Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002848
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59450/2023
LP/00053/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

M B M
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T. Hussain, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr N. Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 8 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge M. Smith) promulgated on 15 April 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 25 October 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Background:
3. The appellant is a national of Iraq who entered the United Kingdom in September 2020 and made a claim for asylum. He was interviewed in respect of that claim in March 2021. The respondent considered his application and, in her decision letter dated 20 September 2023 refused the claim. Beyond accepting his nationality and identity the respondent rejected the factual account given by him concerning the events in Iraq. The respondent in the decision letter and the review set out the issues raised as to the credibility and consistency of his claim which included the Facebook threat he claimed had been issued against him and his claimed political activities in the UK. The respondent also addressed the issues relating to documentation necessary to return to Iraq.
4. The factual background to the claimant was summarised by the FtTJ at paragraphs 6 -7 of his decision as follows: The appellant is an Iraqi Kurd from Tuz Khurmatu [TK] within the Saladin Governate of Iraq – an area under central Iraqi governmental control. He formed a relationship with a girl called M who was from the Kakai ethnic/religious group. Her family, who had a shop, lived close to the appellant’s home, and they had known of each other since childhood. On one occasion, after their relationship had developed from about September 2019 with increasingly regular interactions at the shop and a few phone calls, in about August 2020 they arranged to meet on the roof of her home. They were discovered kissing and hugging by one of her brother’s. The appellant could not say what time they met other than to say it was after the shop had closed, or how long they were on the roof together. In fear of the repercussions the appellant ran off, went to his paternal uncle’s house and his paternal uncle told his parents what had happened. The same night “they [the girl’s family] came to our house.” The appellant contends that he was told that “they” had come to his house armed and that “they” were after him . The appellant’s paternal uncle took him to his aunt’s in Kirkuk and from there (with his aunt’s husband) he made his way to Erbil and then out of the country. He fled Iraq on foot and then made an overland journey to the UK claiming asylum when he arrived. The appellant has had no contact with M since he ran from her house.
5. The appellant contends his own family have disowned him as a result of the “interfaith” nature of his relationship with M and the trouble he has caused them. The appellant contends that he fears being killed by the girl’s family and or the Kakai more generally. The appellant also contends that he does not have his original CSID document which was destroyed in the fighting in the region in about 2017 and is an undocumented Iraqi.
6. Since his arrival in the United Kingdom the appellant has become politically active, joining 2 political groups, organising and attending demonstrations and posting political material on-line. The appellant has also formed a relationship with a partner in the UK and relied upon Article 8 of the ECHR.
7. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 15 April 2025, the FtTJ set out his findings of fact and analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 34-41 ( including the Article 8 assessment which is not the subject of this appeal ). The FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Iraq on the factual basis as he had claimed and in so far as it related to his relationship with M and risk of harm from her family but also that he had been disowned by his own family.
8. The FtTJ assessed the issue of return in the context of his Iraqi documentation and reached the conclusion that he was not satisfied that the appellant had demonstrated that he was without Iraqi identity documentation and that he either retained his own genuine documentation or if he did not have them himself, his family members would have kept the documents safe with them. Consequently, he had access to his Iraqi documentation.
9. As to his claimed political activities, the FtTJ assessed those activities in the light of the evidence provided but reached the overall conclusion that he was not satisfied that the appellant genuinely held “anti-regime” views and as such was not satisfied that he would attend demonstrations in Iraq or post-Facebook material on return. As he did not hold genuine political views, the judge found he could be expected to delete his account. The FtTJ also addressed Article 8 and the relationship that he had with his partner in the UK. The assessment undertaken in that part of the decision is not challenged for the purposes of this appeal.
10. The appellant sought permission to appeal on three grounds.
11. Permission to appeal was refused by a FtTJ on 12 June 2025 but on renewal permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman on 29 July 2025.
