Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002669

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65583/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 14th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

HH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Wood, Legal Representative at Immigration Advice Service
For the Respondent: Mr M Diwyncz, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Bradford on 8 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
2. In this matter, I am dealing with the remaking of the decision in respect of the Appellant’s appeal. I do so pursuant to section 12 (2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision to reject his international protection and human rights claim. The Appellant had been granted permission to appeal against the earlier that decision of the First-tier Tribunal and thereafter the decision of the First-tier Tribunal had been set aside. That is what therefore lead to the matter coming before me. The remaking decision requires me to consider all issues afresh.
Background
3. The Appellant is a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity and was born on 23 November 2024. He states he fears being returned to Iraq because his stepmother and stepmother’s brother have tried to kill him in the past and might do so again.
4. The key issues have been identified as follows:
(i) Was the Appellant previously mistreated as claimed by him by his stepmother and her brother?
(ii) Would there be a sufficiency of protection available to the Appellant if he was of adverse interest?
(iii) Would there be a safe place of relocation that would not be unreasonable for him to go to?
5. In his witness statement of 20 October 2023, the Appellant says he also fears his step mother’s brother who is connected highly with the PUK Party in Iraq.
Documents and Non-Compliance by the Appellant with Directions
6. There are a substantial number of documents in this case. The documents provided to me include:
(i) A main bundle for this hearing comprising 350 pages;
(ii) The Appellant’s Rule 15(2A) application (etc) comprising 40 pages;
(iii) The Bundle provided for the Error of Law Hearing;
(iv) The Respondent’s original bundle;
(v) The Appellant’s skeleton argument for this hearing; and
(vi) The Respondent’s skeleton argument for this hearing.
7. Clearly with such a large number of documents, it is not proportionate or necessary to refer to every part of the evidence.
8. At the Error of Law hearing before me on 13 August 2025 I had provided directions to be complied with by both parties. Mr Wood explained to me this morning that unfortunately he had fallen foul of those directions, for example, no interpreter had been requested even though one of the orders I had made was that an interpreter be sought in good time for this hearing. There were also difficulties in relation to the filing and service of documents by Mr Wood and which were also late. Mr Wood apologised and I accept that he will not permit such errors with documents or requests for interpreters to occur in the future. It is important that hearings progress and that requires the parties to further the overriding objective and to assist the Upper Tribunal to achieve that. It includes compliance with the directions of the Upper Tribunal. Fortunately, it was possible to obtain an interpreter from the First-tier Tribunal and so the matter was able to proceed. It has also meant having to refer to different bundles for different documents. The risk is that the Appellant’s case is not seen as clearly as he wishes when Appellants do not provide a composite bundle. The fault is not of the Respondent or the Upper Tribunal when that occurs but of the Appellant.
Respondent’s Reasons for Refusal Letter
9. The Appellant’s claim was refused by the Respondent by way of a decision dated 27 November 2023. Within her decision, the Secretary of State had set out the Appellant’s basis of claim. I am going to refer to some of that document. It appears within the 350 paged bundle. Starting at page 35 of 350 of the Respondent’s Reasons for Refusal Letter states in part as follows:
“ You are a national of Iraq, born in Chwarqurna.
 You are Kurdish.
 Your stepmother abused you since she married your father.
 When you were in Year 5, your father was imprisoned because your stepmother reported him to the Women’s Rights Organisation. Alternately, your father was arrested because of your stepmother’s connections.
 Your stepmother took you out of school and forced you to work in a factory when your father was imprisoned. When he was released, you were not returned to school and worked in the factory for a year and a half.
 Your father was afraid of your stepmother’s brothers because of their affiliation with the PUK.
 In 2019, you were abused by your stepmother’s brother and, on your way to the police station to report this, he hit you with his car. You were hospitalised with a head injury.
 In 2021, you discovered that your stepmother was having an affair and you told your father.
