Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002735

First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/03077/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

ADEBOLA FAROUK ABDUL
(No Anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ahmad Badar of Counsel, instructed by Expert Law
For the Respondent: Mr Edward Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 August 2025
Further written submissions from the Respondent on 12 September 2025
Further written submission from the Appellant on 17 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of Nigeria, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Baffa (“the Judge”) who in a decision dated 14 February 2025 had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal based on human rights grounds in connection with a decision of the Respondent to deport the Appellant. I had heard the matter on 22 August 2025. I had granted permission for there to be sequential written submissions. First from the Respondent, which were served on time on 12 September 2025. The Appellant’s solicitors had appeared not to have responded so I had caused the Upper Tribunal’s Office to ask the Appellant’s solicitors for an update. Thereafter the Appellant’s solicitors provided their written submission on 17 November 2025 with an apology for their lateness. I am grateful to both parties for their written and oral submissions.
Background
2. Permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision had been granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready by way of a decision dated 23 June 2025.
3. The matter has come for hearing before me pursuant to that grant of permission to appeal and my task is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If there is no material error of law then the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the appeal will stand. If I find that there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision, then I will have to consider whether the matter ought to remain here at the Upper Tribunal for re-making or whether it ought to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. The Judge in his decision at paragraph 1 had referred to the Appellant having been convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery and for which he was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment. The Judge also referred to a number of other convictions recorded against the Appellant previously, including an offence of being in possession of a bladed article in 2018 and possession with intent to supply Class A drugs in 2019.
5. The Judge noted at paragraph 9 of his decision that the Appellant’s appeal was against the Respondent’s decision dated 19 June 2024 to refuse his human rights, with reference to deportation. The Judge also set out parts of the Respondent’s decision at paragraph 10.
6. At paragraph 13 the Judge listed the issues including that the Appellant was not relying on protection matters and that there was no further claim in respect of his former partner and child. The Appellant’s claim was on the basis of Article 8 ECHR matters in respect of his private and family life and whether there were very compelling circumstances which outweighed the public interest in the Appellant’s deportation.
7. The Judge set out the evidence at paragraphs 15 to 31. The Judge considered the sentencing remarks of the Crown Court Judge and the various OASys and other reports thereafter. At paragraph 42 to 49 the Judge set out the submissions made by the parties.
8. At paragraph 50 to 56 the Judge set out the relevant legal principles.
9. The Judge’s findings can be seen at paragraph 57 to 87 of his decision in which he concluded that he was not satisfied that there were every compelling circumstances over and above those in the statutory exceptions that outweighed the public interest in deportation.
10. I note from the Respondent’s Review (at page 215 of the bundle at the Upper Tribunal), the Respondent said as follows in respect of the claimed relationship and made clear that the relationship was not accepted. This becomes an important feature of this case and so I refer to it at the outset. The Respondent’s Review had stated:
“5. The A has provided a number of supporting letters from family members and Ms Sabia Ahmed [AB, Pages 1-9]. It is noted that Ms Sabia Ahmed maintains that she has been in a four-year relationship with the A, and they also plan to get married [AB, Page 6, para 2]. However, the R has previously considered this relationship [RB Page 205] and the relationship was not accepted due to the absence of any evidence to substantiate its existence. The additional evidence provided in the Appellant Bundle, namely, the witness statements [AB, Pages 1-9] fails to cause a departure from the R’s position.
6.The A’s current witness statement [AB, Page 2-3] fails to mention anything about a relationship with Ms Sabia Ahmed. In addition to this, though this was raised in the refusal, there has been no Identification Document provided to demonstrate the existence of a Ms Sabia Ahmed as well as no other evidence to demonstrate the alleged relationship of four years. In light of this, the R’s position remains that a relationship between the A and a Ms Sabia Ahmed is not accepted.
7. Consideration has also been given to the witness statements from Ms Oluwanishola Abdul [AB, Pages 4-5) and Mr Adedapo Abdul [AB, Pages 8-9] and the ASA, however nothing provided within those witness statements and submissions are sufficient to depart from the findings already made by the R [RB, RFRL, Pages 184-209].”
