Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002782

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50209/2024
LP/03610/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL

Between

YOUCEF AMAOUZ
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mavrantonis of counsel, instructed by Farani Taylor Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Parvar, a Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Row (“the judge”). By his decision of 25 April 2024, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his human rights claim.
Background
2. The appellant is an Algerian national who was born on 3 July 1982. He first arrived in the United Kingdom on 1 March 2004. He held a visit visa which was valid until 19 August that year. He overstayed and was subsequently arrested by the police in connection with criminal offences. On 18 January 2007, he was convicted at Croydon Crown Court of being in possession of a false identity document and sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment.
3. The respondent initiated deportation proceedings against the appellant later that year. His appeal against the decision to make a deportation order was dismissed in October 2007, however, and no further appeal was brought. A deportation order was signed against the appellant in November 2007 and he was deported to Algeria on 15 March 2008.
4. The appellant re-entered the United Kingdom unlawfully on an unspecified date in 2009. He met his current partner, who is a British national born in 1968, in 2012. They entered into an Islamic marriage in November 2013 and they have lived together since then.
5. In September 2021, the appellant’s solicitors sought revocation of the deportation order. The application was finally refused on 3 January 2024. That decision constituted the refusal of a human rights claim and the appellant appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
6. The appellant’s appeal before the judge took place on 22 April 2025. His case was focussed on his relationship with his wife. She is a British citizen with no connection to Algeria. She is a qualified solicitor and is now a Senior Compliance Manager for Santander UK PLC. She earns in the region of £90,000 per annum. She has mental health problems and caring responsibilities for her elderly parents in the UK. She is said to be a Christian. It was submitted before the judge that her relationship with the appellant could not continue in Algeria and that the decision to remove him from the United Kingdom was a disproportionate interference with the family life they share.
7. It was accepted by the respondent that the appellant and the sponsor have been in a committed relationship for many years. It was also accepted that the appellant is a not a foreign criminal as that term is defined in statute, and therefore that only the general public interest considerations in s117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 applied to the appellant’s case.
8. The judge heard evidence from the appellant and the sponsor. Two other witnesses who had attended to give evidence were not called because their evidence was not contested. The judge heard submissions from Mr Mavrantonis and the Presenting Officer who appeared for the respondent. At the conclusion of the hearing, he reserved his decision.
9. The judge’s reserved decision was issued two days after the hearing. The judge set out the background and the legal framework before turning to the issues, which he set out at [29]-[32]. He then proceeded, at [34]-[68] to consider the evidence before him and to reach a conclusion on the proportionality of the respondent’s decision.
10. The judge considered the sponsor’s circumstances in some detail. He addressed her medical issues at [35], noting that the main issues were depression and anxiety for which she received “a standard first-line antidepressant”. The judge was not impressed by a report from a Consultant Psychologist, and he noted that the conditions “do not appear to have affected her functioning in any significant way”, but he accepted that she was “understandably distressed” about the appellant’s situation.
11. The judge then considered the situation with the sponsor’s parents. He accepted that they were elderly and did not live with the sponsor. He noted that their situation was managed by visits from the sponsor and from “various home helps”, and that the sponsor had power of attorney.
12. Under the sub-heading “Proportionality”, the judge accepted that the appellant enjoyed a family life in the United Kingdom and directed himself that he should consider whether the interference was proportionate by using the balance sheet approach commended in Hesham Ali v SSHD [2016] UKSC 60; [2016] 1 WLR 4799. He considered that there was a strong relationship, which weighed in the appellant’s favour. He noted that the appellant was not a foreign criminal as defined, and that his offences were not of the utmost seriousness, although he noted the eight-month sentence for the identity document offence. He stated that the offending “weighs heavily against the appellant”, although he noted that the appellant had not committed any further offences since his return to the UK and that there was no evidence of an ongoing risk of offending.
13. At [55], the judge counted against the appellant the fact that he had returned to the UK in breach of the deportation order. He noted that:
He has remained unlawfully in the United Kingdom ever since. In this he has been facilitated by the sponsor. This weighs against him in assessing proportionality.
14. The judge thought that the position might have been different if the appellant had left the UK to apply for entry clearance after his marriage to the sponsor, but he had chosen not to do so: [56]. He considered that there were “other options” open to the appellant and the sponsor, in that she could live with the appellant in Algeria. Of that possibility, the judge said this:
[57] There are other options open to the appellant and sponsor. It is open to the sponsor to leave the United Kingdom and to go to Algeria with the appellant. I accept that the sponsor does not wish to do so. I also accept that there are reasons why she does not wish to do so.
[58] It would mean leaving her work and her home. She may not have the same job prospects in Algeria. She has family commitments in the United Kingdom.
[59] That situation would be faced by most people who marry a foreign national. One of the other of the parties must face the prospect of living in another country. This inevitably involves a separation from family, friends, and a previous life.
