Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002711
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63869/2024
LP/01745/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

8th of July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Ó CEALLAIGH KC

Between

AN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Pantho, legal representative instructed by Internations Legal LLP
For the Respondent: Ms Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh who seeks protection in the United Kingdom. His application was refused by the Secretary of State in a decision dated 30 April 2024. He appealed that decision and his appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Juss in a decision dated 15 April 2015.
2. Permission to appeal was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready on 5 June 2025. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was however granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman on 22 July 2025.
3. At the hearing Ms Everett accepted on behalf of the Secretary of State that the determination contains a material error of law and the parties agree that it should be remitted for a fresh hearing.
Grounds of appeal
4. The grounds of appeal may be summarised as follows:
a. Ground 1: The FTT failed to make clear and unambiguous findings with adequate reasons on the most material evidence, and failed to apply the approach in Karanakaran to the credibility of the appellant’s claim;
b. Ground 2: The FTT used the country evidence selectively and ignored material evidence;
c. Ground 3: The refusal of the adjournment application was procedurally unfair;
d. Ground 4: The FTT failed to consider Article 8 ECHR in light of the correct factual background.
5. Permission was granted by UTJ Hoffman as follows:
“(2) This appeal evidently had an unusual hearing, and I have sympathy for the judge given the difficult circumstances that he faced on the day. I am, however, satisfied that his decision contains arguable material errors of law.
(3) Ground 1 argues that the judge failed to make clear and adequately reasoned findings. In particular, I have had regard to [39] and [43]. The findings at [39] are brief and arguably fail to properly engage with the documentary evidence from Bangladesh. Furthermore, at [39], having appeared to accept that the appellant is the assistant secretary of the UK-based human rights organisation Equal Rights International, the judge fails to provide reasons as to why the Bangladeshi authorities would “have either no means to track this or any interest in this.” Similarly, at [43], the judge says that the Bangladeshi authorities do not have the capacity to recognise all returnees who have attended demonstrations in the UK, and that their ability to do so is limited by the lack of facial recognition technology, but again the judge does not say where he has obtained that information. It may be that these points are immaterial in the light of the judge’s findings in relation to the change of government in Bangladesh, but I am satisfied that the points are, at least, arguable.
(4) I am also satisfied that it is arguable that the judge failed to properly take into account the objective material relied upon by the appellant. I therefore grant permission in relation to Ground 2.
(5) While I am not particularly convinced by the suggestion that the judge was not entitled to refuse the adjournment request, I am satisfied that it is arguable that the judge erred by then using his rejection of the claimed outbreak of vomiting by the appellant and his witness, as well as the criticism of the “antics” of the appellant’s representative, which he appears to have had no opportunity to respond to, as a basis on which to impugn the evidence in respect of the asylum claim at [40] and [41]. I therefore also grant permission in relation to Ground 3.
(6) Finally, I am also satisfied that Ground 4 is arguable. While the appellant’s Article 8 claim will likely stand or fall with the asylum claim, it is arguable that the judge failed to take into account the best interests of the appellant’s children.”
6. When granting permission UTJ Hoffmann directed that the recording of the hearing be made available.
Hearing
7. At the outset of the hearing I played the recording of the proceedings before FTT Juss. We listened to the recording from the point that the paramedic arrived until proceedings continued.
8. Having listened to the recording Ms Everett for the Secretary of State indicated that she accepted that the FTTJ had made a material error of law in respect of the consideration of the appellant’s credibility. In view of the centrality of the issue of credibility to the case the matter had to be remitted.
Decision and reasons
9. Like UTJ Hoffman I have considerable sympathy with FTTJ Juss. The circumstances of the hearing seem to have been nothing short of bizarre and very challenging to deal with. The fact that the matter took place by CVP appears to have added to the confusion. However I agree with Ms Everett that, having now heard the recording, there is a clear error of law and the matter must be remitted.
10. The key issue is that the appellant claimed to be ill on the morning of the hearing, and there is no doubt that a paramedic attended and spoke to the FTTJ. That conversation took place online with the paramedic speaking from the solicitor’s office (where the appellant was giving evidence) and the FTTJ in a hearing room.
11. It is quite clear that the FTTJ in dismissing the appeal believed that the appellant was faking his illness. Not only was an adjournment refused on that basis [16], with an express finding that the appellant was not being truthful, but when it came to determining the credibility of his asylum claim [40] the FTTJ specifically held against him that he had pretended to be ill.
12. However we have now heard the recording. Of particular note is that the paramedic states in terms that the appellant is genuinely ill. He specifically says that the appellant has been examined and “by no means was he faking”. The FTTJ is audibly attempting to take notes on at the time, at what is a remote hearing, and the strong impression formed is that the FTTJ did not actually hear that part of the evidence. As is clear from subsequent questions the FTTJ was primarily concerned with whether the appellant could continue and give evidence.
13. Whether (as I very much suspect) the FTTJ did not hear this critical part of the evidence because it was remote and he was trying to type, or he did hear it and did not consider it, it was clearly relevant. On the recording it is very striking indeed – the paramedic is emphatic when he says that the appellant was genuinely ill and not malingering. Yet this view is not addressed by the FTTJ at all, who does not give the impression of being aware of it.
14. The FTTJ was not bound to accept the paramedic’s assessment, but as the view of a qualified medical person at the scene of an apparent medical emergency it clearly had to be considered. That applies a fortiori if the FTTJ intended to give significant weight to the faking of illness in his assessment of credibility. Ms Everett is right to accept that the failure to consider the evidence of the paramedic amounted to an error of law, and to accept that as it affects the FTTJ’s credibility findings the entire appeal must be reheard.
15. The appeal is allowed on Ground 3. The matter will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings preserved.
Notice of Decision
The determination of First-tier Tribunal Judge Juss of 15 April 2025 did involve the making of a material error of law. It is set aside in its entirety and will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing with no findings of fact preserved.

Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 June 2026