Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002732

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56407/2024
LP/00687/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8 September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

R J
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Brakaj, instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 20 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Hands) promulgated on 16 April 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 4 March 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
The background:
3. The appellant is a national of Iran who arrived in the United Kingdom on 26 October 2022 and claimed asylum.
4. The basis of his claim was that he had left Iran in fear of his life as the authorities were looking for him after 2 of his friends were arrested at an anti-government demonstration. He had previously attended demonstrations with these 2 friends but on this occasion he was working and then went to visit his uncle. His parents were arrested, detained and questioned when the authorities came to his home looking for him. On their release, a few hours later, they telephoned him and told him he had to leave the country for his own safety. His uncle spoke to a friend and his journey was organised with the appellant leaving Iran within 24 hours. He left Iran or September 2022 in a van heading to Turkey. He travelled to Italy by boat, before entering the United Kingdom on 26 October 2022. He claimed that there was an arrest warrant issued by the Iranian authorities for him.
5. In the United Kingdom he claimed to have been engaged in political activities against the Iranian authorities by attending demonstrations and placing posts on social media.
6. The appellant’ claim for asylum was refused by the respondent in her decision letter dated 4 March 2024. Beyond accepting the appellant’s nationality and ethnicity as a Kurd, and that he had left Iran illegally, the respondent set out credibility issues in respect of the factual account of what had occurred in Iran and in the UK . Thus his claim was refused.
7. The appeal came before the FtTJ and in a decision promulgated on 16 April 2025, the FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Iran on the core of the factual basis as claimed. The FtTJ set out her assessment of the evidence between paragraphs 15-38 and concluded that having taken all the evidence the round she did not accept the appellant’s account of being of adverse interest to the Iranian authorities or having left Iran for the reasons she had given. In respect of his political activities in the UK the FtTJ found that there was no evidence of his attendance at demonstrations on social media (on his Facebook), the material on his account was not reliable and that there was insufficient evidence to enable her to find the appellant’s claim that political profile was such that he had come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities because of such activity or that it would come to the adverse attention should he return. The FtTJ found that he had no political profile prior to leaving Iran, and the authorities would have no reason to search him on Facebook because they has no knowledge of his existence either in Iran or in the United Kingdom. The FtTJ did not accept that his opinion was genuinely held and that he would be able to delete his Facebook account. When assessing risk on return, she took into account that he had exited Iran illegally and that whilst he was of Kurdish ethnicity which was a risk factor when combined with other factors, and of particular significance, when applying the relevant country guidance, the FtTJ concluded that he was not at a real risk of persecution or serious harm contrary to Article 3 ECHR. The FtTJ dismissed the appeal.
8. The appellant applied for permission to appeal the decision. Permission to appeal was granted by FtTJ Chowdhury on 23 June 2025.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
9. The hearing took place on 20 August 2025. The appellant was represented by Ms Brakaj, of Counsel and the respondent by Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer. Ms Brakaj indicated that she relied upon the grounds of challenge alongside the skeleton argument provided which also set out the grounds. Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer, confirmed there had been no reply provided to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 but that the appeal was opposed.
10. I am grateful to the advocates for the helpful submissions made by each of them and how they have advanced their respective cases. The submissions are contained in the record of proceedings, and I will not rehearse them here. I will refer to them as relevant in the analysis of the issues raised.
Discussion and analysis:
11. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, it is necessary to set out the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
12. The grounds advanced by Ms Brakaj expressly challenge the decision on the basis of inadequacy of reasoning. In her oral submissions she referred to the FtTJ decision as “brief “. As regards the provision of reasons, I take into account that there is a legal duty to give a brief explanation of the conclusions of the central issue on which an appeal is determined and what is said in Shizad (sufficiency of reasons; set aside) [2013] UKUT 85 (IAC) that “reasons need not be extensive if the decision as a whole makes sense, having regard to the material accepted by the FtTJ.” I further observe that the parties are aware of the evidence that has been presented before the FtTJ, both orally and in documentary form.
