Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2025-002767
PA/62890/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Promulgated

3rd November 2025

Before

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MANUELL

Between

S M
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at FIELD HOUSE
on 17 October 2025

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Holmes, Counsel
(instructed by Barnes, Harrild and Dyer)
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant appealed with permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor on 3 July 2025 against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge C J Williams who had dismissed the appeal of the Appellant against the refusal of his international protection claim. The decision and reasons was promulgated on 14 April 2025.

2. The Appellant is a national of Iran, of Kurdish ethnicity, born on 22 December 1998. The Appellant’s claim to be at risk upon return to Iran was advanced on the basis of his involvement with the Kurdish Democratic Party. The Appellant claimed that while he was working as a kolbar (cross-border smuggler), carrying political material alongside goods from Iraq into Iran, the group he was travelling with were ambushed by the Iranian authorities. The Appellant’s name was given to the authorities and his home was raided. As a result, the Appellant claimed to be at risk upon return to Iran. Additionally, the Appellant feared prosecution as a result of his sur place activities in the United Kingdom.

3. After reviewing the evidence the Appellant presented and the account he provided, including his immigration history, Judge Williams accepted the Respondent’s concession that the Appellant was Kurdish and had worked as a kolbar in Iran. That concession was limited – it was not accepted that the Appellant was known to the authorities. The Judge found that the Appellant could have claimed asylum before reaching the United Kingdom and that such Section 8 considerations detracted from his credibility, which was already weak. The Judge further found that the Appellant had no genuine political commitment and that his sur place activities in the United Kingdom were opportunistic and unlikely to become known to the Iranian authorities.

4. The Judge continued:

“28. I now turn to consider the Appellant’s return to Iran. Having regard to paragraph 98 of HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430, the Appellant is likely to be questioned upon return to Iran by the authorities there. I bear in mind there is a “hair-trigger approach” to any perceived political support for the Kurdish cause. I have found that none of the Appellant’s political activity in the United Kingdom will have come to the attention of the authorities. I also find the Appellant could delete his Facebook account before reaching the first ‘pinch point’ of applying for an ETD. In the absence of any pre-existing profile, the authorities are unlikely to have any adverse interest in the Appellant upon arrival in Iran.

“29. I have considered what any questioning by the authorities is likely to reveal. I have concluded that the Appellant is a person who is willing to provide a false narrative to the authorities when it is in his interests. That is what he has done with the Respondent, and with me. Having regard to his clear propensity towards untruth, I do not consider that the Appellant will disclose any of the activities he has been involved in which have the potential to put him at risk upon return. Although I do not ‘expect’ the Appellant to lie, I find that is what he would do upon return.”

7. Permission to appeal was initially refused in the First-tier Tribunal by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready. Nevertheless Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor granted permission to appeal in the following terms:

“The grounds of appeal are overly-long. As with many others seen in this jurisdiction, aspects of the grounds read more as submissions which might have been (or were) made at first-instance, rather than concise arguments identifying potential errors of law.

“Notwithstanding the above, the challenge has arguable merit. Although the Judge did refer to HB (Kurds) and accepted that the Appellant would be questioned on return to Iran in the context of a “hair trigger” approach by the authorities, it is arguable that the risk assessment is flawed, in particular by the finding that the Appellant could and would lie about his history (leaving aside the claimed political activities in Iran) and the Respondent’s acceptance that the Appellant had worked as a kolbar: [10], [18] and [29].”

6. The Respondent filed a rule 24 notice opposing the appeal, in the following terms

“4. It is submitted that the grounds amount to a disagreement with the findings and are seeking to re-argue the appeal.

“5. Notwithstanding, the acceptance of the appellant being a kolbar for a period of 6 months the Judge considered all the evidence and made findings open to be made.

“6. At [11] to [13] of the decision the Judge gave sufficient reasons for finding that the Appellant was not credible with regards to the knowledge of the political material. Considering these findings the Judge was entitled to find that the Appellant was not politically active or that his name was not given to the authorities, [15].

“7. In addition, the Judge does consider the submission by the Appellant’s representative that being a kolbar on its own would put the Appellant at risk. At [16] the Judge notes the only evidence put before them was an article. The Judge noted from the article that it was one person, who was a kolbar, in 2018 from the Appellant’s area who was shot by the authorities. Based on that evidence the Judge was entitled to find just being a kolbar does not put the Appellant at risk.

“8. It is noted that the grounds go into detail with regards to the treatment of kolbars in Iran, but given the Judge’s indication that the ‘only evidence’ was the article, it is not clear that the background evidence referred to in the grounds was provided to the Judge or highlighted to them.

“9. At [18] the Judge discussed the Appellant returning. The Judge made the finding that he would lie, not that he would be expected to lie, based on the Appellant’s credibility.

