Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002841

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62811/2023
LP/13981/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

H A
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L. Brakaj, Solicitor advocate instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr A. McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 6 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Fisher) promulgated on 14 February 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 22 November 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
The background:
3. The appellant is a national of Iraq who arrived in the United Kingdom and claimed asylum on 13 August 2021.
4. The basis of his claim is summarised both in the grounds and in the decision of the FtTJ as follows. The appellant and his mother had been left a parcel of land by his father, who passed away in a road traffic accident. However, his paternal uncle, who was said to be a high-ranking commander in the anti-terrorist force, seized the land and sold it to a colleague who had a similar high profile as a commander in the anti-terrorist force. In the ensuing dispute over the land, his uncle and his uncle’s colleague made a false allegation that the appellant had sexually assaulted his cousin so that he would be arrested. The appellant said that he left the country with the assistance of his maternal uncle.
5. The appellant’s claim for asylum was refused by the respondent in her decision letter dated 22 November 2023. Beyond accepting the appellant’s nationality and his Kurdish ethnicity the respondent set out credibility issues in respect of the factual account of what had occurred in Iraq. Thus, his claim was refused.
6. The appeal came before the FtTJ and in a decision promulgated on 14 February 2025 the FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Iraq on the core of the factual basis as claimed. The FtTJ dismissed the appeal.
7. The appellant applied for permission to appeal the decision. Permission to appeal refused by a FtTJ but on renewal was granted by UTJ Keith on 18 July 2025.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
8. The hearing took place on 6 October 2025. The appellant was represented by Ms Brakaj, Solicitor Advocate and the respondent by Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer. Ms Brakaj indicated that she relied upon the grounds of challenge, which had been replicated in the skeleton argument she had provided as an additional document when the Upper Tribunal hearing bundle was uploaded to the electronic file.
9. Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer, confirmed he relied upon the reply provided to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 dated 21 August 2025 and that the appeal was opposed. I am grateful to the advocates for the helpful submissions made by each of them and how they have advanced their respective cases. The submissions are contained in the record of proceedings, and I will not rehearse them here. I will refer to them as relevant in the analysis of the issues raised.
Discussion and analysis:
10. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, it is necessary to set out the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
11. The grounds advanced challenge the decision on the basis of inadequacy of reasoning. As regards the provision of reasons, I take into account that there is a legal duty to give a brief explanation of the conclusions of the central issue on which an appeal is determined and what is said in Shizad (sufficiency of reasons; set aside) [2013] UKUT 85 (IAC) that “reasons need not be extensive if the decision as a whole makes sense, having regard to the material accepted by the FtTJ.” I further observe that the parties are aware of the evidence that has been presented before the FtTJ, both orally and in documentary form.
12. As the issues in this appeal relate to challenges brought against findings of fact on credibility made by the FtTJ, and as also raised in the grant of permission, I also remind myself of the decision in Volpi v Volpi ( supra) when reviewing a first instance judge's findings of fact as per Lewison LJ as follows:
"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i)An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
13. As a general submission, Ms Brakaj submitted that the decision of the FtTJ is brief in its contents and that the findings were only set out between paragraphs 7 – 11.
14. As the judge who granted permission observed there is no arguable error of law based on the brevity of a judge’s reasoning in reaching findings on credibility. I agree. The current practice direction (FtT practice direction of the IAC for the FtT) at paragraph 15.6 under the heading “decision and reasons” makes it clear that succinct reasons addressing the disputed issues will suffice. In this appeal the FtTJ set out at paragraph 2 that having discussed the issues with the advocates that it was common ground that the appeal would turn on issues of credibility (also see further references at paragraph 7). At paragraph 4 the FtTJ set out that he had considered all the evidence including the documentary evidence and the oral evidence of the appellant and the fact that he did not make specific reference to any individual facet of the evidence should not be taken as an indication that he had failed to consider it.
15. Returning to the grounds of challenge, the more relevant issue is whether the FtTJ gave adequate reasons open to him on the evidence and I therefore turn to the specific challenges made to the decision.
16. Ms Brakaj submitted that the appellant’s claim was that his uncle and his uncle’s friend with whom he had a dispute had made an allegation that he had sexually assaulted his cousin to ensure that he was detained. She submits that the FtTJ stated that, “it makes no sense to me that they would have to concoct an allegation that the appellant and sexually assaulted his cousin in order to ensure that he was detained.” She submitted that the FtTJ did not explain how he came to that conclusion or why he found it implausible. In her oral submissions Ms Brakaj submitted that there was no evidence referring to why the man would not behave in a particular way and that it was not clear why it had been concluded that no reasonable person would act in that way, and the judge did not give any reasoning as to why the appellant was not capable of being believed.