13. As the issues in this appeal relate to challenges brought against findings of fact on credibility made by the FtTJ, I also remind myself of the decision in Volpi v Volpi (supra) when reviewing a first instance judge's findings of fact as per Lewison LJ as follows:
"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i)An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
14. The written grounds of challenge and the oral submissions made by Ms Brakaj seek to challenge the decision made by the FtTJ on the basis of inadequacy of reasons. It is submitted that in relation to the appellant’s activities in Iran, the FtTJ’s findings are very brief and that they are set out between paragraphs 21 to 23, on the basis of not being able to provide an arrest warrant and being able to leave Iran within 24 hours of his parents release and that this is indicative of the appellant fabricating account of being of adverse interest to the Iranian authorities. She submitted the FtTJ had failed to give adequate consideration to the appellant’s evidence about events in Iran, including the demonstrations and drew attention to the finding made that the fact that someone is able to flee the country shortly after discovering that they are at risk from the authorities does not indicate a conclusion that they were planning to leave.
15. Whilst Ms Brakaj has referred to the findings made between paragraphs 21 – 23, as with any decision of a FtTJ the decision should be read as a whole. The FtTJ set out the core of his claim at paragraph 16. The findings begin at paragraph 17 where she accepted his nationality and his ethnicity as a Kurd, as did the respondent. As to the claimed events in Iran the FtTJ noted that the appellant had given inconsistent dates for the demonstrations he claimed have attended in Iran but accepted that he would have been unaware of this until drawn to his attention by the refusal letter using the Iranian calendar.
16. At paragraph 20 the FtTJ addressed the appellant’s account of how the authorities had become aware of him. The FtTJ set out the appellant’s evidence ( and as recorded in his interview, that they were tortured and they had said that ”I have encouraged them to protest” (question 70)). Whilst Ms Brakaj submits that there was no finding made on this, it is tolerably clear at the end of paragraph 20 that the assessment made by the FtTJ was that the appellant’s assertion that his name was given by his friend was “speculation”.
17. Further this has to be viewed in the context of paragraph 21 where the FtTJ set out the appellant’s evidence given at the hearing that his parents had been told that his friend had been arrested and given his (the appellant’s) name when they were at the station which was inconsistent with his previous evidence. The FtTJ’s assessment was that he had not given this information previously. This was a clear inconsistency in his account and formed part of the FtTJ’s overall reasoning.
18. Ms Brakaj in her submissions sought to argue that the reasoning at paragraph 22 relating to the arrest warrant was flawed because significant reliance had been placed on the fact that the appellant has not provided the arrest warrant and that corroborative documentary evidence is not mandatory and that he had provided a detailed explanation as to why he was unable to provide the document. ( see paragraph 7 of the grounds and replicated at paragraph 9 of the skeleton argument).
19. There is no error of approach demonstrated either by reference to the lack of reasoning or by the assertion made that the FtTJ’s findings suggested that documentation was mandatory.
20. The FtTJ plainly had regard to the evidence including the explanation given by the appellant to why he had not obtained a copy of the arrest warrant (see paragraph 22). As Mr Tan submitted the FtTJ was entitled to consider this issue in the context of the evidence given by the appellant in his claim. Firstly, he claimed that an arrest warrant was issued for him by the authorities and that they had left it with his parents (Q87) Secondly, he was in contact with his parents having stated that he was in contact with them once or twice per month (Q5) and that he “speaks to his parents and asks what is going on” (Q114) and also confirmed in oral evidence given one year later, that he was in regular contact with parents and also his uncle (paragraph 21). Thirdly, this was an issue raised in the decision letter of March 2024. In the circumstances, as the appellant was in contact with family members (both his parents and uncle) the FtTJ was entitled to find that there had been no reasonable explanation for the warrant not having been provided by the appellant. The FtTJ was entitled to reject the appellant’s evidence that it was too dangerous for them to send the warrant and did so by giving adequate evidence-based reasons. The FtTJ was entitled to find that his evidence, where he claimed he only contacted his family via the neighbours in case they were being monitored and could not send a copy of the warrant in fear of putting them in danger, was inconsistent with his claimed evidence that his parents telephoned him as soon as they returned home from the authorities. The FtTJ was entitled to find that that evidence was not consistent with the fear he claimed now that contacting them directly or asking them or his uncle to send the arrest warrant would place him in danger. That was a finding open to the FtTJ to make.