 Three days after you told your father, your stepmother’s brother went to your work to see you and started shooting when he spotted you running away. You escaped to your sister’s house in Erbil.
 After three days with your sister, your stepmother’s brother and other men broke into your sister’s house. You escaped and subsequently exited Iraq with the assistance of your brother-in-law. Alternately, your stepmother’s brother tried to kill you three times in Erbil.
 If returned to Iraq, you fear that you will be killed by your stepmother and stepmother’s brother because they have tried to kill you in the past”.
Appellant’s Skeleton Argument for this Hearing
10. In the skeleton argument provided for this hearing drafted by, Mr Wood, it states in part as follows:
“The Appellant is a Kurdish male national of Iraq who fears mistreatment contrary to Article 3 at the hands of his stepmother and her brother. The Appellant was subjected to domestic abuse at the hands of his stepmother. This took the form of being forced to work and hand over his wages to her, being verbally abused, being hit, stabbed, run over and shot at.
In 2019, the Appellant was on the way to the police station to report the mistreatment that he had received when his stepmother’s brother hit him with his car and he was hospitalised with a head injury.
In 2021 the Appellant discovered that his stepmother was having an affair and he told his father who has been released from a previous detention. The stepmother’s brother went to the Appellant’s place of work and tried to shoot him. The Appellant fled to his married sister’s home in Erbil. The stepmother’s brother and other men broke into the sister’s house. The Appellant escaped and subsequently exited Iraq with the assistance of your brother-in-law on 21 April 2022.
After travelling via Turkey, Italy and France the Appellant entered the UK by boat on 17 June 2022 and made his protection claim. In a decision dated 27 November 2023 the Respondent refused his protection application; it is against that decision that he appeals.
In her refusal decision dated 27 November 2023 the Respondent accepted the Appellant’s identity, ethnicity and nationality. The Respondent did not accept that the Appellant had received adverse attention of his stepmother and her brother.
The Appellant believes that the Tribunal will need to make findings of fact on the following issues:
i. Was the Appellant previously mistreated as claimed by his stepmother and her brother?
ii. Would there be a sufficiency of protection available to the Appellant if he was of adverse interest?
iii. Would there be a safe place of relocation that would not be unreasonable for him to go to?
The Tribunal is invited to accept the Appellant’s account as set out in his witness statements and prefer his responses to the Respondent’s refusal decision.
The Tribunal is invited to take account of the Appellant’s age at the time of the events that he is describing which caused him to have to flee Iraq as per KS (benefit of the doubt) [2014] UKUT 00552 (IAC) at [99]”.
There is then reference within the skeleton argument to other matters including the assessment of credibility.
The Appellant’s Rule 15(2A) Application
11. The Appellant’s has made an application pursuant to Rule 15(2A) of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules 2008 seeking permission to adduce further evidence. The proposed new evidence was in the form of documentary evidence obtained from the Appellant’s sister in Iraq; copy of the deceased mother’s CSID, personal status court documents regarding an inheritance from the Appellant’s deceased mother, a patient referral form, a marriage document for the Appellant’s father and stepmother, and marriage document for the Appellant’s parents.
12. There is also a skeleton argument on behalf of the Respondent. That states there is no objection to the Rule 15(2A) application. At the start of today’s hearing, I had permitted the new evidence to be relied upon in view of there being no objection from the Respondent and because I concluded that it was in the interests of justice to permit the Appellant to rely on the new evidence.
The Hearing Before Me
13. The Appellant attended today’s hearing. He has had the assistance of the Tribunal’s interpreter. The interpreting has been of a good quality, certainly because no issues have been raised with me by the Appellant or by his legal representative or the interpreter himself. Appropriate breaks were offered to all.
14. It is essential to note the Joint Presidential Guidance in relation to vulnerability. In my judgment an Appellant who is as young as this Appellant- he was 16 approaching 17 years of age-when he arrived in the United Kingdom is vulnerable. He is now aged 21 but he is still relatively young.
