Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002771

First-tier Tribunal: PA/64892/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE J F W PHILLIPS

Between

TP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Karim, Counsel instructed by MK Adams Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 8 December 2023 dismissing his appeal against the Respondent’s decision refusing his protection claim.
Background
2. The Appellant a citizen of Bangladesh asserts, in summary, that he would be at risk on return due to his involvement with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and Bangladesh Jatiobadi Chatradal (BJD) resulting in adverse interest from the Awami League including false and politically motivated charges having been made against him.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
3. The Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision was heard by the First-tier Tribunal in Manchester on 2 May 2025 and dismissed. The Judge found that the core of the Appellant’s account was incredible, that there was sufficiency of protection and a viable internal relocation alternative and that Article 8 was not engaged.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal the decision by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dieu on 24 February 2025.
Preliminary issue
5. The Appellant raises eight grounds. It is clear from the grant of permission that Judge Dieu only intended to grant in respect of grounds 1, 4, 5 and 8. However Mr Karim submitted that he should be allowed to argue all grounds as the heading to Judge Dieu’s decision simply said “Permission to appeal is granted”. In support of this submission Mr Karim referred to the decision in Safi and others (permission to appeal decisions) [2018] UKUT 388 paragraph 41 of which provides
“ we regard it as essential for a judge who is granting permission only on limited grounds to say so, in terms. The place to do so is in the section of the document that contains the decision.”
Paragraph 46 of Safi and others does however demonstrate that paragraph 41 is not intended to be entirely prescriptive leaving at least some residual discretion to the Judge dealing with the error of law
“Henceforth, it is likely to be only in very exceptional circumstances that the Upper Tribunal will be persuaded to entertain a submission that a decision which, on its face, grants permission to appeal without express limitation is to be construed as anything other than a grant of permission on all of the grounds accompanying the application for permission.”
Given the express nature of Judge Dieu’s reasoning we may have been persuaded that the circumstances in this case were indeed exceptional. However Mr Karim was able to point to the notification of the grant of permission issued to all parties through MyHMCTS (CCD) which gives no limitation on the grant of permission, and which consequently does not inform the appellant of his right to renew his application to the Upper Tribunal on any refused grounds. In these circumstances we concluded that permission was not limited and that all grounds could be argued. Having reached this conclusion we believe that it will be appropriate for First-tier Tribunal Judges dealing with permission to appeal applications to be reminded of the decision in Safi and others to protect against future uncertainty.
The hearing
6. Mr Karim took us through the grounds of appeal. For the Respondent there was no rule 24 response. Ms Isherwood said that there was no material error of law. Referring to MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812 Ms Isherwood said that since the August 2024 overthrow of the Awami League the situation in Bangladesh had fundamentally changed. The December 2024 CPIN, referred to in MU v SSHD, shows that BNP supporters are unlikely to be persecuted.
Findings – Error of Law
7. Ground one of the application along with Mr Karim’s submissions assert that expert’s report provided by Mr Tushar was rejected without adequate reasons. The decision suggests that the expert had no contact with the Appellant’s lawyers but fails to note the instructions provided to the expert including scanned copies of court documents. Ms Isherwood said that it was clear that the judge was looking at the evidence holistically in rejecting the report.
8. In our judgment ground one is made out. The report together with the instructions to the expert clearly show that the expert was provided with everything that was required, no reason is given for doubting either the expert’s expertise, independence or credibility. The expert has personally verified the documents. The facts, such as they are, cited in paragraph 53 of the decision appear to be based upon a misunderstanding of the documents provided to Mr Tushar. In all these circumstances the Tribunal did not adequately engage with the report or give sufficient, or indeed any, reasons for rejecting it. As this report relates to the verification of falsely raised criminal charges against the Appellant it was fundamental and therefore this ground alone justifies setting aside the decision as a whole
9. Ground two puts forward similar criticism regarding the treatment of the expert report of Dr Hoque. Again Mr Karim pointed out that the instructions given to Dr Hoque were included in the Appellant’s bundle . The skeleton argument includes the report in essential reading and whilst Mr Karim was unable to say that the instructions were specifically brought to the judge’s attention they are referred to in the report.
