Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002658

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63611/2023
LP/09422/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE D. CLARKE

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

as
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Easty of Counsel, instructed by Thompson & Co Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Ms Kerr, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 31 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. This order is made on account of the fact that the Appellant’s claim is for international protection.

DECISION AND REASONS
INTRODUCTION
1. Whilst the SSHD is the Appellant in the proceedings before me, to avoid confusion I will refer to the parties as they appeared before the First-tier Tribunal.
2. The SSHD appeals against the Decision of First-Tier Tribunal Judge Abebrese, promulgated on 22 March 2025 (“the Decision”), allowing the Appellant’s appeal against the SSHD’s decision dated 2 November 2023 (“RFRL”), refusing the Appellant’s application for protection, dated 9 January 2021.
BACKGROUND
3. In summary, the Appellant entered the UK on 28 February 2020 and claimed asylum on 9 January 2021 on the basis of his political opinion.
Protection Claim
4. The Appellant claimed that whilst in Sierre Leone he had been an APC member for 5 years and that he had participated in elections, delegated conferences and made financial contributions. The Appellant said that on 24 August 2019 there was a by-election due to a court ruling against the APC candidate who had won in 2018.
5. The Appellant says that he attended the by-election as an agent for the APC to monitor the electoral process. The Appellant says that the by-election was attacked by SLPP thugs because they suspected that the election was not going in their favour. The Appellant says that he was caught up in the attack and suffered injuries, however with the help of neighbours he was given first aid and escaped to Lunsar in northern Sierre Leone.
6. Whilst in hiding the Appellant says that he spoke to a friend who agreed to speak to his father about helping the Appellant flee the country. After a few weeks, the Appellant’s friend told him to prepare to travel out of the country as his father had obtained the required documentation. The Appellant was then given a passport before boarding a flight to the UK.
7. Upon arrival in the UK, the Appellant was met at the airport and taken the house of DS, where he handed over his passport and was made to work from 5am until 10pm every day. Despite promises of payment, after several months the Appellant left the house with no money or food and then slept rough until he was taken in by a Nigerian woman.
8. The Appellant says that he was required to clean the Nigerian woman’s house and required to have sex with her and her friends against his will. The Appellant says that when he refused, he was denied food and sometimes thrown out of the house. The Appellant says that this went on for 3 months until finally in December 2020, the woman told the Appellant to have sex with her in exchange for food, but when he rejected her, she hit him, threw him out of the house and threw the food in the bin.
9. The Appellant says that after wandering the streets he met JB, who assisted the Appellant in making his protection claim.
RFRL dated 2 November 2023
10. For the purposes of the issues arising in the proceedings before me it is relevant to note that the RFRL conceded that the Appellant was a victim of trafficking.
11. In this regard, it is of note that the RFRL did not suggest that the Appellant was not at risk of re-trafficking. Instead, within the assessment of “Well-Founded Fear of Persecution”, the RFRL argued that sufficiency of protection was available:
“External information shows that protection is available for victims of human trafficking, the government has standard procedures to identify trafficking victims and refer them to services.”
ASA dated 3 May 2024
12. In compliance with the Reform process, in response to the RFRL and the Respondent’s bundle, on 7 May 2024 the Appellant uploaded onto the MyHMCTS platform an ASA and Appellant’s bundle. In this regard, it is pertinent to note the following salient paragraphs:
[5] As recognised by Para. 339K of the Immigration Rules, the fact that the A has already been subject to persecution or serious harm is a serious indication of his well-founded fear of persecution or his real risk of suffering serious harm.
Risk of trafficking.
[7] The A is at risk from those who trafficked and exploited him. He is also at risk of being trafficked, if returned to Sierra Leone. Moreover, it is contended that based on what the A knew about the thugs and the clear objective evidence regarding the links between those who are engaged in trafficking. The only reasonable inference that could be drawn, on the required standard of proof, is that they are likely have wider criminal connections in Sierra Leone.
[8]. The A is at a higher risk of being trafficked if returned. These characteristics are further acknowledged by the R in his statutory guidance on modern slavery (V3.5, October 2023):
13.5. Some adults are more susceptible to becoming victims of modern slavery. The following people may be particularly susceptible to modern slavery:
• young men and women
• pregnant women
• former victims of modern slavery including people who don’t consent to enter the NRM who may be at risk of being re-trafficked
• people who are homeless or at risk of becoming homeless
• people with drug and alcohol dependency issues
• people with underlying health factors such as learning difficulties, disability, communication difficulties, chronic developmental or mental health disorders
• people who have previously experienced abuse
• people in particularly deprived/poor areas where there are few employment opportunities are more likely to be recruited by traffickers posing as recruitment agencies/legitimate employers
• people struggling with debt
• people who have lost family or suffered family breakdown or have limited support networks
• people with criminal records
• illegal immigrants with no source of income and other people with insecure immigration status
• older people experiencing loneliness and financial hardship
• people who speak no or very little English and/or are illiterate in their own language