The Hearing Before Me and the Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal
11. The Appellant relied on 3 grounds of appeal.
12. Ground 1 contended that the Judge had not considered core features of the Appellant’s case and had not given sufficient reasons. At paragraph 9 of the grounds it is stated, “It is submitted that [the] J[udge] has not considered any aspect of [the] A[ppellants]’s rehabilitation.”
13. Ground 2 contended that the Judge had erred in his assessment of the evidence in respect of Miss Ahmed and references to a pregnancy. Paragraph 15 of the grounds state,
“15. With regards to evidence of the pregnancy, it is firstly submitted that given that S only found out shortly before new years, and the first dating scan is booked, there would be limited evidence of this aspect. The lack of evidence issue was not put to S either…”
14. This Ground also relied on the decision in R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 and states,
“Although J makes adverse findings against A, it does not appear that J has considered as to why the couple has not mentioned these elements in their statements or why they are not forthcoming about the pregnancy. A’s mother and brother were in Court. A and S were not married yet. There could be a number of plausible explanations. It does not appear when considering A’s evidence on this aspect, whether he has applied the Lucas principles to the evidence.”
15. Ground 3 contended that the Judge had made irrational findings in relation to activities on behalf of his church and the positive impact on his community.
16. The Respondent relied on a Rule 24 reply dated 23 July 2025.
The Law
The Correct Approach for an Appellate Judge
17. I remind myself at the outset that there has to be appropriate judicial restraint in relation the assessment of an appeal from the specialist First-tier Tribunal. I also remind myself that the authorities date back to Baroness Hale’s clear judgment in AH Sudan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; ]2009] 1 AC 678 in respect of that expertise.
18. More recently the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 revisited the proper approach to appeals. Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed, explained that the role of the Appellate Court or Tribunal must be exercised with restraint. His Lordship said at paragraph 29:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
19. The correct approach to assessing whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision was explained in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm A.R. 535. Brooke LJ, giving the judgment on behalf of the Court of Appeal summarised as follows:
“90. It may now be convenient to draw together the main threads of this long judgment in this way. During the period before its demise when the IAT's powers were restricted to appeals on points of law:
1. Before the IAT could set aside a decision of an adjudicator on the grounds of error of law, it had to be satisfied that the correction of the error would have made a material difference to the outcome, or to the fairness of the proceedings. This principle applied equally to decisions of adjudicators on proportionality in connection with human rights issues;
2. A finding might only be set aside for error of law on the grounds of perversity if it was irrational or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, or one that was wholly unsupported by the evidence.
3. A decision should not be set aside for inadequacy of reasons unless the adjudicator failed to identify and record the matters that were critical to his decision on material issues, in such a way that the IAT was unable to understand why he reached that decision.
4. A failure without good reason to apply a relevant country guidance decision might constitute an error of law.
5. At the hearing of an appeal the IAT had to identify an error of law in relation to one or more of the issues raised on the notice of appeal before it could lawfully exercise any of its powers set out in s 102(1) of the 2002 Act (other than affirming the adjudicator's decision).
6. Once it had identified an error of law, such that the adjudicator's decision could not stand, the IAT might, if it saw fit, exercise its power to admit up-to-date evidence or it might remit the appeal to the adjudicator with such directions as it thought fit.
7. If the IAT failed to consider an obvious point of Convention jurisprudence which would have availed an applicant, the Court of Appeal might intervene to set aside the IAT's decision on the grounds of error of law even though the point was not raised in the grounds of appeal to the IAT.”
20. It is therefore with the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal firmly in mind and the nature of basis of appeals from first instance decisions set out in R (Iran) that I assess the appeal before me. I am well aware that there have been various iterations of the way in which R (Iran) has subsequently been explained in higher court and Upper Tribunal decisions. I need not refer to them because they are well known.
21. At the hearing before me, Mr Badar had relied on his grounds of appeal and Mr Terrell had responded to those submissions. I refer to their submissions within my analysis.