21. The FtTJ further reasoned that the appellant’s claim that his uncle helped him leave Iran and had not been of any adverse interest to the authorities since the appellant left further undermined his account that asking for the arrest warrant would place the appellant in danger.
22. Thus the FtTJ was entitled to reject the appellant’s evidence as to why he had not provided a document that was reasonably available to him. That finding is not inconsistent with paragraph 86 MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216.
23. In the circumstances and in the absence of his willingness for the document to be sent, the judge made a finding that she did not accept that such a document existed or that the appellant was wanted by the Iranian authorities. The appellant’s case was based on being of interest to the Iranian authorities and that was a finding which went to the core of his claim of having attended demonstrations which subsequently brought him to the attention of the authorities.
24. The FtTJ also made a finding at paragraph 23 that his ability to leave Iran within 24-hour’s of his parents release was indicative of the appellant fabricating his account and that it was more likely to be due to him having planned his departure. Ms Brakaj sought to challenge this on the basis that it was not evidenced and was not a rational reason. However this was an issue raised in the decision letter and was based on the evidence given by the appellant in his interview. He had been asked how long after his parents had he left Iran (question 98) and the appellant responded, “less than 24 hours”. When asked, how was it arranged so quickly? (Question 89) the appellant stated that his uncle arranged for the journey and his father paid for it. The appellant did not answer the question as to how it was arranged nor did he later explain or provide any answers as to how much it had cost, stating that he did not know. Thus the FtTJ’s findings did have an evidential basis, and it was not a finding that was made in isolation but in the context of the rest of his claim.
25. The FtTJ also gave reasons for rejecting his account between paragraphs 36 – 37 which are not challenged in the grounds, where the FtTJ addressed his claim in the context of section 8 of the 2004 Act and that the appellant travelled to Italy and had been fingerprinted there but that he had failed to make a claim there in a safe country. The FtTJ made an adverse credibility finding that the appellant had an opportunity when with the Italian authorities to say that he was fleeing Iran to save his life and that would have been advised of the procedure to follow but that he failed to do so.
26. At the hearing Ms Brakaj sought to widen the grounds by challenging the findings of fact made on the sur place claim at paragraph 25 in respect of the demonstrations and paragraph 27 in respect of the Facebook evidence. I agree with Mr Tan that these submissions were wider than the written grounds advanced where the challenge made was to whether the activities had already been discovered (paragraph 8) and the issue of pinch point on return (paragraph 9 of the grounds). Nonetheless I have considered those submissions.
27. The FtTJ assessed the appellant’s sur place activities between paragraphs 25 – 35. Those paragraphs should not be viewed in isolation but should be viewed together and when they are so read, there is no merit in the assertion made that either the FtTJ failed to give adequate reasons or failed to assess the claim adequately.
28. As to the evidence of his activities in the UK the FtTJ addressed both his claimed attendance at demonstrations and his social media use (Facebook) before reaching her conclusions set out at paragraphs 30 – 31 and 35 that his profile was such that he would not come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities on return or that he had already come to their attention because of his activity either in the UK or in Iran and that his claimed political opinions were not genuine and that the authorities would not be aware of any activity in the UK. When reaching those conclusions the FtTJ provided adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons which are consistent with the relevant case law of XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG[2022] UKUT 23 (IAC) (“XX(PJAK”) and which had taken into account by the FtTJ in her analysis.