“10. With regards to the Appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom, the Judge accepted that the Appellant had attended demonstrations in the United Kingdom, but the Appellant’s actions were limited and part of a large crowd not drawing attention from the Iranian authorities. At [25] the Judge dealt with the Appellant’s Facebook evidence. The Judge was entitled to find that the Appellant’s evidence was open to manipulation and, therefore, entitled to not accept the evidence.
“11. The Judge directly considered the ‘pinch-point’ and, on the evidence provided, was entitled to find, on the cumulative findings, that the Appellant would not be of interest to the authorities on return. The Judge considered the evidence along with the caselaw and made findings open to him.”

7. The Upper Tribunal error of law hearing proceeded via a CVP link for the parties’ convenience.

Submissions

8. Mr Holmes for the Appellant relied on the grounds of appeal. Counsel submitted that the Judge had erred in [29] of his decision. The country background evidence and the country guidance cases showed that the Appellant would be subject to close interrogation by the Iranian authorities on his return because of his profile as a young male Kurd. The Judge had failed to ask the right question, which was why the Appellant would not answer truthfully. The answer was the harm to him which would follow. There was no assessment in the factual analysis about how the Appellant’s interrogators would behave, nor of whether the interrogators would be fooled by the Appellant’s answers. The lies which the Appellant had told in the past had unravelled, as the Judge found. The Appellant was a bad liar. There needed to be a proper assessment of what would happen on return. The appeal needed to be reheard.

9. Mr Ojo for the Respondent relied on the rule 24 notice. He submitted that there was no material error of law, merely disagreement with a decision properly open to the Judge. It was clear from the decision that the Judge had considered and applied the relevant country background evidence, such as the CPIN concerning kolbars. HB (Iran) (above) had been expressly cited. [98] and [99] of that decision were relevant and the applicable factors had been taken into account. The Judge had referred to the “hair trigger” approach of the Iranian authorities. The Judge had also taken into account the Appellant’s evidence that kolbars had been shot at.

10. The Appellant had never been politically involved in Iran and was not known to the authorities. He had been found to have lied twice, to the Respondent and to the Tribunal. The Judge had taken the Appellant’s age into account when reaching that finding, and had acknowledged the Appellant’s lack of education and illiteracy.

11. In relation to the Appellant’s sur place claim, the Judge had been entitled to find that the Appellant had only been a face in the crowd with a low profile. His political opinion was not genuine. The Appellant could delete his Facebook account. The Judge had clearly had both RT (Zimbabwe) [2012] UKSC 38 and HJ (Iran) [2010] UKSC 31 in mind. The appeal should be dismissed.

12. There was no reply.

No material error of law finding

13. The Tribunal reserved its decision, which now follows. The Tribunal is not persuaded by the submissions as to material error of law made on behalf of the Appellant. In the Tribunal’s view, the errors asserted to exist in the decision are based on misapprehensions and a failure to read the careful decision and reasons as a whole.

14. The Tribunal accepts Mr Ojo’s submissions on behalf of the Respondent. There was no flaw in the Judge’s risk assessment of the return process and the Judge’s findings were open to him. HB (Iran) (above) was correctly followed and applied. As well as reaching findings as to the Appellant’s past in Iran and his sur place activities in the United Kingdom, the Judge specifically examined what would happen to the Appellant on return to Iran, as a young Kurdish male faced with hostile and suspicious authorities. The Judge recognised that this was a separate element of the case and asked the right questions. The Judge had found that the Appellant was a kolbar (the Respondent’s concession) and that he had not engaged in any form of political activity, even as a mere courier, in Iran. The Appellant would not be suspected of being a kolbar just because of his home area in Iran. The Appellant was not known to the authorities as a result of his kolbar activities in Iraq, so there was nothing with which he could be challenged when questioned. The Appellant’s sur place activities in the United Kingdom were not a source of risk. The Appellant’s illegal exit was not a source of risk

15. The Judge rejected the submission that the Appellant would simply confess to being a kolbar. There was no submission in the First-tier Tribunal that the Appellant would be at risk because he was a bad liar. That was no part of the Appellant’s case. It was open to the Judge to find that the Appellant would lie if necessary to avoid revealing his kolbar activities to the authorities. It is obvious that that is exactly what any kolbar would be likely to do (unless caught red-handed), given the potential penalties for smuggling. The Judge found that the Appellant had not been politically engaged in Iran, so there was nothing for him to hide in that respect, the subject of greatest concern to the authorities as HB (Iran) makes clear. The Appellant had no genuine political beliefs, so he would not be compromising himself, nor did the Judge expect him to do so. The principles of HJ (Iran) (above) informed the Judge’s finding.

16. The Judge gave the Appellant full credit for the only elements of his claim which were accepted by the Home Office, which were the Judge’s starting point. But Home Office had not accepted that the Appellant faced any real risk on return and so the Appellant’s evidence required critical analysis with anxious scrutiny. The Judge identified with multiple sustainable reasons why that case failed. Those reasons are in the Tribunal’s view ample.

17. The Tribunal finds that there was no material error of law in the decision challenged. The onwards appeal is dismissed.

DECISION

The appeal is dismissed

The making of the previous decision did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision stands unchanged, including the anonymity direction.

Signed R J Manuell Dated 20 October 2025
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Manuell