UI-2025-002839

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 17 Mar 2026
• Promulgation date: 24 Jul 2026
• Publication date: 17 Aug 2026
• Last updated on: 17 Aug 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002839
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55694/2023
LP/08582/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

24th July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS

Between

NI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs Turnbull instructed by Bristol Law Centre
For the Respondent: Mr Lawson, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 17 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants or the sponsor, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants and the sponsor. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

1. In an error of law decision dated 5 (annexed to this decision at Annex A), a Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 20 February 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim for the reasons given in that decision.
2. The appellant’s appeal now comes before me to be remade pursuant to s.12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
3. The first issue before the Upper Tribunal in this case is whether the appellant is a Syrian national, as he asserts, or an Iraqi national as asserted by the respondent. It is submitted by the appellant that either way, due to the appellant’s health conditions, he faces inhuman or degrading treatment on return to Syria or Iraq in violation of his Article 3 ECHR rights. It is also asserted that if the appellant is found to be a national of Iraq he is at risk because of a lack of documentation. It is conceded that he is no longer at risk for political reasons in Syria because of a change in country conditions. The final issue is whether there would be very significant obstacles or a disproportionate breach of Article 8 ECHR to return him to Syria or Iran.
Background and chronology of appeal
4. The appellant’s nationality is disputed. He entered the UK on 25 June 2013 and claimed to be a national of Syria. His claim for asylum was refused on 25 July 2013. The respondent did not accept that the appellant is a Syrian national based on his lack of knowledge of Syria and a Sprakab report which found that his accent was more consistent with him being a national of Iraq. The respondent asserted that the appellant was an Iraqi national. The appellant appealed against this decision and his appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal on 19 September 2013. The judge found that the appellant was not a Syrian national. The appellant lodged further submissions. His most recent submissions were lodged on 4 May 2022. He again asserted that he was Syrian and that he feared serious harm as a result of forcible conscription to the YPG The further submissions were refused on 9 April 2023 which is the decision to which this appeal relates.
Documentary evidence
5. There was a considerable amount of documentation before me including a 1086 page PDF bundle which included the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal. There was also a 49 page PDF supplementary bundle with up to date medical evidence and a schedule of country information evidence. I also had before me the latest CPIN on healthcare in Iraq.
Hearing
6. The appeal was held in a hybrid fashion. Mrs Turnbull attended in person, Mr Lawson attended on line. The appellant and a supporter viewed the proceedings from the representative’s office. There were no issues with communication and all participants were able to hear and see each other.
Oral evidence
7. The appellant did not give oral evidence before Judge Lester, having previously provided evidence from Dr Halari that he was unfit to give evidence. Several witnesses including Alan Ari, Emma Bulmer and Loriston Jeakings gave evidence before Judge Lester. In the error of law decision it was found that, since their evidence was recorded in Judge Lester’s decision and had not been challenged by the respondent, there would be no need for the witnesses to give further evidence. This appeal was listed to proceed by way of submissions only. Both parties agreed with this approach.
Submissions
8. Both representatives made lengthy submissions which are recorded in the record of proceedings and which I refer to when making my findings below.
Legal Framework
9. In respect of nationality, it is for the appellant to establish on the lower standard that he is a Syrian national. Since the respondent has asserted that the appellant is Iraqi it is for the respondent to establish on the balance of probabilities that the appellant is Iraqi.
10. In terms of the protection claim it is for the appellant to establish that there is a real risk to him of persecution or serious harm.
11. In respect of Article 3 health claims the question is whether the refusal breaches the appellant’s Article 3 ECHR right not to be “subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. The appellant must establish that he is a seriously ill person and adduce evidence capable of demonstrating that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that as a seriously ill person he would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy. The standard of proof is the lower standard.
12. The key test in Paposhvili v Belgium 41738/10 is set out at [183]; in AM (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17 at [23]; in Savran v Denmark 57467/15 at [130]. The test is helpfully summarised in AM (Art 3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 00131 as follows:
“In Article 3 health cases two questions in relation to the initial threshold test emerge from the recent authorities of AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 and Savran v Denmark (application no. 57467/15):

(1) Has the person (P) discharged the burden of establishing that he or she is “a seriously ill person”?
(2) Has P adduced evidence “capable of demonstrating” that “substantial grounds have been shown for believing” that as “a seriously ill person”, he or she “would face a real risk”:

[i] “on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment,

[ii] of being exposed

[a] to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering, or
[b] to a significant reduction in life expectancy?”