• overseas domestic workers
Respondent’s Review dated 7 August 2024
13. In response to the ASA and Appellant’s bundle, on 7 August 2024 the SSHD uploaded onto the MyHMCTS portal a Respondent’s Review.
14. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the Review does not mention trafficking, nor did it address the trafficking arguments advanced in the ASA.
Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Abebrese dated 22 March 2025
15. In a decision dated 22 March 2025, at [14] Judge Abebrese rejected the Appellant’s claim to be of adverse interest to the SLPP on account of his political opinion. This finding is not challenged, and I therefore need say no more about it.
16. At paragraphs [15] – [18] the FTIJ then addressed the risk of re-trafficking as follows:
[15] The A is a victim of having been previously trafficked and this is not contested by the R. On the basis of the guidance used by the R in this appeal the A in my view would be at risk of being re-trafficked if he were to be returned to his country. The A at paragraph 5 of their skeleton argument state: “As recognised by Para. 339K of the Immigration Rules, the fact that the A has already been subject to persecution or serious harm is a serious indication of his well-founded fear of persecution or his real risk of suffering serious harm”. I am of the view that the A would be at risk of being re-trafficked and this has not been adequately challenged by the R. Following on from this the A would be at real risk and would require humanitarian protection. The A would be at risk of facing one or more of the risks indicated in paragraph 339C
[16] The A in their skeleton argument make the following statement regarding risk and the possibility of wider criminal activities: “Moreover, it is contended that based on what the A knew about the thugs and the clear objective evidence regarding the links between those who are engaged in trafficking. The only reasonable inference that could be drawn, on the required standard of proof, is that there are likely to have wider criminal connections in Sierra Leone”.
[17]. I am of the view that A will face very significant obstacles if he were to return to his country. The A was born in Sierra Leone however because of the risk of being re trafficked there would be very significant obstacles to him re-integrating due to the constant fear. I find the A’s evidence that there are links between the wider criminal activities which the thugs belong to with the groups of people involved in trafficking. The appeal is allowed under paragraph 276ADE. I also allow the appeal on the basis of Article 8 outside of the Rules because the decision of the R is disproportionate and not justified and would result in severe and harsh consequences.
[18]. I find on the evidence that the A would be at a real risk and would require humanitarian protection and or the possibility of there being a breach of Article 3 of ECHR on the basis of the A receiving inhuman and degrading treatment.
GRANT OF PERMISSION and GROUNDS OF APPEAL
17. On 11 June 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge DDH Stevenson granted the SSHD permission to appeal the Decision of Judge Abebrese without restriction. However, in doing so, Judge Stevenson expressed reservations about the ground of appeal’s reliance upon an NRM decision dated 3 June 2024, which did not appear to have been included in the papers before Judge Abebrese.
18. In undated and unsigned grounds of appeal, the SSHD advanced a singular ground in the following terms:
Failing to give adequate reasons for material findings of fact (the risk of re-trafficking)
(i) The Judge set out his findings on why the appellant faced a real risk of ill treatment on return to Sierra Leone in paragraph 15 of the determination which says:
“The A is a victim of having being previously trafficked and this is not contested by the R. On the basis of the guidance used by the R in this appeal the A in my view would be at risk of being re-trafficked if he were to be returned to his country. The A at paragraph 5 of their skeleton argument state : “As recognised by Para. 339K of the Immigration Rules, the fact that the A has already been subject to persecution or serious harm is a serious indication of his well-founded fear of persecution or his real risk of suffering serious harm”. I am of the view that the A would be at risk of being re-trafficked and this has not been adequately challenged by the R. Following on from this the A would be at real risk and would require humanitarian protection. The A would be at risk of facing one or more of the risk indicated in paragraph 339C.”
(ii) The Judge’s findings rely on two points: that because the appellant has been trafficked it gives him a greater chance of being re-trafficked; and that the SSHD has not raised any serious objection to this possibility. It is respectfully submitted that the Judge has made material errors making both of those findings.
(iii) First, if the chance of being re-trafficked is a possibility, it must be based on either precedent, an authority or evidence to show this risk. The Judge in this case provides nothing. His authority is “I am of the view”. It is respectfully submitted that this is inadequate as it provides no coherent evidence to show an enhanced risk of re-trafficking. This finding is therefore unsustainable.
(iv) Second, the Judge relies on the possibility of re-trafficking has not been challenged by the Secretary of State. It would appear that the Judge reached his opinion without considering the NRM letter of 3/6/24 which set out the reasons why there was no risk of the appellant being re-trafficked. It is respectfully submitted that if the Judge had considered this view, he would have reached a different conclusion in his risk assessment.
(v) The Judge’s two findings are inter-dependent and if one falls away, the other one is left unsupported. In this case the risk of re-trafficking has fallen away, so the second limb is seriously – and possibly fatally - undermined. It is submitted that the result is that there are no sustainable findings remaining and that this appeal needs to be reheard in order for fresh findings to be made.