22. I had the benefit of a Rule 24 reply from Mr Terrell. It has been drafted very well and I commend that approach for other cases in which there is a Rule 24 reply because Mr Terrell’s Rule 24 reply was clear, well drafted and helpful.
23. I also refer within my analysis to the parties’ written submissions which were sent to me after the hearing. As I say regrettably those from the Appellant arrived late.
Consideration and Analysis
24. In my judgment, whether taken individually or cumulatively, the grounds do not evince a material error of law.
25. Ground 1 relates to the rehabilitation. I was referred to paragraph 44 of the Judge’s decision which states as follows:
“Mr Badar referred to the OASys report and accepted that the motivation for the robbery offence was largely a financial one. He invited me to accept that the appellant has regret and that the risk indicators set out on page 56 of the OASys report provides for evidence of how positively the appellant has reacted to his offending. He also referred to the list of rehabilitation courses that are set out on page 61 of the OASys report. Likewise, he referred to the basis upon which 11 11 the appellant was successfully transferred to open prison, namely his good behaviour.”
26. The Appellant’s skeleton argument (paragraph 95 of the 217 paged bundle) and which was before the Judge did not refer to rehabilitation.
27. I conclude that there is no material error of law because I do not accept Mr Badar submitted that rehabilitation was relied upon by the Appellant as a factor reducing the public interest. I am fortified in this view because there is arguably nothing within the Appellant’s skeleton argument which referred to rehabilitation either. Paragraph 44 of the Judge’s decision does record that the Appellant had regretted his actions and that he will address his offending in the future, but that was not any or any sufficient evidence of rehabilitation. Therefore, there was no error of law by the Judge because he was not asked to deal with such a submission.
28. In any event, the Judge had taken the Appellant’s case at its highest in terms of the Appellant’s attempts to put his old ways behind him because the Judge said at paragraph 70,
“Overall whilst the appellant was genuine in his wish to change and move away from his offending behaviour, I was most unimpressed with his evidence.”
29. In any event in my judgment, even if the Judge had been asked to deal with such matters, it was for the Appellant to provide positive evidence of rehabilitation, such as would reduce his risk for further offending. The Judge was clearly referring to this when he said that he had been ‘unimpressed with the evidence’ at paragraph 70 of his decision.
30. In HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22; [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at paragraph 56 to 58, Lord Hamblen, giving the judgment of the Supreme Court explained the limited impact rehabilitation has in these cases. I refer to part of paragraph 58 of his Lordship’s judgment which succinctly deals with this point being raised by the Appellant, (underlining has been added by me for relevance),
I would agree with Underhill LJ's summary of the position at para 141 of his judgment:
"What those authorities seem to me to establish is that the fact that a potential deportee has shown positive evidence of rehabilitation, and thus of a reduced risk of re-offending, cannot be excluded from the overall proportionality exercise. The authorities say so, and it must be right in principle in view of the holistic nature of that exercise. Where a tribunal is able to make an assessment that the foreign criminal is unlikely to re-offend, that is a factor which can carry some weight in the balance when considering very compelling circumstances. The weight which it will bear will vary from case to case, but it will rarely be of great weight bearing in mind that, as Moore-Bick LJ says in Danso , the public interest in the deportation of criminals is not based only on the need to protect the public from further offending by the foreign criminal in question but also on wider policy considerations of deterrence and public concern. I would add that tribunals will properly be cautious about their ability to make findings on the risk of re-offending, and will usually be unable to do so with any confidence based on no more than the undertaking of prison courses or mere assertions of reform by the offender or the absence of subsequent offending for what will typically be a relatively short period."
31. In any event, the OASys report referred to the high risk of harm to the public from this Appellant. It is clear that, even if the Judge had considered the rehabilitation arguments in any further detail, there was nothing which could have arguably or otherwise assisted the Appellant in terms of the decision which the Judge made. There was no material error of law in the Judge’s decision, even if Mr Bardar had raised rehabilitation. The Judge had noted at paragraph 36,
“With regard to risk the report states “Mr Abdul is assessed as a high risk of serious harm…” (section 3.6)”
32. Ground 2 relates to Ms Ahmed’s pregnancy. It is important to note when this evidence came to the Judge’s attention. It was not referred to within the Appellant’s skeleton argument and to which I have referred previously. Nor was the pregnancy referred to within the Appellant’s witness statement or those of his witnesses. Nor was the pregnancy identified in the issues which were identified by the parties that needed to be considered by the Judge, despite the clear judgments of the Upper Tribunal that only those issues identified will be dealt with by the Judge at the First-tier Tribunal.
