Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002697

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55678/2023
LP/12541/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 25th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANZANI

Between

MF
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms G. Capel, Counsel instructed by Wilson Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Mr B. Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a Palestinian refugee formerly resident in Lebanon, appeals against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal dated 21 April 2025, which dismissed his appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 15 August 2023 refusing his protection and human rights claim.
2. On 18 June 2025, the First-tier Tribunal granted the Appellant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on all grounds.
Background
3. The Appellant, born in Burj Al Shemali camp and raised in Shabriha, Tyre, claims to have faced repeated recruitment attempts by Saraya al-Mukawama, an armed group operating in Lebanon. His father, suspecting recruitment into armed activity, arranged for the Appellant to leave Lebanon. He arrived in the UK on 24 November 2014 and claimed asylum. His claim was refused, prompting an appeal.
4. In November 2015, the Appellant’s brother (“B1”) arrived in the UK and sought asylum. B1’s case was deemed relevant to the Appellant’s claim, leading the First-tier Tribunal to direct reconsideration of the Appellant’s asylum application. The Respondent took until August 2023 to issue a decision, again refusing asylum. The Appellant appealed this refusal. His appeal was heard before the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Taylor House on 6 March 2025. Meanwhile, on 18 June 2025, another of the Appellant’s brothers (“B2”) claimed asylum in the UK. On 21 July 2025, the Respondent granted B2 Humanitarian Protection.
First-tier Tribunal appeal
5. In the proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal, the Respondent disputed all aspects of the Appellant’s case, including his identity as a Palestinian refugee born in Lebanon. The Respondent also rejected the Appellant’s account that he had been targeted for recruitment by Saraya al-Muqawama.
6. The Tribunal heard oral evidence from both the Appellant and his brother, B1. The Appellant applied to be treated as a vulnerable witness pursuant to the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010: Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant (“the Joint Presidential Guidance Note”). Reliance was placed on the report of Dr Woodcock, Consultant Clinical Psychologist, dated 27 November 2023, which recommended that the Appellant be treated as a vulnerable witness. That application was not opposed by the Respondent. At [6] of his decision, the Judge confirmed that the application was granted and that the measures recommended by Dr Woodcock would be adopted.
7. In his decision of 21 April 2025, the Judge accepted that the Appellant is a Palestinian born in Lebanon, as claimed, and that Article 1D of the Refugee Convention applies. However, the Judge found that, even on the lower standard of proof, the Appellant’s account of inducement by Saraya al-Muqawama and the claimed risk of forced recruitment to Hezbollah lacked credibility.
Grounds of appeal
8. The Appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the following grounds:

