Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002864
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/04600/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19th of December 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

AD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
And

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms S Akinbolu, instructed by Mass Law Ltd

Heard at Field House on 21st January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant (who has also used other identities) is a citizen of Albania born on 3rd May 1979, and following notification of deportation, he appealed against the Secretary of State’s decision of 21st October 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The appellant claims to have entered the UK by lorry on 15th September 2015 and came to the attention of the authorities on 7th April 2019 when he was arrested. On 9th March 2020 he was convicted of two counts of possession of a handgun and one count of possession of ammunition without a certificate. He was sentenced to a total of six years’ imprisonment. The judge’s sentencing remarks record the appellant was found in possession of a concealed short-barrelled weapon and a sound suppressor in his sleeve.
3. On 13th May 2020 the Secretary of State served the appellant with notice of liability to deportation under the UK Borders Act 2007. On 13th August 2020 the appellant claimed asylum based on a fear of an organised crime group (OCG) in Albania. The Secretary of State refused the asylum claim certifying it under Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
First-tier Tribunal decision
4. The First-tier Tribunal (the FtT) concluded that the appellant was unable to rebut the presumption under Section 72(5A) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, therefore the appellant’s appeal fell to be assessed only by reference to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 3). The appeal was allowed by the FtT Judge Symes on 8th May 2025 on human rights grounds. The finding by the FtT judge that the appellant was excluded from asylum and humanitarian protection was not challenged.
5. The FtT Tribunal concluded that the reforms in Albania, absent concrete evidence that they would reduce the risk faced by someone with the appellant’s history, would not prevent the appellant from facing a risk of inhuman and degrading treatment at the hands of the OCG.
Secretary of State’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. The Secretary of State appealed the FtT decision on the basis that the starting point of the FtT’s analysis ought to have been the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in AD v Sweden [2024] ECHR 402 (‘AD’). It was submitted that from the judgment in AD v Sweden it was evident that there is a Horvath [2000] UKHL 37 level of protection in Albania. The question for the FtT ought to have been whether the particular circumstances of the respondent’s case meant that the Albanian authorities were unable or unwilling to obviate any risk of ill-treatment by non-state actors.
7. In the error of law decision, it was found that the judge did quote from AD v Sweden but the extract cited by the judge concentrated on [69] of AD v Sweden and which set out the difficulties in protection and which were now cited in the Country Policy and Information Note: Albania: actors of protection. The Tribunal made reference to the Country Policy and Information Note Albania – Actors of protection (December 2022) (CPIN) on Albania and criticised it for not acknowledging the “reach and potency” of OCGs in Albania. This did not reflect the Strasbourg Court’s decision in AD v Sweden and the judge did not proceed to reflect the conclusions at [70] and [71] of AD v Sweden which updated the position as to the current protection that could be offered by the Albanian authorities.
8. A material error of law was found and the Upper Tribunal set the FtT decision aside in terms of the assessment of protection, in particular [37] to [38] which related to Article 3.
9. The matter was retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking.
Grounds of appeal
10. The appellant’s grounds of appeal rested on the claim that the appellant remained at risk from the OGC and that his deportation would breach of Article 3 of the ECHR. In Article 8 terms, the appellant also relied on his relationship with his children and asserted there would be very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions set out in s117C of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (and which included considerations of undue harshness in relation to the children and their best interests). The appellant cited his safety and protection, mental health support and family ties.
11. A critical issue in this appeal is whether there is sufficiency of protection for the appellant in Albania and thus very significant obstacles to his return.
Documentation
12. I had before me the bundles presented by the appellant and respondent to the FtT, and which included the respondent’s underlying decision dated 21st October 2024, medical notes, sentencing remarks (displaying the appellant’s four aliases) dated 9th March 2020, an OASys report dated 4th April 2022, asylum interviews and country background material including UNICEF Albania report on trafficking in four regions dated September 2022, USSD Albania 2023 Human Rights Report, a medicolegal report dated 27th May 2022 from Dr A Hameed, Consultant Psychiatrist, identity documentation, and documentation relating to daughter LD born on 15th January 2011, a step child born 6th March 2016, a witness statement of the appellant dated 18th November 2023 and a further statement dated 21st January 2024 and a witness statement of his wife of the same date. A further bundle included details of a third child born to the appellant and his wife on 15th September 2024.