“It is only after the threshold test has been met and thus Article 3 is applicable, that the returning state’s obligations summarised at [130] of Savran become of relevance – see [135] of Savran”
13. I set out the legal provisions n respect of Article 8 when I deal with it below.
Findings
Nationality
14. Mrs Turnbull conceded, in the light of the most recent expert report by Dr Giustozzi in respect of Syria, that the appellant is no longer at risk in Syria from enforced conscription or from the YPG.
15. However, it is agreed by both parties that the question of the appellant’s nationality is important in this appeal because his Article 3 and 8 claims fall to be determined in the light of his nationality and which county he will be returned to. If he is found to be an Iraqi national, there is also the additional question of risk as a result of a lack of documentation.
16. On arrival in the UK on 15 June 2013, the appellant claimed to be Syrian. It is recorded in the asylum interview which took place on 15 July 2013 that he came from Jawadiyah. He said that he was stressed and worrying a lot, that he had not been in contact with his family and that he did not have his paternal uncle’s phone number. He said that his mother died when he was young and that he lived with his grandmother together with his father. He then lived with his father and his stepmother when his father remarried. He always lived in Jawadiyah. He also had a step sister. He said that Bashar Assad is in control of the whole country and he did not know which building was on the Syrian bank note, nor could he read the tablet or engravings.
17. In support of his asylum application he produced a witness statement dated 10 July 2013. In it he continued to assert that he was from “Al Jawadi”. He said his “native language is Kurdish Kurmanji”. In the respondent’s initial decision in 2013 the appellant was found to be an Iraqi national on the basis of the Sprakab report.
18. On 19 September 2013 First-tier Tribunal Judge Grimmet found that the appellant was not Syrian, that the appellant had not told the truth about his age and that he was an adult Iraqi. He also found that the appellant’s parents are not Syrian, he did not attend a demonstration in Syria and that his parents were not arrested. This is the starting point in this appeal in accordance with the principles in Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 00702.
19. The appellant has adduced further evidence of his nationality in the form of a Syrian ID document. On 14 February 2020, the appellant attended the further submissions unit in Liverpool. He submitted what is recorded to be “postal envelope, foreign document with translation, letters for support and medical materials”. It is also recorded that copies of documents were taken and were sent to the appellant with a covering letter on 24 February 2020.
20. The appellant’s further submissions dated 14 February 2020 were refused on 26 April 2021 with no right of appeal. In that decision letter, it is said that the appellant provided a letter from Mr Ahmad said to be a Syrian national and family friend (but with no identity document) and a handwritten undated letter from uncle Zikri which said “regarding the document you requested it’s been sent to you” ( with no supporting identity document). The respondent took issue with how the identity document was obtained and the reliability of the document. The respondent asserted that the envelope says the sender is “Mohammad Saeed Saeed” and not uncle Zikri. The respondent noted that there was no formal identification of those with the “witness” roles. Elements of the document appeared to be handwritten and other elements were printed. The respondent concluded that it was not possible to ascertain when the document was produced as it is not dated.
21. The appellant’s evidence in his statement for this appeal dated 9 July 2024 is that he obtained the document with the help of his uncle Zikri (who was living in Turkey) with whom he was in contact by Facebook and then WhatsApp. He no longer has access to the messages because it is so long ago. The document was sent by post from Syria and he was living with Alan Ari at the time. The appellant also said that he attempted to trace his uncle through the Red Cross in 2021 with the help of Emma Bulmer but he was not able to trace him. He said he was concerned about his uncle because his phone was switched off.
22. Alan Ari confirmed in his statement dated 20 June 2024 that an envelope was delivered to his address with Syrian stamps. The envelope contained some Arabic documents one of which bore the appellant’s picture. He accompanied the appellant to Liverpool to make the fresh claim.
23. I have not had sight of the original document. The document itself is entitled “identification certificate”. It bears a photograph which is unclear. It has the appellant’s name and parents’ names. Two witnesses Mohammed Omar and Ali Ahmed have confirmed that “the details and photo above is known by me and the details are correct and genuine”. This declaration was made on 1/10/2010. The document is signed and stamped by the village headman Ministry of local Administration and Environment Village headman (Mukhtar) of Hay Al Wahdah: Eyas Saeed Hassan, Al Hasakah Governorate- Al Malikiyah Town.
24. The verification report was not submitted with the further submissions dated 4 May 2022. Those submissions included the more recent language analysis which says that it is untrue and could be wrong “due to the mental health problems” the appellant is suffering from.
25. The verification report by Dr Guistozzi was prepared for the purposes of the appeal. It is dated 24 April 2024. He was provided with a scan of the identity document which he passed to his researcher in Damascus. She is a journalist and student of the Media Faculty at Damascus university.
26. He states “Ms. Alshikh sought to verify the identification certificate with the Civil Affairs Department of Al-Hasakah, which she visited on 23 April 2024. There she met Officer Muhammad Daib, who was tasked to handle external queries on that day. Ms. Alshikh handed over a copy of [the appellant’s] identification certificate to Mr. Daib and asked him to confirm whether the document is genuine. Mr. Daib took the copy and went to check it with the relevant department. He then confirmed that [the appellant’s] identity certificate is genuine”.
27. In his country report he states “I have organised the verification of [“the appellant’s” ID] which is positive”. The remainder of the report focuses on the situation in Syria. There is no examination of the document or opinion on the document by Dr Guistozzi himself.
28. In the respondent’s review dated 23 August 2024, the respondent said that the appellant has failed to offer any explanation as to what attempts he has made to try and retrieve the messages from his uncle on Facebook and that it also remains unknown how the uncle was able to obtain this document in order to send it to the appellant. Further the appellant did not explain why he was not able to produce this document when he first claimed asylum or at his first hearing in 2013. The respondent noted that no identification documents have been produced for the witnesses listed on the certificate. The respondent also submitted that there was no written evidence from Officer Muhammad Daib from the Civil Affairs Department of Al-Halakah to corroborate the above or what checks were made and no statement from Ms Alshikh or CV. The respondent also noted that there was a country expert report produced on the basis that the appellant is an Iraqi Kurd from Iraq.
29. In response to this review, the appellant provided Ms Alshikh’s CV, an email from Dr Guistozzi explaining why there was no written evidence from the Syrian authorities and two supplementary statements. The appellant clarified in a supplementary statement dated 29 August 2024 that it was his uncle who contacted him through Facebook. The appellant responded by providing his telephone number and then uncle Zikri contacted him through WhatsApp using his phone number. He then decided to delete his Facebook account with the help of Alan because he was worried about safety. He does not have access to it now. He cannot access the WhatsApp messages because he lost his phone. He has a new phone with a different number. He could not get his old number back. He could not get the registration certificate at the time he left the country because he had to quickly flee. His complex needs worker also recalls that the appellant lost his phone on 12 April 2023 and it was replaced on 13 April 2023.
30. At the appeal before Judge Lester the appellant’s friend Alan Ari gave oral evidence that he had spoken with the appellant’s uncle on messenger on the Facebook account of the appellant. He confirmed that he was present when the documents were received. He agreed he had no evidence about the Facebook account of messages.
31. The skeleton argument did not make any detailed submissions on the identity documents. Mrs Turnbull in submissions asserted that the Syrian document is reliable. The appellant has consistently said he is from Syria. The fact that there is no statement from the Syrian official is not material. Dr Guistozzi has confirmed that the Syrian authorities would not provide a written confirmation. Mrs Turnbull asks what more the appellant could do to establish his identity.
32. I have considered the evidence in respect of the identity document. I take into account that the appellant’s and Alan’s vagueness in their evidence in respect of contacting the uncle can be explained by the passage of time and the appellant’s poor memory. I note that no challenge was made to Alan’s evidence or Ms Bulmer’s evidence at the hearing. I am satisfied that documents were sent to the appeallant in an envelope bearing Syrian stamps.
33. However it remains the case that there is insufficient evidence before me of how the document was obtained from Syria by uncle Zikri who resides in Turkey, in 2020 (when the appellant claims to have received the document) when the document was witnessed in 2010. It is not the appellant’s evidence that he or his witness have made any attempt to contact uncle Zikri by Facebook (from anyone’s account) after the documents arrived 2020 to obtain this evidence despite the issue of provenance being raised in the refusal letter in 2021. There is also no explanation for why the appellant did not try to get more information from his uncle about why this did not happen, particularly since the phone was said to be lost in 2023, two years after the refusal. There is a lack of evidence of the provenance of the document. There is also a lack of evidence of the contact between the appellant and his uncle. Nor is there any evidence from the Red Cross about the tracing attempts.
34. I also take into account that the verification evidence of Dr Guistozzi is hearsay evidence. He is reporting a conversation that his researcher said she had with a third party. Although hearsay evidence is admissible in the Tribunal, there is no signed witness statement directly from Ms Alshikh which would add weight to her evidence and the evidence lacks detail in general. On this basis, I attribute little weight on the verification evidence. The fact that the Syrian authorities would not issue written confirmation is not an answer to the weaknesses in the evidence surrounding the identification evidence. I find that the verification evidence is not reliable to persuade me even to the lower standard that the identity document is genuine and proves that the appellant is of Syrian nationality.
35. I also take into account that Alan Ari’s more recent evidence. This is that he met the appellant in Bristol where there is close knit Kurdish community. He says he comes from the part of Kurdistan which is in Iraq although he does not recognise himself as Iraqi. He has never been to the Syrian part where the appellant is from. He and the appellant communicate in what is known as “the Voice of America Kurdish” dialect. This is a mix of Sorani and Bahdini and the phrase is well known by the Kurdish community”. I take into account that Alan genuinely believes the appellant to come from Syria but this belief is insufficient to satisfy me that the appellant is Syrian. (I also note from the language reports below that Kurmanji is spoken in Syria and Sorani and Bahdini in Iraq, so the fact that the appellant and Alan communicate in a mix of Sorani and Bahdini does not point to the appellant being Syrian).
36. Another argument is made by Mrs Turnbull when asking me to depart from the previous judicial finding that the appellant is a national of Syria. This is that the appellant’s lack of knowledge of Syria can be explained by his very poor mental health condition of which there was ample evidence before me in the form of GP notes and various medical reports. This evidence was not before First-tier Tribunal Judge Grimmet. Mrs Turnbull also submitted that there has been more recent caselaw giving guidance on the reliability of Sprakab reports but did not make detailed oral submissions on this. Further his poor mental health may have preventing him from engaging properly with the linguistic experts.
37. I will make findings on the medical evidence below when I come on to deal with the Article 3 ECHR health claim. In short, I accept that the appellant does have serious mental health conditions and that it is plausible that at the present time in 2026 he is unable to recall much information about his life in Syria. However I have read the copious medical evidence and I find that the appellant’s mental health deteriorated significantly after he arrived in the UK and because of his experiences in the UK. It was precipitated by living in shared accommodation with drug dealers and witnessing the murdered body of an individual who also shared accommodation as well as experiencing threats of violence. The appellant has also been affected by the uncertainty in his housing and immigration situation. I find that the appellant’s mental health was not as poor in 2013 on his arrival as it is now and I do not find that it was so poor that it would have prevented him from engaging properly with the linguistic expert at that time.
38. The problem in respect of the appellant’s assertion to be of Syrian origin is not however just his lack of knowledge of Syria, but the fact that two very comprehensive linguistic reports have been prepared in respect of the appellant, the first was a Sprakab report dated 16 July 2013 and the second a report by Dr Kawa Morad dated 2022. The first was prepared by the respondent and the second was prepared on the instructions of the appellant’s previous representative. They both conclusively come to the same overwhelming conclusion that the appellant is not from Syria. The Sprakab report found that the appellant is from Iraq with a very high degree of certainty and very unlikely that he is from Syria. This was because the appellant speaks Kurdish Bahdini at mother tongue level with influences of Sorani, commonly spoken in Iraq. He did not speak Kurmanji or use Arabic words which is common in Syria.
39. Dr Morad whose expertise was not challenged by the respondent as a result of his very impressive CV also found that “the grammatical, phonological and lexical features of [the appellant’s] speech are not consistent with his claim that he originates from Jawadiyyah in Syria”. He concluded that the appellant is assessed to be from Iraq also “with a high degree of certainty”. This is because among the Kurds of Syria, Kurmanji is the only variety of Kurdish spoken. The particular dialect of Kurmanji spoken in the area where the appellant claims to originate (Hasaka province) is Southern Kurmanji. Southeastern Kurmanji is the Kurmanji spoken by the appellant (which is also referred to as Bahdini). This is spoken in Duhok province and in the north-west area of Arbil governates in Iraq. Further, he commented on the fact the appellant did not know his own tribe which he characterised as “rather odd” because Syrian Kurds relate themselves to tribes or larger families.