12. The hearing took place on 8 July 2026 at the Tribunal. The appellant was present at the hearing and was represented by Mr Hussain, of Counsel who appeared by remote means. The respondent was represented at the hearing centre in person by Mr Wain, Senior Presenting Officer. The appeal had previously been listed as an error of law hearing but was adjourned to await the promulgation of the new CG decision relating to Iraq, which was said to be the following day after the hearing. The position held by the respondent was that there was no error of law in the decision of the FtTJ based on the grounds including ground 2 and in the alternative any error was not material by reference to the new CG decision. Given that the country guidance decision was to be promulgated the following day, the parties agreed that the sensible course was for the appeal to be adjourned so that both parties could address that decision either by reference to its relevance to the error of law and any materiality or in the alternative when remaking the appeal, should there be an error of law found on ground 2. It appeared to be common ground that if there were errors of law in all grounds (1,2 and 3), the correct disposal would be a remittal of the appeal.
13. Mr Hussain submitted that he relied upon the grounds of challenge. He provided his additional oral submissions on the 3 grounds as advanced on behalf of the appellant.
14. Mr Wain in behalf of the respondent indicated that there was no Rule 24 response but that the appeal was opposed on all grounds and provided his submissions in response.
15. Whilst Mr Hussain had provided an addendum skeleton argument which addressed the legal position following the promulgation of AH, AK and AJ (identity documentation: return to the KRI) Iraq CG [22026]UKUT 00150 (IAC). Given the proceedings subsequent to the promulgation of that decision leading to a consent order being placed before the Court of Appeal, and the respondent’s position, that argument would only become relevant in the context of remaking the decision.
16. It is not necessary to set out the submissions and they will be considered in the context of the grounds advanced on behalf of the appellant.
17. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion:
18. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal and have considered them in the context of the factual appeal and the assessment of the evidence by the FtTJ.
19. There are three grounds of challenge. Ground 1 seeks to challenge the credibility findings made that related to the events in Iraq and relevant to his relationship with M, ground 2 seeks to challenge the assessment of the documentation issue and ground 3 relates to the assessment of the sur place claim.
20. There are two important overarching considerations when approaching my assessment of whether the judge materially erred in law. The first is the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Over the course of many years, the higher courts have emphasised the importance of the application of such restraint before interfering with a first-instance decision. Examples include: Biogen Inc. v Medeva plc [1996] UKHL 18, at [54]; SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL; [2008] 3 WLR 832, at [30]; Fage UK Ltd. v Chobani UK Ltd. [2014] EWCA Civ 5, at [114] and [115]; UT (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [19]; MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC, at [45]; Lowe v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 62, at [29]; Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2]; HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, at [72]; Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51]; and most recently Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47].
21. For present purposes, the essential principles derived from these authorities can be summarised as follows:
(a) Although "error of law" is widely defined, the Upper Tribunal is not entitled to set aside the decision of the FTT simply because it does not agree with it, or because it thinks it can produce a better one ;
(b) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that the judge was "plainly wrong";
(c) What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached;
(d) The judge must consider all the relevant evidence relied on by the parties, although it need not all be specifically addressed in the judgment;
(e) The weight attributed to relevant evidence is pre-eminently a matter for the judge;
(f) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable;
(g) The reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract;
(h) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account;
(i) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out.
22. I confirm that I have had regard to these propositions, amongst others, when considering the respondent's challenges brought.
23. Before turning to an assessment of those substantive grounds, I remind myself of the guidance given when considering the assessment of a FtTJ and the findings of fact an assessment of the evidence undertaken. It is important to have in mind the role of a judgment given after trial. The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the crucial legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view. These are not controversial observations: see Customs and Excise Commissioners v A [2002] EWCA Civ 1039; [2003] 2 WLR 210; Bekoe v Broomes [2005] UKPC 39; Argos Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318; [2006] UKCLR 1135".
24. Mr Hussain referred to the duty to give reasons. The scope of the duty to give reasons was set out MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) and reiterated in Joseph (permission to appeal requirements) [2022] UKUT 00218 (IAC) at [43]:
“[The duty to give reasons] does not mean that every factor which weighed with the Judge in his appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained. But the issues the resolution of which were vital to the Judge’s conclusion should be identified and the manner in which he resolved them explained. […] It need not involve a lengthy judgment. It does require the Judge to identify and record those matters which were critical to his decision.” (citing English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd. (Practice Note) [2002] EWCA Civ 605)
25. The SPT’s Practice Direction of June 2024 on Written Reasons is also of relevance, particularly paragraph 6 which sets out the following
“6. Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved.”