33. I referred previously to the Respondent’s Review. There can be no doubt that the Appellant and his legal advisers were on notice that the Appellant’s relationship with Ms Ahmed was very much an issue. Therefore, it was for the Appellant and her legal advisers to provide the necessary evidence. It is regrettable that the issue of the pregnancy was first raised in Re-examination by the Appellant.
34. The Judge’s decision succinctly and without legal error made his findings on this aspect. It is worth referring to those paragraphs in full and which speak for themselves. In my judgment they are adequately reasoned and free of legal error. The Judge had said,
“74. There is no mention in her statement, dated 3 January 2025 of her claimed pregnancy.
75. I repeat, there is no mention in the statement of the appellant regarding Miss Ahmed, let alone an intention to marry her. In oral evidence the appellant made no mention of any intention to marry Miss Ahmed. He only mentioned the claimed expecting of a child, when it was effectively put to him by his Counsel, Mr Badar. I find this most telling and significant.
76. It was only in re examination that Miss Ahmed stated that there was something “new” in the relationship, namely her finding out she was pregnant. Further, in re examination, Miss Ahmed stated that she would be due in September or October. She was hesitant and most unconvincing in her responses. She also provided no evidence of any pregnancy despite stating that she has a dating scan booked. This evidence could easily have been produced.
77. The difference in evidence of both the appellant and Miss Ahmed lead me to treat the evidence of Miss Ahmed with great caution. I am unable to accept her evidence as to the relationship and pregnancy. I wish to make it clear that whilst I accept the evidence of the appellant’s mother as to knowledge of Miss Ahmed and the visits by her, this is far from satisfying me that there is a genuine and subsisting relationship.
78. I remind myself that the burden of proof is on the appellant and to the standard of the balance of probabilities.
79. In view of my reasons above, and when I look at matters in the round, I am not satisfied that there is a genuine and subsisting relationship between the appellant and Miss Ahmed. I go as far as to say that the appellant has fallen far short in satisfying me as to the relationship.”
35. Even if one is as exceptionally generous and that somehow the Judge ought to have known that Ms Ahmed was pregnant, this is a hopeless ground of appeal because it was only in Re-examination that the evidence of the pregnancy had first come to the Judge’s attention and thereby the first time it had come to the Respondent’s attention. It is obviously therefore not possible for the Respondent to have asked questions about this previously.
36. I have considered the parties written and oral submissions in respect of the part of this ground which relates to the Lucas direction and which I have incorporated in the above.
37. In view of the detailed oral and written submissions of the parties, I shall refer to this in more detail than would ordinarily be the case.
38. The Appellant’s contends in summary that the Judge “misunderstood” the Appellant’s position in respect of the pregnancy. The Appellant states in summary as follows:
“Contrary to what is suggested at §32 of the Secretary of State’s submissions, the Appellant does not accept that the Judge was wrong to reject the pregnancy claim solely on the basis of absence of documents. The error lies in the Judge’s failure to consider that, even if the claim was exaggerated or inappropriately delayed, it may not have been a deliberate or malicious fabrication. That is the essence of a Lucas error.
Further, the Appellant does not seek to “reargue” the facts or advance a new case. The point made in the grounds and in oral submissions was that if the Judge concluded that the late disclosure of pregnancy undermined credibility, he was required either on his own motion or in light of the submissions before him to assess whether there was a possible innocent explanation for that behaviour.
While the Respondent criticises the Appellant for not presenting the explanation below that the Appellant’s mother and brother were present in court, this is a misapplication of the procedural fairness standard. The Judge was entitled but not required to seek clarification on this point if it formed a central plank of his rejection of the relationship evidence. A finding of dishonesty without consideration of motive when there is a live issue as to the existence of a genuine relationship and when the consequence is deportation engages both the Lucas principle and the principle of anxious scrutiny.”