40. Mrs Turnbull did not make a forceful attempt to discredit or challenge the findings of both of these linguistic experts (one of which was instructed by the appellant’s own representative) apart from referencing the caselaw on Sprakab reports in MN and KY [2014] UKSC 30 which criticised the Upper Tribunal’s guidance in RB(Somalia) v SSHD [2010] that where a reasoned linguistic analysis lead to an opinion in terms of near certainty, little more was required to support a conclusion. The Sprakab report was prepared by an Iraqi male born in Mosul who has also lived in Duhok. He lived in Sweden from 1997 and analyses Kurmanji, Kurmani and Badini. Dr Morad is a British Kurd of Syrian origin with a PhD in Kurdish studies and he is a native speaker of Kurdish and Arabic. He has experience of working and living in Iraq and interviewing Syrian refugees in Iraq. I find that both of these linguistic experts are suitably qualified and I have taken the reports in account. I do not accept that the appellant’s poor mental health would have affected the outcome of the reports in terms of linguistic analysis.
41. The appellant has never proffered any explanation for why his language is that of an Iraqi Kurd rather than a Syrian from Jawadiyah. He has not for instance claimed that he was born in Iraq and that his parents subsequently moved to that area or that he spent large parts of his life living in that area. In his asylum statement he said he spoke Kurdish Kurmaji and that the statement had been read back to him in Kurdish Kurmanji but the asylum interview was conducted in Sorani at the appellant’s request (question 7). In his asylum interview he said that his step mother was Syrian and spoke Arabic and Kurmanji and that he could not understand her well. When he was asked where he had learned to speak Sorani and Badini, he said that in “the area we live they were all Sorani speakers”. Later he said “My father was speaking Kurdish. All my friends who were Kurdish. Well we were speaking Sorani – all my family were speaking Sorani”. This is manifestly inconsistent with the linguistic reports which clearly state that in Syria, Kurdish Kurmanji is the dominant language.
42. I find that both of these reports are very persuasive and I place considerable weight on them. I find that the appellant’s lack of knowledge of Syria (including for instance the incorrect pronunciation of the President and his failure to recall any tribes from Jawadiyah) is because he is not a national of Syria. Although I accept that his mental health has deteriorated in the 13 years he has spent in the UK since his arrival, it was considerably better on 16 July 2013 when the Sprakab assessment took place. The examination took place within a month of him arriving in the UK and he could be expected at that point to have a better knowledge of the country he had claimed to grow up and from which he had departed from only a few months earlier.
43. Having considered all of the evidence in the round, I find that the new evidence is insufficient of me to depart from the previous judicial finding in respect of nationality. I find that the appellant has not demonstrated that he is a Syrian national to the lower standard. I find having considered all of the evidence in the round on the balance of probabilities that the appellant is an Iraqi national. I find that he claimed to be a Syrian national on arrival because at that point Syrian nationals were being granted asylum in the UK because of the situation in Syria and he was aware that he had a better chance of succeeding on his asylum claim if he were found to be Syrian. I also do not depart from First-tier Tribunal Judge Grimmet’s finding that the appellant was an adult on his arrival in the UK. I note here that I do not accept Mrs Turnbull’s submission that Judge Grimmet did not go so high as to say that the appellant was dishonest. The judge completely rejected the appellant’s claim and the clear inference was that he was not telling the truth.
44. These findings impact on the appellant’s general credibility because he continues to assert that he is Syrian and he has never accepted that he is an Iraqi Kurd, even though he is running his appeal in the alternative basis that he will be at risk if returned to Iraq.
45. I also emphasise that that it was not argued before me that appellant is so mentally well that he genuinely believes he is Syrian even though he is from Iraq.
Risk due to lack of Documentation in Iraq
46. In the refusal letter, the respondent assesses the appellant’s ability to return safely to Iraq in the light of SMO & KSP (civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC). It is trite that this is an intensely fact sensitive analysis. At the hearing the representatives discussed the possibility of a new country guidance case being promulgated shortly. In the event that country guidance has been set aside due to incorrect evidence being provided by the respondent. SMO is therefore the current guidance.
47. It is for the appellant to demonstrate that if returned to Iraq he will not be in possession of the necessary civil documentation or cannot obtain replacement documents within a reasonable timeframe. In order to travel through checkpoints he will need a CSID or INID. The INID is now replacing CSIDs and is the document now needed in order to access financial assistance from the authorities, employment, education, housing and medical treatment. To obtain this document he will need to attend the Civil Status Affairs Office where he is registered to enrol his biometrics including fingerprints and iris scans.
48. The position of the respondent is that the appellant has not demonstrated that he would be at risk because it is not accepted that he does not hold or that he would not be able to access a CSID with the assistance of family members. It is not accepted that the appellant is not in contact with his family because of the preserved finding that he is in contact with his uncle. The appellant can be returned direct to the IKR. In accordance with SMO1, Kurds who are not from the IKR can relocate there. Subject to security screening and registering his presence with the local mukhtar the appellant would be permitted to enter and reside in the IKR with no further legal impediments or requirements. There are no sponsorship requirements for entry or residence in any of the three IKR governates for Kurds. If the appellant has family in the IKR cultural norms would require the family to accommodate the appellant who would have sufficient assistance to lead a relatively normal life.
49. The appellant submits that he has no family to assist him and does not have a document. The expert report prepared by Dr George proceeds on the basis that the appellant is an Iraqi Kurd from KRG controlled Iraq, a Sunni Muslim with no documentation, no financial resources and no relatives in Iraq. He emphasises that in Iraq its societies are organised on family, tribal ethnic and religious bases. The report is of little assistance because it does not cover the factual scenario in which the appellant does have family in the IKR whom he can ask for support and assistance with documentation and accommodation.
50. Mrs Turnbull pointed me to the evidence that the appellant informed various health professionals in 2017, 2018 and 2020 that he had been told by his uncle that his parents had died and that this had caused him metal anguish. For instance on 19 October 2017 he said his xx and xx were killed in Syria about 3 or 4 years ago. He xxx to know about their death three months ago via messenger from his xxx who lives in Turkey. It was noted that initially he did not believe that his parents and (information redacted) died as he had not seen their body and his uncle only sent their death certificates. (I note here the appellant appears to have been in contact with his uncle in 2017 and that no death certificates have been produced). On 15 October 2018 he says to his GP “his parents have died and that he remains very distressed as per uncles message doesn’t believe It”. On 27 November 2018 he said that he was from Syria and that his parents died there. Dr Halari noted that the appellant did not mention in his assessment that his parents had been killed. She attributed this omission to years of avoidance and poor memory.
51. The appellant has always claimed to be Syrian. He has asserted that he has never held an Iraqi document such as a CSID because he is not Iraqi. He also asserts that he has no family in Iraq because he has never admitted to being an Iraqi Kurd. He has not been forthcoming about where he comes from in Iraq. He has given details of his father, stepmother, stepsister and uncle but says that they are Syrian. He claims that his parents are deceased and that he was told this by his uncle. He has not provided a full family tree or provided details of what family he left in Iraq and there is no evidence from his uncle in this respect.
52. Before First-tier Tribunal Judge Grimmet, his evidence was that he had had no contact with his family including his uncle. The Judge did not accept this and found that the appellant was likely to be in contact with his uncle after his uncle had arranged for him to leave the country. The appellant then claimed that his uncle was able to contact him around 2020 by Facebook and WhatsApp to assist him with obtaining documents. His evidence is that he can no longer contact his uncle because he has closed his Facebook account because it is too dangerous and he has a new phone number after losing his phone.
53. I do not accept his evidence that he cannot re-establish contact with his uncle. There is insufficient evidence that he has made any effort to do so by for instance searching for his uncle on somebody else’s Facebook account or opening a new account of his own. I do not accept his explanation that he closed his Facebook account because he is in danger. He has not asserted that he is in danger from the Iraqi authorities. I find that it is open to him to create a new Facebook account and search for his family or make enquiries through the Kurdish diaspora. He has also not produced any evidence from the Red Cross about tracing attempts despite his assertion that Ms Bulmer assisted him with contacting the Red Cross. Ms Bulmer in her supporting letters and oral evidence was silent on this issue apart from confirming that she has not discussed the appellant returning to Iraq because he says he is from Syria.
54. The appellant’s credibility is significantly impacted by his refusal to admit over the 13 years that he has been in the UK that he is an Iraqi national. I do not accept his evidence on this basis that he has no family at all in Iraq, even if his parents are deceased. I also do not accept that he is so unwell that he does not remember who his family are. This was not submitted and he addressed contact with his uncle in a recent statement.
55. The respondent accepts that the appellant is Kurdish. From the linguistic reports I find that it is likely that the appellant comes from Duhok province or the north-west area of Arbil governates. (This is also the view of Dr George based on that evidence). I find that the appellant can be returned directly to the IKR with a laissez- passer.
56. The appellant has not demonstrated to the lower standard that he does not have a surviving relative in Iraq who could meet him at the airport with his old CSID or accompany him to the Civil Status Affairs Office and assist him to obtain this document or an INID. Nor has he established that he does not have a relative who could accommodate and support him in Iraq.
57. Given his serious medical condition, I find that were the appellant to demonstrate to the requisite standard that he has no documents and no family to assist him at all or inadequately, he would be in a very difficult situation in terms of accommodation and financial support which potentially reach the Article 3 threshold in respect of living conditions. I find that he is not well enough to work and that it would be unduly harsh for him to live in a critical housing shelter without access to basic necessities even with a grant from the voluntary returns scheme because of his inability to manage his activities of daily living, budgeting and carrying out basic functions. He is not resilient or internally robust and it would not be possible for him to get by with support from charities or remittances from relatives abroad because of his high level of need from friends and professional support workers. However he has not persuaded me that he is telling the truth when he says he has no family to assist him.
Article 3 medical claim
58. Having found that the appellant is not a Syrian national I do not consider whether there would be a breach of Article 3 ECHR to return him to Syria because of the lack of treatment there nor do I consider Article 8 ECHR in the context of him being returned to Syria.
59. It is submitted in the skeleton argument that the appellant is a seriously ill person and that if he is removed from the UK there will be a substantial deterioration in his mental health because of his subjective fear of removal, leading to a poor short-term and long-term prognosis and an increase in suicidal thoughts and suicide. It is submitted that he will not be able to access support or help in Iraq because of the complexity of his mental health problems and his mistrust of other people. He will not be able to obtain meaningful treatment for his mental health. Mrs Turnbull elaborated on this, drawing my attention to the various reports on the diagnosis, the impact on the appellant of his ill health and how this impacts his ability to obtain treatment in the UK. She submitted that in the short term there would be an increase in suicidal thoughts and risk of self-harm. She submitted that this amounts to intense suffering. In Iraq the appellant would not have any protective factors. She also submitted that even with family support that the appellant would not be able to access the high level of support that he needs because of his mistrust and inability to engage. She did not address me on the authorities of MY (Suicide risk after Paposhvilli) 2021 UKUT 232 or address me on the principles in J v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 629 (as reformulated in Y (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 362. The case was not put on this basis. I also note here that the appellant’s trauma is not caused by any experience in his home country.
60. The respondent’s position in the review is that it is not accepted that the appellant does not have family or a support network in Iraq. The respondent relies on the CPIN on Medical and Healthcare provisions in Iraq which shows that treatment is available. He will have access to the healthcare system and treatment albeit not to the same standard as in the UK. It is also submitted that the fact that he is in a country where he has linguistic, social and cultural ties will contribute towards his recovery. The appellant’s trauma has been caused by experiences in the UK and he will benefit from being in Iraq. Mr Lawson submitted that the severity of the appellant’s illness does not meet the high Article 3 threshold.

