Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002706

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03209/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 8th of October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

P DD
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Brakaj, instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 29 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Walker) promulgated on 26 March 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 1 September 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
The background:
3. The factual background is summarised in the documents and is taken from various sources of evidence as follows. The appellant is a national of Vietnam. In summary, the appellant feared persecution from loan sharks. When in Vietnam he had secured a loan for 900 million Vietnamese dong to buy land and had to pay interest. He had only paid 200 million of the loan and he also used his parents’ house to borrow 300 million Vietnamese dong from the bank. Thus, he owed money both to the loan sharks and to the bank. In February 2020 he was unable to pay back the loan and he was forced to leave Vietnam illegally to work for the loan shark company in Russia to pay back the loan. He claimed that he had been subjected to continued threats whilst in the UK and his family in Vietnam were also regularly threatened.
4. The appellant’ claim for asylum was refused by the respondent in her decision letter dated 1 September 2023. Beyond accepting the appellant’s nationality, the respondent set out credibility issues in respect of the factual account of what had occurred in Vietnam. Thus, his claim was refused.
5. The appeal came before the FtTJ and in a decision promulgated on 26 March 2025, the FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk on return to Vietnam on the factual basis as claimed. The FtTJ set out his findings of fact between paragraphs 21-34 and concluded that having taken all the evidence the round he did not accept the appellant’s factual account.
6. He therefore dismissed the appeal.
7. The appellant applied for permission to appeal the decision. Permission to was refused by FtTJ le Grys on 22 May 2025 but on renewal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman on 17 July 2025.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
8. The hearing took place on 29 September 2025. The appellant was represented by Ms Brakaj, Solicitor advocate and the respondent by Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer. Both were able to provide their oral submissions to the tribunal at the hearing. I am grateful to both advocates for their helpful submissions.
9. Ms Brakaj indicated that she relied upon the grounds of challenge and explained them in her oral submissions and Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer, referred to the reply provided to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 dated 11 August 2025 where it was submitted that the FtTJ directed himself appropriately and had explained at length which factors or evidence he considered as damaging the appellant’s credibility and that indicated a balanced assessment of the appellant’s evidence.
10. The submissions are contained in the record of proceedings and in the written grounds and it is not necessary to rehearse them here. I will refer to them as relevant in the analysis of the issues raised. I record that whilst the decision granting permission made the observation that grounds 2 and 3 appeared to be less convincing, there was no restriction on the grounds and Ms Brakaj relied upon the 4 grounds in her submissions.
Discussion:
11. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, it is necessary to set out the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
12. As the issues in this appeal relate to challenges brought against findings of fact on credibility made by the FtTJ, I also remind myself of the decision in Volpi v Volpi (supra) when reviewing a first instance judge's findings of fact as per Lewison LJ as follows:

"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i)An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
13. The written grounds of challenge and the oral submissions made by Ms Brakaj seek to challenge the assessment of credibility made by the FtTJ in his decision.
14. I remind myself that the Judge had the benefit of having heard the evidence and that there must be judicial restraint and respect of the decision of the expert First-tier Tribunal Judge. I must not interfere with the Judge's decision unless there is a material error of law.

15. In the recent decision of the Court of Appeal, in MH (Bangladesh) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 (9 June 2025) Lord Justice Arnold, with whom Lord Justice Singh and Lady Justice King agreed, reiterated this and summarised,

“The role of an appellate court or tribunal”
29. There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen's summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
'It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirection’s simply because they have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [ 2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [ 2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead."
16. The grounds seek to challenge the findings of fact made by the FtTJ. It is submitted that the assessment of whether there had been an inconsistency in the answers given by the appellant when asked about when the last threats were made is factually incorrect. In essence what is submitted is that the FtTJ was wrong to assess the evidence by stating that the appellant had given a different answer each time he has been questioned about the last time his family was threatened, and this was inaccurate when considering the date of the information given and the ongoing nature of the threat. Ms Brakaj submitted that on each occasion the differing answer was correct and that it was not inconsistent and therefore the FtTJ was wrong in considering this was an issue of credibility.
17. Having considered the submissions in the context of the decision of the FtTJ and the evidence that he was referring to, I am satisfied that the grounds are not made out. The grounds and submissions as made involve a misreading of the decision and what findings the FtTJ had made when assessing the appellant’s credibility. It is therefore necessary to set out in some detail the findings made by the FtTJ and the context in which they were made.