Ground 1:
26. This ground challenges the credibility findings made by the FtTJ which addressed the factual claim made of being in a relationship with an unmarried woman in Iraq, meeting her on a roof and being discovered by her brother kissing and cuddling her. The grounds refer to paragraph 34 (d), (e ) and (f) however the relevant paragraphs are those at paragraph 35.
27. Dealing with the first point made at paragraphs 3 (a) and (b), the grounds assert that the appellant had not been materially inconsistent about contact with his family and that his response was that he thought he was being asked about the actual night of the incident and not some period thereafter. Mr Hussain submitted that the FtTJ misunderstood the evidence and conflated it with other issues.
28. Having considered the evidence relevant to the issue raised in the grounds and submissions, it has not been established that the FtTJ either misunderstood the evidence or conflated the evidence when making his findings of fact. My reasons are as follows. The FtTJ correctly identified a material inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence relating to contact with his family and this was relevant to the core aspect of his claim that he would be at risk on return as a result of his relationship with the woman concerned. The FtTJ set out the evidence concerning his family’s views about the relationship with the woman given at Q42 of the interview and where he stated, “But I don’t think my family would be happy, but I did not see my family to see their reaction, but I guess they would not be happy”. This question was asked of the appellant in the context and chronology of what had happened after the incident with the woman concerned (see reply to question 41). The FtTJ correctly recorded the evidence at paragraph 35 (b) and that during his asylum interview the appellant was also asked about the threats from M’s family. He explained that he had not been at home when they had come to his house, but his uncle relayed information from his parents over the phone. He was asked, do you know if they came to your house again after this [the night of the incident].” He replied, “Because I did not stay at home I don’t know” ( see Q127). The earlier question at question 126 was that his uncle had called his father to telling about her family attending at his home after the incident.
29. The inconsistency identified in the appellant’s evidence was set out by the FtTJ at paragraph 35 (d) which related to his account in the witness statement at paragraph 7 (p32CB) and as recorded by the FtTJ at paragraph 35(c ): “Whilst trying to be smuggled out of Iraq, I spoke with my paternal uncle who told me that the family had been to my house again on a few other occasions and my family told me that my family has disowned me to the other family. I was not asked about this information in my interview; therefore, I have not disclosed it in the past.”
30. The point made by the FtTJ in his finding at paragraph 35 (d) was that the claim made in the witness statement was not consistent with the account given in his interview. The appellant’s account at paragraph 7 was that he had not disclosed the conversation with his paternal uncle and that his family disowned him because he was not asked about it in the interview. The finding made at paragraph 35 (d) considered that explanation but rejected it with adequate reasoning. The FtTJ found that his explanation as given was not consistent with the earlier evidence that the appellant had provided and which the FtTJ had recorded and that he had been asked questions in interview about both topics which would have given him the opportunity to answer the question in full. The FtTJ’s reasoning was that the failure to mention this account that there had been further contact and that his own family had disowned him impacted adversely on his credibility. The appellant had claimed in his interview questions 8 – 11 that he had no contact with his family because he didn’t have anything to contact them by as he had no mobile. There was no reference made in this context of his family disowning him when asked in interview.
31. At paragraph 35 ( e) and by reference to the witness statement at paragraph 14, where he stated that his family refused to help him when he needed them back then and that they had not contact him ever since”, the FtTJ found that this is contrary to what he had said and that he had been assisted to leave the country by his paternal uncle and aunt and her husband.
32. A further finding of fact made by the FtTJ which is not challenged in the grounds relates to the evidence advanced by the appellant in support of the claim that he was being threatened by a family member of M. This is referred to at paragraph 35 (m) which consisted of a Facebook message purporting to be from a family member of M threatening the appellant. The FtTJ assessed that evidence and found that it was undated, it consisted of one message that importantly there was no evidence about the person who sent the message or anything else about his Facebook account which the judge could regard a significant and he reasoned that he expected that he would have been provided with more details about the sender in the circumstances of the case if this had been a genuine threat. Consequently, he could place little or no weight on that evidence.
33. A further finding of fact was made at paragraph 35 (l) concerning the nature of the threats.
34. Taken together, the FtTJ was entitled to find that there was a material inconsistency in his evidence and to make those factual findings which were adverse to his claim.
