Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002791

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60354/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COTTON

Between

HS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T Haddow, advocate instructed by Gray & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr T Lindsay, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a national of Pakistan born in 1991, entered the UK on a student visa on 14 February 2022 and claimed asylum on 12 May 2023. The respondent refused the application on 9 April 2024 and the appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FtT).
In the First-tier Tribunal
2. In the FtT the appellant challenged the respondent’s decision on the grounds that the appellant was entitled to asylum, was entitled to humanitarian protection and that the respondent’s decision would unlawfully interfere with the appellant’s human rights. The FtT refused the appeal in a decision dated 25 March 2025.
In the Upper Tribunal
3. Permission to appeal was given by the Upper Tribunal on grounds set out in full in the application to appeal, and refined in written submissions. I summarise them as follows:
a. Ground 1: At [25] and [26] the FtT failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing the appeal, failing to give sufficient reasons for not believing the appellant’s account. The FtT failed to give the appellant a chance to address criticisms that might be made of their evidence.
b. Ground 2: The FtT erred in not following the approach in Tanveer Ahmed (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan [2002] UKIAT 00439 when finding that a document (Police ID) was not reliable. The FtT failed to consider that this was just one of several documents lodged by the appellant and to consider all the evidence in the round.
c. Ground 3: The FtT erred in finding that the appellant’s partner (AG), who gave written and live evidence, was lacking in detail. The error lies in that AG was not cross examined, nor asked questions by the FtT, exploring that lack of detail. The appellant points to Griffiths v TUI (UK) Ltd [2025] AC 374 at [70] as authority for the position that a witness should be given the opportunity to address any criticisms that might be made of their evidence.
d. Ground 4: The FtT erred in finding that art 8(1) was engaged but that the respondent’s decision was proportionate, and failed to provide adequate reasons for this conclusion. By the time the case was considered by me, Mr Haddow no longer insisted on this ground, whilst effectively reserving the ability to re-argue any art 8 point should the appeal be allowed on other grounds and proceed to be remade.
4. The respondent resisted the appeal, submitting (in summary) that the FtT had been entitled to come to the conclusions reached in the determination and that the FtT had not erred in their approach. The judge was entitled to come to the conclusions on lack of detail that they did, and provided sufficient reasons for their conclusions. On the police ID, the FtT needed to make findings on that document as it was specifically in issue from the Reasons for Refusal Letter (RFRL). It was open to the respondent to take issue with that document and open to the judge to make express findings only on that document. The respondent submitted that the decision on the police ID at [30-34] was careful and thoroughly reasoned. This was the only impugned document and so the only one that needed to be addressed.
5. I heard submissions for the appellant on the third ground first. It was submitted that the statement of AG was patently very brief and addresses a very basic account, obviously not being a comprehensive account of everything that the witness knows. It was clear from the determination that cross-examination was brief. None of the questions put to the witness cover the areas of his evidence that it is said lack detail.
6. I have refreshed my memory of Griffiths v TUI (UK) Ltd, and of [70] in particular. I agree with the appellant that, whilst Griffiths was concerned with an expert witness, the approach taken to achieving fairness can apply to non-expert witnesses. However, it seems to me that the Supreme Court was there concerned with the necessity for a party to put to a witness in cross-examination any material point of that witnesses’ evidence that the party wishes to submit to the court should not be accepted. The court points out that this is part of ensuring a fair trial, enabling the judge to make a proper assessment of all the evidence, and allowing the witness to explain or clarify his or her evidence.
7. I was also referred to the case of WA (Role and duties of judge) Egypt [2020] UKUT 00127 (IAC), from which I accept the point that a judge is entitled to ask a witness questions, within bounds, to ensure that ‘evidence is given as well as it may be’.
8. It does not appear to me that the Supreme Court in Griffiths concluded that a judge is required to ask questions of a witness to explore their evidence where the judge might, once they have considered the case in the round, and reflected on the arguments put forward by the representatives of both parties, come to negative conclusions about the value of their evidence. I further consider that a judge is entitled to ask clarificatory questions of a witness (or invite representatives to lead evidence on a particular topic), but must be careful not to descend into the arena and ask questions which would put the judge in the position of adducing from a witness evidence that one party has chosen not to adduce themselves, or to cross-examine the witness on a point that the other party has chosen not to explore in cross-examination. As the judicial headnote in WA notes, ‘during the taking of evidence a judge’s role is merely supervisory’.
9. Turning to the determination of the FtT, at [28 – 29] the FtT gives what I judge to be a sufficiently well-reasoned assessment of why the FtT concludes AG’s evidence is lacking in detail. In my assessment, the judge is not so much criticising the witness as assessing what weight can be given to their evidence and why. I do not find that a judge is under a duty to ask questions of a party’s witness to make better gaps or shortfalls in that party’s case – especially where that party was legally represented. It is for a party to put forward their case and for the judge to assess whether they have discharged such burden as they carry. I consider that a judge is entitled to assess where a party’s evidence falls short. The FtT was going no further than that in this case.
10. Turning to grounds one, I consider the same can be said for the FtT’s approach to the appellant’s evidence. It was submitted to me that the FtT should not have concluded at [27] that the appellant’s evidence was lacking in detail if this was not put to the appellant. I find that a judge is entitled to conclude to the effect that they would expect a witness easily to provide more detail on a topic, and that failing to do so damages their credibility.
11. It was also submitted on this ground that the FtT had failed to provide sufficient reasoning for concluding at [38] that the appellant’s account is not reasonably likely to be true. The FtT sets out factors which go in favour and against the credibility of the appellant’s account.
12. I was referred to South Bucks DC v Porter (No2) [2004] 1 WLR and it is convenient to repeat part of [36] of that judgment here:
The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal important controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn.
13. In my judgment, the FtT at [38] in the present case achieves what is required by South Bucks DC. The FtT sets out within the determination those factors relevant tot the credibility of the account, weighs them together and comes to a conclusion. I do not agree that the judge did not provide a sufficiently detailed explanation – at some point a judge has to look at what is in the scales and declare where the needle points.
14. Considering the second ground of appeal, I note that the FtT directs itself at [24] on the requirements of Tanveer Ahmed. I refreshed my memory of Tanveer Ahmed, and note here the same summary of principles set out at [38] of that judgment as the FtT noted:
a. In asylum and human rights cases it is for an individual claimant to show that a document on which he seeks to rely can be relied on.
b. The decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.
c. Only very rarely will there be the need to make an allegation of forgery, or evidence strong enough to support it. The allegation should not be made without such evidence. Failure to establish the allegation on the balance of probabilities to the higher civil standard does not show that a document is reliable. The decision maker still needs to apply principles 1 and 2.
15. The FtT assesses the Police ID from [30] where the FtT starts by reminding itself of the need for the appellant to establish the document can be relied on. I am not persuaded by the submission that it was not open to the FtT to take a different view on the police ID to other documentary evidence – the FtT is justified in approaching each document individually. Equally, I do not accept that the FtT failed to take into account that this was one of several documents lodged by the appellant – the FtT notes at [34] that they have taken all the evidence in the round and, based on the determination as a whole this is plainly correct that the FtT has given consideration to the whole of the evidence. I do not expect a judge to recount all of the evidence that they have considered. I find no error on this ground.
16. With regards to ground four, whilst it was no longer insisted on, I conclude that there was no error. The FtT approached the art 8 assessment correctly and was justified in coming to the decision that it did.

Notice of Decision
The determination of the First-tier Tribunal contains no material error of law.
I do not allow the appeal.
The determination of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

D Cotton
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
3 January 2026