13. For the appeal hearing Ms Akinbolu produced a speaking note and cited the following reports
1. MCLU: Is Albania a safe country?, (2023) https://miclu.org/news/is-albania-a-safe-country
2 Country information note: medical and healthcare provision, Albania, May 2023 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/albania-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-information-note-medical-and-healthcare-provision-albania-may-2023-accessible
3 Trafficking and organised crime in Albania, by Claudia Neale and Micah Anne Neale, May 2024 https://gardencourtchambers.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/old/trafficking-and-organised-crime-in-albania-claudia-neale-and-micah-anne-neale.pdf
4 Asylos: Albania: Trafficking, April 2024 albaniatraffickingfullreportfinal(3)_7c677570-ca08-4b31-bc48-752e4526bb7b.pdf
5 Freedom House: Nations in Transit 2024 Country Report, 18 April 2024
6 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime: Integrity and Independence of Criminal Justice Institutions in the Western Balkans: Police and Prosecution Ugljesa-Ugi-Zvekic-Ioannis-Vlassis-Integrity-and-independence-of-criminal-justice-institutions-in-the-Western-Balkans-Police-and-prosecution-GI-TOC-November-2024.v2.pdf
7 Country policy and information note: actors of protection, Albania, February 2025 (accessible) - GOV.UK
8 European Commission: COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Albania 2025 Report https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/fe9138b7-90fe-4277-a12c-3a03f6d1957f_en?filename=albania-report-2025.pdf
Relevant sections of the FtT decision
14. For convenience and further background, relevant sections recorded in the FtT decision and recorded evidence are set out below:
‘3. The Appellant asserted that he had been trafficked to the UK; a positive conclusive grounds decision was made on 29 January 2024, though in May 2024 a decision was made not to grant him any leave to remain on that basis.
4. … His refusal to explain the background to the incident [the index offence] called for an inference that his purpose was extremely serious criminality. He had previously received a five-year sentence for a narcotics offence in Albania and had let the present proceedings continue in his false identity until this was discovered at a late stage.
5. The Appellant was born in Puke, in the north of Albania. His asylum claim is based on having been recruited as a bodyguard for a politician, SO, from 2003 until his death in 2013. He was required to disrupt the political opposition’s demonstrations and assist in enforcing blackmail threats. From 2013-2019 he worked for the politician’s son IS and his gang. He had tried to escape the gang by relocating from Tropoje to Sarande but was kidnapped by them. He was trafficked to the UK in 2015 where he regularly met with IS’s local manager here. He was repeatedly attacked by IS’s friends in this country, AG and RC. He now feared being killed at the gang’s hands for having spoken to the police.
…
8. Relevant evidence before me includes
(a) The Appellant's screening interview in which he mentions his family having sent him to Greece for his own protection to live with another family for several months. During his time with the OCG he had worked with a team of ten people of whom eight had been killed.
(b) The Appellant's full asylum interview in which he said that he now glimpsed members of the OCG at least three times a week but he would stay inside as much as possible to avoid running into them. He had reported them to the police via three in-person visits and some fifteen telephone calls but the police had not taken matters further beyond questioning him and watching a video of him being attacked in the street by two Albanian men (who he named) leaving him with a broken nose and fractured eye socket who were subsequently arrested and released on bail. He feared an Albanian man about whom he had spoken to the police and been interviewed by the CPS, now he believed that people would think he had snitched on them and broken the law by which Albanians would never report anything to the police. S’s people were present in the UK. He feared that individuals including lawyers and interpreters had told the group about his whereabouts. He had been threatened around a year before the interview at which point he stopped living with his family here. The OCG he feared had links with other Albanian criminal groups.
(c) An OASys report of 4 April 2022 noting the Appellant's account that he and the alleged kidnapping victim were in truth good friends who had lived together for some nine months, the latter having been paid to set the Appellant up. He had not been cohabiting with his family before the incident in order to protect them and was moving around frequently, for which reason there should be a safeguarding referral should he plan to live with them now. He had admitted previous problems with drugs and gambling, as well as various criminal activities with the OCG including holding drugs and transferring money. He was very motivated to make changes to his life now. He appeared to understand the norms of society and why they existed, although his behaviour in the community had not always reflected this. He had been prescribed medication for his heart and blood pressure and described a suicide attempt some six years earlier when he cut his arm and took an overdose. Key issues identified to be addressed in the future included his record of mixing with bad company, previous drug misuse, impulsive behaviour, lack of employment, financial problems, being bored, being lonely, feeling stressed, feeling depressed, and gambling.
