Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-002827
UI-2025-002828
UI-2025-002831
UI-2025-002833

First-tier Tribunal Nos:
PA/72007/2024 LP/01127/2025
PA/72000/2024 LP/01124/2025
PA/71994/2024 LP/01121/2025
PA/68247/2024 LP/01123/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

SO (1)
LO (2)
LO (3)
DR (4)
ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED
Appellants
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Ms Kalyan of Counsel instructed by Logan Kingsley Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Young, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Bradford on 27 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is my oral decision that I delivered at the hearing today.
Introduction
2. The Appellants, comprising a husband, his wife and their minor children, are nationals of Iraq and they appeal with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hillis (“the Judge”) dated 19 February 2025. The Judge had dismissed their appeals against the Respondent’s decision to refuse their protection and human rights claim.
3. To ease following this decision I shall refer to the main (first) Appellant only, although his wife and their children are also the Appellants in this case. They rely on the success of the main Appellant’s appeal for their own.
4. The hearing before me has taken place remotely because of a difficulty arising out of the building at Bradford Hearing Centre having had an issue requiring it to close today. At this remote hearing, I have been greatly assisted by Ms Kalyan who has provided oral and written submissions of a high quality including a speaking note which was sent to the Upper Tribunal this morning. I found that speaking note of assistance. Ms Kalyan had said and done all that can be on behalf of the Appellants. This morning for virtually most of the hearing at least, the main Appellant was in also in attendance.
The Judge’s Decision-A Matter of Magnetic Importance
5. It is necessary to look at the decision of the Judge through the lens of a very serious matter which the Judge accepted had occurred. When in Iraq, the Appellant had been shot with a firearm and which had led to a very serious injury to his leg. Within the bundle of documents provided to me, there are colour copies of the Appellant showing his injuries shortly after the shooting. That bundle was also before the Judge.
6. This shooting is of magnetic importance because the Judge said at paragraph 16 of his decision that, “I accept that the screen shot submitted, the video footage and the photographs of him in hospital and of his wound are compelling evidence that the Appellant was, in fact, shot.”
7. The Appellant contends that he was shot by assailants linked to the Appellant being the victim of honour based violence relating to a woman, not his wife.
8. Against that background of it being accepted that the Appellant had been shot, and in light of background material which the Appellant presented, including a CPIN which shows there is a risk of honour based violence in Iraq from non-state actors with limited protection from the state, I must ask myself why was it that the Appellant’s appeal was dismissed by the Judge? This an aspect of the case which immediately troubled me and which I have reflected on. I had also pressed Ms Young, the Senior Home Office Presenting Officer about this.
Appeals to the Upper Tribunal-Appropriate Judicial Restraint
9. I remind myself that as a Judge at the Upper Tribunal I must show appropriate judicial restraint in relation to the assessment of appeals from the specialist First-tier Tribunal. I am well aware that the authorities on this matter date back to Baroness Hale’s clear judgment in AH (Sudan) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2009] 1 AC 678.
10. That expertise of the First-tier Tribunal is something that has been impressed upon Upper Tribunal for very many years since then, including more recently in the decision in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025, when Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. The importance of the role of the Appellate Court or Tribunal was reiterated. It was said at paragraph 29:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:

‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
11. That must be at the forefront of mind in respect of how I am to assess matters.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge
12. It is necessary to look at the First-tier Tribunal judge’s decision. I take time here to go through that decision in detail.
13. The Judge noted at paragraph 3 of his decision that the Appellant said that he would be at risk on return to Iraq due to him being a member of a Particular Social Group namely a potential victim of an honour crime or alternatively that he was entitled to humanitarian protection. The issues to consider at the First-tier Tribunal were noted at paragraphs 5(a) to (d) where it was said:
(a) Is the Appellant credible and reliable in his claim to have been involved in an extra-marital relationship in Iraq?
(b) Is the Appellant at risk of persecution and/or serious harm on return due to that relationship?
(c) Was the Appellant shot by the lady’s brother for having the relationship with his sister?
(d) Will the Appellant’s removal from the UK breach his ECHR Article 8 rights.