18. The findings of fact are set out between paragraphs 25 – 34. It is important to consider the Judge's decision as a whole as the case authorities set out above make clear. It is also important to consider the chronology of events. In this appeal the appellant claims that he left Vietnam in February 2020 and that he was in Russia until May 2021. That he entered the UK on 12 July 2021 via a small boat. He completed a screening interview in 2021 and underwent a substantive interview on 28 August 2023 which led to the decision refusing his claim made on 1 September 2023. He provided a witness statement on 21 July 2024 and a later witness statement in 2025.
19. Between paragraphs 21 – 24 the FtTJ sets out parts of the appellant’s evidence relevant to the assessment of the credibility of his factual account. At the paragraph 25 of the decision the FtTJ makes his finding of fact from the evidence that there are “clear inconsistencies in the appellant’s account and I do not find that his explanations sufficiently explain them away”.
20. In his recitation of the evidence at paragraph 22 the FtTJ sets out the evidence given by the appellant relating to ongoing threats he says have been directed towards him and his family from the moneylenders to whom he owes money. First, the FtTJ refers to the substantive interview which took place on 20 August 2023. As recorded in that interview, the appellant was asked when he was first threatened, and he stated that it was in “October 2018”, and it was over the phone, and they came to his house (Q78). He was also asked to identify the last time he was threatened, and he stated “May 2019” saying that this was in his home. Considering the chronology set out above this must have been when he was in Vietnam because he did not leave that country until February 2020 and did not enter the UK until 12 July 2021. Thus, when asked in August 2023 to give the last time he was threatened by the moneylenders he identified the time as being “May 2019” this was despite the account given that he was being threatened in the UK.
21. When asked when the last time the moneylenders had threatened his family, he said “October 2019” (Q92). On the above chronology this would be a time when he was in Vietnam. Thus, the appellant’s evidence was that up until August 2023 (date of the interview), the last time he was threatened was in May 2019 when he was at home and that his family had been threatened in October 2019. However, when he was asked if it received threats in the UK (the chronology showing that he entered the UK on 12 July 2021) he said, “yes they call”. This is inconsistent with the account the last threats made to him were in May 2019. When asked if they were aware he was in the UK he said, “I don’t know” (Q 91; p 274). When he was asked how they were able to contact him in the UK, the appellant’s response was, “maybe they threatened my family and asked for my phone number” (Q92; page 275).
22. At paragraph 22 the FtTJ correctly identified that when pressed on the issue he confirmed that his family had been threatened into giving his mobile number to people coming to the house (Q 94 – 104). The FtTJ also records, “it was put to him that this is not consistent with his previous answer that the family were last threatened in October 2019 to which he said that was in reference to the last time he was threatened at home in Vietnam (Q100; page 276). When asked to clarify again (about threats made to the family) the appellant stated that they come to the home and threatened his family and asked for the telephone number. The appellant then gave the date of that happening as being 2022. As the FtTJ stated at paragraph 22 the interviewer challenged him on the inconsistency at question 104 and he replied that they were threatening him in October 2019 as he was to Vietnam (Q104).
23. There is an inconsistency in the evidence given in interview. The date he gave of the last time the family was threatened was October 2019 and when asked to confirm the last threat to him he stated it was in May 2019 despite his claim that he was being threatened in the UK. He then stated that his family had given the number in 2022 and when challenged on the inconsistency in his evidence by the interviewer he said that it was in October 2019 as the date that he was threatened in Vietnam. However, that does not explain the inconsistency.
24. In his witness statement (paragraph 5; p 31) the appellant stated that he did not remember using the word “maybe”; he didn’t intend to use that word and doesn’t know why the interview records this. He also stated that the interview recorded the last time his family was threatened was October 2019, but I clarified that it was me who was threatened in October 2019 and mother was threatened and forced to give my number in 2022. He said he did not realise giving the date of 2019 I was being asked about my family. He claimed that had been constantly threatened and he was stressed during the interview.
25. The FtTJ also records the relevant evidence between paragraphs 23 and 24.
26. The FtTJ’s assessment of credibility begins at paragraph 25. The FtTJ states as follows: “There are clear inconsistencies in the appellant’s account, and I do not find that his explanations sufficiently explain them away.” He later goes on to state,” the appellant has given different answers on almost every occasion when asked to give the date of the last time he or his family were threatened.” Pausing there what the FtTJ is clearly saying is that on each occasion in time when he was asked to give a date for the last time, he or the family been threatened he gave different answers. This is taken from when he was interviewed in August 2023, in the statement that he gave on 10 July 2024 and lastly during cross-examination.