15. I factor these matters in when assessing the Appellant’s evidence, whether it is in relation to past events or even the events which are more recent. I must not, and I do not consider the historic evidence as that of an adult. It is very easy for vulnerable persons to be confused; to be traumatised and indeed they can find it difficult in the formal environment of a court even though this Tribunal is set up in a relatively informal way here in Bradford. It is right that the Equal Treatment Bench Book reminds me that speaking through an interpreter is also fraught with embarrassment, difficulty and concern and I accept that and I must hesitate long before I look at the inconsistencies within the evidence. Giving evidence is difficult for all people, for those who are younger who have left their country of ordinary residence and those who speak via an interpreter find it even more difficult and I accept all of those things and I factor them in when I assess the Appellant’s evidence. I have these matters at the forefront when considering the Appellant’s evidence and I make every possible allowance where the Appellant’s evidence appears to be inconsistent or where it does not tie up with other parts of the evidence.
16. The Respondent’s skeleton argument raises various matters to which I shall return. The Appellant had arrived in this country and claimed asylum on 17 June 2022 and therefore this is a pre-Nationality and Borders Act 2022 case and therefore the well settled (previous law) of the lower standard applies both to the asylum claim and in respect of Article 3 ECHR of which this case largely involves. Mr Wood said at the original hearing before Judge Hillis that there was no asylum claim and nor was there one before me. Mr Wood also makes clear that there is no separate Article 8 claim which is being advanced and that the same factual matrix would apply. Mr Wood said that if the Article 3 claim did not succeed then Article 8 could not succeed either. I am grateful to Mr Wood for his realistic approach.
17. In assessing the Appellant’s evidence, I take into account the whole of the evidence. I need not refer to all of it but I will start with a General Practitioner’s notes which have been provided to me in the shorter bundle of 40 pages. Those notes set out medical entries in the GP’s surgery’s notes rather than, as it were, a GP’s report. I will seek to do it justice but anybody who has seen medical records will know how they, as it were, present a patient summary. It appears at page 15 and it notes that on 20 February 2025 “This patient is newly registered here”. Then for an entry on 5 November 2025, i.e. just last month, it says:
“History: Attended by translator, [H] and Paul from Humbercare
Attended today for an objective assessment of residual scars and lesions following two separate assaults from extended family in Iraq. Occurring approximately 1 year apart. and both requiring hospital treatment.
Examination: 1- frontal scar under hair approx 3cm
2 - occipital linear scar approx 13cm - reports requiring 50 stiches
3 - 8mm point scar on left of philtrum
4 - 9cm linear scar on dorsum of left forearm
Knees bilaterally no objective joint swelling or point tenderness. Full range of motion. No skin changes.
Neurovascularly intact distally.
Mental health is stable. Denies PTSD symptoms.
Plan: Reports transient numbness in lower legs when sitting for long periods. Not impacting activities of daily living. Not worsening. No issues walking”.
I must take that into account and do take into account when assessing this case that medical reports and expert reports are an aid to the consideration of credibility and the claim as a whole. Here, even if I take matters at their highest, I have not been provided with a medical ‘report’ and not an expert report. I have just been given some GP entries. I accept though that this still evidence worthy of some weight. As I explain further though the weight I apply to the GP’s entries is very limited.
18. I turn then to the Appellant’s most recent witness statement dated 17 November 2025 which appears at pages 3 to 7 of the 40 paged bundle. There is an earlier witness statement from the Appellant dated 20 October 2023 upon which the 17 November 2025 witness statement says that the Appellant also relies.
19. In the Appellant’s most recent witness statement dated 17 November 2025, he says at paragraph 33, page 6:
“This statement has been read to me in Kurdish Sorani a language I understand, by Snoor Ahmed Mohammed Al Jaf”
Then the interpreter’s caption states:
“I, Snoor Ahmed Mohammed Al Jaf, read this statement to [the Appellant] faithfully interpreting it into Kurdish Sorani”
The interpreter has also signed that witness statement. At the start of that witness statement the Appellant says at paragraph 2 that he is the Appellant and that he makes the witness statement in support of his appeal. He states that he also wishes to rely on his statement of 20 October 2023.