10. In our judgment ground two is also made out. Whilst this is a detailed and lengthy decision the Judge does not adequately engage with the report or give sufficient reasons for rejecting it or giving it limited weight.
11. Ground three asserts that insufficient reasons were given for the finding that the Appellant had manufactured his claim. Mr Karim accepted that this ground would stand or fall depending on our decision in respect of grounds one and two. He said that the errors already outlined undermined the Judge’s conclusion. We can only agree with this assertion and we therefore find that ground three is made out.
12. Ground four is similar in nature to grounds one and two and relates to the two cases filed against the Appellant. We accept in this respect that the Tribunal made a factual error in its interpretation of the letter from the Appellant’s lawyer in Bangladesh Mr Billah (believing that he had failed to refer to one of the cases relied upon by the appellant). A cross reference to the report of Mr Tushar shows his verification of the two cases by case number, and confirms that Mr Billah was in fact referring in his letter to both cases.
13. It is unnecessary in the circumstances to deal in any detail with grounds five and six, which we were not persuaded in themselves disclosed errors of law. The fact is that the errors of law as detailed infect the decision as a whole, such that if the expert reports had been fully considered it would have been necessary for the Tribunal to go on and consider the separate items of evidence referred to. Similarly, proper consideration of the expert reports, would have informed the judge’s assessment of whether there had been a durable and sustained change for individuals in the appellant’s position. Grounds five, six and seven therefore also succeed.
14. The criticisms in ground eight of the Tribunal’s approach to Article 8 stand or fall with the challenges to its assessment of the appellant’s protection appeal, as Mr Karim properly accepted. Given our findings above, ground eight also succeeds.
15. The final issue is materiality and in this respect Ms Isherwood pointed to MU v SSHD which is a very recent decision of the Court of Appeal. MU v SSHD deals with an appellant whose appeal had been allowed on Article 3 grounds by the First-tier Tribunal due to risk on return as a result of BNP activities. At the time of the First-tier Tribunal decision the Awami League was the party of government. The decision was set aside because there was no evidence of adverse interest in the Appellant. Having set aside the decision the Court then went on to consider whether it was able to remake the decision or to remit to the Tribunal and in this respect the change in government and the December 2024 CPIN were considered. The conclusion at paragraph 17 is, in respect of the appellant in that case, unequivocal
“The truth is that the change of government has wholly changed the picture in such a way that there is no reason whatever to suppose that the respondent will be at risk of serious harm if returned.”
Mr Karim sought to distinguish the Appellant arguing that MU v SSHD was a deportation case involving a person found to be of no continuing interest to the Bangladesh authorities and against whom there were no outstanding charges.
16. Bearing in mind our conclusions above we must agree with Mr Karim’s assertion. The appellant in MU v SSHD claimed to be of adverse interest solely because of BNP activities. The Appellant in the case before us claims that there are outstanding charges against him. Whereas these charges may well have been brought as a result of his political activities in Bangladesh at the time the Awami League was in power, the Appellant claims that it is his belief that it was due to his posting about the problems faced by the Hindu minority. We also note that charges, apparently brought in August 2024 at the time of the downfall of the Awami League, include Sheikh Hasina as one of the defendants along with the Appellant. If the charges are indeed genuine this casts a wholly different light upon both the weight that should be placed upon them and the likelihood of the charges being pursued, as they apparently connect the Appellant to the former discredited regime. The charges, at least according to the report of Mr Tushar, are genuine and are likely to be pursued. It follows that we cannot be certain that the appeal would inevitably have been dismissed regardless of the above errors.
17. In our judgment the First-tier Tribunal made material errors of law and we set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
Remaking
18. We are satisfied that none of the Judge’s findings can be preserved. Given that the findings set aside are fundamental to the credibility of the Appellant’s account and applying paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, the appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors on a point of law.
The unchallenged finding that the claim does not engage the Refugee Convention is preserved. In all other respects the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside with no other findings preserved.
The remaking of the decision in the appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Birmingham, to be remade afresh and heard by any judge other than Judge Farrelly.

Judge J F W Phillips
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

10 September 2025