Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002725
PA/59542/2023
PA/01794/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
17th June 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between
HT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 9 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is a remaking decision, in the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State’s refusal of his protection and human rights claim.
2. This follows my earlier decision to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. In doing so I did preserve some of the First-tier Tribunal’s findings of fact which I shall touch upon in due course in my determination.
3. The respondent’s decision setting out the her reasons for refusing the appellant’s claim are contained in the decision letter dated 19 October 2023 (“the decision letter”) albeit this now has to be read in light of the National Referral Mechanism (“NRM”) and the acceptance that the appellant is a victim of trafficking (“VOT”).
4. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. I continue to consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.

The evidence/the hearing
5. I had before me a composite bundle (“CB”) of 212 pages which included all the evidence that had been placed before the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal for the error of law hearing. I also had a further supplementary bundle (“SB”) and an addendum skeleton argument.
6. At the resumed hearing, there was discussion concerning the SB which included material relating to the appellant’s wife, who had previously been untraceable but was by the stage of my remaking decision present in the United Kingdom and had been recognised as a victim of trafficking.
7. No witness statement had been provided from the appellant’s wife, and she did not attend to give oral evidence. The respondent questioned the provenance and weight to be attached to this material. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that, in the absence of a statement or further detail, the fact of the appellant’s wife being recognised as a victim of trafficking did not establish any direct link to the risk claimed by the appellant, including any risk of re-trafficking. In particular, it was submitted that there was no evidence to demonstrate that the appellant’s wife had been trafficked by the same individuals responsible for the appellant’s own experiences.
8. In accordance with my earlier directions, I admitted this material as I had given permission for any further evidence to be provided. I agree with the respondent’s contention that the weight to be attached to it is, however, a matter for assessment in light of the evidence as a whole.
9. The findings of fact preserved from the earlier decision are that the appellant’s account is credible and that he is at real risk from illegal money lenders in his home area, but not from criminal organisations more generally.
10. The issues to be determined were those agreed at the error of law hearing and in fact the ones that had been before the Judge at the First-tier. These are for ease:
(a) Would the appellant be able to obtain protection from the authorities in Vietnam
(b) Internal relocation

Findings of fact
11. Before turning to the issues to be resolved, it is helpful to set out the appellant’s case in fuller detail aligned with the preserved findings of fact.
12. There was an acceptance that the appellant was a VOT (as recorded at paragraph 7 of the determination), that the account was credible and that the appellant was at risk from the money lenders (as recorded at paragraph 9 of the determination).
13. Therefore by way of background, the appellant is a 39-year-old Vietnamese national from Quang Binh Province. He is married with two children. He was educated to the equivalent of A-level standard and worked as a lorry driver.
14. In 2016, the appellant borrowed in excess of 10 billion Vietnamese dong in an attempt to support his failing business. The money was borrowed from an illegal money lender, which the appellant described as a group of “gangsters”. The interest rates were extremely high and the appellant was unable to maintain repayments.
15. The appellant ceased making payments in early 2017. As a result, the money lenders/gangsters threatened him, attended his home, and assaulted him with a hammer. They also threatened to kidnap his wife and children. The appellant did not report these matters to the police, fearing that doing so would trigger the threats made against his family.
16. He subsequently agreed to travel abroad to work off the debt. He was thereafter trafficked to Greece and ultimately to the United Kingdom. His wife continued to be threatened after his departure from Vietnam.
17. The appellant is a victim of modern slavery, having been trafficked in Vietnam, Greece, Romania, France and the United Kingdom between 2019 and 2021 for the purposes of forced labour and forced criminality.