27. The FtTJ identified the first time he had been inconsistent in his evidence as during the substantive interview. I have set out above that part of the substantive interview. The FtTJ was correct to find inconsistencies in the evidence during the interview and that it was not later explained in the later witness statement at paragraph 4. The FtTJ was entitled to look at the questions he was asked in 2023 when interviewed and to make a finding that the questions asked were “clear and unequivocal” and that “his answers only changed when his answers were scrutinised”.
28. The FtTJ then turned to the second stage where evidence was given. This is identified at paragraph 25 as follows, “in the second statement and in interview he also said he was unable to give a specific date for the last time he or his family were threatened because it was an ongoing course of conduct” ( this refers to the second witness statement 21/2/2025;p31 at paragraph 4 where he stated, “however I have constant been threatened. I don’t really have a last time being threatened as the threat remains.”) The FtTJ’s second finding at paragraph 25 was that he did not accept that that was a reasonable explanation for the vagueness of his answers and that “the appellant has at times chosen to answer this question, albeit inconsistently, and other times chosen to revert to this justification for not giving a direct answer or to explain the variation in his responses in his responses.” In this context the FtTJ turned to the evidence given in cross-examination which he set out, “when put in cross-examination the appellant again gave differing answers as to when his mother was last threatened stating in the first instance it was last month and confirming that was a reference to February 2025 when they turned up and threatened his mother and family. Shortly after, he was asked again about his mother receiving threats and that the last occasion was two months ago (i.e. January). The FtTJ records that when the inconsistency of those dates was put to him during oral evidence, he was unable to give an explanation. The FtTJ therefore identified inconsistent evidence given during cross-examination at the hearing in 2025 as to when they were last threatened at first giving a date of February 2025. When the cross-examination returned to the issue during the same part of the hearing the appellant gave a different date of January 2025 and could not provide an explanation as to why he had given those two different dates.
29. The FtTJ then turned to other evidence relating to the issue of threats. The FtTJ stated “he has also given different answers to when his wife was last threatened. The FtTJ contrasted his oral evidence where he stated that could not recall when she was last contacted by moneylenders. The FtTJ found that was inconsistent with his ability to do so as his evidence previously given, he was able to give clear dates as to when she had been threatened (the FtTJ refers to the first statement he made in July 2024 where he stated she been threatened three months before the statement was given (ie April 2024)).
30. Pausing there, the clear point the FtTJ was making was that the appellant was not able to recall when they were last threatened when giving oral evidence in 2025 but that he been able to do so in an earlier witness statement.
31. When the FtTJ’s findings of fact are set in the context of the evidence, the grounds misread paragraph 25. The FtTJ was plainly aware of the appellant’s case that the threats were ongoing but what the FtTJ had set out in his assessment of the evidence was that the appellant’s factual account in his evidence was inconsistent at the particular times he had given evidence about those threats. It is not the case as the grounds set out that as the threats were ongoing the answers will differ each time he is asked. Those submissions misread the FtTJ’s findings and the evidence he assessed. The grounds challenging paragraph 25 are therefore not made out.
32. In this context ground 2 is also not made out. The submissions made in relation to this ground relates to the appellant’s mental health, stating that he has “undergone trauma” and had explained his stress in his witness statement at the time of the interview in August 2023 but that the FtTJ failed to take that into account when assessing the evidence given in interview and as stated in his witness statement he felt stressed at this time and could not fully understand what was being asked of him. Thus, the judge did not consider whether his past experiences may have affected his evidence.
33. As set out when addressing ground one above, the FtTJ identified inconsistent evidence given during a substantive interview. He explained that by stating that he was “stressed”. Ms Brakaj submitted that the judge failed to take into account the medical evidence when assessing the inconsistencies.
34. However, at the time of the screening interview in 2021, the appellant confirmed that he had no medical condition (Q 2.1), that he had no disabilities and was not taking any medication. Similarly in interview in August 2023 the situation had not changed -he confirmed that he was fit and well to attend and be interviewed and when asked if he had any current physical or mental health issues he said, “I want to go and see the doctor because I feel tired”. When asked if he had a GP in the UK, he said that he had one but that he had not seen him. And at question 4 when asked if he had any mental health issues he answered “no” and confirmed that he was not taking any medication.