14. The Judge then noted that he heard evidence from the Appellant via a Kurdish Sorani interpreter and the Judge then set out various findings. The Judge said that he had read and given anxious scrutiny to all of the documents submitted by both parties irrespective of whether or not such documents and evidence was referred to specifically. The Judge dealt with the issues and said first of all that he did not accept that the Appellant was credible or reliable in relation to him having had an extramarital relationship.
15. The Judge then gave numerous reasons for that finding. Firstly, the Judge said that during his cross-examination, the Appellant said he had left Iraq on 18 April 2021 but that he had previously said in a screening interview that he had left Iraq on 20 August 2019 and he had said he had arrived in the UK by boat on 29 May 2021.
16. The Judge said he did not accept the explanation that the Appellant was illiterate and could not understand dates because the Appellant had given the interviewing officer 3 very precise dates previously.
17. The Judge also said that the Appellant said that his wife knew all the dates but the Judge observed that she was not at the hearing to give evidence. Nor was there a witness statement from the Appellant’s wife. Ms Kalyan submitted today that omission may be because the Appellant’s wife had childcare or other duties that that made it difficult for her to attend the hearing. Whilst I accept that a person who is a recent arrival from another country with young children would indeed find it difficult to get appropriate childcare, but as I explored during the hearing, as the Judge said, there was no reason provided why a witness statement or an affidavit could not have been obtained from the Appellant’s wife. That would not have caused undue difficulty in terms of childcare. There is still no explanation in respect of that omission.
18. In any event, the Judge said at paragraph 10, “the difference of almost 2 years is simply not explained by not being good with dates.” The Judge noted that the Appellant had changed his account in relation to the date of 20 August 2019. The Judge said that he had sought to clarify this with the Appellant by asking the question a different way and whether he might have confused the time that he spent in Turkey. Perhaps he had confused 7 seven months or 20 months.
19. The Judge also noted that the illicit relationship was said to have started in Iraq in the year 2020 and that the relationship had lasted 2 weeks, yet it was pointed out to the Appellant in cross-examination that the Appellant had claimed to have left Iraq in the year 2019. Making this even worse, the Appellant said that he did not know whether the relationship was at the beginning or the end of 2020. The Judge said this was not credible. On any fair assessment, it clearly was not credible when the Appellant was not supposedly even in Iraq at the time of the illicit relationship in 2020 because he had ‘fled’ in 2019.
20. The Judge further said that the Appellant had claimed that the relationship had lasted 2 weeks and that he had left Iraq 6 weeks after the affair had been discovered. The Judge said it was not credible that the Appellant would not remember the number of times he saw the person with whom he has having an affair in a 2 week period and on which occasion they were discovered in bed together.
21. The Judge also noted that during cross-examination the Appellant was asked how he managed to escape when he was supposedly caught in bed with the person with whom he was a having the affair. The Judge said:
“When asked how he managed to get out of bed, get dressed, climb through the window and onto the roof without the other person’s father taking hold of him, he claimed he was fully dressed when in bed with the other person. I do not find this to be credible and reliable.”
22. The Judge noted that the Appellant was supposedly followed back to his home by the other person’s father and brothers some 2 or 3 minutes later but the Appellant was at his father’s home 10 minutes away. The Judge also noted at paragraph 16 that the Appellant claimed he was in hiding at his father’s house for 20 days without being found by the other person’s family. The Appellant said that he then went to the other’s person’s family to apologise for what he had done and that the other person’s brother shot him. The Appellant said he was taken to hospital. The Judge said he accepted that the Appellant had been shot, but importantly the Judge also said:
“I conclude that the screenshot and video do not show, to the required standard that the Appellant was the intended target, that he was shot for having a relationship with Z and the person who shot him intended to kill him. If the intention was to kill him there is no reasonable explanation provided as to why, having shot the Appellant in the leg he did not then shoot and kill him whilst he was effectively immobile. There is no supporting evidence from the Appellant’s friend, L, whom the Appellant claims accompanied him when he went to Z’s home to apologise despite the fact that the Appellant stated that L was one of the men in the photograph.”
