UI-2025-002847
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002847
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/51382/2024
LH/00205/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
3rd November 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA
Between
Bogdan Marius Mandita
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T Muman, counsel instructed by Rashid Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 23 October 2026
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Secretary of State has been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal allowing the appellant’s human rights appeal following a hearing which took place on 8 April 2025. For ease of reference hereafter, the parties will be referred to as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
Anonymity
2. The First-tier Tribunal did not issue an anonymity order. I take into account the principle of open justice and see no reason to make an order, so none is made.
Factual and procedural background
3. The appellant is a national of Romania now aged forty. On 12 September 2019, the appellant was granted limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom under the EU Settlement Scheme for a five-year period.
4. On 19 May 2023, the appellant was convicted of being concerned in the supply of a Controlled Class B Drug, namely Cannabis. On 19 October 2023, he was sentenced to 7 months’ imprisonment.
5. On 22 October 2023 the appellant was served with a decision to make a deportation order in accordance with section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, in response to which he made a human rights claim, relying on his family life with his wife and their two children. That claim was refused by way of a decision dated 1 February 2024 in which it was asserted that the appellant’s conviction had caused serious harm, with reference to s.117D(2)(c)(ii) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, as amended.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
6. Following the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal, the judge concluded that the appellant had not been convicted of an offence that “has caused serious harm” for the purposes of section 117D(2)(c)(ii) and as such he did not meet the required definition of being a “foreign criminal.” The judge proceeded to carry out a proportionality assessment and concluded that the appellant’s removal would amount to a disproportionate interference with his Article 8 rights.
7. At [54], following the consideration of the appellant’s human rights claim, the judge refers to the respondent’s following submission, made at a case management review:
“The respondent accepts that if the appellant does not meet the definition of a “foreign criminal” in section 117D(2) …..his appeal must succeed, as by virtue of section 117C his deportation would not be necessary in the public interest.”
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:
Ground one – that the judge materially misdirected themselves in failing to consider that the appellant was caught with Cannabis valued at nearly £100,000.
Ground two – that the judge provided inadequate reasons for concluding that the decision to refuse the appellant’s human rights claim was disproportionate.
9. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis sought, with the judge granting permission making the following remarks.
1. At [54], the First-tier Tribunal writes: ‘my Article 8 findings are unlikely to be a surprise to the respondent given the recitals outlined in the Directions of Judge Dunne dated 11 February 2025 (following a Case Management Review Hearing) when it was recorded that “The respondent accepts that if the appellant does not meet the definition of a “foreign criminal” in section 117D(2) …..his appeal must succeed, as by virtue of section 117C his deportation would not be necessary in the public interest”. The Secretary of State appears to resile from that position; what was said at the case management review is itself surprising in the light of the Upper Tribunal’s remarks in Wilson (NIAA Part 5A; deportation decisions) [2020] UKUT 350(IAC) at [68-69]. In any event, the First-tier Tribunal judge proceeded to make an Article 8 ECHR analysis but is arguable that that analysis was influenced by a misunderstanding of the law as regards ‘conducive’ deportations.
2. It is arguable that the judge may have erred in his analysis of ‘serious harm.’ I note that the judge rejected the Secretary of State’s view that a conviction for involvement in Class B drugs causes serious harm. The judge arguably erred at [33] (considered in the light of Laws LJ’s remarks at [24]: LT (Kosovo) [2016] EWCA Civ 1246). The judge arguably adopted an incorrect approach by finding that, whilst dealing in Class A drugs causes ‘societal harm’, dealing in Class B drugs does not.
3. The judge’s Article 8 ECHR assessment is arguably flawed for the reason given in the grounds of appeal, namely that the appellant and his family could reasonably relocate to continue family life in Romania. It is arguably unclear why, whilst noting the family’s continuing links to Romania, this ‘scenario’ was not considered.
10. The appellant filed a Rule 24 response dated 9 September 2025, in which the Secretary of State’s appeal was opposed, with detailed arguments being made.
The error of law hearing
11. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A bundle was submitted by the Secretary of State containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
12. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Ms McKenzie had very little to add to the grounds, other than to point to the remarks of the Upper Tribunal Judge granting permission. The conclusions below reflect the arguments and submissions made, where necessary.
13. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I provide below, with reasons.
Analysis and Conclusions
14. The principles and cautious approach to be applied by an appeal court to first instance findings of fact are well established and set out in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2]. I remind myself of the role of the First-tier Tribunal as an expert Tribunal and bear in mind that a determination should not be ‘picked over’ or subjected to narrow textual analysis: HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22, at [72].
Ground one
15. The first point made under this ground is that the First-tier Tribunal judge “failed to consider” the value of the cannabis found in the appellant’s possession. It is contended that “of itself is sufficient reason to find that this offending causes serious harm.” There is no substance to this complaint. At [2], the judge summarised the sentencing remarks which included that the amount of cannabis was “valued at £41,730 to 98,800 depending on how it was to be sold.” Furthermore, at [39], the judge considered the seriousness of the appellant’s offending with direct reference to the upper value of the drugs.
16. It is also contended at paragraph 7 of the grounds that the nature and scale of the appellant’s offending is sufficient, without more, to demonstrate that serious harm has been caused. That argument is legally insufficient and fails to take into consideration the case law, as summarised in headnote 3 of Wilson where the respondent’s view is described as “a starting point.” There is no support for the suggestion in the grounds that the judge failed to begin their consideration from the viewpoint of the respondent. It is apparent from [31-33] of the decision that the judge directed himself correctly, applying the conclusions in Wilson.
17. The remaining paragraphs in the grounds amount to little more than disagreement with the judge’s assessment of the seriousness of the appellant’s offending. Those grounds further fail to engage with the fact that the burden is on the respondent to show what harm has been caused by the appellant’s offending and this burden was not discharged. At [33], the judge accepted the respondent’s argument that harm caused by drugs offences can be a general one to the interests of society as a whole. As is apparent from headnote (3)(h) of Wilson this is not enough and “there must be some evidence that the actual offence has caused serious harm.” As can be seen from the assessment of the judge at [40-41] of the decision, there was no evidence adduced of identifiable serious harm and no link had been established between the offence and “any direct harm.” The judge rightly applied the decision in Wilson, at headnote “(3)(g) The mere potential for harm is irrelevant.”
18. The grounds at paragraph 11 refer to an OASys assessment indicating that the appellant represented a medium risk because of his associations. Ms McKenzie did not challenge Mr Muman’s submission that no such document had been adduced before the First-tier Tribunal. In fact, Ms McKenzie did not draw my attention to any evidence which had not been considered by the First-tier Tribunal and nor did she identify any evidence showing that the appellant’s offending had caused actual rather than potential harm.
19. The judge’s assessment as to whether the appellant’s offending had caused serious harm was rational and reasonably open to him and thus contained no error of approach.
Ground 2
20. This ground expresses further disagreement, this time with the judge’s reasons for allowing the appeal on Article 8 grounds. It is contended, at paragraph 15 of the grounds that the judge failed to advance “any” reasons why family life could not continue in Romania. The grounds misrepresent the judge’s findings. In fact, at [51], the judge found that family life could continue in Romania, noting that the appellant and his wife, who gave evidence of having a flat in Romania, would have to decide whether to move there together. It is abundantly clear that the “go” scenario was considered.
21. The judge’s Article 8 assessment was in accordance with [69] of Wilson, in that at [43] the judge recognised that this was not an appeal against a decision to make a deportation order and their concern was solely whether removal would be a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s Article 8 rights and that of his family.
22. The judge’s assessment followed a balance sheet approach, starting with the factors in favour of removal at [45]. The grounds wrongly suggested that the “key issue” was whether there would be a disruption to family life. That matter was just one of many issues to be considered, all of which were, in fact, considered by the judge.
23. The judge considered all factors put forward by the respondent and the appellant at [45-51] of the decision. At [52] onwards the judge weighed those factors and concluded that the appellant’s single conviction was insufficient to outweigh the strong private and family life factors. That was a conclusion which was entirely open to the judge on the evidence.
24. I would add that the judge did not allow himself to be misled by the respondent’s erroneous concession that if the appellant did not meet the definition of foreign criminal, “his appeal must succeed.” It is clear from the face of the decision, that the judge directed himself appropriately. The reference in the penultimate paragraph to that concession amounts to no more than a passing remark.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.
T Kamara
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
27 October 2026