35. The FtTJ was correct in his assessment at paragraph 29 that there was no probative medical evidence available. Whilst there was evidence that the appellant had been referred to talking therapies and that he had attended time-limited counselling between 4 December 2024 and 18 December 2024 and there was a letter of support dated 18 June 2024 from an advocate of support that he was struggling with his mental health “as a direct result of trauma he experienced during modern slavery”, that was not evidence that could be properly considered to be expert evidence as to any mental health diagnosis which is what the FtTJ had stated at paragraph 29. There was no reference to any GP notes and no reference to other aspects of the appellant’s history such as having crossed the Channel by boat or any other consideration of his factual circumstances. Consequently, the FtTJ was correct to state that there was no probative value in that evidence. As the respondent submitted, nor was there evidence that stated the appellant could not give consistent evidence or that his current medical circumstances were such that he was not able to do so. Therefore, the FtTJ did take into account the evidence provided. He was plainly aware of the written evidence of the counsellor and identified its evidential shortcomings as not being probative evidence to support the claim that he had been threatened by loan sharks or that he was a victim of modern slavery. The FtTJ plainly took that into account when assessing the evidence given generally but also given in interview.
36. Ground 3 seeks to challenge paragraph 26 of the FtTJ’s findings of fact where he considered the threatening messages in the text messages as translated. They can be found at page 204 of the bundle and were produced as evidence of the threats the appellant said to still be receiving whilst in the UK. As the FtTJ correctly identified the dates on the translation are given as 14 November and 28th of November but gave no year and there was no name of the sender or any details provided of the identity of the person who sent the messages or where they emanated from. The FtTJ assessed that in those circumstances they could only have “limited weight” and that was an assessment entirely open to the FtTJ to make on that evidence given that the appellant’s claim that he had been constantly threatened whilst in the UK but only two messages had been provided which were undated, with no name of the sender or detailed evidence where they had come from.
37. Insofar as the grounds have argued that the FtTJ did not make a finding about the threat messages (see paragraph 12 of the grounds) that ground is not made out. The FtTJ went on to assess the evidence given by the appellant about those messages. Firstly, the FtTJ set out the evidence given in cross examination that the messages were from November 2024. As the FtTJ set out that could not be true because the translation of the messages was undertaken in August 2024. The FtTJ recorded the appellant’s evidence given in re-examination that the messages were more likely to be November 2023. The findings made by the judge was that his concern was that the appellant was “once more unable to give an accurate answer at the first time of asking”. That was factually correct. In those circumstances paragraph 10 of ground three does not address this finding made in the context of the appellant’s evidence.
38. The FtTJ then considered the appellant’s evidence based on an acceptance that the threatening messages were sent in November 2023 and that he had showed the messages to MF who had assisted him with lodging his appeal out of time. The FtTJ set out the evidence in the first witness statement of July 2024 the appellant stated, “since I went into immigration centre I change my phone number, there were strange numbers calling on my old phone, but I did not pick it up and changed my number”. The FtTJ found that if that had been the case it was not consistent with the evidence given in cross examination where he stated the last threats he received whilst in the UK was last month. The FtTJ set out his reasoning that if that had been the case then the moneylenders would have obtained the appellant’s new phone number by some means and that if that was by making threats to his family which is the means previously stated as to how they been able to contact him in the UK, and that was clarified as being in 2022 that was not consistent with the time when the appellant engaged the services of MF which appeared to be around October 2023. Therefore, the judge reasoned that he must have changed his telephone number between October 2023 and February 2025 and no explanation or been given as to how the moneylenders had continued to be able to contact him. The FtTJ therefore found that in light of this lack of detail and consistency he drew a further adverse inference over the truthfulness of the appellant’s account. Whilst the grounds at paragraph 11 refer to oral evidence that he lost his phone around 15 days prior to the hearing, that submission has not been supported by evidence. It is well established that without evidence of what took place below there is no evidential basis on which to make such a submission and where it is asserted that evidence was not taken account of it is necessary to adduce evidence either in the form of a witness statement from the applicant and or a note of evidence or transcript. It is worth reiterating the grounds of appeal do not prove themselves and are not evidence of their contents. Furthermore, it does not explain how the moneylenders have continued to be able to contact him. The FtTJ was therefore entitled to make the adverse finding of fact that he did at paragraph 26. Ground three is therefore not established.
