Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002813

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53917/2024
LP/02984/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN

Between

M R
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S. Hosen of GigaLegal Limited
For the Respondent: Mr N. Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 01 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity because the case involves a protection claim. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appealed the respondent’s decision dated 30 January 2024 to refuse a protection and human rights claim.
First-tier Tribunal decision
2. First-tier Tribunal Judge Stedman (‘the judge’) dismissed the appeal in a decision sent on 13 March 2025. The judge summarised the main aspects of the case [6]-[8]. The appellant claimed that he was a member of the student wing of the BNP Chatra Dal in 2013 and then a member of Jubo Dal in 2017. Between 2017 and 2022 he was politically active. His problems started in 2016 when he was attacked and kidnapped for 5 hours. He was released on payment of a ransom. The appellant feared that he would be killed by members of the Awami League if he returned to Bangladesh.
3. The judge noted that there had been a significant change in the political landscape since the appellant claimed asylum [10]. The appellant asserted that the interim government was not stable and that there was still no law and order in Bangladesh. Leaders and activists were still in hiding [16]. The judge also considered a psychological report [19]-[20] and various pieces of background evidence [22]-[24]. The judge concluded that the appellant was a low level activist for the BNP [25]. While it was possible that, as a businessman, he might have been kidnapped in 2016 and brutally beaten, that incident was clearly not the catalyst to him leaving the country [27]. He remained in Bangladesh with his wife and child for a further 5 years before leaving in 2022. The judge did not accept that the appellant was in hiding during this time [28].
4. The judge found that the appellant had failed to explain why he claimed asylum only after the expiry of his visa [29]. He concluded that it was unlikely that any previous activities for the BNP in Bangladesh or the activities that he carried out in the UK would give rise to a risk on return [31]. The judge said that he came to this conclusion whilst being mindful of the political chaos in Bangladesh at the current time and in light of some evidence to indicate that there might still be risks to some BNP activists from remnants of the previous regime or its supporters. Despite this evidence, he concluded that the evidence did not support the appellant’s claim for international protection.
Upper Tribunal proceedings
5. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the following grounds:
(i) Although the first ground is headed ‘procedural unfairness’, in fact, the text formulates an argument that the First-tier Tribunal failed to give adequate consideration to the evidence. In particular, the evidence given by the appellant’s wife and a psychological report.
(ii) The First-tier Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for not ordering anonymity.
(iii) The First-tier Tribunal failed to engage with the core element of the appellant’s claim to have been kidnapped in 2016 and failed to engage adequately with the evidence.
(iv) The First-tier Tribunal failed to assess the evidence relating to the appellant’s membership and activities for the BNP ‘in the round’ alongside the psychological report.
(v) The First-tier Tribunal failed to give ‘proper weight’ to the background country evidence.
(vi) The First-tier Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting the claims made in relation to Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and failed to conduct a ‘cumulative risk assessment’.
(vii) The First-tier Tribunal failed to consider the best interests of the children.
6. A First-tier Tribunal judge granted permission to appeal in an order dated 26 June 2025. An anonymity order was made. Although the judge only identified one ground as arguable in relation to the psychological assessment, permission was not restricted.
7. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions because they are a matter of record, but I will refer to any relevant arguments in our decision.
8. I bear in mind that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of a specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings: see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19.
Decision and reasons
9. The grounds set out a rather diffuse set of arguments, which upon closer consideration, are either insufficiently particularised or immaterial.
10. It is questionable whether the failure to make an anonymity order is capable of amounting to an error of law. In any event, one was made by the First-tier Tribunal judge who granted permission. The second ground is now academic.
11. The first ground made a series of rather mixed points about procedural fairness, which when analysed were in fact assertions that the judge failed to give adequate consideration to the evidence contained in the psychological report and the evidence given by the appellant’s wife. In relation to the psychological report, the first ground failed to particularise how or why the report would have made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal. At the hearing, Mr Hosen accepted that it did not go to any relevant issues in relation to the Refugee Convention claim.
12. The psychological report is said to have been prepared by Mr JUM Nazmul Hossain on 19 June 2024, a psychologist who appears to be based in London and Dhaka. He conducted an assessment of the appellant by video link. The report records that the appellant told Mr Hossain that that he was a member of the BNP, that there were 20-30 cases filed against him between 2013 and 2014, that he was kidnapped in 2016, and that he was arrested and detained for 2-4 days in 2018. The report then sets out a series of results from psychometric tests that were said to have been undertaken with the appellant. The formatting of the report is rather mixed and is not of the quality usually seen in psychological assessments presented to this court. Some of the results appear to be rather muddled or do not record the outcome from the score accurately. For example, on page 5 the reports sets out symptoms of depression but then goes to the criteria for PTSD before concluding: ‘he is suffering from Clinical-Level Depression and Anxiety (PTSD)’ i.e. mixing the disorders. The score for the ‘Anxiety Measurement Scale’ is recorded as ’75 out of 144’, but according to the scale that was a score for ‘Severe Anxiety’ rather than the ‘Profound Anxiety’ as stated at pg.15 of the report. On page 18 the report states that the appellant scored ‘7 out of 20’ for the Beck Hopelessness Scale, stating that he had a ‘moderate sense of hopelessness’ regarding his life. However, the scale given just above indicates that a score of 7 would be categorised as ‘Mild’. I highlight these examples to indicate that there was a lack of rigour in the report. The assessment for suicidal ideation on page 19 amounted to no more than providing a score. No reasons were given to explain the score, let alone sufficient information to found the elements of a claim on medical grounds. Mr Hosen confirmed that no claim made under Article 3 on medical grounds.