20. Therefore, the Appellant relied today on his witness statements. They in turn had been interpreted to the Appellant and the Appellant signed to confirm the contents of those witness statements were true. The Appellant did not seek to change those witness statements or to point out any errors in them when he provided evidence in chief.
Consideration and Analysis
21. I turn now to some of the Appellant’s oral evidence before me.
22. In assessing the matter and in assessing the Appellant’s evidence, I firmly have in mind the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance (“the 2010 Presidential Guidance”).
23. The Joint Presidential Guidance reminds the parties that while some individuals are by definition vulnerable, others are less easily identifiable. Paragraph 10.3 specifically deals with assessing evidence and states:
“Consider the evidence, allowing for possible different degrees of understanding by witnesses and appellant compared to those are not vulnerable, in the context of evidence from others associated with the appellant and the background evidence before you. Where there were clear discrepancies in the oral evidence, consider the extent to which the age, vulnerability or sensitivity of the witness was an element of that discrepancy or lack of clarity.”
24. Here the Appellant was under 18 when he arrived in the UK. He was therefore vulnerable when he was interviewed by the Home Office. In addition, recollection of events from when a child always carries with it the risk of misunderstanding and lack of appreciation of what is being asked. I must make and do make due allowance for these matters, but as I explain, even then, the Appellant’s story is fanciful. I refer again to what I said earlier about vulnerability of witnesses and Appellants.
25. I start with how the documents now presented came to be provided. Mr Diwyncz on behalf of the Respondent cross-examined the Appellant in relation to certain parts of his witness statement.
26. At paragraph 29 of his witness statement dated 17 November 2025 at page 6 of the 40 paged bundle, the Appellant said:
“Since my case was refused by the First-tier Tribunal I have been able to obtain some further documentary evidence. I refer to the copy of my deceased mother’s CSID, Personal Status Court regarding inheritance from my mother, Patient referral form, marriage document for my father and my stepmother and marriage document for my parents, My sister sent me the copies of the documents I have provided in this bundle via WhatsApp”.
27. Mr Diwyncz also invited the Appellant to consider paragraph 23 of the 17 November 2025 witness statement because there the Appellant said,
“In 2023 when I spoke to my sister in Erbil for the last time, she told me that our father has been arrested again”.
28. Mr Diwyncz very carefully and fairly took the Appellant through these paragraphs, seeking to give the Appellant an opportunity to explain how it could be that on the one hand that the Appellant said that he “last spoke to his sister in the year 2023”, yet also in that same witness statement stated at paragraph 29 that he has been able to obtain further documentary evidence since the refusal of his case by the First-tier Tribunal because the two are wholly inconsistent. The problem being that the hearing at the First-tier Tribunal was in April 2025. Therefore how could it be that if the Appellant ‘last’ spoke to his sister in 2023 that he was able to get the documents from her in 2025 because he had not spoken to her between 2023 and 2025.
29. The Appellant now also said to me today that he had arrived in the United Kingdom in 2022 and that his sister provided him with copies of the documents now relied upon in this Rule 15(2A) via WhatsApp. The Appellant said that the documents were provided to him before the hearing at the First-tier Tribunal. The Appellant said he initially had someone else representing him but it was now Mr Wood who was representing him. The Appellant insisted in his oral evidence that his sister had sent him these documents before the hearing at the First-tier Tribunal. The Appellant said he had not retained the WhatsApp message which his sister had sent him attaching those documents. The Appellant said that his previous solicitor had not forwarded these documents to Mr Wood, his current solicitor.