Seriously ill person
61. There is a significant quantity of medical evidence in this case. This includes:
(a) Neuropsychological assessment by Dr Halari Chartered Consultant Clinical Psychologist
(b) Psychiatric report by Dr Galappathie dated 24 December 2023
(c) Evidence from Dr Hoban Clinical psychologist “Hope: Asylum Seekers and Refugee Trauma Service” (letter dated 5 June 2023 and report dated 29 January 2024)
(d) Letter from Dr Griggs Consultant Psychologist and manager “Hope: Asylum Seekers and Refugee Trauma Service” dated 12 July 2024
(e) Letters from Emma Bulmer complex needs worker 15 January 2024
(f) Letters from Loristan Jeakings
(g) GP records
62. I note here that the earliest medical evidence dates from October 2017 (GP records).
63. I find that the appellant has a number of complex and inter related medical issues. In this respect I have given weight to the medical evidence (which was not challenged) and in particular to the report of Dr Halari dated 1 July 2024 who in turn has had sight of GP records and the reports of Dr Galappathie and the earlier letter of Dr Hoban.
64. I set out an extract from the report below as it explains the complexity of the appellant’s mental health problems:
6.4.1 Having read the reports of Dr Galappathie and Dr Hoban, considered his medical records, result of psychometrics and my own assessment of Mr Ismail, I am of the view that Mr Ismail is presenting symptoms consistent with a diagnosis of complex PTSD, severe anxiety, and depression. The scores of the psychometrics tests across the assessments completed by professionals have largely been consistent, which suggests reliability in his self-reported symptoms.

6.4.2 Mr Ismail’s presentation can be understood as a complex interplay of his traumatic experiences prior to arriving in the UK, and then experiencing on going psychological (e.g. nightmares, avoidance), environmental (living arrangements, witnessing a murdered individual), and biological/medical (nose bleeds non epileptic seizures) trauma which has had a highly significant detrimental impact on his neurocognitive, psychological and emotional functioning to the extent that the constant avoidance and internalisation of his thoughts and experiences have exacerbated his anxiety and levels of stress, which have had a detrimental impact on his physical health, leading to non-epileptic seizures, headaches and nosebleeds.

6.4.3 I am of the view that Mr Ismail presents with learning difficulties and likely impairments associated with a neurodevelopmental condition, namely autism, which impacts his executive functioning, memory, language and communication and ability to regulate his emotions, leading to a complete shut down in the face of perceived stress, or pressure. It was evident in the assessment that Mr Ismail can misunderstand and misinterpret communication. Dr Galappathie’s view was that Mr Ismail is likely to have ASD.

6.4.4 I agree with Dr Galappathie that further evaluation of whether Mr Ismail has ASD should be conducted at the appropriate time….”
65. Dr Halari makes clear that the appellant’s mental health problems present as genuine and her opinion is that there is nothing to suggest that he is exaggerating, feigning or maligning.
66. I accept Dr Halari’s unchallenged diagnosis. I find that the appellant has complex PTSD, severe anxiety and depression. He also has poor memory, and is likely to have learning difficulties and ASD based on his preference for routines and finding loud noises irritating. He also has problems with his left leg as well as pain in his face as a result of a deviated septum.
67. The consequences for him of his poor mental health is that he is in constant avoidance, internalises issues, has poor executive functioning and is unable to regulate his emotions. He sometimes has suicidal ideation. His sleep is very poor and he has memory loss. He feels tearful, is forgetful, has poor appetite and has low mood. He is anxious and worried all the time. He also has flashbacks nightmares and distressing memories. The physical results are that he has non epileptic seizures in which he loses consciousness, headaches and nosebleeds. He also has difficulties with language and communication.
68. On this basis I find that he is a seriously ill person.
Current treatment
69. His current medication is sertraline 2 x 100mg tablets a day. He is also sometimes prescribed zopiclone to help him sleep. He also takes omeprazole for stress induced gastrointestinal issues. He is waiting for an operation on his septum.
70. He was referred to the Hope Service on 7 September 2022 and attended three out of nine sessions. He engaged in phase 1 of treatment by attending the seven-week MOAT (moving on from trauma course). He attended four out of the seven sessions. He struggled to maintain engagement. He then disengaged with “recovery” a secondary intensive mental health support service. He is not currently receiving therapy.
Recommended treatment
71. Dr Galappathie’s opinion is that the appellant needs long term psychological support and that this with assurances he will not be removed from the UK he is likely to have a good short term and long-term prognosis. It will however take several years for him to be able to meaningfully recover.
Impact on daily life
72. I accept the evidence that all of these issues impact upon his daily life, that as a result he is a mistrustful of people and is highly dependent on those who assist him particularly Alan Ari.
73. Alan Ari’s evidence is in his witness statements and unchallenged evidence before Judge Lester. In summary Alan used to share accommodation with him. He assists the appellant to attend medical appointments and to go out and socialise. He assists the appellant with activities of daily living such as brushing his teeth, hygiene as well as budgeting, shopping and prepares his meals. He prompts the appellant to take his medication.
74. Mr Loriston Jeakings is a mental health engagement worker who attended the hearing before Judge Lester. His evidence is also set out in his witness statements and his unchallenged oral evidence is recorded in the decision of Judge Lester. His service is commissioned by the NHS to work with individuals who have significant and enduring mental health issues and who face barriers in engaging with mainstream statutory mental health services. In summary, his evidence is that there was a change in medication following a medical review on 18 December 2024 because the appellant was using his medication chaotically and sometimes doubling the doses. The appellant has issues with basic tasks such as preparing meals, personal care and hygiene. The appellant has problems with impulsive spending and difficulties with budgeting. The appellant has a constructive support network which consists not only of Alan but friends and acquaintances of Alan. His support network masks significant challenges which the appellant faces on a daily basis. Mr Jeaking’s opinion is that the appellant is vulnerable to exploitation.
75. Ms Emma Bulmer is a qualified social worker working for Bristol Refugee Rights. Her role is that of a complex needs caseworker. She has provided detailed written evidence and also gave oral evidence before Judge Lester. She has been working with the appellant from 20/21 until around May or June 2024. She said his support needs during this had been very high and he was the only active adult on the safeguarding radar. She said he had suicidal ideation, memory and sleep issues, that he required a lot of reassurance and struggled with assessment services. She said he finds appointments difficult and that he was often reliant on his friends getting him to appointments.
76. Within her letter she describes how the appellant is mistrustful of people and professionals and that it takes time to establish a rapport with the appellant and gain his trust which she has managed to do. She also describes difficulties which she has seen firsthand of the appellant trying to engage with other professionals in meetings or attempting to access services even those which he has considerable experience of. She says that the appellant does not always seek help and is often reliant on others to take action for him on his behalf.
77. Ms Bulmer describes the appellant existing in a “multi-facted cycle of trauma and fear”. She says:
“Having lived with uncertainty about his future for such a long time, he has an enduring inability to feel safe, a condition that is now constantly triggered by the significant stress of the asylum process. He survives on minimal sleep as his mind is constantly consumed by rumination and flashbacks that erode his memory sleep, as his mind is constantly consumed by rumination and flashbacks that erode his memory and concentration. The cognitive toll combined with episodes of psychogenic non-epileptic seizures and a severely lowered distress tolerance, means that functioning day-to-day is a significant task, and focusing his attention beyond his day-to-day survival is very challenging”.
78. I find that the appellant’s difficulties in his day to day functioning are as described by the above individuals who have a good knowledge of the appellant and frequent contact with him. I accept that the appellant is a very vulnerable individual who requires significant assistance with day to day functioning and accessing healthcare. I also find that he does have the capacity to build trusting relationships with others including his friend Alan Ari and his support worker Ms Bulmer. From the evidence I also find that he has other friends in Bristol, and is able to accept support from members of Alan Ari’s family.
Will the appellant will be exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy because of the absence of treatment or a lack of access to treatment
Availability of treatment in Iraq
79. In the refusal letter, the respondent quotes sections of the CPIN Iraq; Medical and Healthcare Provisions: January 2021. This has now been updated and the latest CPIN is dated August 2024. In summary, the quality and availability of healthcare throughout Iraq is low although it is slightly better in the IKR. There are four specialised psychiatric hospitals in the Kurdistan region. There is a lack of personnel and a severe scarcity of mental health experts. There has been a gradual reduction in the stigma associated with mental health. Anti-depressant medication is available. Dr George also provides a brief paragraph on the limited public services available. I did not understand the appellant’s submissions to be that mental health treatment is not available, rather that the appellant would not be able to access it.
80. I find that the medication that the appellant is currently receiving in the UK in terms of medication is available in Iraq. I find that the highly specialised therapy that the appellant has received in the UK is not available in Iraq. However I note that the appellant is not currently receiving therapy and that although the appellant has been offered services in the UK that even with support he has not fully engaged.
Access to treatment
81. Dr Galappathie was asked if the appellant’s mental health would pose a barrier to him accessing treatment in practice.
82. He responded:
“In my opinion, if Mr Ismail is removed from the UK, he is likely to suffer from a deterioration of his mental health, leading to worsening depression, anxiety, and PTSD, in the manner which is described previously in this report, and in my opinion, it is unlikely that he would be in a position to access support and help, and thus engage with the recommended treatment, even if this was available for him in Iraq. In my opinion, being returned to the country, where he claims he is not from and where he fears being unable to take care of himself and living in fear, would be highly distressing and traumatising for him, would worsen his mental health, and make him feel unsafe such that he could not take part in the treatment that he requires. In my opinion, he needs to feel safe and secure to engage and benefit from the treatment that he requires, and this would not be possible if he was removed to Iraq.

In my opinion, if the treatment that he requires was available for him in Iraq, this would help mitigate against the deterioration in mental state that would occur, however, in my opinion, his subjective fear of being removed would still cause his mental health to deteriorate, even if the treatment that he requires was available and he could access this treatment. It is notable that he has a very well established network of support in Bristol, UK and is likely to feel very distressed being separated from this network of support and is likely to be at risk of putting himself in very vulnerable situations if he was removed, especially as he chose to be homeless and repeatedly refused accommodation in the UK that he did not think was suitable for him. ( my emphasis)
83. This opinion is premised from the starting point that the appellant is not Iraqi, does not come from Iraq and would be living in fear. It is not clear whether the doctor appreciates that the support would come from his own family.
84. The basis on which the expert forms his views undermines the weight I can give to this opinion.
85. The ability of the appellant to access treatment will depend on what support is available to him in Iraq. It is for the appellant to demonstrate that he will not be able to access treatment. I accept that if he has no support at all this will be difficult if not impossible because of his inability to function on a day to day basis and in these circumstances he would not have access to treatment. If, however he had family members to assist him, they might be able to help him in the same way as his friend Alan Ari does in the UK, by assisting him to order and collect prescriptions, make appointments with the doctor, take him to appointments and prompt him to take medication, assist him to eat and socialise and generally look after him. I do not accept Mrs Turnbull’s submission that the appellant will not be able to access treatment even with the support of family, and that he would need professional support because it is clear from the evidence that it is the appellant’s friend who is the main person assisting him with accessing and prompting the appellant to take medication.
86. The appellant has not been forthcoming about what support he has in Iraq. He has not made a full disclosure of his existing close and extended family or provided any evidence of attempts to contact his uncle or stepsister. Red Cross tracing is available. His support network provides him with a huge amount of support in every other aspect of his life and it is not explained in the evidence why no-one has attempted to help him to trace his family (either in Syria or Iraq). He has failed to demonstrate on the lower standard that he has no support in Iraq and therefore no access to treatment. It is for him to demonstrate ether that he has no family, or that the family and networks he has in Iraq cannot provide him with the assistance he needs.
Impact on appellant if he is returned to Iraq
87. Dr Galappathie states in his report dated 24 December 2023:
“In my opinion, if Mr Ismail is removed to Iraq, his mental health is likely to deteriorate, as a result of his subjective fear of being removed. He fears he would have no support if he was removed to Iraq. He feels that he would be an easy target and would be detained and killed by the Iraqi authorities. In my opinion, he would suffer from worsening depression, anxiety, and PTSD. The deterioration would be more rapid, if he did not have access to the treatment that he requires. In my opinion, his subjective fear of removal, is likely to cause a substantial deterioration in his mental health, leading to a poor short-term and long-term prognosis and an increase, in suicidal thoughts, leading to a high and real risk of self-harm and suicide. (my emphasis)
88. He also states:
“In my opinion, if Mr Ismail were to be removed to Iraq, his mental health and general well-being is likely to deteriorate, as a result of his subjective fear of being removed from the UK to Iraq. In my opinion, if he were removed to where he outlines, he has no support and would live in fear, he is likely to suffer from worsening depression, anxiety, and PTSD, that would rapidly deteriorate within a matter of hours of days. Mr Ismail’s depression is likely to deteriorate, leading to worsening low mood, difficulty sleeping, tiredness during the day, loss of interest in activities in life, poor appetite, tearfulness, worsening poor concentration and memory, worsening despondency and hopelessness, and an increase in hearing voices. This would also lead to worsening anxiety related symptoms, worsening PTSD related symptoms, including an increase in the frequency of his flashbacks and nightmares. He is also likely to suffer from the development of thoughts about self-harm and suicide, leading to a potential risk of self-harm and suicide occurring if he were to be removed to Iraq.(My emphasis)
89. I recognise that the view of Dr Galappathie is that removal would lead to a high and real risk of self-harm and suicide and that he has come to this view after a comprehensive examination of both the appellant’s medical records, reports including Dr Hoban’s and his own examination. I repeat however that Dr Galappathie’s opinion above is premised on the basis that the appellant would have no support because he would be returning to a country he has never lived and that he would be at risk in that country and thus living in fear.
90. The opinion of Dr Hoban is as follows:
“It is highly likely that a removal to Iraq, where Mr Ismail has said he has never lived, would be detrimental for his mental health. What we know about Mr Ismail’s mental health is that positive symptoms of PTSD increase with stress, and therefore any threat of or actual removal are highly likely to trigger both. Using a PTSD formulation, an increase in perceived sense of threat will trigger an increase in PTSD symptoms such as hyper arousal, intrusions, negative beliefs and mood, avoidance and dissociation. As dissociation is a shut down of the body, beginning with a feeling of exhaustion, inability to speak coherently, a feeling of being out of the room looking in and at worse, a loss of orientation to time and space, I believe Mr Ismail will be highly vulnerable to harm when experiencing high levels of dissociation in a foreign country with no support”.