(a) Sufficiency of protection
18. The appellants appeal was advanced that he was at real risk from the money lender/gangsters if returned to Vietnam, either in his home area or wherever he lived in Vietnam. It was also advanced that he would be at risk from others who would seek to exploit his vulnerability.
19. I remind myself of paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules. Previous persecution or serious harm is to be regarded as a serious indication of a well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of serious harm, unless there are good reasons to conclude that such harm will not be repeated.
20. In this case, the appellant was subjected to serious violence by illegal money lenders, to the extent that he required hospital treatment, and was subsequently trafficked out of Vietnam by their associates. On the evidence before me, there is no good reason to conclude that such treatment would not be repeated upon his return to his home area. I came to this conclusion on the basis of the background information and the expert evidence.
21. My reference to that is inevitably selective within my decision but I shall address the background information and expert evidence in turn.
22. I have found it helpful to consider the Country Policy and Information Note (“CPIN”) Vietnam: Trafficking (February 2025), together with the CPIN Vietnam: Fear of Illegal Moneylenders (Version 3.0, February 2025) up to date versions of which appear in the SB.
23. It is accepted that the appellant is at risk from illegal money lenders in his home area. The respondent acknowledges in the illegal money lending CPIN the links to trafficking at section 8.6. For example it states:
8.6.1 A 2019 article on the Electronic Immigration Network website notes that: ‘…Loan sharks are closely connected to trafficking victims and often act as migration brokers. Traffickers frequently take advantage of debt bondage to control their victims, as trafficked person are lured with promises of economic opportunity. Traffickers also threaten families back home to ensure the victims continue to cooperate.’36
8.6.2 The 2022 DFAT report noted that: ‘…Moneylending and migration are commonly linked and the reason for the loan may have been to fund a people smuggler in the first place. ‘Moneylending is commonly linked to people trafficking. People are expected to pay money at each stage of the journey and are then held in servitude with the threat of violence where they owe money. Victims of trafficking may be used as recruiters for new victims to pay off their debts
24. In my judgment the evidence demonstrates a clear overlap between illegal money lending and trafficking networks. In this case, the money lenders and traffickers are indistinct. They are properly to be understood as interconnected.
25. Whilst not binding upon me, the CPIN sets out factors for consideration which I have found helpful when looking at the circumstances in the appellant’s home area. I have not treated these as a checklist but as a structure through which I can consider the appellant’s circumstances.
26. These are recorded as follows:
3.1.4 Factors that may increase the risk of being abused or re-trafficked include, but are not limited to:
• The person having an outstanding debt to the traffickers
• The person knowing the trafficker
• The absence of a supportive family willing to take the victim back into the family unit
• The person having no other support network to assist them and material and financial deprivation such as to mean that they will be living in poverty or in conditions of destitution
• No or few educational or vocational skills
• Mental health disorders, which may have been caused and / or exacerbated by experiences of abuse when originally trafficked
27. The appellant does have an outstanding debt. This is because the loan was not satisfied and he escaped his traffickers. Put another way, he was not released by the traffickers on satisfaction of a debt. There is nothing to suggest that the debt has been written off. Therefore it is correct to characterise it as outstanding.
28. The appellant’s traffickers were not personally known to him and I acknowledge that this may in some instances militate risk. The appellant does not have a supportive family who he can return. His wife is in the UK although I have been mindful of the observations of the respondent and even on a lower standard there is no indication that her trafficking was linked to the appellant. I make it clear this is not an adverse credibility finding rather a lacuna in the evidence.
29. There is a letter from the appellant’s cousin but this does indicate that the appellant’s cousin is a protective factor. I say this because he was not so previously even though he was aware of the challenges presented to the appellant by the money lenders which is indicated within his letter. I am not persuaded that he is a supportive family member willing to take the person back or that he represents a support network for the appellant.
30. The appellant does have education and previous work experience but the weight I have attached to these are limited. This is because they are the skills and experience that the appellant had when he was trafficked. Put another way, these are not additional skills obtained since his trafficking experience that may change his prospects and reduce the risk of retrafficking.
31. In terms of the appellant’s mental health there is evidence that he is taking medication to support his mental health in the form of Amitriptyline. Given the accepted trafficking experienced by the appellant this is sadly unsurprising.
32. Turning towards more formalised protective and support structures that may be available for the appellant. As part of that analysis I have considered what legal frameworks would be available for the appellant.
33. The CPIN summarises the position as follows:
4.1.1 In general, the state is willing and able to offer effective protection, which is generally accessible to those who fear they are at risk from being retrafficked. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.
34. Whilst the CPIN expresses a general view that protection is available, I find on the specific evidence in this case that the position differs for this appellant. Turning to why I have reached this view.
35. The CPIN opines that the Vietnamese government has enacted a legislative framework criminalising trafficking, including provisions within the Penal Code providing for fines and terms of imprisonment. It also notes, drawing on the US State Department report, that legal assistance and protective services exist in principle.
36. However, the background evidence which the CPIN draws upon also demonstrates a significant gap between the formal legislative framework and the protection available in practice. This is because the authorities do not systematically identify and refer victims to protective services, in part because the domestic definition of trafficking does not fully align with internationally accepted definitions.
37. While the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) provides assistance to vulnerable individuals, this does not extend effectively to all victims of trafficking (see CPIN §4.1.11). Access to services depends on formal recognition as a victim, which is often difficult to obtain, particularly where individuals are perceived as having been complicit in irregular migration. It is noted with the CPIN that support for male victims is especially limited.
38. The CPIN goes on further to state:
4.1.12 Access to government run services and shelters are unlikely to be available for those returning from the UK as they would not be in receipt of a victim’s certificate. Reintegration and support services may be available to them through NGOs who may be able to provide services including shelter, reintegration assistance and vocational training programmes
39. I have also considered the expert report of Dr Tran Thi Lan Anh. I am satisfied that Dr Tran is appropriately qualified and their report is balanced, well-sourced, and compliant with their duty to the Tribunal. They considered all relevant material, including the respondent’s decision, and appropriately identifies the limits of her expertise. I attach significant weight to her evidence.
40. Dr Tran notes that there is limited objective evidence that money lenders alone facilitate international trafficking. However, traffickers who are frequently linked to illegal money lenders do so. That analysis is consistent with the CPIN.
41. A further factor of concern is that the appellant did not report these matters to the police. I acknowledge the observations within the CPIN that a failure by an individual not to approach the police does not mean that there is not effective protection. However the appellant’s explanation for not doing so is plausible when placed within the country context. His explanation was that he believed the police to be connected to the individuals from whom he had borrowed money. I accept that this was a genuinely held belief. However there is support for this within Dr Tran’s report in the section addressing corruption. In my judgment, it would constitute a significant barrier to his seeking protection from the authorities, and reinforces the conclusion that effective protection would not, in reality, be available to him.
42. Drawing these strands together, the factors I have identified pull towards a lack of protective factors that would mean the appellant would be at real risk from the money lenders/gangsters/traffickers who I have found to be indivisible. In using these terms interchangeably, I do not depart from the preserved finding. Rather, I find that within the appellant’s home area the money lenders to whom he is indebted are part of an interconnected network that includes trafficking actors.
43. Even though the appellant has previous work experience, qualifications, and does not personally know his persecutors, the other factors weigh more heavily towards him being at risk of retrafficking in his home area. These factors that attracted more weight include the outstanding debt, a lack of personal or professional support network and notwithstanding there being a legislative framework this not being effective for this appellant on the facts of his particular case.
44. I am not satisfied that there is, in practice, a sufficiency of protection available to the appellant in his home area and that he is at real risk in his home area.