35. The grounds also seek to challenge the finding made at paragraph 35 (i). The grounds assert that the FtTJ considered that the appellant would have taken precautions of ensuring access to the roof was either shut or locked. However, the grounds state that the appellant had been clear that the shop was part of the home. It is submitted that it is a material error of law to assume that the shop and/or house/or roof had ways of being locked in access to the premises was multifunctional. Mr Hussain also submits that if the premises were locked and the lady later emerged, this might have been far more problematic for the couple. As the shop was part of the home this was why they were not clear opening times.
36. Mr Hussain submitted that the FtTJ had erred in his findings as they were based on assumptions. He further placed reliance on the decision in HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 as cited in the grounds at paragraph 4.
37. I am satisfied there is no error of law established by those grounds. Whilst the submissions made refer to the FtTJ making assumptions about the opening times of the shop, the findings made at paragraph 35 (f)-(l) should be read together and were based on the evidence and not on any assumptions made as the grounds assert. At paragraph 35 (g) the FtTJ assessed the plausibility of the appellant’s account that he met M on the roof of her own house in broad daylight and as set out in the country evidence relating to the position of women in Iraq. He was entitled to consider his account in the light of the appellant’s own evidence that he did not want people to find out about the relationship (question 78) and that he was in “fear of others” (question 83) and that she should not call him over the telephone “openly” (question 86) and was in fear of being caught. The FtTJ made his factual assessment against that evidential background and also by taking into account the appellant’s personal characteristics as an” intelligent man.” The FtTJ concluded:
“that it is implausible that the appellant, potentially in broad daylight, would agree to meet M on the roof of her own house, which he accessed by climbing on the roof of the family shop and then failed to take the precaution of ensuring the access to the roof was not either shut or locked or in some other way monitored so that he would not be discovered there. Given the appellant’s obvious intelligence, it seems to me it would be obvious to agreeing to a meeting in such circumstances were unsafe and I am satisfied he would not have met M without taking significant precautions and would not have agreed to meet her on the roof in the way he describes.”
38. He did not make that finding in isolation but assessed other parts of the evidence relevant to this at paragraph 35 (h) and (i) where the appellant was not able to provide details of when he met her on the roof, the time of day or whether the shop had different opening times. Also, at 35(j) the judge found that the appellant was not able to provide details as to the length of the meeting with on the roof by reference to the appellant’s evidence at Q119 .
39. The further finding made at paragraph 35 (k) assessed the evidence holistically and the FtTJ took into account that giving an estimate of time could be difficult but concluded that first, the meeting on the roof was an “exceptionally important event” in the appellant’s life which he must have thought a lot about after he left Iraq. Secondly, it was reasonable to expect the appellant to provide more detail about events including when it occurred and how long it lasted and thirdly whilst he took into account that estimates of time can be difficult, in his evidence the appellant had not even estimated or provided any idea of how long the events occurred and his explanation as to why he could not do so and as set out in the interview was not an adequate explanation of his failure to do so.
40. Dealing with the point raised by reference to the decision in HK (cited above), the FtTJ’s’ findings were not based on assumptions or general plausibility but were evidence-based and were also set against the factual context of this claim which concerned the appellant’s illicit relationship with an unmarried woman of a different tribe and religion and the consequent risks as referred to in the CPIN relating to honour-based violence (see document in the bundle and paragraph 34 (d) ). The FtTJ was therefore entitled to conclude that the appellant’s account and the lack of explanation and detail in his evidence was lacking as to the relevant to the core of that account. Furthermore, I accept the submission made by Mr Wain that the FtTJ was permitted to draw adverse inferences from the absence of satisfactory explanations.
41. For those reasons, the overall conclusion reached by the FtTJ that he was not satisfied that the appellant had demonstrated even to the lower standard that he was of adverse interest to M’s family was open to him on those findings of fact which were evidence-based and adequately reasoned.
Ground 2:
42. This ground challenges the assessment made of the issue of documentation relevant to return to Iraq. Mr Hussain relies upon the written grounds of challenge. They challenge the finding made at paragraph 35 (o) that the appellant was able to live in Iraq without documentation and that the FtTJ’s reference to the conflict in the appellant’s home area was inconsistent with the country evidence.