13. It is clear from the face of the decision that the judge did have regard to the psychological report. The judge summarised the report at [19]. Contrary to what is argued in the first ground, the judge made findings in relation to the report at [20]. It was open to him to observe that the minimal level of treatment described by the appellant appeared to contrast with the ‘exaggerated and hyperbolic findings of the report’. Despite the report having mentioned that Mr Hossein was provided with copies of GP records, it was open to the judge to find that none had been provided for the hearing. It was also open to the judge to find that despite the severity of the appellant’s stated psychiatric condition, there was no evidence to show that he was receiving psychiatric treatment beyond his statement that he was prescribed sleeping tablets. Those findings were open to the judge to make on the face of the evidence and do not disclose an error of law.
14. The first ground made no more than a bare assertion that the judge failed to give adequate consideration to the appellant’s wife’s evidence without particularising how or why her evidence might have made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal. Mr Hosen relied on the pleaded ground but did not expand on the argument in oral submissions.
15. Even if his wife’s evidence was taken at its highest she repeated his account of having been kidnapped in 2016. The judge appeared to proceed to assess the case based on this aspect of the claim taken at its highest [26]. For this reason, the point made in the third ground also fails to disclose an error of law.
16. In contrast to the appellant’s evidence, the appellant’s wife’s statement did not mention her husband’s later claim that he was arrested and detained in 2018. The appellant himself answered ‘no’ when asked if he had ever been detained in the screening interview. The appellant did not mention a detention in the Preliminary Information Questionnaire or the asylum interview. The incident appears to have been raised for the first time in the appellant’s witness statement prepared for the appeal. Even then, his account was confined to a single line stating that he was ‘put in prison due to false cases put against me’. There was no surrounding detail let alone any supporting documents to support this aspect of the claim. A second witness statement again failed to mention any incident in 2018.
17. I note that the judge did not deal with this aspect of the claim. This has not been raised in the grounds. Given the dearth of evidence relating to any incident in 2018, it was open to the judge to focus on the incident that took place in 2016, which did form a consistent part of the appellant’s evidence. It was open to the judge to note that there was no meaningful evidence to show that the appellant suffered any further serious problems in the 5 years after that incident before he left Bangladesh.
18. Given the limited and unparticularised nature of the first ground, as pleaded, I conclude that the appellant has failed to show that the judge’s failure to make specific findings in relation to the appellant’s wife’s evidence discloses an error of law that would have made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal.
19. At the hearing, Mr Hosen said that he no longer relied on the fourth ground. In any event, it did not disclose an error of law. The fourth ground did no more than disagree, along with a similar point made in ground 5, with the judge’s assessment of risk in light of the country evidence. The judge took into account the fact that there was still evidence of human rights abuses amid the political chaos and a general lack of law and order. However, it was open to him to find that there was insufficient evidence to show that a low level member of the BNP would be at real risk of serious harm if returned to Bangladesh since the fall of the Awami League government. The weight of the evidence showed that it was Awami League members who were more likely to be attacked. The judge’s findings were within a range of reasonable responses to the evidence.
20. The argument made in ground 5 accepts that the CPIN suggests that BNP activist may not face state persecution. However, the argument that the judge failed to give adequate consideration to the risk from now non-state members of the Awami League in his local area is unparticularised. The argument that the judge failed to consider internal relocation fails to disclose an error of law on the appellant’s own case. No reasons are particularised as to how or why he could not relocate to another area of Bangladesh to avoid any feared problems with local elements of the Awami League.
21. The sixth and seventh grounds relating to human rights arguments are equally vague and unparticularised. At the hearing, Mr Hosen made clear that there was no Article 3 medical claim. Any Article 3 claim relating to risk on return stood with the findings relating to the Refugee Convention. On closer inspection the skeleton argument for the First-tier Tribunal hearing did not put forward any meaningful Article 8 claim. It is not arguable that the judge erred in failing to determine an issue that was not properly particularised.
22. In any event, the appellant had not lived in the UK for sufficient time to engage any of the private life requirements relating to long residence contained in the immigration rules. Given him and his wife’s short length of residence since 2022, it was not arguable that there would be any significant obstacles to their integration in Bangladesh. They continue to have cultural, familial and linguistic connections there. Although they have two children in the UK, the children are not British citizens and have not lived in the UK for long enough to engage section 117(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The last ground fails to particularise how or why a claim under Article 8 could have succeed when it is likely to be in the best interests of the children to remain in a family unit with their parents and no evidence was produced to show any other detriment if the family returned to Bangladesh. At the hearing, Mr Hosen suggested that it was not in the interests of the children to return because of the situation in Bangladesh, but again, this was not particularised in the grounds and was not expanded on beyond that bare submission.
23. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.

Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law
The decision shall stand

M. Canavan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 October 2025