“Mr Ismail’s experience of anxiety is centred on worries and stress about being removed from the UK and how he would survive. The experience of anxiety is contributed by the following factors: a person’s perceived ability to cope by how likely they expect threat to occur (internal resources) and the availability of external resources to be able to cope with said threat. Mr Ismail strongly believes that both internal and external resources for support are low and that leaving the UK would mean a strong likelihood of danger, as such a move to Iraq is likely to increase his experience of anxiety. This is in agreement with Dr Galappathie’s comments about the likely exacerbation of symptoms of anxiety, depression and PTSD if moved to Iraq.
91. This opinion is also based on the premise that the appellant has never lived in Iraq and has no family there. Similarly Dr Hoban at 4.7.2 does not engage properly to the question of whether the appellant can access treatment if support is available, referring to him moving to a place where he has no family/friends and to a culture he is not from.
92. Mr Jeakings says that if the appellant is returned to Iraq he would have serious concerns about his ability to survive and access adequate support. My immediate concern would be him acting on his suicidal ideations. Mr Ismail’s talk of suicide has been escalating in response to a negative outcome of his asylum appeal, and while some of these thoughts can be framed through the lens of a coping mechanism, the situation changes when you remove the protective factors (Alan’s network of support) and any remnants of hope that exists (him being granted asylum). This significant factor in combination with his propensity to dissociate, would lead me to believe that suicide is a genuine and probable risk.
93. This opinion is also premised on the basis that the appellant will have no protective factors in terms of a network of support in Iraq and that he will not be able to survive because he has no family.
94. I have carefully considered all of the evidence on the risk of suicide. I note that he expressed that he might as well kill himself in 2021 and that he was assessed in 2022. At that time he was said to have unspecified thoughts of suicide but with no intent and not of an active nature. At one point in 2023 he took ten tablets when he had an adverse decision on his immigration claim. On another he took a double dose of tablets. He was not hospitalised and he has not been sectioned. These are the only deliberate attempts I can find reference to. There is further reference to suicidal thoughts in 2023. I take into account Mr Jeakings opinions and those of Dr Galappethie and the concerns raised by other support workers. I do not find that the evidence, given the underlying assumptions about the lack of support in Iraq, is strong enough to persuade me that there is a real risk that the appellant will end his life ( a completed act of suicide) either on being informed of the negative decision nor in the event of being removed.
95. I am not therefore satisfied that the appellant has met the burden of demonstrating that the mental health treatment he requires is not available nor accessible. Although I accept that his mental health would deteriorate if returned to Iraq, he has also not demonstrated on the evidence that there would be a significant shortening of his life expectancy or that he will be exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in the state of his mental health resulting in intense suffering. I find that it would not be a breach of Article 3 ECHR on medical grounds to remove the appellant to Iraq.
Article 8 ECHR
96. Article 8 ECHR states as follows:
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
97. In so far as he relies on Article 8 ECHR, it is for the appellant to show that article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under article 8 of the ECHR outside the rules.
98. It is agreed that the appellant has private life in the UK because he has lived in the UK for 13 years, and receives medical treatment. He also has a close relationship with Alan and his family and his support workers, especially Ms Bulmer. Article 8 has a low threshold of engagement. I find that Article 8(1) is engaged in respect of his private life.
99. It is agreed that the respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights claim causes an interference in the appellant’s enjoyment of his private life to the extent that he will not be able to access medical treatment. The likely consequences of the interference are sufficiently serious to engage Article 8(1).
100. There is no dispute that the decision was made in accordance with the law or in pursuit of a legitimate aim.
Proportionality
101. The immigration rules reflect where the Secretary of State considers the balance of proportionality to lie. If the appellant can demonstrate that he meets the immigration rules this will be determinative of the appeal.
102. The appellant arrived in the UK in 2013. He has been living in the UK for 13 years. He has not been living in the UK for a continuous period of 20 years. He cannot meet the immigration rules in respect of long residence.
103. I turn to whether there are very significant obstacles to the appellant reintegrating in Iraq. He has been absent from Iraq for 13 years and he claims to have no contact with anyone there or family in Iraq. The appellant’s age as assessed by the respondent is 31. I have taken into account the medical evidence and made extensive findings on the limitations of the appellant’s ability to function. If he had demonstrated that had no family in Iraq who could assist him or family who could not adequately assist him, I would not hesitate to find that there would be very significant obstacles to integration. I repeat my earlier comments about the lack of evidence about the appellant’s family or his previous life in Iraq. It is for the appellant to show that whatever family or support network he does have in Iraq cannot help him find accommodation, support, medication assist with activities of daily living and assist him to socialise. If he is able to build up a network of support in the UK where he does not have family or linguistic ties, he should be able to do the same in Iraq if he can access family /a network of support.
104. The appellant has not adduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there are very significant obstacles to his integration.
105. I turn to the final limb of the test in R (Razgar) v SSHD [2002] UKHL 27. I consider the factors weighing in favour of the public interest and in favour of the appellant’s private life holistically in the round.
106. In cases where the claimant resists removal to another state on health grounds failure under Article 3 does not necessarily entail failure under Article 8.
107. In GS (India) & Ors (Article 3 and Article 8) [2015] EWCA Civ 40, it was held that the absence or inadequacy of medical treatment even life preserving treatment in the country of return cannot be relied on at all as a factor engaging article 8. If that is all there is the claim must fail. Secondly where article 8 is engaged by other factors, the fact that the appellant is receiving medical treatment in this country which may not be available in the country for return may be a factor in the proportionality exercise but that factor cannot be treated as by itself giving rise to a breach since that would contravene the no obligation to treat principle [801].
108. The immigration rules reflect the Secretary of State’s view of where the balance of proportionality lies. The appellant has failed to satisfy the immigration rules in any category. I give this factor weight.
109. The appellant has lived unlawfully in the UK since 2013 for a period of 13 years. Little weight should be given to private life when it was built up when the appellant’s immigration status was precarious or unlawful. His asylum claim has also been found to lack credibility. I therefore give his private life little weight in accordance with 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
110. The appellant speaks some English, but this is a neutral factor. The appellant is not currently financially independent in that he receives support and accommodation from the Home Office. His friend also supports him. He is reliant on NHS treatment and currently not fit to work and his presence in the UK entails the use of public resources, which is not in the public interest.
111. I set against these factors the appellant’s length of residence in the UK for 13 years. I take into account the fact that during this time, he has not been forthcoming about his true nationality which has contributed to the delay in resolving his immigration status. I take into account the strong ties that he has with Alan Ari, his friends and his support workers.
112. I take into account that the appellant has very serious mental health problems which impact him on a daily basis and that his support network in the UK assists him to function. However I have found that there is some treatment available for his conditions and I am not satisfied that he does not have access to any treatment in Iraq. I have found that his removal to Iraq will not cause him a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.
113. Having considered all of the factors holistically in the round, I find that the removal from the appellant from the UK would not result in unjustifiably harsh circumstances such that there is a disproportionate interference in the appellant’s right to respect of private life.
114. The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

Signed R J Owens Date 16 July 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Owens


Appendix 1




IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002839
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55694/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMEATON

Between

NI
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Turnbull, counsel instructed by Bristol Law Centre
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 December 2025


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant claims to be a citizen of Syria. The Respondent maintains that he is a citizen of Iraq. His date of birth is also in dispute.
2. He appeals, with the permission of the Upper Tribunal (‘UT’) (Judge Kamara) against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) (Judge Lester) promulgated on 20 February 2025. FTTJ Lester dismissed his appeal against the Respondent’s refusal dated 9 April 2023 of his protection claim made on 4 May 2022.

Background
3. The Appellant entered the UK without valid leave on 25 June 2013 and claimed asylum. He claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution in Syria because of his actual or imputed political opinion.
4. The claim was refused on 25 July 2013. The Respondent did not accept that the Appellant was a Syrian national, as claimed. The Respondent maintained that the Appellant was an Iraqi national and could safely be removed there.
5. The Appellant appealed to the FTT. His appeal was heard by FTTJ Grimmett and dismissed in a determination dated 13 September 2013. FTTJ Grimmett found that the Appellant was a Syrian national and was not at risk in Iraq.
6. The Appellant lodged further submissions on three occasions between 2013 and 2022, the last of which, made on 4 May 2022, are the subject of this appeal. The Appellant continues to maintain that he is a Syrian national. He claims:
a. To be at real risk of persecution because of his imputed political opinion
b. To be at risk of forcible conscription by the Syrian government or the YPG
c. To be at real risk of serious harm in Syria
d. That his removal would breach article 3 ECHR on medical grounds
e. That removal would be a disproportionate interference with his rights under article 8 ECHR.
7. The further submissions were refused by the Respondent on 9 April 2023. The Respondent continues to assert that the Appellant is an Iraqi national and maintains that he can be safely returned there.
The appeal to the FTT
8. The Appellant appealed against that refusal to the FTT. His appeal was heard by FTTJ Lester and dismissed in a decision promulgated on 20 February 2025.
9. FTTJ Lester:
a. Acknowledged the previous decision of FTTJ Grimmett and the guidance in Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 000702
b. Noted that there were two areas of evidence which could entitle the FTT to revisit and overturn the decision of FTTJ Grimmett: the Syrian ID document and verification report of Dr Giustozzi, and the evidence as to the Appellant’s poor memory due to factors including anxiety, likely learning difficulties and symptoms of PTSD
c. Found that, on the lower standard of proof, the Appellant had not established that the Syrian ID document was genuine or that he had memory issues in 2013, such that he was not satisfied that the decision of FTTJ Grimmett should be departed from and was satisfied that the Appellant is a citizen of Iraq
d. Did not accept that the Appellant has no family members to assist him on return to Iraq and found it more likely than not that he does have family members who can assist him on return
e. Found that there would be no breach of article 3 ECHR because the health issues of the Appellant are not of such a degree or severity as to pass the threshold in AM (Zimbabwe) [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC) and that there is a healthcare system in Iraq which the Appellant can access
f. Found that there would not be any very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Iraq and that removal would not breach his rights under article 8 ECHR.
The appeal to the UT
10. The Appellant sought permission to appeal to the UT on four grounds of appeal:
a. The FTTJ imposed too high a standard of proof when assessing the Appellant’s Syrian ID document
b. The FTTJ failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the Appellant has family in Iraq and a supportive family and social network there
c. The FTTJ failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the Appellant’s removal would not breach article 3 ECHR, alternatively that finding was irrational
d. The FTTJ failed properly to consider the medical evidence and support workers’ witness evidence in assessing article 8 ECHR (both within and outside of the Immigration Rules).
11. The matter was listed for hearing before this Tribunal on 10 December 2025. I was provided with a bundle of documents comprising 1032 pages.
12. I heard submissions from both representatives. I do not propose to rehearse the submissions here but will consider what was said during my analysis of the grounds of appeal.
13. At the end of the hearing, I indicated that my decision would be reserved.
Discussion
14. I have reminded myself of the authorities which set out the distinction between errors of fact and errors of law and which emphasise the importance of an appellate tribunal exercising judicial restraint when reviewing findings of fact reached by first instance judges (as summarised by Lewison LJ in Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464). In reaching my conclusions, I acknowledge that the UT should be slow to infer that a relevant point has not been taken into account simply because it is not expressly mentioned by the judge below (applying MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49 and Volpi & Anor v Volpi) and should not too readily assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out (R (on the application of JR (Jamaica)) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 477).
15. I also note, however, that in an asylum context, the obligation to give the most ‘anxious scrutiny’ to a case requires reasoning that shows ‘that every factor which might tell in favour of an applicant has been properly taken into account’ (ML (Nigeria) v SSHD [2013] EWCA Civ 844).
16. I have had regard to the Practice Direction from the Senior President of the Tribunals: Reasons for decision (dated 4 June 2024) which states that to be adequate, the reasons for a judicial decision must explain to the parties why they have won and lost. The reasons must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the main issues in dispute.
Ground 1
17. Ms Turnbull acknowledged that the FTTJ had identified the appropriate lower standard but submitted that the subsequent findings at paragraph 76 of the determination do not reflect an appropriate application of that lower standard.
18. The FTTJ acknowledged the evidence of Dr Giustozzi and did not make any adverse credibility findings in respect of his report. The steps taken by Dr Giustozzi’s assistant to verify the document were not criticised or challenged.
19. Instead, the FTTJ concluded that the Appellant had not established that the Syrian ID document was genuine because ‘the tribunal has no way of knowing what checks or investigative steps were undertaken by Mr Daib [the officer at the Civil Affairs Department of Al-Hasakah who was asked to verify the document] or the relevant department.’ In reaching this finding, I find that the FTTJ imposed too high a standard of proof on the Appellant and failed properly to apply the guidance in MAH (Egypt) [2023] EWCA Civ 216.
20. The Appellant did seek to address concerns about the absence of direct evidence from Mr Daib. The email from Dr Giustozzi states that, ‘In my experience the Syrian authorities never issue written statements about the validity of documents, except to official sources. So, the only way of this to be obtained would be for the Home Office to request it directly’. Although the FTTJ did reference that email in the determination, he did not criticise it or suggest that it was wrong. In the circumstances, it is not clear what more the FTTJ was reasonably expecting the Appellant to produce to explain the checks or investigative steps undertaken by Mr Daib.
21. This was a material error on a core issue in the claim.
Ground 2
22. Ms Turnbull acknowledged that, applying Devaseelan, the starting point for the FTT when assessing whether the Appellant still had family members in Iraq, was the previous determination of FTTJ Grimmett. She maintained, however, that the finding at paragraph 15 of the determination, that the Appellant has family members in Iraq who could assist him on return, was inadequately reasoned in light of the evidence submitted by the Appellant that post-dated FTTJ Grimmett’s determination.
23. Specifically, she noted that the Appellant had prepared a new witness statement explaining that, since the hearing before FTTJ Grimmett, the Appellant had learned that his uncle is living in Turkey and that his parents have died. He claimed not to be able to provide messages on this issue from his uncle because he had lost his phone, and provided evidence from his support worker to support that assertion. He also provided medical documentation in which he had referred to his parents’ death in 2017 and 2018.
24. Mr Mullen (rightly in my view) conceded that there was a material error of law. The FTTJ did not engage with the new evidence provided by the Appellant. He did not resolve the conflict between FTTJ Grimmett’s finding that the Appellant had family support in Iraq, and the new evidence provided by the Appellant that his family had either died or moved away since 2013.
25. The FTTJ gave no, or no adequate, reasons for his finding that the Appellant still has family members in Iraq. Given the new evidence, reliance on FTTJ Grimmett’s determination was not sufficient.
Grounds 3 and 4
26. Given my findings on ground 2, it is not necessary to deal with grounds 3 and 4 separately. Mr Mullen acknowledged that, given the error of law in respect of ground 2, the findings in respect of the Appellant’s medical and family life claims are not sustainable. The presence or otherwise of family members in Iraq and the support available to the Appellant from such family members on return are relevant to the question of whether his removal would breach article 3 or 8 ECHR.
Disposal
27. Both parties considered that the matter could be re-made by the Upper Tribunal. No adverse credibility findings have been made about the witnesses who gave evidence in support of the Appellant and they do not need to give evidence again. The Appellant did not give evidence before the FTT and will not give evidence at a re-hearing.
28. Applying the guidance in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I agree with both parties that the matter can be retained by the Upper Tribunal. It is likely that the matter will proceed by way of submissions only at the next hearing.
29. The Appellant has indicated that he will rely on additional, updated medical evidence. Directions have been made in this respect below.
Notice of Decision
30. The decision of the FTT (Judge Lester) promulgated on 20 February 2025 contained material errors of law. The decision is set aside.
DIRECTIONS
(1) By 4pm on Friday 5 February 2026, the Appellant shall file with the Tribunal and serve on the Respondent any further evidence on which he wishes to rely at the resumed hearing.
(2) The Appellant must confirm by the same date whether any witnesses will be called to give oral evidence at the next hearing and whether an interpreter is required.
(3) The hearing will be relisted before any Judge of the Upper Tribunal on the first available date after 26 February 2026, face-to-face, with a time estimate of ½ day.

J SMEATON

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Smeaton
1 January 2026