39. I refer to some of the caselaw in respect of the Lucas direction. I refer first to the Upper Tribunal’s decision in Azizi (Succinct credibility findings; lies) [2024] UKUT 65 (IAC) (The President, Vice President and Upper Tribunal Judge Blum). The judicial headnote makes clear that,
“1. A determination in relation to an appeal must deal with the principal controversial issues presented to the judge, and it may be possible in some circumstances to provide adequate reasons in relation to those issues succinctly, provided they deal with the points raised by the party and enable the parties to understand why the decision has been reached.
2. Where an appellant accepts that he has told lies during his immigration history it will be appropriate to consider his explanation for telling those lies, and whether that explanation is accepted, as part of the fact finding process.”
40. Therefore, the first point being that the Appellant must focus on the principal controversial issues. The second point being that if an Appellant accepts he has lied then it will be appropriate to consider the explanation for the lies.
41. The immediate difficulty for the Appellant is that he did not state that he had lied. Therefore, it is clear that the Appellant’s argument fails at that first step.
42. Even when considering the Appellant’s arguments further, I am wholly unpersuaded that somehow it was for the Judge to know or to have the insight to think that there was a reason for the failure to refer to the Appellant’s pregnancy until the Re-examination. It is impossible to decipher how the judge was to have worked that out for himself. Whilst I accept that some couples, whether for cultural or other reasons might not want their relatives to know of a pregnancy, there is nothing in this case which could have alerted the Judge to such a concern.
43. The specialist judges at the First-tier Tribunal are well aware of cultural and similar matters and the judges of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber, like other judges, are aware of and trained in respect of matters set out the in Equal Treatment Bench Book. Even with all of that mind, I do not accept that a Judge would know or should somehow have known that there were cultural reasons why the Appellant and/or his claimed partner did not refer to the claimed pregnancy until Ms Ahmed’s Re-examination. The ‘after the event’ suggestion, unevidenced as it is, that the reason for the late ‘disclosure’ was due to cultural or similar reasons is fanciful in the circumstances of this case.
44. In any event, none of that gets around why even the Appellant had failed to refer to the pregnancy in his witness statement or during his own evidence, despite being legally represented by competent solicitors and counsel. I note that the Judge specifically asked the Appellant’s counsel at the hearing about Ms Ahmed and was told to deal with the matter holistically. The Judge having been asked and to deal with matters as follow:
“I asked Mr Badar to assist me on how I am to treat the witness statement of the appellant in which there is not one mention of Miss Ahmed. Mr Badar accepted this absence but invited me to look at the matter “holistically”
45. Although not cited to me, I consider the Court of Appeal’s judgment in the family law case of Re: A, B, C Children) [2021] EWAC Civ 451 [2022] 1 FLR 329. Macur LJ, with whom the rest of the Court of Appeal agreed said at paragraph 57,
“57. To be clear, and as I indicate above, a 'Lucas direction' will not be called for in every family case in which a party or intervenor is challenging the factual case alleged against them and, in my opinion, should not be included in the judgment as a tick box exercise. If the issue for the tribunal to decide is whether to believe X or Y on the central issue/s, and the evidence is clearly one way then there will be no need to address credibility in general.”…
58. That a tribunal's Lucas self-direction is formulaic, and incomplete is unlikely to determine an appeal, but the danger lies in its potential to distract from the proper application of its principles. In these circumstances, I venture to suggest that it would be good practice when the tribunal is invited to proceed on the basis, or itself determines, that such a direction is called for, to seek Counsel's submissions to identify: (i) the deliberate lie(s) upon which they seek to rely; (ii) the significant issue to which it/they relate(s), and (iii) on what basis it can be determined that the only explanation for the lie(s) is guilt. The principles of the direction will remain the same, but they must be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the witness before the court.”
46. Having that Court of Appeal’s guidance in mind, albeit in a family law context, it is clear, in my judgment that it was not necessary in any event for this Judge to have considered a Lucas direction.