17. Mr McVeety relied on the Rule 24 response at paragraph 5 where it is submitted that it is clear from reading paragraph 9 as a whole how the FtTJ came to his conclusions. Mr McVeety submitted that it was not a case of the FtTJ substituting his own views but that the FtTJ carefully made the findings in the context of Iraq and gave specific reasons based on the objective evidence in support of his conclusions and therefore made a finding that was open to him on the evidence. This was a plausibility finding made in the context of Iraq and the particular individual the appellant claimed to be in fear of.
18. There is no error of law on the basis advanced on behalf of the appellant. Paragraph 9 reads as follows:
“It was the Appellant’s case that his uncle and his uncle’s friend, to whom the land had been sold, were powerful members of the anti-terrorist force. Indeed, he even expressed a fear that they may be able to reach him in the UK. If that were the case, it makes no sense to me that they would have to concoct an allegation that the Appellant had sexually assaulted his cousin in order to ensure that he was detained. I asked the Appellant about this, and he merely suggested that it would have enabled the authorities to find and arrest him. The Rudaw report dated 12 October 2022 at pages 44-46 of the stitched bundle refers to an allegation that top military commanders from a force affiliated to the PUK had been behind the death of a former counterterrorism officer in Erbil after a bomb, attached to his vehicle, had exploded. The attack was said to have been directly ordered by the man named as the Appellant’s uncle’s friend. It makes no sense to me that such an individual would have felt it necessary to make a false allegation of sexual assault if he wished to dispose of the Appellant.
19. I would accept that a FtTJ’s own subjective view as to the inherent probability of an account is an irrelevant consideration (see, for example, HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037). However, contrary to the submissions made, the FtTJ did not approach his assessment of the evidence on the basis of adopting any westernised view or from his own perspective but made the finding taking into account the appellant’s evidence on this issue and did so reached his conclusions as drawn from the background evidence which referred to the individual concerned. At paragraph 9 the FtTJ set out what the appellant said and that his uncle and his uncle’s friend were powerful members of the anti-terrorist force and that “he (meaning the appellant) had expressed a fear that they may be able to reach him in the UK”. The FtTJ also recorded that when asked about why they would have the need to concoct an allegation, the FtTJ recorded the appellant’s evidence that “he merely suggested that it would enable the authorities to find and arrest him.”
20. The FtTJ was entitled to identify this as a credibility issue, and it is plain that the appellant was asked about this during the hearing. The FtTJ was also entitled to take into account what the appellant had said in his witness statement (paragraph 9) and that the men had made the accusations together so that he would not try to claim the land back, and that the appellant had referred to the men wanting him to be killed as he had caused problems for them. The FtTJ was also entitled to take into account the objective evidence before him provided on behalf of the appellant which expressly related to the person the appellant claimed to fear. The Rudaw report (12/10/22 at p31 Cef) referred to the allegation that the top military commanders affiliated to the PUK had been behind the death of a former counterterrorism officer in Erbil after a bomb, attached to his vehicle, had exploded. The attack was said to have been directly ordered by the man named as the appellant’s uncle’s friend. The FtTJ was therefore entitled to take that evidence into account given that it expressly referred to the person involved who had taken steps to dispose of someone in an attack and was someone who, as Mr McVeety submitted, was not afraid of taking direct action rather than going to the length of concocting a story of a sexual assault.
21. It is notable that there is no reference in the grounds of challenge to the Rudaw report referred to by the FtTJ at paragraph 9. However, Ms Brakaj in her reply to the submissions made on behalf of the respondent argued that the material in that report referred to an allegation made and was a report and that it did not automatically follow that he was carrying out an attack with impunity. That submission is nothing more than a disagreement with the reasoning of the FtTJ who made a finding of fact which was plainly open to him on the evidence, where he had expressly considered the explanation of the appellant and was entitled also to consider the issue in the context of the objective material available which related to the specific person identified by the appellant and this man’s particular characteristics. It was not an irrational finding, and the FtTJ had provided adequate reasons for that finding.
22. Dealing with the second ground, Ms Brakaj challenges paragraph 10 of the decision.
23. It reads as follows:
“Mr Wake was critical of the Appellant because he had failed to mention the name of the anti-terror commander during his substantive interview. Mrs Brakaj made the valid point that he was never asked for that information at any point in the interview. However, in paragraph 7 of his witness statement and in oral evidence, he gave an explanation for failing to mention the identity of that individual, namely that he assumed that the Home Office would have known it. That is not a reasonable explanation, in my judgement. Furthermore, the alleged name of the official was provided for the first time in the witness statement as Wahab Halabjayi, and the Appellant’s section of the stitched bundle contained some background evidence on him. It does not assist the Appellant as the news report at pages 47 to 49 of the stitched bundle indicates that Mr Halabjayi had not officially assumed his duties as leader of the counter-terrorism service until 11 July 2021, which is the day after the Appellant left Iraq”.
24. She submits that the FtTJ placed significant weight on the fact that the appellant did not mention the name of the anti-terror commander during the asylum interview despite it being make clear that he was not asked to provide information. In her oral submissions she submitted that if the respondent wanted extra information about his claim the respondent could have requested the appellant to give this.
25. There is no arguable error of law based on the challenges made to paragraph 10 of the decision. As Mr McVeety submitted the matter of weight given to the evidence was for the judge to determine who had the opportunity to consider and assess the evidence as a whole. The FtTJ was aware of the relevant chronology; the appellant having entered the UK in 2021 and having made his claim for asylum on 13 August 2021. He provided a screening interview in August 2021 and later provided the Asylum questionnaire in October 2022. Within those documents various references were made identifying his uncle and his friend described as the “leader of antiterrorism” (see p147Cef). Later in July 2023 he referred to the man as the “antiterrorism leader” but did not identify him by name. In interview in 2023 he referred to him as the “commander of the Dz terrorism” again not identifying him by name. The respondent in the decision letter had made a reference to the lack of sufficient detail and expressly set out that whilst he claimed to fear a powerful anti-terrorist commander not once had he named the individual concerned. It was not until the decision letter that the witness statement of the appellant gave the name of the person.
26. The FtTJ plainly was aware of the submission made that the appellant was not asked for that information during the interview which he recorded at paragraph 10, however, the FtTJ was entitled to consider the evidence even by the appellant, both in his witness statement at paragraph 7 and in the oral evidence given, as to the explanation given that he had failed to mention the identity of the individual because he assumed the Home Office would have known it. The FtTJ was therefore entitled to consider the explanation given, which he did, but it was open to him to reject it in the light of the reasoning that he set out within paragraph 10. The FtTJ expressly referred to the objective material in the appellant’s bundle (and as identified in the respondent’s review at paragraph 9) and that the man the appellant had identified as being responsible for events in Iraq had not officially assumed his duties as leader of the counterterrorism organisation until 11 July 2021 which was the day after the appellant had left Iraq. The grounds do not challenge this evidence, and the FtTJ was entitled to take this into account, and he provided adequate and sustainable reasons for rejecting the core of the appellant’s account which was undermined by this evidence.
27. When the paragraph is read as a whole and whilst the FtTJ acknowledged that the appellant had not been asked about the information in the interview that is not to say that he placed significant weight on that but gave reasons for rejecting his claim by reference the objective evidence which specifically referred to the man he claimed to have been in fear of. The grounds do not demonstrate any arguable error of law as to inadequacy of reasoning or otherwise.
28. The last ground asserts that at paragraph 11 the FtTJ failed to explain why he had reached his conclusions. Ms Brakaj submitted that paragraph 7 of the findings made were not adverse to the appellant, that paragraph 8 was an adverse finding but was not sufficient alone to conclude the account was a fabrication which left paragraphs 9 and 10 and therefore the FtTJ did not give adequate reasons.
29. Having heard the submissions on this issue I agree with those advanced on behalf of the respondent. The FtTJ’s findings are set out between paragraphs 7 – 11 and whilst the FtTJ did not take an adverse point against the appellant at paragraph 7 he did make an adverse credibility finding at paragraph 8 where the FtTJ set out an inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence. The FtTJ explained this in his reasoning by reference to the evidence and that having described a confrontation with his uncle and that his uncle was “very angry and beat him” in cross examination the appellant said that his uncle had not beaten him at that time. The FtTJ recorded that it was accepted that this was an inconsistency in his factual account by his advocate at the hearing. Whilst the judge observed that this would not have led him to conclude that the entire account was a fabrication, his finding as to his concerns as to the reliability of the appellant as a witness when he had given evidence was inconsistent with his adopted witness statement and other written evidence, was a finding open to him. Thus, the FtTJ was entitled to make that finding of fact at paragraph 8 along with the findings of fact made at paragraphs 9 and 10 both referred to the core parts of the appellant’s account of being at risk of harm Iraq and directly took into account the objective evidence provided on behalf of the appellant. Those taken together were sufficient reasoning to support the conclusions set out at paragraph 11.
30. In summary, I remind myself of the need for appropriate restraint before interfering with the decision of the FtT, particularly where the judge below had heard and assessed a range of evidential sources relating to the reliability of an account. Not every evidential issue need be specifically addressed and there is no requirement to provide reasons for reasons. The FtTJ had regard to the evidence before him and gave adequate reasons to why he did not believe the core aspects of the appellant’s account and reached a decision that was open to him on the evidence. For those reasons, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error on a point of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand. The appeal is dismissed.

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

7 October 2025