23. Then at paragraph 17 the Judge said:
“Additionally, the fact that he was not killed in the above shooting is inconsistent with Z’s brother, whom he claims shot him in the leg, searching for him in Turkey to kill him and the Appellant being able to run away from them when he saw him. When asked why he had not mentioned this in his screening interview and only ‘hinted at it’ at paragraph 13 of his witness statement and did not say that it was Z’s brother who shot him who followed him to Turkey the Appellant accepted he had not mentioned that it was her brother who had shot him in Iraq. I do not find it credible and reliable that he would not have mentioned this until he was giving his oral testimony at the hearing as it is the most significant claim he makes of being at risk of being killed if removed to the IKR.”
24. The Judge went on to say at paragraph 18:
“He claimed that Z’s family had broken into his house and destroyed the contents. He also claimed he was told that Z’s brother who shot him had been arrested but was released after a couple of days. The Appellant had produced no supporting evidence of these claims in the form of documents or photographs including calling his wife who is with him in the UK to give oral testimony or even provide a witness statement. The Appellant’s account of when this happened is also inconsistent having stated in his witness statement at paragraph 14 that L told him about his home being ransacked whilst he was still in hiding in his father’s home but stated in cross-examination that it happened after he had fled Iraq.”
25. Then at 19 the Judge said,
“In my judgment, the Appellant’s account contains several significant inconsistencies, examples of which are set out above, resulting in him having failed to show, to the lower standard required, he is a credible and reliable witness.”
26. The Judge went on to deal with documentation matters and said at paragraphs 21 and 22 as follows:
“21. The Appellant stated that his wife only brought him his Iraqi passport when he was in hiding at his father’s house as she could not find his CSID card which was then lost when his home was ransacked. I reject this account as not credible and not reliable. The Appellant has failed to call his wife or provide any witness statement or sworn affidavit from her to support any part of his account. It is generally accepted that an Iraqi National’s most important document was their CSID prior to the introduction of the INID which replaced it. Without a CSID card an Iraqi National would not be able to access any social services or medical care, would not be able to find any employment and would not be able to safely go through any checkpoints. The Appellant must have kept it safe, either on his person or at home, in all likelihood with his passport and any other important official documents, for himself and his family members. On his own account, he had a copy of his CSID card on his mobile telephone which indicates the value he placed on it.
22. I conclude, on the evidence taken as a whole, that the Appellant is not a credible and reliable witness and has not shown, to the low standard required, that he either does not have his CSID card in the UK or, alternatively, that it was not left in safe keeping with his father in the IKR and that he cannot have it sent to him in the UK or be met with it on his arrival at Erbil airport.”
Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal and the Hearing Before Me
27. I turn then to the Appellant’s grounds of appeal. Those grounds were drafted by Ms Renfrew of Counsel and in summary they state:
(1) That the Judge had failed to apply the correct legal test to the issue of corroborative evidence and relation to the standard of proof.
(2) Ground 2 contends that there were speculative finding as to the plausibility/requiring evidence that the Appellant could not produce.
(3) Ground 3 contends that there was a failure to consider material evidence/apply anxious scrutiny.
(4) The findings on documentation CSID were wrong.
28. Ms Kalyan who appeared before the First-tier Tribunal and who appears today has provided her helpful speaking note which she has amplified during her submissions today. She has taken the opportunity to set out the grounds in a different order but it is still the same grounds which are relied upon and so I will refer to the grounds in the way in which Ms Kalyan has referred to them for ease in following this decision. It means that the grounds do not immediately appear to reflect the numbering as originally set out. Ms Kalyan submits orally and in writing that the most striking error is at paragraph 16 of the Judge’s decision because on the one hand the Judge accepts that the Appellant was shot yet the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s account because a person intending to kill him “would have shot again”. The complaint here by Ms Kalyan is that this was pure speculation on the Judge’s part untethered from evidence and it exemplified a fundamental misapplication of the law. Ms Kalyan relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Gheisari v Secretary of State [2004] EWCA Civ 1854 and in particular to paragraphs 10 and 12 where Sedley LJ said:
“The correct approach was twofold:
(i) However, inherently probable or improbable is the account; and
(ii) Whether despite improbability it might nonetheless be true.”
At paragraphs 20 to 21 Pill LJ reiterated that accounts should not be dismissed simply for appearing improbable and that this principle was reaffirmed in HK v Secretary of State [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 when Neuberger LJ, as he then was, cautioned against the “danger of over readily characterising accounts as implausible” and Ms Kalyan says that what seems unlikely in the UK, may be commonplace elsewhere.