43. The grounds at paragraph 6 do not identify, “all the available evidence” and make a generalised reference to the historical context of the circumstances in the appellant’s home area following the defeat of ISIS and the Kurdish referendum. The grounds at paragraph 7 cite paragraphs 79, 85 and 90 of SMO, KSP and IM (Article 15 ( c )(civil status documents – Iraq CG[2019] UKUT 00400 ( “SMO1”). At paragraph 8 of the grounds, it is asserted that the FtTJ erred in his finding that the appellant was able to make his journey from his home area to Kirkuk without documents stating that, “many thousands of managed and been granted protection in the UK…”
44. I have considered the submissions made in the context of the claim and the evidence before the FtTJ. The issue of documentation available to citizens of Iraq has been an issue which has correctly been identified of significance in country guidance decisions before the Upper Tribunal ( see SMO, KSP and IM (Article 15 ( c )(civil status documents – Iraq CG[2019] UKUT 00400 and SMO and KSP (civil status documentation; article 15( c) – Iraq CG[2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC)).
45. The FtTJ set out the appellant’s case by reference to the availability of his documentation but in particular his CSID at paragraph 35(n) and that the appellant said he had not had a genuine document since 2017 when it was destroyed in fighting but that he was able to live in the locality without one because he did not move from his local area and he had a copy. The ASA did not refer to the circumstances in which he did not have his documentation (see paragraph 13 of the ASA) and his evidence in the witness statement paragraph 13 was that he did not have his original documents because Hasht Al Shabab took over the area and they raided everything and burned everything down. There was food rationing everyone’s documents were kept in the office and the office burned down and therefore he lost his documents.
46. The FtTJ assessed the credibility of that factual account and as raised in the respondent’s review at paragraph 7 where it was not accepted that the appellant did not possess his original Iraqi documentation including his CSID. First, the FtTJ took into account which he referred to as the “substantial evidence” about the importance of identity documents in Iraq and the CSID . That factual assessment is consistent with SMO (1) at section F, where it is set out that the CSID was the most important of the documents identified at paragraph 336 because” without the CSID it is impossible to access any of the other documents (the INC) and the PDS (food ration card), and has a clear impact on the ability to move around Iraq, to relocate within Iraq and enjoy the socio-economic rights (housing, food et cetera). The was required to access financial assistance from the authorities, employment, education, housing and medical treatment. It is described not only as a document which can be used as a document to achieve entry into Iraq but as “an essential document for life in Iraq” ( see paragraph 343).
47. Against that background the FtTJ was entitled to reject the appellant’s account that he lived in Iraq for so long after he claimed the document had been destroyed without access to that genuine document or being able to redocument himself. This is not an error as the ground asserts at paragraph 5.
48. Nor was the FtTJ in error in making this assessment at paragraph (o) by reference to the historic conflict of the appellant’s home area.
49. The decision in SMO(1) refers to evidence heard by the Tribunal in June 2019 and also refers back to the relevant history. That was a time when the appellant was present in the governorate. At paragraphs 77-79 the Tribunal summarises the circumstances whereby ISIL captured Tooz in the summer of 2014 and it was the first governorate in which control was regained from ISIL with insurgents removed from most of the key population centres by mid-2015. Reference is made to IDP’s returning in July 2015 and December 2016. Paragraph 79 refer to the governorate also suffering in the wake of the Kurdish independence referendum and that TK (the appellant’s home area) witnessed significant clashes between Peshmerga and other forces. Kurds were expelled from TZ and the city was taken over by Shia militia.
50. That was in essence the history of the conflict referred to by the FtTJ at paragraph 35(o).
51. The grounds at paragraphs 6 and 7 are premised on the basis that if the appellant’s documents were destroyed in 2017 that he would not have been able to redocument. However, that wholly misses the point made by the FtTJ in light of paragraphs 35 (n) and (o). When set against the history in light of the importance of the CSID and in the context of everyday life in Iraq and the history of the conflict as described above, the FtTJ did not find that it was credible that he was able to live so long in Iraq after the destruction of his documents without having held any valid documentation. Further, that having lived in a formally contested area, where identity checks were likely to be more widespread and aggressive, the FtTJ did not accept his claim that he was able to live there from 2017 until he left without having proper evidence of his valid identification via genuine documents . That was a finding consistent with what is known of the formally contested area as set out in SMO (1) at paragraph 80 which refers to armed groups that proliferate including PMU’s and other militia, as supported by paragraph 87 and the security forces targeting civilians who were queueing at checkpoints and at paragraph 95 that they were PMU’s in the area controlling the highway and they were regular checkpoints. I reject the submission made by Mr Hussain (by way of reply) that paragraph 87 was not relevant. Within that section of SMO (1) the tribunal was setting out the position on the evidence before them in June 2019 and by reflecting on the evidence given historically. Furthermore, the grounds themselves cite the same sections.