(d) A report by a consultant psychiatrist Dr Hameed from June 2022 written for the purposes of supporting a bail application stating that following an interview with the Appellant summarising the account given elsewhere. He had overdosed in the detention centre following his transfer from HMP Huntercombe. He feared being killed by the gangsters in Albania within days of arriving there whereas he felt he had a network of friends and his partner who could support him morally and financially in the UK. He reported depression, stress, sleeplessness and anxiety. His speech was continuous without thought disorder, his mood was anxious and low and he complained of memory and concentration issues and he had persecutory delusions about people following him; he was oriented in time, place and person. He suffered from mental disorders in which anxiety was the major problem. His score in the Generalised Anxiety Disorder Assessment which was often related to environmental stress was indicative of severe anxiety needing treatment, almost double that where further assessment would normally be required. His Panic Disorder featured unpredictable recurrent attacks not restricted to any particular situation with dominant symptoms of palpitations, chest pain, choking sensations, dizziness and feelings of unreality. His uncertain immigration status contributed towards the current acute exacerbation of his condition. He would benefit from psychotherapy and maintaining close links with general medical services. If returned to Albania his mental condition would be likely to prevent him accessing any healthcare even were it otherwise available to him; he had failed to seek mental health treatment in detention previously because of his fear of the authorities, the language barrier and difficulties in trusting others. Protective measures such as restraint or medication would not address his underlying problems and a forced removal could exacerbate his mental health problems. Regular contact with healthcare professionals would be important. He was not presently fit to travel as he might disrupt the flight if he became agitated or aggressive which was possible given his mental state. If cross examined his evidence might be inconsistent given his poor concentration and recall and he should not be asked to give oral evidence.
(e) A GP’s letter from January 2023 stating that the Appellant had been named as an emergency contact for L since she registered in March 2022.
(f) The Appellant's GP records from August 2023 (under the name in which he was originally charged) setting out his medication regime: he is prescribed thirteen medications including Sertraline.
9. The Appellant's witness statement sets out that his parents are aged in their eighties and his six sisters live outside Albania, having departed the country for their own safety. He was invited to become the MP’s bodyguard because his physique attracted attention whilst sitting in a local coffee shop. For the first couple of months his role was routine, but he was then required to attend a demonstration where he was compelled to take part in violence against the supporters of other MPs and when he sought official documentation regarding his employment, he was given excuses. He was coerced into criminal activities, moving between Tirana and Fier which were an hour’s drive apart, such as intimidating individuals to repay debts and transporting drugs across the country, and repeatedly beaten with hard objects, including the butt of a gun, when he objected. At one time he fled the group and went to live in Gjirokaster, but was found there by police officers, whose identity and allegiance he suspected, who returned him to Fier. He was brutally beaten by the group, his hand was broken with a hammer, and held captive in handcuffs for 8 days in inhumane conditions, without access to a toilet and with only intermittent access to water. His emotional anguish and desperation was such that he attempted suicide by using a broken bottle he found in the warehouse; he still bore the scars. Eventually he agreed to resume work for the group.
10. In 2009 he met a woman, Ms A, and they began a relationship, marrying five months later, and in January 2011 they had a daughter. He never told her about the reality of his job.
11. In 2010 he sought to escape the group again, fleeing to Durres. He hid there for a month, but one night, as he slept with the door ajar due to the heat, he was abruptly awakened by a very cold sensation on his ribs, and realised he had been shot. He still bore the scar. He was taken back to the same warehouse, unable to move because of the severity of his injuries, until he received treatment from a man professing to be a veterinarian, who crudely treated him, removing the bullet and treating the infection with hot metal. After this he was too fearful to try to escape the group again.
12. In October 2011 his situation worsened when he was arrested for carrying drugs and transporting a firearm on the MP’s behalf and for carrying a firearm. Four months into the prison sentence the MP intervened to secure his release. He pleaded with the group to release him from working from them, but they told him that they any further attempts to escape them would result in the torture and killing of his wife and daughter. He now felt that he had to distance himself from them to avoid endangering them further.
13. He had hoped the death of the MP O in 2013 might lead to the group weakening or dissolving. However, in fact S was replaced by his nephew I S. He had previously served as the Mayor for R.. Council. So he was still compelled to continue the same work under S's command. He still tried to persuade the group to let him leave, but after the group’s manager, known as U, discussed the matter with S, he was summoned to his office and told that the only escape from this life would be death.
14. However, a few days later he was called back to the office and given the opportunity to come to the UK. He felt this was a glimmer of hope and that he might have the chance to escape the gang’s reach here, given the country was less corrupt and more respectful of human rights. He was brought to the UK via Shkoder where he was placed in the back of a lorry. When he arrived in the UK he was picked up in a van, it appeared that particular arrangements had been made for each person arriving, indicating a level of planning and coordination. He was taken to a small studio flat, given a basic old phone without credit or internet access, and told not to try to contact anyone. He feared approaching the police here given the gang’s influence. He regularly received calls from the group instructing him to deliver items including drugs and money.