(i) That the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the country expert evidence of Ms Sheri Laizer.
(ii) That the Judge failed to make findings in relation to the evidence of Dr Woodcock, or to take that evidence and the Joint Presidential Guidance Note into account when assessing the Appellant’s credibility.
(iii) That the Judge misstated the Appellant’s case and failed to consider relevant factors.
(iv) That the Judge failed to consider witness evidence with anxious scrutiny and gave inadequate reasons for rejecting evidence.
(v) That the Judge failed to take into account material evidence and relied upon irrelevant considerations.
9. On 18 June 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Gibbs granted permission to appeal. Judge Gibbs found it arguable that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the country expert evidence (ground 1) and that, despite the Appellant having been granted vulnerable witness status on the basis of medical evidence, there was no indication that the Judge directed himself in accordance with the relevant practice direction when assessing credibility (ground 2). Although Judge Gibbs regarded grounds 3–4 as less persuasive, permission was granted on all grounds.
Decision and reasons
10. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19. We have kept these considerations in mind when coming to our decision.
11. Having considered the arguments advanced by both parties, we are satisfied that the Judge’s decision is vitiated by material errors of law. Our reasons are set out below.
12. In the proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal, the Appellant relied upon an expert report prepared by Ms Sheri Laizer, a Middle East and North African country specialist. In that report, Ms Laizer stated that the Appellant’s account was consistent with her experience, knowledge, and available country information relating to Lebanon and the surrounding region. She expressed the opinion that there is no effective protection against Hezbollah or its proxies, including Saraya al-Muqawama, and that on return the Appellant would be at real risk of reprisals from those who had sought to recruit him. The Respondent accepted Ms Laizer’s credentials as an expert, and the Judge acknowledged at [45] of the determination that she had confirmed her awareness of her duties to the Tribunal when preparing her report. Notwithstanding, the Respondent invited the Tribunal to attach little weight to her report, characterising parts of it as unevidenced assertion.
13. At [47] of the determination, the First-tier Tribunal Judge acknowledged Ms Laizer’s evidence that details, such as the recruitment tactics of Hezbollah and Saraya al-Muqawama, are “too sensitive to find in open sources in English” (para 9(i)) and, elsewhere, that “English sources are hard to find because of the wider political focus being on regional alignments and Hezbollah strong arm tactics” (5(iv)). Nonetheless, the Judge concluded:
“However, for the reasons advanced by Mr Simpson regarding the lack of evidence to support many of the assertions made in Ms Laizer’s report, I find I can only place limited weight on certain aspects of her expert report, particularly in relation to the forced recruitment of young men by Saraya al-Muqawama and Hezbollah”.
14. We regard this finding as legally flawed. While it was open to the Judge to conclude that Ms Laizer’s expertise did not extend to a particular issue, provided that proper reasons were given, it was not sufficient simply to state that she had failed to provide evidence in support of her conclusions. Ms Laizer was not merely offering personal opinion, she was giving expert evidence, the weight of which had to be assessed against recognised legal principles.
15. In Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP [2016] UKSC 6, the Supreme Court set out four general matters which fell to be addressed in the use and admissibility of expert evidence in civil proceedings: (i) whether the proposed expert evidence would assist the court in its task; (ii) whether the witness has the necessary knowledge and experience; (iii) whether the witness is impartial in his or her presentation and assessment of the evidence; and (iv) whether there is a reliable body of knowledge or experience to underpin the expert’s evidence. The Court confirmed that an expert may give evidence of fact, opinion, or a combination of both, but in every case the underpinning rationale must be considered.
16. An expert must, of course, explain the basis of their opinion where it does not rest on direct observation. Bare assertion may carry little weight. However, Ms Laizer did not rely on assertion alone. She explained why certain evidence, particularly regarding Hezbollah recruitment practices, is not available in open English-language sources, and grounded her conclusions in her specialist experience, knowledge, and access to regional sources. Her reasoning constituted expert opinion properly founded on facts and data that were either undisputed, established by her own expertise, or corroborated by other sources. The Judge’s dismissal of this evidence on the sole basis that it was unsupported by further material is inadequate and amounts to a failure to engage properly with expert evidence.
17. Mr Hulme, on behalf of the Respondent, while unable formally to concede ground 1, accepted that there was substance in the Appellant’s criticism of the Judge’s treatment of Ms Laizer’s evidence.
18. Having considered the totality of the evidence and the parties’ submissions, we find that the Judge erred in his assessment of Ms. Laizer’s report. The Judge’s rejection of her evidence for want of supporting material failed to engage with it as expert evidence and amounted to an error of law. Accordingly, Ground 1 is made out.
19. Turning to ground 2, Ms Capel submitted that although the Judge accepted an application for the Appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness, he failed to apply the relevant safeguards when assessing the Appellant’s credibility. She argued that the Judge’s only engagement with Dr Woodcock’s medico-legal report was in the context of the Appellant’s Article 3 medical claim, and that he failed entirely to consider the impact of the Appellant’s psychological difficulties on his ability to give consistent testimony. Reliance was placed on AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123, in which the Court of Appeal confirmed that a failure to follow the Joint Presidential Guidance Note will most likely amount to an error of law.
20. In response, Mr Hulme again indicated that he could not formally concede ground 2, but he accepted that, while the Judge had made a vulnerable witness direction at the outset, there was no indication that the Appellant’s vulnerabilities were taken into account in the credibility assessment. Nor was Dr Woodcock’s report addressed in that context.
21. We are satisfied that the Judge has erred in relation to ground 2. Although at [6] he recorded that the Appellant would be treated as a vulnerable witness under the Joint Presidential Guidance Note, the only apparent application of that designation was to the conduct of the hearing itself. At [7], the Judge observed that the Respondent’s questioning style was consistent with the vulnerability designation, but the assessment of evidence thereafter contains no reference to the Appellant’s vulnerabilities.
22. In particular, the sections of the determination addressing the Appellant’s factual account ([34] and [39]–[50]) make no reference either to Dr Woodcock’s findings or to the relevant provisions of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note. Paragraph 15 of that Guidance Note requires the Tribunal to record whether a witness has been found to be vulnerable and to explain what effect that vulnerability has had on the assessment of evidence. The Judge failed to do so. At [61]–[65] the Judge considered Dr Woodcock’s report solely in the context of the Article 3 ECHR medical claim, without reaching any clear conclusion as to whether the evidence was accepted or rejected for credibility purposes. The omission to consider the report’s implications for credibility and the failure to apply the vulnerable witness safeguards when assessing credibility amount to a material error of law. Ground 2 is therefore made out.
23. In light of our findings on grounds 1 and 2, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal cannot stand and must be set aside in its entirety. As these grounds are dispositive of the appeal, it is unnecessary to consider grounds 3 and 4.
24. For the reasons given, we conclude that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors of law. That decision is accordingly set aside in full.
Disposal
25. Having identified a material error of law, we must now determine whether the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking or remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. In doing so, we must also consider whether any of the Judge’s findings can properly be preserved.
26. Both representatives submitted that the appropriate course is for the appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings preserved. We agree. The Judge’s failure to conduct a proper analysis of key items of evidence, combined with his failure to apply the Joint Presidential Guidance Note when assessing credibility, fundamentally undermines his evaluation of the Appellant’s account and the integrity of the decision as a whole. The appeal will therefore need to be heard afresh. In light of the extent of the fact-finding required, we are satisfied that remittal to the First-tier Tribunal is the correct approach, in accordance with the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT.
Case Management Directions
27. To assist the First-tier Tribunal in the progression of this appeal, the following directions are made:
(i) The Appellant shall, within 7 days of the date on which this notice is sent to the parties, file and serve a letter of authority from his brother (“B2”) authorising the Respondent to disclose information held in relation to B2’s application for international protection.
(ii) The Appellant, having liaised with the Respondent, shall file and serve any evidence relating to B2, which may include material concerning his claim for international protection and a witness statement, no later than 28 days from the date this notice is sent to the parties.
(iii) The parties shall file and serve any further evidence upon which they intend to rely no later than 3 months from the date this notice is sent to the parties.
(iv) This appeal shall be listed for a Case Management Review Hearing at Taylor House, to take place no earlier than 4 months from the date of this decision.
28. Both representatives confirmed that the above directions are appropriate.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal, sent to the parties on 21 April 2025, involved the making of a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo before a different judge.

S. Anzani

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 September 2025