29. Ground 2 contends that there was an unlawful approach to corroboration. The complaint here by Ms Kalyan is that paragraphs 10, 16 and 18 of the Judge’s decision show where the Judge had rejected the Appellant’s account because there was no evidence from the Appellant’s wife or from the Appellant’s friend and that this was a misdirection in law. Ms Kalyan contends Karanakaran v Secretary of State [2000] 2 All ER 449 was not followed. Ms Kalyan also contends that the more recent decision of the Court of Appeal in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State [2023] EWCA Civ 216; [2023] Imm. A.R 713 was not followed either. Underhill LJ had at paragraph 86 had emphasised that Tribunals must not reject an account merely for lack of independent supporting evidence. Indeed Ms Kalyan goes further to say that in any event the Judge did not engage with the Appellant’s explanation for absence of the evidence nor with the practical safety barriers to obtaining corroboration from family members abroad and, in effect, says Ms Kalyan, the Judge had impermissibly elevated the standard of proof treating the lack of corroboration as determinative.
30. In Ground 3, Ms Kalyan contends there was a failure to consider material evidence or there was a lack of anxious scrutiny. Here she refers to the Court of Appeal’s decision in JA (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State [2014] EWCA Civ 450; [2014] 1 WLR 4291 that there is a clear difference between screening interviews which are not reliable indicators of credibility because they are often conducted in haste often without legal advice and with interpreter or interpretation difficulties but here the Judge had dismissed that explanation.
31. Similarly, it is argued that at paragraph 40 Ms Kalyan contends that the Judge erred in relation to how the Appellant might have escaped from his attacker giving no reasons at all because. This was wrong because the principle of anxious scrutiny applies and the decision in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte, Bugdaycay [1987] AC 514 which was then reaffirmed in R (on the application of) YH v the Secretary of State [2010] EWCA Civ 116; [2010] 4 ALL ER 448. Paragraph 24 highlighted that anxious scrutiny signals the heightened responsibility of Tribunals and asylum cases. It is submitted here by Ms Kalyan that the absence of reasoning means the determination falls below the necessary standard because Tribunals are required to apply anxious scrutiny considering the full body of evidence and the nature of the Appellant himself or herself.
32. Ground 4 contends that there was irrationality in respect of the documentation. It said that the Judge at paragraph 22 was simply wrong to say the CSID was in safekeeping with the Appellant’s father but the unchallenged evidence before the Tribunal was that the Appellant’s father was deceased. It is said that this was not a mere slip, it was an irrational finding. The possession or loss of documentation was central to the question of whether return to Iraq was feasible and safe and that here the irrational misstatement of evidence on so fundamental an issue materially affects the outcome.
33. The written submissions in the speaking note, as I say, were amplified during the hearing before me and it will do no justice to those submissions to repeat them again in this decision.
34. On behalf of the Secretary of State Ms Young had relied on a Rule 24 response. That states in summary that the Appellant had made no attempt to substantiate his claim and indeed there is an expectation, it is said, that a claim will be substantiated and reference is made to paragraph 339L(i) and (ii) of the Immigration Rules. That sets out, it is said, what is expected of claimants.
35. The Rule 24 also says:
“The appellant was legally represented, so ought to have been aware that he would have to support his claim with evidence or provide explanations. He did neither.”
36. Insofar as the ground relating to speculative findings is concerned the Rule 24 response says:
“the Judge, who heard the Appellant give evidence, evaluated the Appellant’s claim and found several important aspects of it wanting. He considered all controversial matters in the round and reached conclusions that were open to him”.

and in respect of grounds 3 and 4 the Rule 24 says:
“These grounds are disputes about the weight given to certain strands of the evidence by the judge and a challenge to the findings about the likelihood of the appellant being able to retrieve or renew his identity documents within a reasonable period. Matters of weight are for the trial judge. The judge’s findings were rationally open to him. If follows that the appellant’s evidence as a whole was unreliable so it was open to the judge to conclude that the appellant was not giving accurate information about his ability to obtain identity documents.”