29. Insofar as paragraph 25 is challenged on the basis of inadequacy of reasons, that submission is not made out. The FtTJ set out the appellant’s oral evidence that he had attended 8-9 demonstrations but found that while he said he travelled to London the FtTJ did not accept that he had gone with any personal political motivation but was more likely a social outing. The FtTJ plainly considered the evidence of his claimed attendance at demonstrations in the context of the evidence in his interview. The appellant had entered the UK on 20 October 2022 and by the time of his interview in February 2024 he claimed to have attended one demonstration (not in London but locally) on a date that he could not remember (see question 106 and 112). His witness statement dated 6 November 2024 only referred to 1 demonstration (see paragraph 12). The FtTJ therefore considered the oral evidence in that context and that if he had attended 8 or 9 demonstrations that would have meant he had attended 7 or 8 in the last 5 month period. The FtTJ found that there was no reference to his attendance at demonstrations on his Facebook posts or the material he had presented. Ms Brakaj accepted that there were no posts showing him at any demonstrations despite his claim to have attended. At its highest there were 2 posts of identical pictures showing a pair of boots (p 52 and 56). No one’s face can be seen and there is no evidence that it was the appellant.
30. By reference to that material it is tolerably clear that there was no evidence of the appellant attending 8 or 9 demonstrations beyond his assertion. There was no photographic evidence either provided on its own or uploaded to social media; he had not provided any evidence as to any activity at the demonstrations and whether he played an active role and there was no evidence from the friends that he travelled to London about his activities. As Mr Tan submits the burden was on the appellant to make good his claim to have been at those demonstrations and he failed to do so and under the circumstances the finding made at paragraph 25 that it was more likely a social outing was open to the FtTJ to make.
31. The Facebook evidence was addressed by the FtTJ between paragraphs 26 – 30. The respondent had set out in the review (paragraph 8) that the appellant had not provided the full Facebook download therefore little weight could be attached to the screenshots of the Facebook material (applying the guidance in XX(PJAK) at paragraphs 127-128).
32. The FtTJ had directed herself to the guidance in XX (PJAK) when reaching her decision and when reading those paragraphs it is clear that the FtTJ did not find the material to be reliable and gave reasons between paragraphs 27 and 29 by reference to the ability to change the information provided, that the appellant claimed that he got 4000 followers but that the screenshot provided showed 1000. The FtTJ was also entitled to find the content of the posts were not his genuine opinion or emanating from him originally but those of his friend (see paragraphs 26 and 31).
33. In XX (PJAK) the Upper Tribunal found that there was no evidence to show that the Iranian authorities routinely monitored Facebook on a large scale and that more focused searches would be confined to individuals of significant adverse interest and whether an individual’s Facebook account will be targeted would depend on the individual’s existing profile on the “social graph”. There was no evidence before the FtTJ of the appellant attending demonstrations, but more importantly there was no evidence of what activity, if any, he had undertaken or in what capacity. He therefore had not shown any basis for being a demonstrator that the Iranian authorities would have any wish to identify and as such it could not be said that his attendance at demonstrations would have brought him to the attention of the authorities and thus it was not reasonably likely that the use of his social media Facebook would be the subject or focus of targeted surveillance.
34. The findings reached at paragraphs 30 – 31 that the appellant had no political profile prior to leaving Iran, that the material did not emanate originally from him, and there was no evidence that he attended demonstrations on Facebook, supported the conclusions reached by the FtTJ. Firstly, there was insufficient evidence to show his political profile was such that it would have come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities should he return or that he had already been known because of his activity and secondly, in light of the lack of evidence of him attending demonstrations and that there was no evidence of him attending demonstrations on social media, and the finding made that the Iranian authorities would have no reason to search for him on Facebook because they have no knowledge of his existence either in Iran or in the UK, was a finding reasonably open to the FtTJ on that evidence and consistent with the guidance in XX (PJAK) and BA (demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKIT (IAC).
35. Consequently the FtTJ adequately assessed his sur place activities including the social media evidence but gave adequate, sustainable and evidence-based reasons consistent with the guidance and the relevant case law when reaching the conclusions that she did. Consequently paragraph 8 of the grounds is not established.
