Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002810

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55905/2024
LH/00759/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE L MURRAY

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
And

HASSAN ISHTIAQ
(ANONYMITY ORDER not MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Lams, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. On 5 February 2024 the Appellant made an application for entry clearance under Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules on the basis of family life with his partner. That application was refused by the Respondent on 13 May 2024 on grounds that the Appellant did not meet the suitability, eligibility relationship, eligibility financial requirement and eligibility English language requirements of paragraphs E-ECP of Appendix FM. The Respondent did not accept that the suitability and eligibility financial requirements were met as it was concluded that the documentation the Appellant had submitted in relation to the sponsor’s employment with Norbury Dessert House Ltd T/A Kaspa’s Dessert House was concluded to be false. The reasons for this conclusion were set out in a Document Verification Report (DVR) dated 18 April 2024.
2. The Appellant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge O R Williams (the FTTJ) in a decision dated 13 April 2025. The Appellant appealed on two grounds, namely that the Judge failed to take account of the evidence in the round (Ground 1) and that there was a material mistake of fact constituting an error of law as HMRC evidence obtained by the Appellant subsequent to the hearing incontrovertibly established the genuineness of her employment and documentation (Ground 2).
3. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds on renewal on 1 August 2025 on the basis of an arguable mistake of fact in the light of HMRC evidence which was relevant to the issue of the reliability of the DVR.
4. Directions were issued by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell on 18 August 2025 pursuant to a request to expedite the appeal due to the sponsor’s pregnancy. The Respondent conceded pursuant to those directions in a Response dated 26 August 2025 under R24 of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules 2008 that the FTTJ had erred in respect of Ground 2 and this error was such as to render the decision unsafe in its entirety. The Respondent submitted that the appeal was suitable to be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking.
5. The matter came before us to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law, and if so whether any such error was material such that the decision should be set aside.
The hearing
6. The Respondent conceded that there was a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. We agreed with that concession and canvassed views on whether the decision in the appeal could be re-made at the hearing before us given the narrow issues. We clarified the position of both parties in relation to the issues that remained outstanding. Ms McKenzie confirmed that the eligibility relationship and English language requirements of E-ECP of Appendix FM had been conceded before the FTTJ in the Respondent’s Review. Ms McKenzie maintained however, that the Appellant did not meet the suitability and financial eligibility requirements.
7. The Appellant produced, with her grounds of appeal, a document purporting to be an HMRC issued ‘Income Tax and employment history’ dealing with her employment at Norbury Dessert House Limited. This was said in her grounds to be consistent with the P60 information detailing her earnings from 6 April 2023 to 5 April 2024 as £19,106.05. The Appellant sought to rely upon this evidence as a mistake of fact constituting an error of law (E v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 49). As the Respondent conceded this ground, and the evidence is clearly relevant to the question of dishonesty, we admitted this evidence pursuant to Rule 15 (2A) of the Upper Tribunal Rules.
8. Notwithstanding the Respondent’s concession as to the material error of fact, Ms McKenzie maintained that the Respondent’s position remained the same in relation to the suitability and financial eligibility requirements. She submitted that it remained the Respondent’s position that the documentation submitted by the Appellant in relation to the sponsor’s employment was not reliable.
9. This position had not been articulated in the Respondent’s Response, and consequently we canvassed with the representatives how we should approach the new HMRC evidence now relied on by the Appellant. That evidence is a record of the PAYE Income Tax and employment history of the sponsor. It shows at p252 to 257 of the bundle, that the sponsor’s taxable income for the period 6 April 2023 to 5 April 2024 was £19,106.05 which, Mr Lams submitted, married up with all of the other employment documentation in the Appellant’s bundle, namely her Accountant’s letter, accompanying P11 Deduction Working Sheets, her employment letter, bank statements, payslips and P60. He reminded us that the burden of proving dishonesty was on the Respondent and the Respondent had not said why the new evidence was not reliable. He said that the grounds of appeal had appended those documents and there had been no indication that they had been opposed.
10. It was our view that the question of whether the Appellant’s HMRC evidence was reliable was capable of being established as objective fact. Ms McKenzie accepted that the Respondent could do this and that no further checks had been carried out since the DVR had been written. The HMRC evidence submitted with the grounds of appeal consisted of a print out in the sponsor’s name from HMRC and a screenshot of her tax records on her phone. We invited Mr Lams to take instructions on whether the sponsor was able to show that the HMRC account was hers and access it on her phone. He took instructions and confirmed that she could do so. Both parties and the Tribunal then viewed her online HMRC account and inspected the records.
11. On the basis of this evidence, which confirmed the contents of the print out and screenshot, and showed that her income from employment for the tax year from April 2023 to April 2024 was £19,106.05, we informed the parties that we would re-make the decision in the appeal and allow it with full reasons to follow.
The Re-making of the decision
12. The burden of proving dishonesty is on the Respondent on the balance of probabilities (DK & RK (ETS: SSHD evidence; proof) India ([2022] UKUT 00112 IAC). The Respondent relies on a DVR dated 18 April 2024 at p331 of the composite bundle. The Respondent concludes in that document that the employment letter and monthly payslips issued by Norbury Dessert House and submitted with the application are false. According to the “verification result” in the DVR, the salary declared in the application has been checked against the records held by HMRC. According to the information provided by the Respondent in the DVR at p335 of the bundle, the HMRC system check of the provided sponsor’s address did not match with HMRC records. Also, there was no HMRC record of employment for Norbury Dessert House Ltd. Consequently, based on this information, it was deemed that the employment letter and monthly payslips were false.
13. The explanation provided by the Appellant in her witness statement dated 4 November 2024 was that the documents were genuine and she was genuinely employed as a Junior Administrator at Norbury Dessert House and she provided the further documentation set out at paragraph 9 of her witness statement to prove this. The Appellant produced a bundle of documents before the First-tier Tribunal. He relies on a letter dated 28 October 2024 from Kaspa’s Desserts stating that the sponsor had been employed with Norbury Dessert House since 1 December 2022. He also relies on payslips dated from 30 April 2024 to September 2024 and bank statements showing money in from Norbury Dessert House Ltd and a P60 for the tax year to April 2024 showing that her income for the tax year to April 2024 was £19,106.05. He also relies on a letter from Mann Accountancy Services dated 31 October 2024 confirming that she commenced her employment on 1 December 2022 and had been employed continuously by the company. Her accountant also confirmed that all of the information regarding her pay, tax and NIC deductions and net pay figures had been filed with HMRC. The P11 Deductions worksheet is also included.
14. The evidence with the application considered by the Respondent consisted of the sponsor’s payslips for the six months before the application from August 2023 to January 2024, her bank statements for the same period showing payments in of exactly the net amounts shown in the payslips and an employer letter which met with the requirements of Appendix FM-SE.
15. We are satisfied having additionally seen her P60 for the tax year to April 2024, the accountant’s letter and having seen her online HMRC records that the evidence submitted both meets the requirements of Appendix FM-SE and is reliable. It is not in dispute that if reliable, the required threshold of £18,600 is met. We find that the Respondent has not proved that the documents relied on the Appellant at the time of the application were false and consequently we find that both the suitability and financial eligibility requirements of the Rules are met. In the circumstances, all other requirements having been conceded, we find that he meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
16. In TZ (Pakistan) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1109 at paragraph 34 the Court of Appeal held that where a person satisfies the Immigration Rules, whether or not by reference to an Article 8 informed requirement, then this will be positively determinative of that person’s Article 8 appeal, provided their case engages Article 8 (1), for the very reason that it would then be disproportionate for that person to be removed. We are satisfied therefore for the above reasons that the refusal of entry clearance is a breach of Article 8 ECHR.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
We set the decision aside and re-make the decision allowing the appeal.

L Murray

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 September 2025