Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002855
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/63756/2023
LH/03822/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 14th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KIRK

Between

A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R. Ahmed, Counsel instructed by Charles Simmons Immigration Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr S. Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant is a citizen of India. She had appealed under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 17 November 2023 to refuse her application made on 22 November 2022 for leave to remain based on Article 3 rights.
2. In a decision which was promulgated on 30 August 2024, following a hearing in the First-tier Tribunal on 2 August 2024, Judge Lester (‘Judge’) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal (‘Decision’).
3. On 8 October 2024, First-tier Judge Elliott refused to grant the Appellant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
4. On 15 August 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Landes granted the Appellant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
Anonymity
5. The Tribunal considers that it is appropriate to maintain the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal. No party asked for it to be set aside.
Background and claim
6. The Appellant entered the United Kingdom (‘UK’) on 29 May 2022 with entry clearance for six months as a visitor, valid from 25 May to 25 November 2022, with the intention of visiting her UK based family.
7. The Appellant’s family in the UK are her son and his wife and their minor child with whom she has lived since she entered the UK, and her daughter and her husband and their two minor children and one adult child.
8. On 22 November 2022, an in-time application for leave to remain was made on behalf of the Appellant based on her health decline, citing medical grounds and exceptional circumstances, including supporting medical evidence. The Respondent refused the application in a decision dated 17 November 2023.
First-tier Tribunal decision
9. The Judge noted that the Appellant had confirmed that there was no longer an Article 3 claim and her skeleton argument had been based on very significant obstacles and Article 8 (at [7]-[8]). His Honour also noted that the Appellant’s son gave evidence at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal (at [12]).
10. Having summarised the medical evidence before the Tribunal at [20]-[22] and [25, the Judge considered the Appellant’s claim that there would be very significant obstacles to her integration into her country of origin (at [34]). His Honour concluded at [44]:
“I consider the evidence in the round and note that the burden is on the appellant and the standard required is the balance of probabilities. I find that the appellant has failed to establish that there would be very significant obstacles to their reintegration into India.”
11. The Judge considered the Appellant’s Article 8 claim at [45] and stated at [46]-[47]:
“The threshold for Article 8 is low. The appellant states that her relationship with her son the sponsor engages articulate on (sic) that it would be breached if the appeal were dismissed. It is established case law that Art 8 engagement is likely to be limited to spousal relationships and those between children. Here the position is of an adult child (the sponsor) and his mother the appellant. The appellant and sponsor would need to establish through evidence that their relationship goes above and beyond a familial relationship and to demonstrate dependency. From the evidence produced by the appellant it is not clear that there is sufficient evidence to establish that Article 8 is engaged. However for the purpose of the exercise I will proceed on the basis that Article 8 is engaged.
Although Article 8 (1) is engaged, the Immigration Rules are not met for the reasons given above.”
12. The Judge identified the public interest factors which weighed against the Appellant at [48] and [50] and the family and private life factors that weighed in the Appellant’s favour at [49] and concluded at [52]-[53]:
“I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the appellant has shown that they should be able to bypass the requirements of the immigration rules in order to regularise their presence in the UK. Considering the balance to be struck between these factors I find that those in favour of the interference outweigh the factors against it.
For all these reasons I find that the decision of the respondent does not amount to a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s rights under Article 8.”
Grounds of appeal
13. The Appellant argued that the Judge failed to give reasons why he found that the Appellant had not established that there would be very significant obstacles to her integration into India. This failure by the Judge to give reasons for his conclusion amounts to a material error of law (ASA [10]).
14. The Appellant further argued that the Judge failed to set out any reasons adequately or at all why it was not clear that there was sufficient evidence to establish that Article 8 is engaged, and this failure is a material error of law (ASA [11]). The Judge did not make any clear findings whether the Appellant enjoys family life with her adult child and her daughter-in-law in the UK and, for this reason, he did not make any proper Article 8 findings: Kugathas v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 31 (ASA [13]). His Honour failed to engage with the matters set out in the Appellant’s skeleton argument adequately or at all (ASA [22]) and failed to take into account material matters/evidence and/or failed to provide adequate reasons for findings on material matters (ASA [23]).
Permission to appeal to Upper Tribunal
15. Judge Elliott refused permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal for the following reasons at [2]-[5]:
…
“The grounds assert that the Judge erred in failing to provide adequate reasons for his findings; failing to make any or adequate findings as to whether the appellant enjoyed family life with her sponsor and daughter-in-law; failed to conduct a balancing exercise under Article 8(2) or take account of factors relevant to it.
The Judge’s determination in respect of very significant obstacles at paragraph 44 states that although he considered the evidence in the round, he found that she had failed to establish that there would be very significant obstacles in to integration in India. No reasons are given for that finding. However, the Judge took into account the factors referred to in paragraph 48 of his determination, in the context of his Article 8 assessment, all of which are relevant to the appellant’s ability to integrate. It is reasonably clear from the determination why the Judge would therefore have arrived at his conclusion at paragraph 44.
Although the Judge did not make a clear finding on the existence of family life, he proceeded on the basis that Article 8(1) was engaged (paragraph 46 and 47 of the determination). It cannot be said that the Judge failed to carry out a balancing exercise since he clearly did from paragraph 48 to 50 of the determination.
The grounds and the determination do not disclose an arguable, material error of law. Permission to appeal is therefore refused.”
16. The Appellant was subsequently granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal by Judge Landes on the following grounds:
“I consider the grounds are arguable. It is arguable that the judge simply did not engage with the skeleton argument and what was claimed to be the particular dependence of the appellant on her family in the UK both practically and emotionally. The judge did not give reasons why he was not satisfied that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into India. Whilst he mentioned matters which might have impacted on his conclusion at [29] – [34] and [48] it is arguable that a reader of the decision cannot work out from those paragraphs what facts he found, such as for example about the appellant’s health condition and why he did not accept the evidence of the witnesses without evidence from the family in India. Whilst the judge assumed that Article 8 was engaged, it is not clear whether he made that assumption taking the facts at their highest. If he did not, then it is arguable as set out in the grounds that he should have made clear findings about whether the appellant enjoyed family life with her family in the UK and if not, why not. If he was purporting to take the facts at their highest, then it is arguable he did not properly weigh the appellant’s family life in her favour taking into account her vulnerability (see 49 (b)); such findings as the judge makes at 48 (a) are weighed against the appellant and it is not clear why the judge takes those as public interest factors weighing against the appellant.”
Rule 24 response
17. The Respondent outlined her response to the grounds of appeal as follows:
“Ground One
The respondent submits that this does not give rise to a material error of law. It was reasonably open to the FTTJ to find that the appellant had failed to demonstrate any very significant obstacles. At [44] the FTTJ confirms that they considered all the evidence before them in the round. At [20]-[25] the FTTJ sets out the nature of the medical evidence and conditions before them, and highlights at [26] the appellant had those medical issues when she came to the UK and that Article 3 ECHR was not being relied on. At [27], the FTTJ confirmed that the contents of those reports have been considered.
At [41]-[42], the FTTJ has directed themselves appropriately, including identifying relevant factors for consideration. Accounting for the evidence before them, the FTTJ was entitled to find at [44] that the appellant had failed to demonstrate any very significant obstacles. At [20]-[33] the FTTJ summarises the evidence before them. At [29], it is recorded that the appellant’s son confirmed that he would be able to provide financially for the appellant on return to India. The sponsor confirmed, as set out at [30], that the appellant has family members in India. At [31], the FTTJ was entitled to take into account the absence of documentary evidence of research on care facilities in India. It is for the appellant to demonstrate such facilities are not available or appropriate. At [33], the FTTJ notes the claim that the appellant had had a ‘mental breakdown’ and the lack of medical evidence in support of that, as well as the absence of evidence from the appellant’s brother showing his inability to look after the appellant. The FTTJ was entitled to take those points into account.