(b) Internal relocation
45. In considering the issue of internal relocation, and assessing whether relocation would be unduly harsh a central issue of the submissions was the appellant’s ability to obtain a Vietnamese national identity card.
46. There is consensus between Dr Tran’s evidence and the CPIN that, in January 2021, Vietnam introduced chip-based Citizen Identity Cards.
47. I accept Dr Tran’s analysis that this document is essential to daily life in Vietnam. It is required for accessing employment, accommodation, banking, healthcare, travel, and engagement with state authorities. Citizens are expected to carry it and produce it when required.
48. I therefore find that possession of a valid identity card is fundamental to the appellant’s ability to live and function in Vietnam and is directly relevant to the reasonableness of relocation.
49. The evidence indicates that identity cards are not issued by Vietnamese diplomatic missions abroad and must be obtained within Vietnam. Given the appellant’s age and the introduction of the new system, I accept that he would need to obtain a new card upon return.
50. I further accept Dr Tran’s evidence that this would require him to return to his place of origin, Quang Binh Province, thereby exposing him to the very risk from which he seeks to escape. This would therefore require him to return to the home area in which I have found there would be a real risk to him.
51. Further and in addition I find that the factors that caused me to conclude that the appellant would be at real risk of retrafficking in the home area are present in the appellant remains in debt.
52. He did not repay the loan but escaped from his trafficking situation, rather than being released from it. There is no evidence that the debt has been extinguished or that those to whom it is owed would no longer seek to recover it.
53. The appellant does not have a supportive family network available to him in Vietnam. His wife is now in the United Kingdom, and there is no evidence of other immediate family members able to provide support. I have considered the evidence from his cousin; however, there is nothing to suggest that he is in a position to offer meaningful assistance. If such support had been available, it is reasonable to infer that it would have been utilised to alleviate the appellant’s debt difficulties. I therefore find that the appellant would be without a meaningful support network on return.
54. I have already identified the gap between the existence of a legislative framework of protection and the reality on the ground. Whilst the appellant possesses some education and practical skills, I approach that factor with caution. Those attributes did not prevent him from becoming a victim of trafficking previously.
55. I place significant weight on Dr Tran’s evidence as to the factors that give rise to a risk of re-trafficking. At paragraph 9.1 of her report, she identifies that trafficking networks in Vietnam commonly target individuals who are unaccompanied, lack a support network, have previously been trafficked, and/or face financial and social vulnerability.
56. Applying that evidence to the appellant’s circumstances, I find that a number of those risk factors would persist upon return and accordingly are not restricted to the appellant’s home area.
57. Accordingly, even if I were wrong in my assessment that he would face a real risk from his original traffickers in an area of relocation, who clearly have an extensive network such that it involves an international trafficking dimension there remains a reasonable degree of likelihood that he would be vulnerable to re-trafficking in that area by others who would seek to exploit his circumstances.
58. Taking all of these factors cumulatively, I am not satisfied that internal relocation would be either safe or reasonable for this particular appellant.

Conclusion and Decision
59. For the reasons set out above, I find that the appellant has established that he faces a real risk of serious harm in his home area and that there is not a sufficiency of protection available to him.
60. I further find that internal relocation is not a reasonable option for this particular appellant. It would not be safe, and in any event would be unreasonable, having regard to the appellant’s continuing indebtedness, lack of a support network, the practical barriers to establishing himself elsewhere in Vietnam, and his ongoing vulnerability, including the real risk of re-trafficking.
61. Drawing all matters together, the appellant has discharged the burden of proof to the lower standard applicable in protection claims.
62. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed on protection grounds.

Notice of Decision
I remake the decision allowing the appeal on protection grounds

R A Pickering
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Pickering
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
1 June 2026