Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002838
PA/58234/2023
LP/02319/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
And

BC (GHANA) + 1
(anonymity order made)
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Diwnycz, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms Mair, Counsel instructed by Fisher Stone Solicitors

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 1 October 2025

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Respondent BC is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify her, any of her witnesses or any member of her family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings

DECISION and REASONS
1. The Respondent is a national of Ghana born in June 1991. Her dependent is her son, also a Ghanaian national, born in the United Kingdom in March 2019.
2. On 8 April 2025 the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Respondent’s case for protection, but allowed her appeal on human rights grounds. The Secretary of State now has permission to appeal against that decision.
3. The First-tier Tribunal began with the protection claim. It made a series of admirably clear and well-reasoned findings, rejecting much of what the Respondent had to say about why she feared return to Ghana. The Tribunal was prepared to accept that she had endured “some adverse childhood experiences” but discounted any risk to her on the basis that her son had been born out of wedlock: on previous information provided to the Home Office, she and his Czech father had been married when he was born. The Tribunal further accepted the evidence that the Respondent’s only close family in Ghana consisted of her sister who lived in a single-room rural dwelling with no running water, sanitation or electricity. The Respondent herself had been diagnosed with depression and had experienced some challenges in parenting her son on her own (his father has never been part of his life). The Tribunal accepted that she was unlikely to be able to access any support, for either her parenting or her mental ill-health, if she lived with her sister. Although there were not ‘very significant obstacles’ to her integration in Ghana such that the appeal should be allowed on Article 8 ‘private life’ grounds, these matters were relevant to the proportionality of the decision, in particular as it related to her son. Having had regard to the fact that the child was born and brought up in the UK, and had no experience of life in rural Ghana, the Tribunal found it to be strongly in his best interests to remain in the UK where he could continue his education and his mother could receive support where necessary. Balancing those matters against the public interest factors set out in s117B Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the Tribunal concluded that the decision was disproportionate, and the appeal was allowed on human rights grounds.
4. The grounds challenging those findings are particularised by the Secretary of State under the heading “Making a Material Misdirection of Law – Inadequate Reasoning - Private and Family Life under article 8”. Excluding those paragraphs of the grounds that simply recite the findings or set context, I deal with each point made in turn.
5. The grounds begin as follows:
“3. It is respectfully submitted that judge’s findings under article 8 outside the Rules, are significantly at odd’s with their own analysis of the appellant’s private and family life in the UK given also the lack of evidence to support it, and is a material error in law”.
6. Two points appear to be made here. The first is that the decision to allow the appeal is “significantly at odd’s” (sic) with the Tribunal’s own findings. I was unsure how to read this. It might be suggesting that the words ‘the appeal is allowed’ were an error and that the Tribunal in fact intended to dismiss it: if that is what is meant, I discount that possibility because it is clear from paragraphs 70 to 76 of the decision that the Tribunal consciously found the matters in the Respondent’s favour to outweigh the public interest. On another reading it might mean that the Secretary of State contends the decision to be perverse: before me Mr Diwnycz did not adopt that position, and indeed he could not: had it been the Secretary of State’s case that this was a claim which could not on any rational basis succeed, presumably it would have been certified under s94 NIAA 2002. That leaves the possibility that the Secretary of State is simply observing that much of the reasoning in the decision was adverse to the Respondent, and so it was. But that is no basis to interfere with the remaining findings which were not. The second point made in paragraph 3 of the grounds is that there was “a lack of evidence” to support the Tribunal’s findings. I am also unsure of what this means. It was not in dispute that the child had been born and brought up here and was attending school. The evidence about the situation that he and his mother would likely face in Ghana was set out in the Respondent’s witness statements, the opinion of a clinical psychologist and a country expert report. It is not therefore correct to say that there was a lack of evidence.
7. The grounds go on to acknowledge that the Tribunal quite properly adopted a balance-sheet approach and then say this:
“6. However, in weighing up the pros and cons, judge has failed to identify the strength of the appellant’s ties to the UK, other than her length of residence and birth of her son. There is no evidence that she is financially independent or has taken any steps towards further education or learning to assist her to find work to support herself and her son. It is unclear how she is in fact supporting herself, given also the child’s father has no input in his life.
8. This is simply incorrect. The Tribunal did consider all those matters, and as UTJ Keith observed in granting permission, in fact weighed them against the Respondent. At its paragraph 71 the Tribunal found there to be “no particularly strong features of the Appellant’s private life that would justify my attaching anything more than little weight to it”, a finding in accordance with s117B(5) NIAA 2002. Similarly the Respondent’s lack of financial independence is weighed against her at the Tribunal’s paragraph 69. As to it being “unclear” how the family are supported, the evidence before the Tribunal, unchallenged by the Secretary of State, was that they are supported by a charity called Shine, and that since the Respondent claimed asylum, had been given NASS accommodation.
9. The grounds next address the Tribunal’s findings on whether the Respondent would be able to access support for her mental health in rural Ghana, calling them “purely speculative and not based on any factual evidence”. Ms Mair has helpfully prepared a schedule of evidence in her Rule 24 response which demonstrates that this submission is factually incorrect. The Tribunal had before it a report by clinical psychologist Dr Kirsten Lamb, setting out the extent of the Respondent’s needs, and the Tribunal read this in line with a report by country expert by Dr Kerrie Thompson about the dire lack of provision in mental health. Ms Mair also points out that the Secretary of State’s own Country Policy Information Note, provided to the Tribunal, supported the conclusions reached by Dr Thompson. This was the evidence that the Tribunal had in mind when it concluded that the Respondent was unlikely to receive the support that she requires.
10. Finally the grounds address the finding that it would be contrary to the child’s best interests to remain in the UK:
“9. Judge has put forward the case that it is in the appellant’s child’s best interests to remain in the UK, having been born here and on the strength of attending primary school. However, the child has no status in the UK, as his mother, and further the child would have access to education in Ghana. He is still young enough to adjust to a change in environment and he would be with his mother and his aunt, which are protective factors. There is also no material evidence to suggest that the appellant’s son will be detrimentally impacted by leaving the UK with his mother, either from the school, medical evidence or social worker’s input”.
11. This ground is problematic for several reasons. First, the First-tier Tribunal is not “putting forward a case”. It is making findings. Second, there is no indication at all that the Secretary of State has ever disputed that it would be in the child’s best interests to remain in the UK. Third, the paragraph fails to identify an actual error of law: it is simply a series of submissions, which as I say, do not appear to have been made below. Finally it is again wrong to say that there was “no material evidence” to support the Tribunal’s conclusions. As I note above, it had before it expert medical evidence about the likely impact on the Respondent of removal, in the form of a report by Dr Lamb, and this was supported by country background evidence from Dr Thompson.
12. The final ground is that ‘a best interests’ finding in favour of granting leave is not determinative of the Article 8 balancing exercise. That is of course correct, but it has not been shown that this is what the Tribunal has done here. It has considered all of the material factors, including the public interest considerations, and has reached a properly reasoned conclusion, open to it on the evidence. It is not the decision that every Tribunal would have reached, but that is no grounds for this Tribunal to interfere with it.

Decisions
13. The appeal is dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to allow the appeal on human rights grounds is upheld.
14. There is an order for anonymity, made because the Respondent is a vulnerable witness, and to protect the identity of the Respondent’s child.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
3 October 2025