15. In the UK he had panicked when arrested. He suspected he had been set up for arrest which was why the man he was with left the scene just before the police arrived. The accusation that he had kidnapped that man was manifestly false, as he had been seen in his presence repeatedly.
…
19. The Appellant adopted his witness statement and gave evidence. Cross examined he said that he was not sure when his wife entered the UK; they were still married at that time though separated. He had now lived with the children for two years and eight months. Previously he had not lived with them before 2018, when his daughter was 9 or 10 years old. They had lived with their mother alone before 2013, when he left the household to ensure they were safe and that he could provide for them.
20. Nevertheless he had daily contact with the children once he was released from prison; it was only the refusal of social services that prevented them from living together. There was no documentary evidence of cohabitation because all the bills were in his ex-partner’s name. His children were the most important thing in his life. He learned of the possibility of claiming asylum only after a few weeks in detention. They both cared for their son. He would give his life and his last breath to be with his family. They were now trying to rebuild their life together, as his ex-partner remained scared given what they had been through, they were not a couple but were seeking to rebuild their family. Children were a gift from god and given his age he felt they could not wait any longer, and so they decided to have another child, even though he knew he was liable to deportation at the time.
21. His wife had family in Albania. He was also in contact with his own family in Albania, he had even spoken to them from prison. He had not regained contact with his own children until 2019 because he been brought to the UK by the gang rather than coming simply as a visitor. He didn’t know where his family was at that time. It was put to him that perhaps he would be endangering his family by having contact with them now. He replied that they were his whole life. He had distant relatives in the UK who sometimes returned to Albania.
…
25. Re-examined, the Appellant said that the gang operated in every country in Europe, but their headquarters was in Fiar. Albania was a small country. He believed he would be killed within hours of approaching the police there. He believed he had no chance of accessing the mental healthcare he needed in Albania.
15. Preserved findings of the FtT read as follows:
33… At times I believe that his account of repeatedly seeing members of the OCG in close proximity to his home is exaggerated, and it is difficult to accept that police and Home Office interpreters have breached confidentiality by reporting aspects of his case to the media, though I conclude that these aspects of his case are probably borne of the paranoia that his poor mental health entails; but the fact remains that at least once he has been tracked down by them even in the UK and seriously assaulted. The fact that he has repeatedly chosen to live separately from the family to whom he is clearly devoted attests to the genuineness of his underlying fears.
34. Having heard the Appellant's oral evidence which held up well under cross examination, I accept that his account of the historical facts is wholly credible. It is unsurprising that his graphic account of repeated mistreatment and being hunted down by the OCG in Albania, and that he has been violently assaulted in the UK by the OCG's agents, was accepted by the Respondent. Overall his account has been broadly consistent between its various narrations at the screening and substantive interviews, in examination in chief and cross examination.
…
37. So the Appellant's asylum claim must be assessed only by reference to ECHR Art 3.
16. I do not record all the oral evidence before me in the Upper Tribunal and refer to the relevant evidence in my findings. Under cross examination, the appellant confirmed that the last time he made a complaint in Albania he was handed over by the police to the gang and this was in 2008. He was concerned about his memory owing to his mental health. He arrived in the UK in 2015. He confirmed he lived apart from his wife for 9 years. He confirmed he accompanied his child to school on many occasions and sometimes everyday. He confirmed that he was first arrested in 2019 and released in May 2022. He moved in with his family in December 2022. He remained on immigration bail. He had seen the people who attacked him in January 2023, 7 or 8 times and reported this to the police, but the police did nothing, he thought, because he was an ex-convict. The attackers were from the same group based in Albania.
17. His wife attended and adopted her statement and confirmed that she had been apart from the appellant for 9 years and she had a child by another man in 2016. Since he was released, the appellant had been living with them and taking his children to clubs and gym and school. He took the oldest child to school almost every day. She received assistance from the Salvation Army when they were apart.
Submissions
18. Mr Tufan submitted that AD v Sweden was the final word on the sufficiency issues and the factual matrix was quite similar and he referred to [49]. The appellant was subjected to further attacks abroad after leaving Albania. No other evidence could displace the rationale of AD v Sweden. The Country Policy and Information Note 2025 suggested sufficiency of protection and indeed referred to AD v Sweden. There were elements of corruption in the security system, but they did not reach the threshold to suggest AD v Sweden was wrongly decided.