36. Dealing with paragraph 9 of the grounds, Ms Brakaj submitted that the FtTJ failed to adequately consider the country guidance decision of HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430. The challenge is made on the basis of paragraph 34 and that if interrogated on return he would say that he claimed asylum for political reasons but was found not to be credible. Ms Brakaj submits that this is contrary to the objective material and if the appellant stated this he would be informing the authorities that he had been politically active against the authorities.
37. Having considered this ground I am not satisfied that there is any error which could be said to be material to the outcome. A careful reading of paragraph 34 demonstrates that the FtTJ was not saying that a positive case had been put by the appellant as to what he would say on return, but it was what the FtTJ said that he would be able to say.
38. As Mr Tan submitted it is consistent with the observations made in PS (Christianity - risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 46 (IAC) at paragraph 100 where the UT reminded themselves of the underlying reasoning in SSH & HR. They stated ,”The Iranian authorities know very well that many Iranians leave the country to seek asylum in the West, and that when they do so, they advance protection claims that by their nature will involve some criticism of the Iranian state. The Tribunal rejected the contention that it was reasonably likely that the Iranians would frame this as propaganda against the regime. On the contrary, the evidence before them indicated that an Iranian who had made up a story in order to claim asylum could re-enter the country without difficulty. It is only where ‘particular concerns’ arise that the subject will be sent for further questioning, and it is in this second-line questioning where the potential for ill-treatment will arise”.
39. The FtTJ did not need to set that out in view of her earlier findings of fact and her analysis which she had made in relation to the appellant and risk on return which were consistent with the country guidance in SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016 ] UKUT 308 HB (Iran-Kurds) [2018] UKUT (430) both of which she had taken into account (see paragraphs 32 – 35).
40. As set out above, the FtTJ’s assessment was that the appellant was not of any adverse interest to the authorities in Iran before he left that country nor had he come to their attention as a result of activities in the UK whether by attending demonstrations or by his social media and that the Iranian authorities had no reason to search for him on Facebook because they would have no knowledge of his existence either in Iran or in the United Kingdom. Thus he had no political profile( see paragraphs 30-31). The FtTJ having made a finding that the appellant did not hold any genuine political opinion (see paragraph 35) and was entitled to find that he could delete his Facebook account (see paragraph 34 of her decision and paragraph 126 of XX (PJAK)). Based on those findings of fact and having rejected the genuineness of his beliefs, the appellant would not be required to volunteer information about activities which were not an expression of his genuinely held beliefs. Thus paragraph 34 does not demonstrate any error material to the outcome.
41. Turning to the analysis of risk on return, the FtTJ undertook that analysis applying the relevant country guidance and by identifying the relevant characteristics of having exited Iran illegally and being of Kurdish ethnicity, but that the mere fact of being a returnee of Kurdish ethnicity with or without a valid passport and even combined with the illegal exit did not create a risk of persecution or article 3 ill-treatment. The FtTJ did remind herself of the headnote paragraph (5) of HB (Kurds) that Kurdish ethnicity is a risk factor of particular significance when assessing risk however based on the factual findings made, he was not a returnee otherwise of interest and as such would not be at risk on return at the “ pinch point”. In light of her assessment that his activities in the UK were not genuine, he would not be required to volunteer information about his activities and also in light of her findings of fact that he had no political profile before he left Iran, she was entitled to find that there would be no reasons for the Iranian authorities to have any suspicions about the appellant, therefore would not be at risk of either persecution or article 3 ill-treatment if questioned on return.
42. In summary, I remind myself of the need for appropriate restraint before interfering with the decision of the FTT, particularly where the judge below was heard and assessed a range of evidential sources relating to the reliability of an account. Not every evidential issue need be specifically addressed and there is no requirement to provide reasons for reasons. The FtTJ had regard to the evidence before her and gave adequate reasons to why she did not believe the core of the appellant’s account, which was not a detailed or complex factual account and having undertaken a risk assessment applying the relevant country guidance relevant to Iran on the basis of the facts as found and reached an assessment which was consistent with those country decisions and one that was open to her on the evidence.
43. Consequently for those reasons the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of a material error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand. The appeal is dismissed.

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

21 August 2025