[60] The appellant is a national of Algeria. He speaks its languages. There is no reason why the sponsor should not learn those languages. The appellant can work there. Other arrangements could be made for the care of the sponsor’s parents. Her brother is in the United Kingdom. He might be expected to take a more active role.
[61] I do not underestimate the difficulties which the appellant and sponsor would face. However the difficulties can be overcome. It is an option open to them. It reduces the effect of the interference.
15. The judge noted that the appellant and the sponsor might alternatively choose to live apart but maintain their relationship by visits until the deportation order was revoked. He then turned to s117B of the 2002 Act. He accepted that the appellant spoke English and was financially independent, both of which he considered (in line with Rhuppiah v SSHD [2018] UKSC 58; [2018] 1 WLR 5536) to have a neutral effect on proportionality. He noted that the family life of the appellant and the sponsor had been established when he was present unlawfully in the UK. He attached little weight accordingly.
16. It is necessary for reasons which will shortly become apparent to set out [67]-[68] of the decision in full:
[67] The maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest. It is not in the public interest for people to come to the United Kingdom with visitor visas and to overstay. The appellant was convicted of serious criminal offences. He was deported. He returned illegally and criminally. He has remained unlawfully in the United Kingdom. Such conduct if tolerated would cause chaos. It causes economic and social damage. It damages public confidence in the ability of His Majesty’s Government to manage its immigration policies. It is contrary to good order and governance. All this weighs heavily against the appellant in assessing proportionality.
[68] Taking all these matters into account I find that the public interest in not revoking the appellant’s deportation order far outweighs any interference with his family life. He does not succeed on that ground.
17. The judge therefore dismissed the appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
18. The appellant sought permission to appeal from the First-tier Tribunal but it was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chowdhury. The appellant renewed his application to the Upper Tribunal, relying on three grounds of appeal. Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds considered the grounds to be arguable.
19. The first ground is that the judge gave “manifestly inadequate” weight to the matters on which the sponsor relied in submitting that she could not relocate to Algeria. It was also noted in this ground of appeal that the judge had on several occasions referred to the appellant as the sponsor and vice versa.
20. The second ground is that the judge gave manifestly unreasonable or excessive weight to irrelevant or less relevant factors . The grounds took issue with the strength of the language used by the judge at [67] and to the suggestion at [55] that the appellant had been “facilitated” by the sponsor.
21. The third ground, which Mr Mavrantonis described orally as his strongest, was that the judge had failed to make reference to the Country Information and Policy Note which he had cited in his skeleton argument and which made particular reference to discrimination against Christians and women.
22. I heard submissions from Mr Mavrantonis in development of the grounds of appeal and the skeleton argument which he had helpfully settled in advance of the hearing. I heard submissions from Mr Parvar in reply. Having done so, I reserved my decision on the appeal. I am grateful to them both for their assistance.
Analysis
23. I do not consider the First-tier Tribunal to have erred in law in deciding to dismiss this appeal. My reasons for reaching that conclusion are as follows.
24. It is convenient to consider the first and third grounds together, bearing as they both do on matters which are said to weigh in the appellant’s favour in the scales of proportionality. I will then turn to the second ground, which relates to the public interest in the appellant’s removal.
Grounds One and Three
25. It is quite clear that the judge took account of all of the reasons given by the appellant and the sponsor as to why she did not wish to relocate to Algeria. It is as country to which she has no cultural or linguistic connection. She is in her fifties; she has a senior position at Santander, having worked there for most of her adult life; she has mental health issues, and elderly parents for whom she is responsible. Whilst the judge was critical of some of the evidence adduced by the appellant, noting for example, that the psychologist’s repot was rather aged by the date of the hearing, he clearly accepted the thrust of what he was told in these regards.
26. The judge weighed those matters carefully. He did not cite any authority in connection with his assessment of whether family life could continue in Algeria but he was not required to do so and his assessment nevertheless follows essentially the approach required by cases such as Lal v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1925; [2020] 1 WLR 858 and NC v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1379. He focused, therefore, on each of the obstacles relied upon by the sponsor and he considered, objectively, whether reasonable steps could be taken to avoid or mitigate those obstacles. Having done so, he concluded that the sponsor’s difficulties could be overcome.
27. Mr Mavrantonis accepted before me, as he had to, that matters of weight were for the trial judge. He submitted, however, that the weight which the judge’s decision on the weight which could be attached to these factors was perverse or irrational. I do not accept that submission. It is clear from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR that the court imposes a stringent test when considering whether family life can be continued outside the expelling state: R (Agyarko) v SSHD [2017] UKSC 11; [[2017] 1 WLR 823, at [43]. Applying that approach, as the judge clearly did, it was open to him to conclude that the sponsor’s objections to relocating to Algeria did not establish that she was unable to do so. As he put it, the difficulties could be overcome.
28. Whilst that conclusion might not be the one at which I would have arrived, that is obviously not the test. As Mr Parvar submitted, the appellant cannot establish that the decision was one which was so unreasonable that no reasonable judge could have reached it. The threshold for perversity is not reached, by some margin, and this ground of appeal is not made out.