19. In a Rule 24 reply settled by Anas Khan of Counsel dated 16 July 2025, the Appellant argued that the ground of appeal did not identify a material error of law; the SSHD had expressly conceded that the Appellant was a victim of trafficking in the RFRL; the SSHD did not challenge the arguments set out in the ASA in her Review or before the FTT; and the NRM decision was not before the FTT.
20. In a supplementary skeleton argument settled by Ms Easty of Counsel dated October 2025, the Appellant maintained his position as set out in the Rule 24 reply.
21. The matter now comes before me to determine whether there is an error of law in the Decision of the Judge pursuant to s.12(1) of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. If I find an error, I must then determine whether the error is material, such that the Decision should be set aside. If the Decision is set aside, I must decide whether to remake the Decision in the Upper Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal, pursuant to s.12(2) of the 2007 Act.
ERROR OF LAW HEARING
22. At the outset of the hearing, the parties confirmed that they had before them an Upper Tribunal stitched bundle consisting of 267 pages (“SB”) and the Appellant’s supplementary skeleton argument dated October 2025.
23. I further indicated to the parties that I had before me a USSD 2021 “Trafficking in Persons Report: Sierre Leone” and a USSD “Sierre Leone 2021 Human Rights Report”, which were before the FTT but which had not been included in the SB. Whilst the parties confirmed that they did not have these reports before them, it was agreed that for the purposes of the error of law hearing they were not required.
24. Upon hearing submissions from Ms Kerr and Ms Easty I indicated that I would be dismissing the SSHD’s appeal and that I would provide my Decision in writing with reasons in due course. I now set out my reasoning and Decision as follows.
DISCUSSION
25. At the outset of Ms Kerr’s submissions, it was conceded that there was no NRM decision before the FTT; the position was that the SSHD had therefore accepted that the Appellant was a victim of trafficking.
26. The consequence of this concession is that paragraph (iv) of the ground falls away. In this regard I note that the pleaded ground singularly relied upon the existence of an NRM at paragraph (iv) to support the contention that the FTIJ erred in finding that the SSHD had not challenged the risk of re-trafficking.
27. The SSHD’s trafficking case at the FTT was therefore as set out in the RFRL, that is, that there was sufficiency of protection by reference to [21.1.1] of the “Country Information Note Sierre Leone” (“CIN”) dated July 2022 (see SB at [248]); which I note recognises the prevalence of trafficking in Sierre Leone.
28. I find no evidence before me to support the suggestion that the SSHD argued before the FTT that the Appellant was not at risk of re-trafficking.
29. This, I find, leaves the remainder of the ground in shambles.
30. The immediate problem is that what is left of the ground singularly impugns the FTIJ’s reasoning at [15], where the FTIJ invokes immigration rule 339K and finds, “I am of the view that the A would be at risk of being re-trafficked [……]”. In this regard the ground argues that if re-trafficking is a possibility, “it must be based on either precedent, an authority or evidence to show this risk”. As such, argues the ground, in the absence of coherent evidence, it was not enough for the FTIJ to simply say “I am of the view” that the Appellant is at risk.
31. I find this argument wholly misconceived.
32. First, it is simply not open to the SSHD to advance the argument that the Appellant is not at risk of re-trafficking at the error of law stage, when such an argument was not advanced at the FTT.
33. Second, the ground in any event ignores paragraph [16] of the Decision, which records the Appellant’s reliance upon the existence of “clear objective evidence” to support his risk of re-trafficking case:
[16] The A in their skeleton argument makes the following statement regarding risk and the possibility of wider criminal activities: “Moreover, it is contended that based on what the A knew about the thugs and the clear objective evidence regarding the links between those who are engaged in trafficking. The only reasonable inference that could be drawn, on the required standard of proof, is that there are likely to have wider criminal connections in Sierra Leone”.
34. In this regard, the Review served in response to the ASA was completely silent on the issue of trafficking and the trafficking arguments advanced in the ASA. Whatever the merits of the ASA’s arguments, the SSHD at no point took issue with them before the FTT. I find that the ground of appeal before me does not address or impugn the Judge’s consideration of the ASA argument at [16] or his acceptance of the same at [17]:
“I find the A’s evidence that there are links between the wider criminal activities which the thugs belong to with the groups of people involved in trafficking,”
35. As such, what the FTIJ had before him, was a concession by the SSHD that the Appellant was a victim of trafficking; an absence of any case being advanced by the SSHD to suggest that the Appellant was not at risk of being re-trafficked; and a finding of fact that there was a link between the thugs who attacked the Appellant (the attack having been found plausible at [13]) and trafficking gangs.
36. It is in this context that the FTIJ invoked the principle in Demirkaya [1999] Imm AR 498, as translated into immigration rule 339K:
“The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the person’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.”
37. In short, the SSHD’s “good reason” was sufficiency of protection. However, whatever might be said of the FTIJ’s approach to the issue of sufficiency of protection, the ground of appeal before me does not address it.
38. As such, I find the FTIJ’s conclusion that the Appellant is at real risk of re-trafficking to be within the FTIJ’s reasonable range of responses.
CONCLUSION ON ERROR OF LAW
39. For the reasons above, I find that the Decision of First-tier Tribunal Abebrese does not disclose any material errors of law.
NOTICE OF DECISION
1. The Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Abebrese dated 22 March 2025 does not contain any material errors of law and therefore stands.
2. The Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed.

D. Clarke

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 November 2025