39. Ground 4 challenges the finding made at paragraph 27 in relation to the location of family members in Vietnam. The FtTJ assessed the evidence at paragraph 26. He identified that in the first witness statement (7/7/24; page 189) the appellant stated that his family “was so scared that they had to run away from where they lived” and were too scared to go back. In the second witness statement 2025(paragraph 7) he stated, “my parents moved as have my wife and child. I do not know their address and they don’t tell anyone where they are they are not safe and are trying to hide where they are.” The FtTJ made a finding that his oral evidence was not consistent with the evidence in the statements where he had stated that his mother sometimes went to different pagodas to escape the threats that she had not moved to another city as she is quite elderly and could not afford to relocate. The FtTJ recorded that the appellant gave no reasonable explanation (or no reasonable explanation had been offered) to explain why contradictory evidence was given. Whilst the grounds seek to provide an answer or explanation now that he does not say that they moved away from the area, the point the FtTJ was making was that the appellant has not given any explanation for that evidence which was contradictory. Ground 4 does not establish an error of law in the decision of the FtTJ.
40. The FtTJ also made other findings of fact on the evidence that had been produced on behalf of the appellant. At paragraph 28 the judge considered the evidence in support of his claim which consisted of photographs (see pages 207 – 211). In his assessment the FtTJ was entitled to find that there had been no medical evidence to explain the injuries and how they were consistent with any account given, furthermore the appellant had not given any specific evidence to explain how those injuries occurred. In the circumstances the judge was entitled to place little or no weight on that evidence.
41. The FtTJ was also entitled to make his finding at paragraph 29 relating to the evidence of his current mental health. There is some overlap with ground 2 as set out above. The FtTJ entitle to make the finding that the fact that the appellant was receiving counselling was not determinative evidence that he was a victim of modern slavery or a victim of trafficking or to show that had come to the adverse attention of moneylenders in Vietnam. The FtTJ had not been provided with medical evidence in support of those conclusions and in the circumstances of the lack of supporting expert evidence was entitled to find that that as it stood the evidence of his current mental health had no probative value as supporting evidence for his factual claim. This was also supported by his finding at paragraph 30 that the ICEA decision did not accept that he was a victim of modern slavery. The FtTJ correctly identified the differing standards of proof, but he was entitled to take into account that the ICEA found inconsistencies in the appellant’s account and that was consistent with the assessment made of the appellant’s evidence by the FtTJ.
42. At paragraph 34 the FtTJ set out his conclusions on the evidence taken “in the round” and that he found the appellant’s evidence to be “so weak by virtue of inconsistencies and vagueness” that he could place no weight on his account. He took into account that there was no requirement to adduce corroborative evidence that in the absence of that the appellant’s case rested predominantly on his own evidence and that on the assessment undertaken, the appellant had been “unable to give consistent accounts about the ongoing threats himself and his family, and the effect of the same on his family at home in Vietnam”. The FtTJ found that he had given a vague account which lacked any depth regarding the moneylenders and that when challenged repeatedly had given contradictory answers and had not provided a reasonable explanation for his inability to give consistent evidence. The FtTJ finally concluded that he did not find the appellant to have discharge the burden of proof to establish that had come to the adverse attention of moneylenders and been subject to ongoing threats or that had been trafficked to work in Russia to pay off debts.
43. The FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons for reaching those conclusions and the grounds do not establish that the FtTJ’s reasoning was in error or did not take into account the evidence when reaching those conclusions.
44. In summary, I remind myself of the need for appropriate restraint before interfering with the decision of the FTT, particularly where the judge below was heard and assessed a range of evidential sources relating to the reliability of an account. Not every evidential issue need be specifically addressed and there is no requirement to provide reasons for reasons. The FtTJ had regard to the evidence before him and gave adequate reasons to why he did not believe the appellant’s account.
45. The overall findings of fact made by the judge were reasonably open to him to make on the evidence and were sustainable findings and that the FtTJ engaged with the evidence and undertook a fair assessment of credibility when he made the findings he did when reaching his overall conclusions and having taken all the evidence “in the round”.
46. Consequently, for those reasons the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of a material error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

1 October 2025