30. In cross-examination, the Appellant also said that he had not complained about that previous solicitor.
31. Mr Wood had no questions in Re-examination.
32. In view of what appeared to be an obvious issue in relation to the 2023 and 2025 dates, I had sought clarification of the evidence and to which I invited Mr Diwyncz and Mr Wood to ask further questions. It appeared to me essential to do so in view of the Appellant’s vulnerability and for fairness so that the Appellant had a chance to explain the obvious discrepancy in his evidence. Mr Wood declined the opportunity.
33. The Appellant said that he had given Mr Wood the documents that he now relied upon and which were part of the recent Rule 15(2A) application. The Appellant said he could show me his mobile telephone for me to see he had sent the documents to Mr Wood. After Mr Wood invited me to do so, that, and after Mr Diwyncz had seen it, I was then shown the Appellant’s mobile telephone with an e-mail to Mr Wood in 2025.
34. I was shown an email by the Appellant to Mr Wood, his solicitor, dated 11 August 2025 at 13.38 hours. It says, “To this email I have attached document about my mother’s death, my father remarrying and medical records”.
35. The Appellant said he could not remember when he received these documents precisely but it was before 2023 because the last time, he spoke to his sister was in 2023. He said his sister was sending him a document about his mother’s death because it was to support his claim and, for example, when he said his mother had passed away here was her death certificate. He said the inheritance document was sent along with the other documents and that his sister had sent him these via WhatsApp. Mr Diwyncz asked questions arising from my questions seeking clarification. His topic again asking the Appellant how it was that the Appellant was able to send these documents in August 2025 to Mr Wood, his solicitor. The Appellant said that they were on his “Apple ID” and that he had lost his contact list from a previous phone to the new phone which he got at Christmas in 2023. He said he did not know why his sister had not sent the actual documents rather she sent only copies via WhatsApp. The Appellant said he could not now access his WhatsApp from 2023.
36. I have to remind myself again that this is a young Appellant in a strange environment under what I am sure must be very difficult circumstances. He is young and vulnerable. Despite taking all of those matters into account I find myself extremely concerned about the wholly inconsistent evidence of the Appellant in relation to these documents. In my judgment even when making every allowance for the Appellant’s age, vulnerability, nervousness and the like, it is impossible to reconcile his witness statement with the actual dates. People lie for all sorts of reasons but even when I factor in that the underlying claim might be genuine and that the attempt to rely on these ‘new’ documents might have been to bolster a genuine claim, I am unable to conclude that the Appellant’s claim is true. I am well aware of the decision in Tanveer Ahmed but those principles which derive from that decision do not assist the Appellant.
37. On the one hand in paragraph 23 of his 17 November 2025 the Appellant states he last spoke to his sister in 2023. Yet in the same witness statement he states that since the refusal of his case by the First-tier Tribunal (which was in 2025) he has been able to obtain the further documentary evidence. The two are wholly inconsistent and years apart. It is possible that sometimes people make mistakes and sometimes interpreters can make mistakes, but as I noted previously here the Appellant’s solicitors were careful to set out precisely what it is that the Appellant was saying including with the very careful captions from the interpreter and from the Appellant himself at paragraph 33 of the Appellant’s witness statement on page 6 of the 40 paged bundle.
38. Indeed, at the start of his evidence before cross-examination the Appellant did not seek to make any amendments to his witness statement and adopted his witness statement as being the truth. In my judgment the Appellant simply has not told the truth. The Appellant has sought to lie about the documents and about when it is that he obtained them. He has also lied about his contact with his sister and when he was last in touch with her.
39. In my judgment Mr Diwyncz is also correct that it would have been quite possible for the Appellant to have provided details to assist in respect of his case. Whether by way of evidence of complaints about his former solicitor not providing the documents to the Tribunal or what efforts were made to rely on the documents, said to have existed previously.
40. The IAT in BT (Former solicitors’ alleged misconduct) Nepal [2004 UKIAT 00311 which is apposite in this case and which the Appellant’s very experienced solicitors are well aware of, set out the procedure for dealing with such matters. It is not for me to second guess why they have not undertaken this task but the failure to do so speaks further volumes about the unreliability of the Appellant’s evidence before me:
“If an appeal is based in whole or in part on allegations about the conduct of former representatives, there must be evidence that those allegations have been put to the former representative, and the Tribunal must be shown either the response or correspondence indicating that there has been no response.”
41. The Respondent’s Rule 24 refers to the decision in MAH (Bangladesh) and I am well aware that I cannot seek corroboration, but here the issue is that the Appellant has provided documents which he states he has had since at least 2023 but there was a hearing of his appeal at the First-tier Tribunal in 2025 and he failed to provide the documents at that time. I metaphorically scratch my head too when I assess how the Appellant last spoke to his sister in 2023 but then got the documents from her after the hearing in 2025. It is impossible. It shows the Appellant’s case is not reliable. The Appellant has not told the truth.
42. In my judgment the Appellant’s whole case really does fall as a consequence. Of course I am well aware of the guidance of the senior courts whether when expressed in Lucas directions terms or otherwise (whether Lucas really applies or not the Immigration and Asylum Chamber) in my judgment the fairest approach towards the Appellant is to say that all the evidence must be taken into account in the round rather than to pick on one aspect and then for that to lead to a wholesale dismissal of the case. I do ask myself is it possible whether because of exuberance or whether because of exaggeration or whether because of desperation the Appellant is relying on these new documents leading to his case becoming so unreliable. In my judgment it is not possible even if I am as charitable as possible to come to the conclusion that there is any basis to the Appellant’s claim in terms of the risk.
43. This was in my judgment a very sophisticated attempt by the Appellant to produce documents in the format that he has, firstly provide them to his current solicitors in recent times and then to seek to ‘pull the wool over the eyes’ of the Upper Tribunal. The documents themselves even when taking Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 into account appear to suggest they are official documents. By way of example, they appear to have official stamps from Iraq, they have thumbprints and the like, they have photographs of various persons. In my judgment this is no mere slip-up or exuberance by an inexperienced young person; this is a sophisticated attempt at deliberately providing a wholly false account to the Upper Tribunal. In my judgment as a consequence the other aspects of the Appellant’s account require appropriate consideration against that backdrop and I of course remind myself once again that these findings are to be made to the lower standard.
44. It is because the Appellant knew that his witness statement unravelled his case that he then sought to distract with his mobile telephone to show he had sent the documents to Mr Wood. But as Mr Wood confirmed and as the mobile telephone shows, Mr Wood was only sent those documents via e-mail in August 2025 by the Appellant. Thereafter after the hearing in the earlier part of 2025 at the First-tier Tribunal. I do not accept the Appellant’s evidence that he last had contact with his sister in 2023 because his own witness statement states she sent him the documents after the hearing at the First-tier Tribunal. That hearing was in 2025. The Appellant’s oral evidence to attempt to hide that error does not begin to show any reliability in view of number of hearings in this case and whereby the Appellant has been legally represented throughout.
45. The Appellant’s visit to his new GP just last month to report his scarring and the like is just a part of that sophisticated attempt by him to mislead me. Whilst there can be evidence of past ill treatment from injuries or scarring, it is not only the timing of the GP’s visit so close to this hearing, but the self reporting of matters which causes me serious concern. I do not give much weight to the GP’s medical notes. In my judgment, this is yet another attempt by the Appellant to use sophisticated means to hide his weak and inconsistent claim with his visit to his new GP.
46. It is not for me to guess if the Appellant might have wished to provide other reasons for the glaring error in his witness statement and despite invitations to do so, Mr Wood did not seek explanations in Re-examination or during other parts of the evidence after I had invited him to do so following my questions seeking clarification.