29. Nothing turns on the fact that the judge referred in various parts of the decision to the appellant as the sponsor and vice versa. As Mr Mavrantonis was constrained to accept before me, the meaning of the decision is quite clear despite these infelicities, and he was not able to point to a single example of genuine confusion arising from these slips on the part of the judge. Whilst they are indeed regrettable, they do not obscure the real conclusions reached by the judge, which are understandable by a lawyer or a non-lawyer.
30. Mr Mavrantonis was potentially on more solid ground when he submitted, with reference to ground three, that the judge had not at any stage in his decision made reference to the parts of the CPIN which had been carefully set out in his skeleton argument for the FtT. He took me to page seven of that skeleton argument, which is devoted to citations from the CPIN concerning the position of women and Christians in Algeria.
31. The judge was obviously not required to repeat the references to the CPIN in his decision. (In fairness to Mr Mavrantonis, that was not his submission.) What the judge was required to do was to show, by his reasoning, that he had come to grips with the import of that document to the case before him. In my judgment, he did just that in connection with the sponsor’s employment. The judge was evidently aware that women might face discrimination in employment in Algeria because he noted at [58] that relocation would mean leaving her work and that she “may not have the same job prospects there.” Nothing more was required of him to show that he had taken this relevant consideration into account.
32. I was initially more concerned about the judge’ consideration of the sponsor’s faith. Whilst he recorded at [31] that the sponsor “is a black woman and a Christian”, he did not engage thereafter with the references to faith-based discrimination in Mr Mavrantonis’ skeleton and the CPIN.
33. The evidential basis upon which it was submitted that the sponsor is a Christian is not entirely clear. Her statements make reference to her being a non-Muslim and believing in God but Mr Mavrantonis was not able to take me to anything in the evidence which stated in terms that she is a Christian. He said that he had settled the skeleton argument on her instructions, however, and I accept that.
34. The difficulty for the appellant is that there is nothing in any of the documents which explains the extent to which the sponsor manifests or practises her faith. There is nothing to suggest that she goes to church or that she proselytises her faith, and there is no reason to think that she would suffer the discrimination described in the CPIN. Against that backdrop, nothing more was required of the judge; the aspect of the evidence which he omitted from his decision was immaterial and did not need to be examined: R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm AR 535, at [13], applying and adapting what was said by Griffiths LJ in Eagil Trust Co Ltd v Pigott-Brown [1985] 3 All ER 119, at p122.
35. In my judgment, therefore, the judge’s analysis of the obstacles to the sponsor’s relocation was adequate and he reached a conclusion which was properly open to him on the evidence.
Ground Two
36. The targets of this ground are the observations made by the judge at [55] and [67] of his decision. I have reproduced the relevant parts of the decision in full above.
37. Mr Mavrantonis expressed concern, firstly, that the judge had stated in [55] that the appellant had been “facilitated” by the sponsor. I agree with Mr Parvar that there is nothing objectionable in the use of that word. The appellant and the sponsor have been in a cohabiting relationship since 2013. She has financially supported him throughout. It was only about eight years later that he sought revocation of the deportation order. I do not find the judge’s meaning to be obscure or unexplained when his remark is understood in that context.
38. The judge went on to state at the end of that paragraph that the appellant’s behaviour counted against him in assessing proportionality. That is also unobjectionable in law. The appellant had entered the UK in breach of the deportation order and had remained “under the radar” with the assistance of the sponsor for many years before he presented the respondent with what he hoped was a fait accompli. To treat that conduct as enhancing the public interest in removal was squarely in accordance with the jurisprudence including Jeunesse v The Netherlands (2014) 60 EHRR 17.
39. As for [67], Mr Mavrantonis submitted that there were various turns of phrase used by the judge which were indicative of a closed mind. He particularly drew my attention to “Such conduct if tolerated would cause chaos.” and to the suggestion that the appellant’s conduct “causes economic and social damage”. I accept that there might be a penumbra of imprecision in the judge’s language but I also accept Mr Parvar’s submission that his reasons are to be construed with a degree of benevolence: see, respectively, Biogen v Medeva [1996] UKHL 18 and DPP v Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672; [2021] IRLR 1016.
40. Taking that approach, it seems to me that the judge’s meaning is quite plain. The appellant re-entered the UK in breach of a deportation order and such conduct must be reflected in the weight which is attached to the public interest in the maintenance of immigration control. A deportation order is the strongest sanction available to the Secretary of State in the regulation of immigration control and wilful disobedience to such an order, shortly after it was made, is a serious matter. In using the word “tolerated”, and in referring to “chaos” the judge evidently meant that society is entitled to expect that people should abide by the rule of law, and that the appellant’s failure to do so had to be reflected in the scales of proportionality. The use of that language was not indicative of a closed mind, or of any other error of approach on the part of the judge.
41. It follows that none of the grounds are made out and the appeal will be dismissed. If, as Mr Mavrantonis foreshadowed in his concise submissions, the sponsor’s health has worsened since the hearing before the FtT, the proper course of action is for that deterioration to be drawn to the Secretary of State’s attention by way of further submissions.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed and the decision of the FtT shall stand.

Mark Bliundell

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 November 2025