Further Analysis and Consideration
37. I return to what I had said at the beginning of this judgment in relation to the role of a Judge on appeal hearing this matter. It is worth stressing that I am not rehearing the matter. I have to remind myself that mere disagreement is not sufficient to enable me to overturn the Judge’s decision. I have to remind myself that it is the Judge who had the benefit of hearing from the Appellant, his witness and indeed from his Counsel at that hearing.
38. I have referred to the case law and I remind myself again that there must be appropriate discipline in relation to accepting the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal.
39. As I said at the outset, the aspect which has troubled me significantly was, there was, as the Judge put it, compelling evidence that the Appellant had been shot, including video evidence and the screen shots. One can see the injury but, in my judgment, it is necessary for me to remind myself that the decision of the Judge needs to be read as a whole.
40. When, read as a whole, in my judgment the Judge’s decision leads to the following inevitable outcome, when applying the most anxious scrutiny to the case.
41. The grounds as drafted appear in a different numbering from the way they were put before me by Ms Kalyan. I deal Ground 4 in respect of the documentation issue and the aspect relating to the Appellant’s deceased father. Ms Kalyan is entirely correct; there was reference within the Appellant’s witness statement to the Appellant’s father being deceased. However, it is necessary to read the decision as a whole because here the Judge, when dealing with this aspect at paragraphs 21 and 22 made clear that,
“I conclude, on the evidence taken as a whole, that the Appellant is not a credible and reliable witness and has not shown, to the low standard required, that he does not have his CSID card in the UK or, alternatively, that it was not left in safe keeping with his father in the IKR and that he cannot have it sent to him in the UK or be met with it on his arrival at Erbil airport.”
42. So, the starting point is that the Judge had rejected the Appellant’s account and said he did not accept that the Appellant was a credible or reliable witness. The Judge had also said earlier at paragraph 21 that he did not accept the Appellant’s version of where it is that the CSID was and the Judge had set out an extensive detail why he did not think the Appellant had given a truthful or reliable account.

43. In the circumstances, in my judgment, even if this part of the Judge’s decision could have been put even more clearly, in my judgment, this was the end of the judgment and read as a whole, the decision and reasoning in respect of the CSID and documentation was sufficiently clear, well-reasoned, rational. This ground is not one which shows a material error of law. The Judge was stating that the Appellant was not believed about his claim and he can access his documentation, whether here in the UK or from Iraq. In any event, even if I am wrong and the Judge did consider that the Appellant’s father was not deceased, read as a whole, the Judge found that the Appellant’s CSID/documentation could be accessed. Therefore, this ground of appeal does not succeed.
44. I then consider the remaining three grounds of appeal.
45. In my judgment, insofar as the Ground 2 relating to speculation and implausibility is concerned, whilst the case law cited by Ms Kalyan is entirely correct and is of some standing, a proper reading of the Judge’s decision as a whole shows that the Judge had not speculated and nor did he impermissibly rely on implausibility. Whilst the Judge has not cited the caselaw, he did adhere to it. The Judge had considered how inherently probable or improbable the Appellant’s account was and whether despite that improbability, the Appellant’s account might nonetheless be true.
46. That is because the Judge made clear through the whole of the decision that the Appellant had proved with compelling evidence that he had been shot. It was the explanation provided by the Appellant in terms of what had occurred leading to shooting and the extramarital affair that the Judge said he did not accept. The Judge explained with clear and permissible reasoning that, the Appellant having fled from Z’s home (itself curious as the Appellant claimed he was dressed in bed) the assailants who were out to kill him only shot him in the leg. The Judge was entitled to come to that decision that he did not accept that as true. The Judge came to that view having heard from the Appellant and from his witness. The Judge noted the background material that honour based violence exists. Nor did the Judge accept the evidence about the Appellant’s friend “L” with adequate reasoning.