As set out at [25]-[26] in NC v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1379, the broad evaluative judgment on very significant obstacles includes consideration of any reasonable steps which can be taken to avoid or mitigate any obstacles. On a fair reading of [20]-[44], the respondent submits that it is clear how the FTTJ reached their findings, and sufficient reasons have been provided. The FTTJ was not required to set out the entirety of their reasoning.
Ground Two
This does not demonstrate a material error of law. The FTTJ proceeded, at [46][47], on the basis that Article 8 ECHR was engaged in the alternative. The respondent submits that there is nothing in the determination to demonstrate that the FTTJ did not take the appellant’s case at its highest. The FTTJ has engaged in a balancing exercise at [47]-[52], setting out relevant factors. As part of that exercise, the FTTJ was entitled to consider that the appellant has family in India, the age of the medical evidence before them, that India is where the appellant had spent the majority of her life, and her understanding of the country. Although the appellant cites, at paragraphs 24-27 of the grounds of appeal, BRITCITS v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 368 at [59] and [76], that does not alter the position that it is for the appellant to demonstrate. The FTTJ was entitled to consider that the appellant had failed to demonstrate appropriate treatment was unavailable in light of the absence of documentary evidence of the research. It was reasonable for the FTTJ to also consider the evidence before them that the sponsor would continue to provide financial support.
The submissions raised at paragraphs 12 to 21 of the grounds of appeal ultimately amount to a disagreement with the FTTJ’s findings. It is a coherent determination which makes sense throughout. Based on the evidence before them, having taken account of the relevant factors, the FTTJ was entitled to consider that any interference was proportionate.”
Upper Tribunal hearing and submissions
18. The oral and written submissions at the hearing are a matter of record and need not be set out in full here. The Tribunal had access to all the documents before the First-tier Tribunal and the composite bundle filed by the Appellant.
19. The Tribunal heard submissions from Mr Ahmed for the Appellant and Mr Walker for the Respondent which have fully been taken into account.
Appellant
20. In relation to Ground 1, Mr Ahmed submitted that the Judge did not give any reasons as to why he was not satisfied that there were not very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration and this amounts to a material error of law. While the Judge mentioned matters that may have impacted on his conclusions in [29], [34] and [48], it is arguable that a reader cannot work out what facts he found, for example about the Appellant’s health condition and why he did not accept the evidence of the Appellant’s son.
21. In relation to Ground 2, Mr Ahmed contended that whereas the Judge assumed that Article 8 was engaged, it is not clear whether he made that assumption taking the facts at their highest. If he did not, then it is arguable as set out in the grounds that he should have made clear findings about whether the Appellant enjoyed family life with her family in the UK and if not, why not. The Judge did not provide adequate reasons on family life.
Respondent
22. Mr Walker relied on the Respondent’s Rule 24 response and added that the determination is coherent, any findings the Judge made he was entitled to make, and he found that any interference was proportionate.
Disposition
23. Both parties agreed that because the matter was heard more than a year ago, it should be considered again by the First-tier Tribunal as there will likely be additional fact-finding required in relation to the Appellant’s health relevant to both very significant obstacles and family life.
Decision on error of law
24. I remind myself of the limited circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the First-tier Judge. In Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 W.L.R. 48, Lewison LJ, with whom Males and Snowden LJJ agreed, explained interference with findings of fact and credibility is appropriate only where such a finding is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’ at [2]-[5]:
“The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
(ii) The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
(iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
(iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
(v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
(vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
Ground 1
25. Ground 1 contends that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for findings on material matters, specifically to support his finding that there were no very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration into India.