52. The appellant’s account is not that his family ever sought to flee from TK but that they had lived there throughout the problems identified. The FtTJ was entitled to reach the conclusion that the appellant had not credibly explained that he was able to access services, facilities and operate on an everyday basis in home area without his genuine identity documentation.
53. The grounds also seek to challenge paragraphs 35 (p) and (q). Mr Hussain submitted the many thousands of managed to make the journey from TK to Kirkuk without documentation. This is a generalised statement and does not take into account the individualised assessment made by the FtTJ which found that there were likely to be more aggressive and widespread identity checks in the appellant’s home area it being a formally contested area (see para 35(o)) and that he was able to travel between TK and Kirkuk ( see paragraphs (n) and (p). The appellant was not travelling with the smuggler from his home area to Kirkuk and the FtTJ was entitled to find that the appellant would have been likely to anticipate the possibility of checks and that it was not credible that he was able to travel through the entire district without having identity documents which were valid and that in light of the country material it was expected to have an identity check at least once.
54. Mr Wain referred to paragraph 401 of SMO(1) which referred to the material relied upon by the UNCHR and that internal relocation was not available in their view due to the overly sensitive security situation with reference made to Kirkuk.
55. It was therefore open to the FtTJ to make those findings of fact as he did along with the finding made at paragraph 35 (q). The grounds and submissions made amount to no more than a disagreement with those findings made on the evidence which were open to the FtTJ to make. The FtTJ was not saying that a person cannot make it to the UK without documents but on the evidence before him and as relevant to this appellant that he was able to travel from his home area to Kirkuk without smugglers and then through to the IKR to the border of Turkey without at any point being asked to access his genuine documents. The FtTJ addressed the plausibility of that account in accordance with what was known of the historical context of the home area and the importance of the CSID. Consequently, the FtTJ was entitled to reach the conclusion he did at paragraph 36 ( c) that he was not satisfied that the appellant had proved that he was without Iraqi identity documents and that in reaching that conclusion he take into account the objective evidence as to the importance of those documents and he was satisfied that either the appellant had kept the document safe himself or he had left them with his family. Thus, he rejected his account that they had been destroyed in the context as claimed. Thus the submission made by Mr Hussain that the fact that he had a copy would not be of any assistance, was not the basis upon which the FtTJ rejected his account.
56. As to the family members the FtTJ drew on his earlier adverse findings between paragraphs 35 (a) –(m) and later between (r)- (w) and that having rejected that his family disowned him that he was satisfied that the appellant was in contact with family members along with those who lived in the IKR. Therefore, taking into account those earlier findings the judge found that he would have access to his genuine identification documents.
Ground 3:
57. in respect of this ground Mr Hussain relies upon paragraph 10 of the written grounds where it is submitted that the FtTJ erred in finding that the appellant’s political views were not genuinely held and that the FtTJ had given no reasons for this. Mr Hussain submitted that the only reason that there possibly could be for such a finding was that the FtTJ had rejected his earlier account as to events in Iraq. However, he submitted that was not a reasoned finding in the decision thus he erred in law by not providing reasons for that conclusion.
58. Mr Hussain further relied upon paragraph 11 and submitted that there were shaky findings on the evidence relating to his political activities and that the FtTJ did not properly engage with that evidence. He submitted that the findings were not “good enough” and the FtTJ had a duty to give reasons.
59. Having considered ground 3 by reference to the grounds of the submissions made, I am satisfied that the matters advanced by ground 3 do not establish the making of any error of law in the decision of the FtTJ.