47. Ground 1 also perhaps overlaps with the Ground 2 in relation to corroboration. I conclude that whether taken together or cumulatively, this ground is not made out either. That is because in my judgment the Judge was not seeking corroboration. I come to this view because the Judge’s decision does not breach MAH (Egypt) principles. The Judge was quite entitled to enquire why the Appellant’s wife had not provided, at the very least, a witness statement or an affidavit. That was so even if she was not able to attend the hearing. Indeed, it has to be remembered that the Appellant’s wife was the second Appellant in the case. This was not a case in which obtaining a witness statement/affidavit from the second Appellant was difficult, as has been explained in the Respondent’s Rule 24 and to which I referred earlier. Indeed, as submitted by Ms Young, the Appellant was legally represented by his solicitors and they ought to have prepared the case to deal with the matters which had been raised against the Appellants. The list of issues which I have cited already put credibility and the plausibility at the heart of this case. The Appellants knew the case they had to meet. The burden of proof remained on them. The hearing at the First-tier Tribunal was the hearing and not a forerunner for a later hearing at which new evidence could then be relied upon. I reject the submission that because the Appellant’s wife had to look after children or because she was new to the UK, then that might have prevented her from providing a witness statement or affidavit. Specialist solicitors are well used to taking witness statements from vulnerable persons, including women with children seeking asylum. The specialist First-tier Tribunal is also able to accommodate such witnesses and usually does.
48. Ground 3 contends that there was a failure to consider material evidence and that there was a lack of anxious scrutiny with particular reliance on the screening interview not being definitive. I am very familiar with JA (Afghanistan) and I am very familiar with the way in which screening interviews are rather short, sometimes they are rather rushed events.
49. It is necessary to see what the Judge actually said though. In my judgment here the Judge dealt significantly with how it was that the Appellant, who on the one hand claimed he was illiterate and did not know about dates, yet still provided different dates on different occasions. It is clear to me that when one reads fully paragraphs 10 to 12 of the Judge’s decision (which I read out previously), it is impossible even applying the most charitable interpretation to the Appellant’s evidence, how he managed to get it so badly wrong. The Appellant could not possibly be having an affair on the dates that he said was because he was not even in Iraq at the time. The Appellant was shown not to be a truthful or reliable witness and the Judge was perfectly entitled to come to that finding, even when noting that the events were described in the screening interview.
50. Putting it another way, the Judge had concluded that the Appellant had been ‘caught out’. There is a qualitative difference between an Appellant saying that they did not set out all of their case during the screening interview, compared with this Appellant who did set out his case, but whereby the Judge felt he could not accept his case because it was just impossible in view of the irreconcilable dates.
51. Further and importantly the Judge said at paragraph 12 of his decision that the Appellant said that he could not even remember when it was that he had actually left Iraq and, at paragraph 13, the Appellant was unable to remember even during a 2 week period of this extramarital affair, when it was that the relationship was discovered by Z’s father.
52. In my judgment this all indicates the Judge concluded that this was an Appellant who was simply making things up in terms of the detail because what the Appellant was saying was not true. That was even though the Appellant had the foundation of what appeared superficially to be a credible claim because there was compelling evidence of the Appellant being shot. As I said at the start of this decision, I have been troubled by how it could be that somebody who has compelling evidence of having been shot can fail in their asylum claim. In my judgment, having thoroughly considered matters, this is a very clear example of one such case. In my judgment the Judge has undertaken a detailed, thorough, lawful and complete assessment of the Appellant’s claim.
53. The very nature of hearings at the First-tier Tribunal is that the Appellants’ evidence is tested at the hearing. The burden of proof remains on the Appellants in such hearings. The issues are set out for all to see well before the hearing commences. Evidence and witness statements are submitted. The Appellants therefore knew what the issues were and what they had to prove. The Appellants were represented by competent solicitors and counsel. The Appellants failed to persuade the Judge in respect of their case.
54. Once the Judge dealt with the first 3 issues and once he found that the extra marital affair had not take place, the rest of the Appellant’s claim then fell.
55. It is not appropriate for me now to overturn the Judge’s decision so as to give the Appellants another opportunity to reargue their case or for there to be a rehearing. Nor would it be sufficient for me to merely disagree with the Judge’s decision. In the circumstances, as I have said already and paying tribute once again to Ms Kalyan who has said and done all that can be on behalf of the Appellants, this is case in which I conclude that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. Accordingly, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge, which led to a dismissal of the appeal stands in respect of both protection and human rights.
56. There continues to be an anonymity direction because the matter relates to a protection claim.
Notice of Decision
There is no material error of law in the decision of the First tier Tribunal.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellants’ appeals on human rights and protections grounds stands.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 August 2025