47. In my judgment, even if it had been necessary to consider a Lucas direction, it was for the Appellant’s advocate to have set out what the deliberate lies were and the significant issue which they would go to. In this case, the Appellant did not accept he had told lies and nor did he state that Ms Ahmed had lied. In my judgment, there was nothing which required the Judge to consider a self direction along the lines of a Lucas direction.
48. In any event, even if the Judge had considered the Lucas direction, the other findings were of such significance that is not possible to see how the Judge’s conclusions in respect of the relationship could have been anything other than what they were. The reference for the first time in Ms Ahmed’s Re-examination to a pregnancy is unlikely to have made a difference to the Judge’s findings in any event. The lack of reference to the pregnancy in the Appellant’s own witness statement, despite the Respondent's Review putting the relationship in issue, meant that the Appellant knew the case he had to meet and he knew that the burden of proving the relationship was on him. Now attempting to raise this at such a late stage, and then by way of appeal, is far too late. Just as was made clear in Azizi, the focused approach to dealing with the issues was imperative.
49. The days of the past when parties were entitled to raise matters on a ‘rolling basis’ are consigned to history. The Appellant’s introduction of the pregnancy in Re-examination of Ms Ahmed is a vivid example of that historical approach. I am well aware that decisions made in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber are some of the most serious, including in respect of protection claims (which this case is not) or in respect of the separation of families. Procedural rigour has been the clear message for some years and must be complied with. Judges are unlikely to be persuaded to do other than to apply procedural rigour when the parties or their legal representatives do not follow what is expected of them.
50. In Hima v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 680 William Davies LJ, with whom the rest of the Court of Appeal agreed, made clear,
“51. Whether a failure to alert an appellant to an issue upon which the FTT proposes to rely in making its decision amounts to procedural unfairness will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. Where a party might reasonably expect the FTT to reach a view on a particular point, there generally will be no unfairness in the FTT not drawing attention to that issue. Thus, where inconsistencies are used to support a decision, it will not normally be necessary for the FTT to draw the attention of the parties to those inconsistencies: SSHD v Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173 . “
51. The Appellant in this case was very much on notice that the Judge was going to deal with the issues which had been raised in the Respondent’s Reasons for Refusal Letter and then in the later Respondent’s Review. The parties, especially, the Appellant knew the issues and knew that the Judge would be required to make findings in respect of his relationship with Ms Ahmed.
52. There was not some inadmissible chain of reasoning by the Judge in any event. The Judge had considered the matter ‘in the round’ as he was required to do.
53. The Supreme Court’s decision in MA (Somalia) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 is relied upon by the Appellant in his grounds of appeal. It is important though to read the whole of paragraphs 31 to 33 of that decision. When that is done, it is clear that the Appellant’s Ground 2 has no merit. In the appeal before me, the Judge had considered the Appellant’s case in the round and the Appellant had been ‘put to proof’ in respect of the relationship with Ms Ahmed. There was nothing which required the Judge to go even further and to self-direct that for some reason he ought to have considered that there was a cultural or similar reason why the pregnancy was not referred to earlier in the written and oral evidence.
54. Lord Dyson giving the judgment of the Supreme Court said in MA:
“31. What Laws LJ was saying at para 54 was that, where a claimant tells lies on a central issue, his or her case will not be saved by general evidence unless that evidence is extremely strong. It is only evidence of that kind which will be sufficient to counteract the negative pull of the lie. But much depends on the bearing that the lie has on the case. The Court of Appeal correctly stated at para 104 of its judgment in the present case:
“The lie may have a heavy bearing on the issue in question, or the tribunal may consider that it is of little moment. Everything depends on the facts. For example, if in the Eritrea cases the Secretary of State had prima facie evidence that the appellants had left legally, the tribunal might think it appropriate to put considerable weight on the fact that the claimant told lies when seeking to counter that evidence. The lie might understandably carry far less weight where, as in YL itself, the judge is satisfied that the appellant has lied where the lie is against her interests.”