26. I have had regard to the authorities in relation to the adequacy of reasons and interference with factual findings. I note the following observations of Dingemans LJ in Terghazi v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2017; [2020] Imm. A.R. 461 at [45]:
“A further principle which it is relevant to note is that, even if an appellate court is entitled to hear an appeal because of an error of fact (because the appeal court has jurisdiction to hear appeals on facts) appellate courts should be very cautious in overturning findings of fact made by a first instance judge. This is because first instance judges have seen witnesses and take into account the whole “sea” of the evidence, rather than indulged in impermissible “island hopping” to parts only of the evidence, and because duplication of effort on appeal is undesirable and increases costs and delay. Judges hearing appeals on facts should only interfere if a finding of fact was made which had no basis in the evidence, or where there was a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence so that the decision could not reasonably be explained or justified.”
27. I have also noted the comments of Carnwath LJ in Mukarkar v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1045; [2007] Imm. A.R. 57 at [40] approved by the Supreme Court in MM (Lebanon) v SSHD [2017] UKSC 10; [2017] 1 W.L.R. 771 at [107] that:
“… It is of the nature of such judgments that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case … The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what may seem an unusually generous view of the facts of a particular case does not mean that it has made an error of law, so as to justify an appeal under the old system, or an order for reconsideration under the new… However on the facts of a particular case the decision of a specialist tribunal should be respected”.
28. The Judge at [20]-[33] summarised the evidence before him, including the evidence of the Appellant’s son that he would be able to provide financially for the Appellant on her return to India (at [29]) and that she has family members in India (at [30]). The Judge was entitled to take into the account the deficiencies in the evidence, including in relation to research undertaken into the availability and appropriateness of care facilities for the Appellant in her home area (at [31]), the absence of evidence in relation to the Appellant’s mental breakdown, and her brother’s inability to look after her if she returned to India (at [32]). His Honour directed himself appropriately in relation to the legal principles applicable to “very significant obstacles to integration” (at [41]-[42]) and concluded that the Appellant had failed to satisfy the burden on her to the required standard.
29. I am satisfied that the Judge’s findings of fact were grounded in the evidence, adequately reasoned and rational, and the law was correctly applied. This ground of appeal amounts to no more than a disagreement with the decision.
Ground 2
30. Ground 2 relates to the Judge’s findings on material matters relevant to the Article 8 claim and contends that he failed to give adequate reasons for his finding in relation to the Appellant’s family life with her adult child and daughter-in-law in the UK.
31. The Judge noted that it was not clear from the evidence produced by the Appellant that Article 8 was engaged, but he nevertheless proceeded on the basis that it was so engaged (at [46]). The Judge correctly stated the relevant law (at [47]) and undertook the required balancing exercise, weighing the public interest factors and private and family life factors relevant to the Appellant (at [47]-[52]. The Judge was entitled to consider the public interest factors that weighed against the Appellant, including that she had resided in India for the majority of her adult life, that she speaks the language, understands the country, society and customs, and has family members who reside in India (at [48]). He also was entitled to have regard to the absence of any evidence that research had been undertaken about possible care home options for the Appellant, specifically the cost, viability and suitability of the care (at [48]). The Judge noted that the Appellant and her sponsor had ‘failed to provide any bespoke evidence in relation to the personal situation of the appellant and how it would be impacted upon return to India’ and that the medical evidence produced by the Appellant was not current (at [48]. It also was open to the Judge to have regard to the sponsor’s evidence that he would continue to support the Appellant financially if she returned to India (at [48]). The Judge noted the family and private life factors that weighed in the Appellant’s favour (at [49]) and stated that he attached little weight to the financial independence statutory factor for reason that it was not clear from the evidence whether the Appellant would be financially independent in the UK (at [50]). Having had regard to the evidence and having undertaken the balancing exercise, the Judge was entitled to conclude that the Respondent’s decision did not amount to a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s rights under Article 8 (at [52]-[53]).
32. I am satisfied that the Judge’s findings of fact were grounded in the evidence, adequately reasoned and rational, and the Judge correctly applied the law. This ground of appeal amounts to no more than a disagreement with the decision.
Notice of Decision
33. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 30 August 2024 did not involve the making of a material error of law and shall stand.

Dr Linda J Kirk

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 January 2026