended at the Iranian Embassy in London between 13 July 2022 and 5 October 2022. The appellant has also included a number of photographs in the three different bundles of evidence he has adduced before the First-tier and Upper Tribunal showing him posing for photographs at multiple demonstrations. Some of those photographs appear on the appellant’s Facebook account as well. In some of those photographs the appellant is holding pieces of paper with slogans or photographs that are opposed to the Iranian state authorities. In some photographs he is with a group of males holding a Kurdish flag or the flag of a political party that supports Kurdish independence from Iran. In addition to the photographs, comments opposing the Iranian regime and invitations to attend demonstrations have also been posted on the appellant’s Facebook account.
8. On the basis of this evidence there was no real dispute about the fact the appellant has attended demonstrations against the Iranian authorities, including demonstrations outside the Iranian embassy in London, and no dispute that photographs and comments opposing the Iranian regime have been posted on a Facebook account in the appellant’s name. There was however a dispute about how many demonstrations the appellant attended, how long he remained at those demonstrations, what he did whilst there and what his motivation was for attending. There was also a dispute about who posted the items on the appellant’s Facebook page and why they did so.
9. It is noteworthy that in his asylum interview conducted on 6 September 2022, after he gave his account of events in Iran, the appellant was asked: “have you continued any political activity in the United Kingdom” and answered “no.” He was then asked “how about on social media” and again answered “no”. I find these answers hard to reconcile with the appellant’s claim that he opened a Facebook account in order to post protests against the Iranian regime just over two months before that interview and that he made three posts against the Iranian authorities on the account during the month preceding that interview. I also find his interview answers hard to reconcile with his claim that he attended his first demonstration outside the Iranian Embassy six weeks before the interview. I do not accept the appellant’s claim that he thought he was being asked about activities in Iran is likely to be true. The question he was asked was explicitly about whether he had undertaken activities in the United Kingdom. Additionally after the interview the applicant took the opportunity, through his representatives, to clarify answers and correct mistakes in the interview summary but he made no attempt to clarify his answers to those questions. I consider the applicant’s answers in interview to be demonstrative of the fact that he had little genuine commitment to the activities on the Facebook account and at the demonstrations but that they were activities designed primarily to construct a reason to be granted permission to stay in the United Kingdom.
10. The appellant was asked in cross examination about his Facebook account. He accepted that he did not use Facebook in Iran and that his account was opened while his asylum claim was being pursued. He denied however that the account only exists for the purpose of establishing the claim. When I asked him, the appellant said that in addition to using his Facebook account to post material about the Iranian authorities he also uses it for contact with his friends. This claim is not however borne out by the Facebook evidence that the appellant adduced in his latest bundle of evidence. That included 88 pages showing posts made on the appellant’s Facebook account between June 2022 and September 2025 all of which concern the Iranian state authorities and demonstrations held in the United Kingdom. 80 of the 88 pages show posts that were made after the appellant had been refused protection by the respondent. When I asked him, the appellant said that (like most people his age in the United Kingdom) he used other social media sites including WhatsApp, Snapchat, Messenger, X and TikTok and that he usually contacts his friends by calling them or leaving voice messages. I find that the appellant is familiar with a number of other social media sites and the fact he has not included any evidence of his use of those sites as part of his evidence indicates that he has not made any posts about the Iranian authorities on those sites that he uses regularly for social purposes. Instead, posts about the Iranian authorities are only made on the Facebook account that is not used for social purposes
11. Having agreed that he can read a little Kurdish but not write it clearly and that he has learnt to read and write English only while being in the United Kingdom, the appellant said that “another guy” writes the posts in Kurdish that are subsequently posted on his Facebook account. Although those posts refer in English and Kurdish to “My participation as an oppressed Kurdish individual in the demonstration against the Islamic Republic of Iran” it is apparent from his evidence that the posts were not written by the appellant but were provided to him by an unnamed “other guy.” It is telling that this “other guy” has not provided an evidence and neither have any of the appellant’s friends with whom he said he shares the posts. I find this indicative of the posts being provided to the appellant for the specific purpose of establishing an asylum claim rather than being created and shared by the appellant as a demonstration of his genuine political opinion. I find that the appellant is likely to have had little awareness or interest in what the posts said beyond the fact they could be used to further his claim for protection. Given that the appellant uses other social media sites for communicating with friends and this Facebook account is used exclusively for posts about the Iranian authorities, with the vast majority of the posts being made after his claim had been refused by the respondent, I find it likely that the Facebook account in the appellant’s name was created and is used for the sole basis of supporting this protection claim.
12. The appellant was also asked about his attendance at the demonstrations during cross examination. The appellant denied that he is always shown posing for the camera and said that it was not him who decided the composition of the photographs: “they showed me how to stand.” The appellant denied that he only attended demonstrations to have his photograph taken and would then leave. Instead he said that he would attend demonstrations with a group of people and they would hold banners and shout slogans. Having considered the photographs adduced with care along with the appellant’s account of the events which I found to be vague and imprecise, I agree with the respondent’s assertion that the appellant’s primary motivation when attending was to have his attendance at the demonstrations recorded by the photographer and was not to genuinely protest about the regime. There are no photographs of the appellant demonstrating towards the embassy or of him shouting or protesting. Instead the photographs are all staged with the appellant facing the photographer and usually holding pieces of paper or flags towards the camera. There is nothing to indicate that the appellant has a prominent or even active role in the demonstrations. Given additionally, the appellant's lack of political involvement while in Iran and the fact he has made no attempt to join any political party or group while in the United Kingdom, I agree with the respondent’s suggestion that the posed photographs at various demonstrations indicate that the appellant’s primary motivation for attending the events was to get evidence to boost his asylum claim rather than a genuine political motivation.
13. Bringing this all together, I have regard to the fact that as part of a group that is discriminated against by the Iranian authorities the appellant may well be inclined to oppose those authorities. I also have regard however to the fact that this did not manifest itself in the appellant showing any political interest in Iran and he has not taken the opportunity to involve himself with any political party or group while in the United Kingdom. Whilst the appellant has attended demonstrations outside the Iranian embassy the evidence indicates that this was primarily to get evidence to use in an asylum claim. I give little weight to his claim to have shouted slogans or his claim to have held the banners up, other than to the camera. I find that the appellant’s Facebook account was created and is used for the sole purpose of supporting this protection claim and that when the appellant genuinely wants to communicate with others he uses different social media sites. The messages on the Facebook account were written and provided by someone else and I do not consider they are likely to represent the appellant’s genuine political view.
14. Overall, I do not consider it reasonably likely that the applicant is genuinely politically motivated. Instead I find that he has sought to construct a protection claim that will result in him being permitted to remain in the United Kingdom and that is the real reason for his attendance at demonstrations and for the existence of the Facebook account. In those circumstances I find that the appellant would delete his Facebook account when faced with the prospect of being re-documented at the Iranian embassy and that he would not seek to pursue political change in Iran because he is not motivated to do so.
Application of these facts to the law
15. Contrary to the appellant’s claim, I am not satisfied that there is a realistic likelihood that the appellant’s limited activity when attending demonstrations, will have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. Whilst I recognise the force in the assertion that the Iranian authorities will not be open about the level and type of surveillance that they use, and whilst I acknowledge the evidence in the appellant’s latest bundle of the Iranian authorities using drone footage and facial recognition technology to identify unveiled women in Iran, I am not persuaded that the Iranian authorities have the will or the capability to monitor or identify each and every one of the many people who attend a demonstration outside their London embassy.
16. As country guidance cases including BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC) have confirmed, the nature and extent of an asylum seekers activities in the United Kingdom is highly relevant to the question of whether they will have been the subject of surveillance or monitoring. Here, the appellant had no political involvement prior to his arrival in the United Kingdom and he has not joined a political party or participated in politics whilst in the United Kingdom. His primary activity in the United Kingdom has been to have his photograph taken in proximity to the embassy during demonstrations, but he has on my findings not been prominent or active in any demonstration. In these circumstances I do not consider it reasonably likely that the appellant will have been the subject of surveillance or monitoring and I do not find it reasonably likely that his attendance at demonstrations in the United Kingdom has been identified by the Iranian authorities.
17. Similarly, in the country guidance case XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC) it was found that the Iranian state is not reasonably likely to monitor Facebook accounts on a large scale and that ad-hoc searches of Facebook accounts will necessarily be confined to individuals who are of significant adverse interest to the authorities. I have found that the appellant will not be of significant interest to the Iranian authorities. I recognise that some of the appellant’s posts on Facebook have attracted hundreds of comments. I note however the appellant’s evidence that the posts are circulated between his friends and it is a fair inference to make that many of those comments (which have not been identified or served as evidence) were made by those friends, or by others who the photographs show the appellant posing with at demonstrations. I conclude that there is not a realistic likelihood that the Iranian authorities have monitored the appellant’s Facebook account.
18. I turn therefore to the two “pinch points” that would be involved if the appellant were to return to Iran, namely the application from the United Kingdom for an Emergency Travel Document (ETD) and the applicant’s arrival in Iran. Having found that the sole purpose of the appellant’s Facebook account is to provide evidence to support a protection claim, I conclude that, contrary to his assertion in evidence, the appellant will close the account prior to either of those pinch points occurring. The appellant raises the possibility that the appellant’s Facebook posts will leave a digital footprint that would be available to the Iranian authorities even if he deleted his account, but I could discern no evidential basis for that assertion. I do not consider it reasonably likely that once deleted the appellant’s Facebook activity will come to the attention of those who would deal with an application for an ETD or those who would want to speak to the appellant on his arrival in Iran.
19. Concerning the second pinch point and the appellant’s arrival in Iran, and applying the guidance provided at [98] of HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC), I am satisfied that as a young man of Kurdish ethnicity who left Iran illegally the appellant is likely to be questioned by Iranian authorities on his return to Iran and that those authorities are likely to demonstrate a “hair-trigger approach” to any perceived political support for Kurdish rights. I am satisfied however that during that questioning the appellant is likely to honestly and genuinely answer those questions by saying that he has no political interest. I find that he will also in these circumstances not reveal the fact that he sought to construct an asylum claim by opportunistically being photographed at demonstrations and posting on a Facebook account that he did not otherwise use.
20. In all the circumstances therefore I am satisfied that there is no current risk to the appellant of persecution or ill-treatment by the Iranian state authorities, because he does not genuinely hold a political opinion that will lead to such persecution and because the authorities will not be aware of the limited activities the appellant has been involved with in the United Kingdom in his attempts to establish a claim that would enable him to remain in this country. I further conclude that neither of the two pinch points the appellant will face in the process of being returned to Iran will give rise to a risk of persecution or ill-treatment of the appellant, because I am satisfied that the appellant will delete his Facebook account and will not reveal his participation in those activities. The appellant’s account of his parents fleeing Iran having been found not to be credible, it is likely that the appellant will be returning to his family and home and would not face any significant obstacles to reintegrating on his return.
21. I conclude therefore that the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his protection claim must be dismissed.
Notice of Decision
The appellant’s protection appeal is DISMISSED on all grounds.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 November 2025

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002654

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55503/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

MZ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Chohan, counsel instructed by Hanson Law
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is 20 years old and a citizen of Iran. He arrived in the United Kingdom without permission and without identity documents aged 16 on 3 August 2021. The following day he claimed asylum on the grounds of a well-founded fear of persecution by the Iranian state because of his involvement in distributing leaflets on behalf of the Komala party, a political party advocating for Kurdish independence. His claim was refused by the respondent on 15 November 2022 as she did not believe the appellant’s account of events in Iran and accordingly found that he would not be at risk on his return to the country. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. While his appeal was waiting to be heard the appellant attended demonstrations in London against the Iranian government and posted criticism of the Iranian government on Facebook. The appellant’s appeal was heard on 6 December 2024 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana (the Judge) and on 28 January 2025 the Judge issued a decision dismissing the appeal. The appellant has now appealed to this Tribunal against the Judge’s decision, having been granted permission to do so by another First-tier Tribunal Judge.
2. Although the Judge did not make an order, I have decided to make an anonymity order preventing the publishing of any detail that may lead to the identification of the appellant. I have had regard to the important principle of open justice, however because this appeal concerns the appellant's claim that he is at risk of ill-treatment by state authorities in Iran, I have determined that the limited interference with that principle that an anonymity order involves is necessarily lest anything said or done in these proceedings gives rise to a risk to the appellant.
The Judge’s Decision
3. In her decision the Judge found that the appellant is a citizen of Iran and of Kurdish ethnicity [6]. She found however that the appellant had not been a supporter of any political movement while in Iran and that he had not come to the attention of the Iranian authorities while in the country, concluding at [19] that “I do not accept that [the appellant] had any political profile or that the Iranian authorities were even aware of his existence”. In reaching this conclusion the Judge rejected the appellant’s account that on three occasions he distributed leaflets with his cousin Ali on behalf of the Komala party in the Iranian city of Sardasht and that he, his mother and father fled Iran when they became aware that Ali’s house had been raided by Iranian authorities. The Judge explained why she rejected this account as not credible at [7] – [15] of her decision. She identified inconsistencies in the appellant’s account about: life as a Kurd in Iran (at [7]), where the leaflets came from and who distributed them (at [8]), the date of the raid on Ali’s house (at [9], [10] and [13]), why he became involved with the Komala party (at [11]), his contact with his family (at [15]). The Judge also considered that it was not credible that the appellant’s father would place his son’s life at risk for a cause the appellant had no strong beliefs about.
4. At [16] and [17] the Judge considered the appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom (the sur place activities) as follows:
16. The appellant relies on his surplus activities in the United Kingdom. The appellant attended a couple of demonstration but I find that he did not have any role of any significance or involvement in the demonstrations.
17. The appellant claims that he has Facebook account at any posted content. However at the hearing it was clear that he deleted the posts that he put up on Facebook. The reason given by the appellant for why he took his post down was because he was advised that he should take down posts of others which he are reflected in his Facebook account. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is applying the principles set out in AB and others that on his return to Iran would be the pinch point for applying for an ETD and that it is likely that the appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom would become known to the authorities. Given that appellant’s Facebook posts were taken down by the appellant, the authorities would not consider the appellant a threat, given his age and had come to no adverse attention of the authorities while he was in Iran.
5. At [20] the Judge found that there was no likelihood that the appellant will have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities and at [21] the Judge recorded her finding that the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations in the United Kingdom was opportunistic and that he had no genuine interest in politics.
6. In these circumstances the Judge found that the appellant could be returned safely to Iran (see [18]), as he was not of interest to the Iranian authorities and he does not have any of the additional risk factors identified in HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC) as those creating a real risk of persecution or ill-treatment (as distinct from general discrimination) for a Kurd returning to Iran.
7. Accordingly the Judge dismissed the appellant’s protection appeal. The Judge also dismissed the appellant’s human rights appeal noting at [29] that the appellant did not seek to rely Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The respondent’s concession
8. The appellant was granted permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision on five grounds. The first ground asserts that the Judge “erred in fact” when considering the appellant’s account of events in Iran, the second ground asserts that the Judge erred in considering the appellant's sur place activities, the third ground asserts that the Judge failed to apply Country Guidance case law, the fourth ground asserts that the Judge failed to consider objective evidence about the use of facial recognition technology by the Iranian state and the fifth ground asserts that the Judge failed to “properly” consider the risk to the appellant as a result of him not doing military service.
9. The respondent did not provide a written response to the appellant’s appeal in accordance with rule 24 of the Tribunal’s Procedure Rules, however at the start of the hearing Mr Ojo accepted on behalf of the respondent that the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s sur place activities involved an error of law as asserted in the second ground of appeal. Specifically, Mr Ojo accepted that the Judge made a mistake of fact when she said at [16] that the appellant had attended “a couple of demonstrations” when the evidence submitted in the appellant’s supplementary bundle of evidence established that he had in fact attended eight demonstrations. Mr Ojo also accepted that the Judge made a mistake of fact when she said at [17] that the appellant had deleted posts he had put on Facebook when in fact the posts are still on Facebook and it was his friends “tags” that the appellant had deleted not the posts. In the light of these mistakes of fact, Mr Ojo conceded that the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s sur place activities was flawed such that the decision would have to be set aside.
10. I agree that this concession was appropriately made by Mr Ojo and that the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s sur place activities involved material mistakes of fact. The Judge’s statement that the appellant had attended a couple of demonstrations appears to have been based on the evidence adduced in the first bundle of evidence submitted by the appellant, which referred to him attending three demonstrations between July 2022 and June 2023. It does not however appear to take into account the supplementary bundle of evidence adduced by the appellant, which contained evidence of him subsequently attending a further five demonstrations between June 2023 and November 2024. Likewise, given that the respondent accepts that the appellant did not say in his oral evidence that he had taken down his Facebook posts there is no evidence to support the Judge’s statement that the posts had been removed from Facebook.
11. These mistakes made by the Judge were clearly material to her conclusion that the appellant would not be at risk at the recognised “pinch points” involved in the process of returning someone to Iran. The Judge says at [17] that because his Facebook posts have been taken down the appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom will not be known to the Iranian authorities at the time they consider an application for an Emergency Travel Document (ETD) for him. The limited number of demonstrations the appellant attended was something the Judge mentioned both when assessing whether the appellant will have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities and also when considering whether the appellant’s interest in politics was genuine (see [21]). The mistakes of fact made by the Judge therefore were unquestionably material to her assessment of risk on return.
12. In these circumstances I conclude that the Judge’s decision must be set aside.
The remaining grounds of appeal
13. The respondent did not concede that the other grounds of appeal advanced by the appellant identified errors of law by the Judge and in those circumstances invited me to retain the matter in the Upper Tribunal and to remake the decision myself, preserving the Judge’s finding that the appellant had not given a credible account of events in Iran. The appellant argued that the other four grounds of appeal did identify further errors of law made by the Judge such that it would be appropriate to remit the appeal for a fresh hearing in the First-tier Tribunal with no findings of fact preserved. It was necessary therefore to consider whether the remaining grounds of appeal identified further errors in the Judge’s decision.
Ground 1
14. As already identified, the first ground of appeal focused on the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s evidence about events in Iran. Although it was entitled “erred in fact” the reality is that this ground amounts to a disagreement with the Judge’s assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s account of events in Iran and why he came to the United Kingdom.
15. I agree with the first criticism of the Judge’s assessment that the appellant’s account of events in Iran was not credible, made in paragraph [4] of the grounds. That paragraph complains that the Judge was wrong to find at [7] that the appellant’s interview answers about his life as a Kurd in Iran were inconsistent with his witness statement and that his credibility is undermined as a result. Although the appellant said in answer to Q58 in his interview that his life was good growing up, he later expanded on that in answer to Q61 to say that he faced discrimination as a Kurd for example when needing medical attention. This was consistent with and not “totally different” to what he said in his witness statements about Kurds being discriminated against.
16. It is acknowledged in paragraphs [5], [6] and [7] of ground one however that there were several other inconsistencies in the appellant’s account about the events in Iran. That acknowledgement reflects the appellant’s later witness statements where he recognises there are inconsistencies in his account but blames then on misunderstandings or interpreter issues. What is clearly correct is that the appellant’s account about why he left Iran has unquestionably evolved and changed over time. In his first witness statement made in December 2021 he said that his maternal uncle M was involved in delivering leaflets in Sardasht with the appellant, his father and his cousin. In his latest statement the appellant said that M had moved to Iraq when he was 13 or 14 years old and that M never returned to Iran afterwards. The appellant did give different dates in his different accounts about when the raid on Ali’s house took place as the Judge identified in her decision. The appellant did give inconsistent evidence about whether he and his father held strong beliefs about the Komala party again as identified by the Judge in her decision. There were therefore several features of the appellant’s account correctly identified by the Judge, which undermined the credibility of that account.
17. Having acknowledged the inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence, , ground one goes on to give explanations for why the different inconsistencies might have occurred and argue that the Judge could have reached a more favourable conclusion to the appellant than she did. The ground suggests that the appellant’s age might also be an explanation for the inconsistent evidence and suggests alternative interpretations of the appellant’s evidence. Ground one also includes a lengthy quotation from the well-known judgment of Keene LJ in judgment of Keene LJ in Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 in which Judges are urged to be cautious before finding an account to be inherently incredible, although the Judge does not say she found the appellant’s account inherently implausible.
18. These explanations and arguments do not identify an error of law in the Judge’s assessment of the evidence. Instead they are submissions about the evidence and attempts to re-argue the case. The Judge however saw the appellant the appellant give evidence and considered the content of that evidence. The Judge demonstrably had regard to the appellant’s age when he gave his accounts, making frequent reference to it in her decision. The Judge heard submissions about the evidence from the parties. Having done all this, the Judge found that the inconsistencies were such that the account could not be relied upon. That was a conclusion that was open to the Judge and it has not been suggested that it was a perverse conclusion. The Judge’s explanation for why she reached the conclusion that the appellant’s account was not credible was clearly adequate to enable the appellant to understand why his account was not believed. Any error about the consistency of the appellant’s account about whether he faced discrimination growing up is not material in the light of the numerous other far more significant inconsistencies in the evidence the Judge found.
19. Ground one does not therefore identify any lawful basis for interfering with the Judge’s assessment of the appellant's evidence about events in Iran. With the exception of paragraph [4] of ground one, the appellant’s arguments are no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s evidence. Looking at the Judge’s reasoning as a whole it is apparent that any error about the consistency of the appellant’s account of growing up as a Kurd in Iran was not material to the Judge’s holistic assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s account about what happened in Iran and why he left. I am satisfied that the Judge reached a rational and reasonable conclusion in respect of the appellant’s account of events in Iran and that she has provided adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account of events. Accordingly I preserve the findings made by the Judge that the appellant was not politically active in Iran, and that he did not come to the attention of the Iranian authorities as he has claimed.
Ground 3
20. This ground is poorly drafted and not well particularised but it does include the suggestion that the Judge erred by failing to apply the relevant Country Guidance when considering the appellant’s sur place activities. It is correct that the Judge does not identify in her decision the Country Guidance provided about risk arising from a person’s social media use in XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC). This may well be because, as previously identified, the Judge was under the mistaken impression that the appellant’s Facebook posts had been taken down. What is clear however is that the true factual position, including the fact the appellant has made Facebook posts against the Iranian authorities which, as of today, he had not removed, means that the guidance in XX (PJAK) is highly relevant. That guidance involves a Judge considering the appellant’s “social graph” to determine whether his Facebook accounts will have been targeted by the Iranian authorities, or will be targeted by those authorities during either the re-documentation process or on his arrival back in Iran. Unsurprisingly given her mistake about the continuing existence of the Facebook posts made by the appellant, the Judge does not assess the appellant’s social graph or whether the appellant’s Facebook posts will have come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities. To this extent ground three does identify an error of law in the Judge’s decision in that she failed to apply all relevant country guidance when considering whether the appellant faces a risk on return to Iran as a result of his sur place activities.
Ground 4
21. Ground four asserts, again without any particularity or clarity, that the Judge erred by failing to consider relevant objective evidence about the Iranian state’s ability to use facial recognition technology. There is no reference in the ground to specific evidence that the Judge failed to consider and no specific evidence was drawn to my attention in submissions. I note that the supplementary bundle adduced by the appellant includes two articles about facial recognition technology though their relevance to the appellant’s circumstances is unclear. Given the vagueness of the ground I do not find that it establishes an error of law in the Judge’s decision. I have however already concluded that it will be necessary to reconsider the question of whether the appellant’s sur place activities will result in a risk to the appellant on return to Iran. Part of that re-consideration will necessarily involve an assessment of whether the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations will come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. No doubt the ability of the Iranian authorities to utilise facial recognition to identify protesters at demonstrations in London will form part of that re-consideration.
Ground 5
22. Ground five asserts that the Judge erred in her consideration of the appellant’s specific claim to be at risk because he missed military service. On this point the Judge referred to the evidence before her that there is an exemption to military service for those who are the only sons of their parents and concluded that the appellant was not at risk for that reason. Ground five does no more than disagree with that conclusion and argue that the appellant may not benefit from such an exemption. Like ground one this amounts to no more than an attempt to re-argue the matter. The ground does not identify an error of law in the Judge’s decision making on this issue and there is no lawful basis for interfering with the Judge’s assessment of this issue.
Error of law – summary
23. In summary therefore I agree that the Judge did err when considering whether the appellant’s sur place activities mean that he faces a real risk of persecution or ill-treatment on his return to Iran. I am satisfied that this error means that the Judge’s decision must be set aside and re-made. I am not however persuaded that there was any error of law involved in the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s account of events in Iran. On the contrary, I am satisfied that the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s account of events in Iran was not credible and her consequent finding that the appellant has not come to the adverse attention of the authorities in Iran was reasonable and rational, and I therefore preserve that finding of fact.
Remaking the decision
24. It is necessary therefore to reconsider the appellant’s sur place activities and whether they give rise to a risk to the appellant on his return to Iran. That reconsideration must have regard to all relevant Country Guidance decisions including not only HB (Kurds) Iran which is referenced in the Judge’s decision, but also XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG. That re-consideration will need to take place in the context of the Judge’s preserved finding that the appellant did not come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities before he left that country.
25. Given that it involves consideration of a discrete issue, I am satisfied that the decision in respect of the appellant’s appeal should be re-made in the Upper Tribunal rather than being remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. That is the presumption as set out by the Presidential panel in Begum (remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I give directions for the re-making hearing below.
Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Chana involved an error of law and is set aside.
The finding by the Judge that the appellant did not come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities while living in that country is preserved.
Directions
1. The remaking hearing will take place at Field House on a date and time to be confirmed.
2. A Kurdish (Sorani) interpreter will be arranged by the Tribunal to assist the appellant.
3. Any further evidence relied upon by the appellant is to be served on the Tribunal and the respondent with an application in accordance with r15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules no later than two weeks before the hearing.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 August 2025