32. Where the appellant has given a totally incredible account of the relevant facts, the tribunal must decide what weight to give to the lie, as well as to all the other evidence in the case, including the general evidence. Suppose, for example, that at the interview stage the appellant made an admission which, if true, would destroy his claim; and at the hearing before the AIT he withdraws the admission, saying that his answer at interview was wrongly recorded or that he misunderstood what he was being asked. If the AIT concludes that his evidence at the hearing on this point is dishonest, it is likely that his lies will assume great importance. They will almost certainly lead the tribunal to find that his original answers were true and dismiss his appeal. In other cases, the significance of an appellant's dishonest testimony may be less clear-cut. The AIT in the present case was rightly alive to the danger of falling into the trap of dismissing an appeal merely because the appellant had told lies. The dangers of that trap are well understood by judges who preside over criminal trials before juries. People lie for many reasons. In R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 , the Court of Appeal had to consider whether a statement containing a lie was capable of amounting to corroboration. At p 724F, Lord Lane CJ said:
“To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly, it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly, the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family…””
55. The Appellant’s case was not an admitted lie; it was the late disclosure of a material fact. The Judge was perfectly entitled to take the lateness of the disclosure, only in Re-examination, into account. The Lucas direction, whether required or not in immigration proceedings, did not arise for application in the circumstances of this case in any event.
56. Therefore, Ground 2, with each of its limbs, has no merit and I dismiss it.
57. Ground 3, which contends that the Judge had made irrational findings in relation to activities on behalf of his church and the positive impact on his community is not made out. Here the Appellant specifically relies on paragraph 3 of his mother’s witness statement which had referred to the Appellant’s dedication to organising local church activities which had not only improved the lives of others but had inspired many to get involved. Beyond community involvement the Appellant was said to be known for his kindness, empathy and reliability. He had built lasting friendships and was respected by many for his willingness to lend a helping hand and support those needs.
58. With respect to the Appellant’s mother, the Judge’s task was entirely a different one. The Judge had read and heard about the Appellant’s serious offending, including the effect on his victims. The task for the Judge was to consider whether those thoughtful and no doubt heart-felt words from the Appellants mother could make any difference to the public interest consideration.
59. In Thakrar (Cart JR, Art 8 Value to the Community) [2018] UKUT 336 (IAC) the President made clear in the judicial headnote as follows,
“(2) Before concluding that submissions regarding the positive contribution made by an individual fall to be taken into account, for the purposes of Article 8(2) of the ECHR , as diminishing the importance to be given to immigration controls, a judge must be satisfied that the contribution is very significant. In practice, this is likely to arise only where the matter is one over which there can be no real disagreement. One touchstone for determining this is to ask whether the removal of the person concerned would lead to an irreplaceable loss to the community of the United Kingdom or to a significant element of it.
(3) The fact that a person makes a substantial contribution to the United Kingdom economy cannot, without more, constitute a factor that diminishes the importance to be given to immigration controls, when determining the Article 8 position of that person or a member of his or her family.”
60. In my judgment the Judge did not fall into error. The Appellant’s assistance to the church and the community in the manner outlined went nowhere near being contributions which could be described as being ‘very significant’. Whilst there are good sides to all people, especially when recounted by a person’s mother, it is only very significant contributions that might sometimes dislodge the imperative of the public interest. Even if the Judge had given more weight to the Appellant’s activities for the church and the like, the Appellant’s contribution gets nowhere near being ‘very significant’. The Judge did not err. This ground has no merit and must therefore also be dismissed.
61. Therefore, whilst the Appellant might consider this to be difficult decision going against him, it is nothing less than what has been stressed as being the correct approach. I have highlighted above the R (Iran) and AH (Sudan) cases. There must be genuine and appropriate restraint by a judge on appeal when considering an Appellant’s grounds of appeal. In my judgment, the Appellant seeks to re-argue his case. That is impermissible.
62. Accordingly, despite the oral and written submissions provide by Mr Badar and his instructing solicitors, who have said and done all they can before me, I dismiss the Appellant’s appeal against the Judge’s decision because I detect no material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law.
Therefore, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the appeal on human rights grounds stands.
No anonymity direction is made.

Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 November 2025