47. In case I am wrong about the Appellant’s new documentation, when I asses the Appellant’s claim of what he says happened to him in Iraq is unreliable. I take into account the background material. I remind myself that culturally Iraq is very different from this country, extramarital affairs and the way they are treated are treated in a harsh way because of the abuse of power of the protagonists. There is significant influence by those in power and that corruption is rife and that those who are seen to be weaker whether politically or because of their age or even if they are female find it difficult to seek redress. This Appellant appears in that category in two respects, firstly because he was a minor and secondly because he has no political influence himself. Sadly, child abuse is an issue in Iraq too without little recourse for help. I note the background material with the US State Department Report of 2023 in the Appellant’s new bundle.
48. The Respondent’s skeleton argument states as follows and which I entirely concur, had it been necessary to do so. It was for the Appellant to prove his case. He has not done so. I make clear that these are alternatives to what I have said above, in case I am wrong about the Appellant’s documentation:
“It is submitted that the appellant’s claim is not credible as there are patterns of exaggeration that have been developed at different stages of the asylum claim. The appellant has maintained that there were three attempts on his life by his step uncle, including that the step uncle tried to kill him three times ‘when staying with my sister’, and ‘coming to the factory to shoot me’.
However, the detail regarding the incident at the sister’s house does not appear in either asylum interview. The appellant gives an account in the first witness statement, dated in between the two substantive asylum interviews, that the uncle broke into the sister’s house in Erbil whilst the appellant managed to escape out the back. It is said that this is a key event that led to the appellant leaving Iraq, but the detail is completely absent in the interviews despite the appellant having the opportunity to elaborate.
Whilst there is no requirement for corroboration, the Tribunal can place weight on the absence of corroborative evidence that could reasonably have been obtained where there is no good reason for not obtaining it (MAH (Egypt) [2023] EWCA Civ 216, [86]). In the appellant’s case, there is contact with his sister in Erbil who had provided him with new documents from Iraq to support his case. Despite the sister providing these documents, she has not provided a supporting statement to corroborate the appellant’s narrative. It is submitted that this is further indicative that the event did not happen in the way described by the appellant.
A further example of exaggeration in the appellant’s account regarding the treatment from the step uncle is seen in the asylum interview. The appellant stated that the step uncle had already stabbed him in the arm before he hit the appellant with his car when travelling to the police station. This again does not feature in the first witness statement but is changed to ‘being stabbed three times with a knife including on my left arm’ in the most updated witness statement for the appeal.
The failure to consistently raise this element of the narrative is significant to the core of the claim that there was mistreatment from the step uncle. The appellant was over the age of 18 when his second asylum interview was carried out and when the first witness statement was written, both from 2023. Given that there are also no health issues, it is submitted that the Joint Presidential Guidance for children and vulnerable adults does not apply to the appellant.
The additional documents obtained from the appellant’s sister also do not assist his case. The account of being hospitalised was that the appellant was at Shar Hospital in Sulaymaniyah after sustaining a head injury that required ten and five stitches at the back and front of head respectively. The patient referral form and its translation that has been provided is from Rania Public Hospital although it appears there is a referral to Shar Hospital in Sulaymaniyah. Again, none of this detail appears in the original account despite the appellant being over the age of 18 and having the opportunity to do so. The document itself does not contain any information about the appellant’s claimed injuries. It is submitted that the documents overall are unreliable when considered in the round.
The appellant also failed to claim asylum in the safe third countries of France and Italy. When assessed in the round with the other issues, it is submitted that credibility is damaged under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004, as a mandatory statutory consideration”.
49. None of these matters have been dealt with adequately by the Appellant. The Appellant well knows the issues.
50. Mr Wood asked no questions in Re-examination and no questions were asked after my questions seeking clarification. That is a matter for the Appellant and his legal representatives, but I cannot make any further allowance based on the Appellant’s age, vulnerability or otherwise. I am satisfied that the Appellant has been competently legally represented and that he knows precisely what the factual issues are and it was for him to deal with them. Ultimately, the burden of proof is on him.