60. The written grounds state as follows:
“It is submitted that the FtTJ has erred in finding that the appellant’s political views are not genuinely held [36d]. The FTJ has given no reason as to why he does not accept they are genuinely held. The Appellant has been forced from his home country from a place which, when the Peshmerga withdrew following the Kurdish referendum, ceded total control to the Iran backed Shia militia. These militia, as SMO details (see excerpts above) launched a campaign against Kurds in the area with a view to “kick them out.” It is therefore reasonably likely that the appellant would have strong political views.”
61. The grounds are premised on the basis that in essence all Kurds are politically active based on the general circumstances relating to their position in Iraqi society and their ethnicity. This submission is really no more than a generalised assessment. The conclusions drawn by the FtTJ were from his assessment of the evidence which related to this particular appellant and by reference to the evidence before him.
62. There is no challenge the findings made between paragraphs 35 (r) – (x) in the grounds of challenge either on the basis that they were irrational or that the judge did not adequately consider the evidence provided. The FtTJ undertook an assessment of the material provided and reached the conclusion that it was “very limited” ( see paragraph 35 (r). That was finding open to the judge and as acknowledged by Mr Hussain, the evidence was as the judge described “very limited” as shown by those few pages in the appellant’s bundle.
63. The FtTJ made his findings of fact that the appellant had not provided any membership documents or evidence from the parties he claimed to have joined and that if he were such a member as claimed it would have been reasonable for him to have provided evidence of this. That finding made related to the appellant’s post on Facebook referring him to being a member of a political party ( see post of demonstration in northern town February 17). The FtTJ rejected the appellant’s account that he played an organisational role for the reasons given at paragraph 35 (u) , the FtTJ made a finding that the appellant had not claimed to have been politically active before he left Iraq and that by reference to the chronology it had taken some time before he undertook any activity in the UK or became politically active ( see paragraph 35 (v). All of those findings were relevant to the assessment of whether his political vies were genuinely held. The FtTJ found his account did not accurately reflect his political opinions.
64. Crucially in his assessment of the evidence and relevant to the finding made that he was not satisfied that the appellant genuinely held “anti-regime views” the FtTJ made a finding of fact at paragraph 35 (v) , “in my judgement I have not heard compelling evidence as to what motivated the appellant to have become political in the UK”. The finding is not challenged the grounds and is an answer to the generalised claim made that because the appellant comes from a disputed area in Iraq and is of Kurdish ethnicity, he was likely to hold strong political views (see paragraph 10 of the grounds).
65. That finding of fact is further reinforced by the evidence before the FtTJ. The ASA did not rely on any sur place activity, generalised or otherwise. It was not asserted nor was there any reference made in the witness statement made by the appellant in 2024.
66. Drawing those matters together, contrary to the grounds at paragraph 10 and the submissions made, the FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons for reaching the conclusion at paragraph 36 (d) that he was not satisfied that the appellant genuinely held anti-regime views and as such he would not attend demonstrations in Iraq or post material on Facebook as return.
67. Insofar as the grounds at paragraph 11 seek to challenge the alternative conclusion reached that he could continue his activities limited as they were without any adverse interest in him, the basis of the submissions made is that “it runs contrary to all available evidence”. However, the evidence is not identified in the grounds nor is it been demonstrated that any reference is made to this before the FtTJ. Mr Wain points out that the ASA did not assert that he would be at risk in his home area because he would be unable to carry out any activities. Nor was there any reference to this in the appellant’s witness statement. Again, and relevant to this the appellant’s evidence was not of sufficient cogency as to his involvement in any sur place activities.
68. In any event, the FtTJ’s primary finding was that he was satisfied that the appellant was not genuine in holding any anti-regime views for the reasons that he gave, which were evidence-based, were adequate and were reasonably open to him to make on the evidence. Therefore, the FtTJ found he would be able to delete his Facebook posts before returning to Iraq and that finding is not contrary to the principles in HJ(Iran) as he is not being expected to conceal opinions that he does not genuinely hold. The FtTJ was therefore entitled to find that the appellant had not demonstrated that there was a reasonable likelihood that he would at risk of persecution or real risk of serious harm on return to Iraq.
69. For those reasons and having considered the decision of the FtTJ in light of the evidence and factual findings made I am satisfied that there is no error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

16 July 2026

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds