Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002811

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/64609/2023
LP/01446/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21 November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEN KEITH

Between

FH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Saeed, Solicitor at Aman Solicitors Advocates
For the Respondent: Ms Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 25 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Ruth promulgated on 25 March 2025, having been heard remotely at the First-tier Tribunal in Manchester. The appellant, who is called FH for the purposes of this decision, is a citizen of Iraq. He had appealed to the First-tier Tribunal under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the decision of the Home Office to refuse his asylum and protection claim dated 29 November 2023.
2. The case is in essence that the appellant asserts that he is at risk of honour killing, and/or torture or mistreatment in the province of Erbil in the Kurdish Autonomous Area of Iraq, following what he says was an illicit relationship with a young woman whose father is a prominent member of a Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).
3. The appellant’s evidence asserts that the relationship he had with a young woman was discovered and he was beaten by members of the young woman’s family with his elbow, teeth and nose broken. He then went into hiding in Iraq for some eleven months at the home of a relative in Sulaymaniyah where he remained for about eleven months before fleeing to the United Kingdom.
4. The appellant lodged six grounds and permission was granted in relation to grounds 2 to 5 by Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman on 16 July 2025. Therefore ground 1, permission was not granted so I deal firstly with ground 2.
Ground 2
5. Irrational and lack of reasons regarding the relationship. Paragraph 5 of the grounds of appeal states as follows, [XX] refers to the lady in question:
“5. The Respondent and the Judge appear to have approached how and why the Appellant and [XX] developed their relationship from a ‘western’ perspective rather than the social norms in Iraqi Kurdistan. There is no self direction to the fact that this issue related to a very conservative society in Iraq and not a liberal western society. This was irrational and speculative.
6. In any event the learned Judge [17] and the Respondent both erred in law by failing to have proper regard to the asylum interview record questions 40-47 and 51-54 and the fact that the Respondent did not ask any follow up questions in the asylum interview or tell the Appellant that the answers about why he liked [XX] were incredible. Moreover, the Judge erred by not giving adequate reasons for what the Appellant set out in his asylum interview and also what he set out in his appeal statement [41] and the failure to take a different cultural and social setting in Iraq.”
6. Mr Saeed has submitted that the First-tier Tribunal was required to self-direct in accordance with the case of HK v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 paragraphs 27 to 30 and in particular paragraph 29, which I paraphrase as requiring any fact-finding Tribunal to take account of the fact that judges sitting in the United Kingdom need to have cultural sensitivity as to the way that different societies outside of our own operate. The submissions were that the judge is required to make an explicit direction to themselves of that and/or in any event the decision was made by the First-tier Tribunal Judge who took the relationship in a western style rather than accepting the evidence of the appellant and analysing the very short relationship through the prism of a very highly conservative society where relationships with unmarried women are frowned upon and can result in serious violence.
7. In my judgment there is no requirement for a self-direction to be made in every case and certainly not required to be contained within the judgment. What matters is whether a proper assessment has been made on the facts presented to a Tribunal in the context of an asylum case. The judge had a substantial bundle of materials of 751 pages, including material in relation to risks in Iraq, Kurdistan. It is also the case that risks are well-known from the country guidance.
8. The judge deals with the relationship at paragraph 17:
“17. I agree with the submissions made on behalf of the respondent that, despite the appellant claiming to have risked his life to meet this young woman, when asked about her on various occasions throughout the asylum process, he could provide almost no real information about her or why he decided to form a connection with her. For example, the appellant did not appear to know even basic information about the young woman such as her interests and hobbies, and although claiming that she was linked to a powerful family, could not provide any real information about what he meant by that statement and how the family was powerful, or what role the father had in the KDP, beyond asserting he was a member of the KDP political bureau. Although claiming their relationship had initially progressed on the telephone, he could provide no real details of what they discussed and gave only the vaguest account of what attracted him to her or what they might have in common. While this level of vagueness could not be definitive of itself, I did regard it as a negative indicator of credibility.”
9. In submissions I have been taken to the asylum interview where Mr Saeed has pointed me to the answers that the appellant gave in response to the questions by the Home Office, in particular questions 40 to 47 and 51 to 54. In my judgment the judge has not performed an improper assessment. They have attempted to assess the credibility of the existence of the relationship within the context of the evidence provided and there was no requirement to give a self-direction as to a western norm or not. The judge also does not find against the appellant, and says at [17] that that will be regarded as a negative indicator of credibility and as, I will discuss, this was only one factor in the assessment of credibility. Therefore, in relation to ground 2, and the submissions before me, as to the western approach to the relationship, I do not find the judge has made any improper assessment and that there is no material error of law.
10. As we have discussed in the hearing, even if I was wrong about and in the alternative, if the judge had found that there was a genuine relationship and more detail had been provided or approached it in a different perspective, the key to this case is in fact ground 3 and whether the appellant is at risk on return as a result of the power of the young lady’s father and the father’s ability to mete violence out against the appellant. The appellant pleads paragraph 7:
“17. The FTTJ erred in law by failing to give adequate reasons for his negative finding [18] because the Appellant gave details of the attack in his asylum interview questions 65-75. The Appellant’s account of the attack in the interview is not vague or lacking in detail and the Respondent did not ask him for more detail or clarification in the asylum interview.”
11. The judge says at paragraph 18:
“18. I also found the description the appellant gave of the alleged attack upon him, whether initially, at the asylum interview or at the hearing, to be vague and lacking in appropriate detail. It appeared to me to amount to mere and vague assertion. While that could not be definitive alone, I did regard it as a negative indicator of credibility.
19. The key problem in this case is, in my judgement, that the appellant has been fundamentally inconsistent about the central elements of his claim. At various times and in the various statements the appellant has made, including in the asylum interview and in evidence before me, he has made entirely inconsistent claims about the relationship and its alleged discovery. He has both claimed that he and the young woman met a few times and that they met only twice. He has also claimed that the brother saw them together in the appellant’s car on the first occasion that they ever met and that this happened on the second occasion. This is clearly set out at question 55 of the asylum interview and contradicted both in the initial statement, at paragraph 8 where the appellant said they would see each other secretly, and in the appeal statement at paragraph 6 where the appellant said they were discovered on the second occasion they met. In my judgement, when these matters were put to the appellant he had no reasonable explanation for what I consider to be an absolutely fundamental and central discrepancy, going to the core of his account.
20. Given the context in which these events are said to have occurred and the importance they have to the claims made by the appellant, I find his inability to give coherent evidence about such central matters is extremely damaging to his credibility and is a serious indicator of negative credibility.”
12. The judge then goes on to analyse the issues in relation to the father and his ability to mete violence out against the appellant. The submissions before me today are that the appellant dealt with the details of the attack in his asylum interview at question 65 to 75 and they were not vague or inconsistent. In my judgment the judge was entitled to come to the decision they did. The judge has properly reasoned the credibility of the appellant not just in the paragraphs that are decided but in the judgment as a whole. The judge examined all of the elements that the appellant put forward but has found that the inconsistencies in relation to the attack and the lack of detail seriously harm the appellant’s credibility. I find no material error of law in relation to ground 3.
Ground 4
13. Number of meet ups. Failure to take relevant considerations into account. This is pleaded at paragraph 8,
“8. The learned Judge erred in law [19-20] because he failed to refer to all of the questions from 46-55 and in particular to question 49.”
Question 49 of the asylum interview says as follows:
“49. Question (required)
In your statement you said we met a few times before her family found out about us, can you explain the difference for me please?
49. Response (required)
In terms of that what I meant I used to see her on a daily basis when I was going to school, but to meet up with her it was only one time it happened.”
In my judgment there is no merit in ground 4. The judge is not required to cite every question in the asylum interview in any decision and the judge has carefully analysed the factual matrix and importantly they made a clear assessment of credibility taking account of all the relevant factors. Failure to refer to a particular piece of evidence, unless that evidence is decisive one way or the other, that cannot be an error of law and I do not find it is. I therefore find that ground 4 is not made out as there was no failure to take into account relevant considerations.
Ground 5
14. Ground 5 is pleaded:
The judge erred [21] because he did not identify what corroborate evidence the appellant could have provided. The appellant did not state that Ali Hussain had a “public role or a public profile”.
Before me it is argued that the appellant did not need to provide any more evidence in relation to the father of the lady he is said to have had a relationship with and that the fact that he did not provide corroborative evidence, and the fact that the judge should have identified what corroborative evidence he could have provided. That in my judgment is to misunderstand the adversarial process. It is for the appellant to provide the evidence to make their case as strong as they think they need to in order to be successful. A failure to provide corroborative evidence can count against them in an individual way that might easily have been provided and I see no error in the judge being concerned. I also see that no corroborative evidence had been provided, particularly given the fact that the appellant had stated that Mr Ali Hussain was a member of the political bureau.
15. Given that no evidence has been provided, it was open to the judge to make a finding that this element was not made out. There was therefore no material error of law in relation to ground 5.
Ground 6
16. Remaining in Sulaymaniyah; lack of reasons and failure to take all matters into account is pleaded as:
“10. The Judge erred in law [22] because the Appellant stated he was in hiding question 88 of the asylum interview and that there was tribal family mediation taking place question 87 of the asylum interview. The lack reasons and failure to take all matters into account render this finding unsustainable.”
17. In submissions today, it is submitted that the judge’s failure to refer to question 88 or 87 of the asylum interview is a material error of law because those questions were in answer to the issue the appellant faced. The issue is that the appellant on his evidence stayed in Iraq for eleven months. If his asylum interview is correct he stayed in hiding for eleven months before leaving with people traffickers to the United Kingdom. However, the judge states at paragraph 22:
“22. I note also that there seems to me to be a fundamental issue of plausibility in this case. While there is no dispute that the KDP and the PUK historically have controlled their respective areas of Kurdistan relatively independently, they nevertheless form the Kurdish regional government together. It is the assertion of the appellant that he was able to remain, not only in Sulaymaniyah for around 12 months, but even in the home of a close relative. In my judgement, that is very difficult to reconcile with the claim by the appellant that a very powerful and senior figure in the KDP knew his identity and was seeking to harm him. This could never be definitive of itself, but I did regard it as a negative indicator of credibility.”
18. In my judgment the First-tier Tribunal Judge was entitled to come to that decision. The First-tier Tribunal Judge does not find that there was no credibility, just that there was very little evidence and that was a factor of negative credibility against the appellant. I therefore find no material error in relation to ground 6.
19. Therefore looking at the judgment in the round, the judge went through carefully each factor which they believed was relevant to credibility and assessed whether they were a negative or positive factor, but ultimately the decision in the round when looking at all the evidence by the First-tier Tribunal Judge was that the appellant’s narrative lacked credibility and did not meet the relevant asylum or international protection threshold which meant that he was able to be granted asylum.
20. I can see no error of law in the reasoning or the failure to mention certain questions or certain pieces of evidence in the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s judgment. I therefore find there is no error of law in relation to any of the pleaded grounds and I dismiss the appeal.

Notice of Decision

1. There is no error of law.
2. The appeal is dismissed.

Ben Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25 September 2025