51. In my judgment, attempts at burying matters amongst documents and failures to set out matters clearly are things of the past. As the Presidential Panel made clear in Lata (FtT: Principal Controversial Issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC):
“3. The reformed appeal procedures are specifically designed to ensure that the parties identify the issues, and they are comprehensively addressed before the First-tier Tribunal, not that proceedings before the IAC are some form of rolling reconsideration by either party of its position.
4. It is a misconception that it is sufficient for a party to be silent upon, or not make an express consideration as to, an issue for a burden to then be placed upon a judge to consider all potential issues that may favourably arise, even if not expressly relied upon. The reformed appeal procedures that now operate in the First-tier Tribunal have been established to ensure that a judge is not required to trawl though the papers to identify what issues are to be addressed. The task of a judge is to deal with the issues that the parties have identified.”
52. In my judgment this is an inconsistent claim by this Appellant, even when one makes every allowance for the Appellant’s age and vulnerability. It is a presentation of lies by this Appellant. If I had to, I would say that the lies are to the beyond reasonable (criminal law) standard, meaning I am sure that the Appellant has lied about his claim. Of course I need not go that far. None of the Appellant’s case makes sense, none of it is consistent with what has been said during various opportunities to provide a truthful account. In my judgment this Appellant clearly has continued contact with his relatives, including contact with his sister in Iraq. That is why he was able to get these documents recently. That is how he was able to get any documents he requires to enable him to return to Iraq. Even if I am wrong and somehow the Appellant is able to establish that he does not have the necessary documentation for his return, in my judgment the copy of the INID really speaks volumes which is within the bundle already.
53. In my judgment despite making every allowance for the Appellant and that the lower standard of proof is to be met, this is a claim in which I dismiss the Appellant’s account as wholly fanciful, clearly made up and that it must be dismissed on both protection and/or human rights grounds and in respect of humanitarian protection. That is my decision.
54. In any event internal relocation for this case involving non-state actors is a reasonable and viable option. The Appellant was aged 16 to 17 when he left Iraq. He is now 21. He will be able to relocate safely and easily in my judgment. I am well aware of the decisions of the House of Lords in respect of internal relocation, including AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] 1 AC 678.
55. No case was presented to me on this basis but for completeness and in case it was later to be raised by the Appellant that I ought to have considered it nonetheless, I set out the following. I have in mind the case law in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 provides that it is necessary for an individual to have a CSID or an INID in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 ECHR, for example at the checkpoints.
56. The Appellant is a fit, young man. I see no basis upon which it can be said he would not be able to secure a home, employment and safe passage on return. In any event, as is made clear in SMO (2), there is a returns package open to the Appellant. I do not accept the Appellant’s evidence, which are mere assertions in light of the background material and case law in any event. All he seeks to raise are matters that have been extensively dealt with in the Country Guidance which Country Guidance remains binding on me. I am aware that the Appellant may have limited education, but that is not unusual and of itself means little in terms of being able to live in Iraq or in the IKR.
57. The failure to deal with the evidence fully is that of the Appellant. He knew the case that he had to meet. The issues based approach to cases in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber is not new and there must be appropriate procedural rigour. There is not some form of rolling consideration of claims, even when the issues at stake are as serious as the ones that I am dealing with. Indeed, this is not the Appellant’s first appeal in any event.
Conclusion
58. I conclude that there is no basis upon which this appeal can conceivably be allowed on any protection grounds, be that asylum, humanitarian protection or Article 3 ECHR. The first item from the list of issues shows that the Appellant is not at risk from his stepmother or her brother or from anyone else. The other issues therefore also fall. I also note that nothing was advanced in respect of Article 8 ECHR and whilst I note that the Appellant has been in the UK for 3 years, there is nothing within the circumstances of his family and/or private life which would come near me being able to allow the appeal, even on an exceptional basis.
59. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law and was set aside.
I remake the decision.
I dismiss the appeal on all grounds including protection grounds, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
The Anonymity Order is continued.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 December 2025