19. Article 8 had not been considered by the FtT but was relevant and the appellant has a serious criminal and a record in Albania and in the UK. The relevant test was encapsulated in s117C (6) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. There was no undue harshness because the two older children had been separated from the appellant until 2022. I was referred to HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC at [41] and the test of undue harshness which in this context denoted something severe or bleak when considering separation from the children or partner, and [49] such that great weight should be given to the public interest and which could only be outweighed by a ‘very strong claim indeed’. There was a high threshold, and the countervailing considerations must be heavy to outweigh the public interest. HA (Iraq) at [58] confirmed that where there was simply no further offending in terms of rehabilitation that was unlikely to carry additional weight.
20. Ms Akinbolu relied on the skeleton argument in the original bundle and her speaking note. It was accepted that the appellant was a former member of an OGC and threatened on multiple occasions when attempting to separate himself from the gang by relocating elsewhere and treated extremely badly. His assault in Albania was in 2008. He was brought by the gang to the UK and worked for them for 4 years and subjected to assaults and then arrested for the index offence whilst working for the OGC and having attempted to cooperate with the police was traced and assaulted in 2023. This was a gang of significant involvement and reach to organise events in Albania and the UK. I was referred to paragraph 339K of the immigration rules in relation to past treatment; the sufficiency of protection in Albania asserted by the respondent was not justified on either the subjective or the objective material.
21. In AD v Sweden the appellant was a serving police officer who had not been involved in an organised criminal gang but faced threats when he left but he had direct links with a senior police office in the force who had taken his reports, [72] and [78]. At [69] it was accepted there was prevalent corruption in Albania and there was a general conclusion there have been positive steps but there was reliance on legislative provisions and establishment of bodies such as SPAK to support the proposition that in general protection was not insufficient.
22. I was referred to the evidence cited above in the speaking note and in particular the most recent Country Policy and Information Note; Albania February 2025, which, at section 7 identified the fight against corruption and at section 8 the legal framework, but which also noted that implementation was poor. There remained widespread corruption. The report showed that the fight against corruption had improved for high-level cases but deteriorated for lower-level cases. The appellant could be traced to the UK and there were persistent attempts by criminal gangs to ‘make him pay’ long after his involvement and he had no access to higher level police officers. Would the protection be sufficient in his case? The OGCs were swift and efficient in exacting revenge, and the evidence suggested that if he approached the police they will do nothing. He may be at risk in 2- or 3-years’ time.
23. The appellant would need support with his mental health, and his sole remaining parent was his mother in Albania. He would not be able to relocate. The availability of health care in Albania was inadequate and there were difficulties in accessing the same and only if he could afford it. He needed continual support medically and this was an article 8 factor. He had support and strong ties with his family, and his children were British citizens and his wife a refugee.
24. It was notable that the risk he faces was accepted to exist. He had a strong bond with his daughter who would be concerned about him if he went to Albania. Dr Hameed’s report dated from 2022, but he recorded the difficulties the appellant would have in facing return. His ability to return to Albania to construct a normal life was hampered. There were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s return. His presence in the UK was not entirely voluntary and he was trafficked. He had vision, diabetic and cardiac problems. The OASys report pointed to positive engagement with all rehabilitative processes and that he was at low risk of reoffending. The public interest was not a fixity. It was not until after he was sentenced, he met with officials and he maintained someone sent to him in prison was from the OCG. Prior to that he made clear his actions were under coercion. He was visited by a solicitor whom he had not instructed. During sentencing he remained silent. At this point Ms Akinbolu confirmed she was not saying that the solicitor or barrister instructed during his conviction was instruction by the OCG. Corruption, inefficiency and misconduct remained as indeed did the CPIN itself acknowledged.
25. Taking all matters in the round his appeal should be allowed.
Conclusions
26. Although the appellant was not presented as a vulnerable witness, I have borne in mind The Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance and AM (Afghanistan) [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 when assessing the conduct of the hearing and assessing the evidence accordingly. I stress I have taken into account Dr Hameed’s report dated June 2022.
27. I was specifically invited to consider paragraph 339K of the immigration rules which states as follows:
339K. The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the person’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.
28. I appreciate that the appellant’s involvement in the OCG in Albania was accepted by the FtT judge and that Devaseelan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKAIT 702 applies. I have set out above the preserved findings. It was accepted that the appellant was working for the OCG (trafficked) until 2019, went to prison in 2019 and released in December 2022 and then attacked in January 2023. I, however, must consider the position contemporaneously (and not in 2 or 3 years’ time). In addition to the findings of the FtT judge, I was provided with further oral evidence by the appellant and his wife and have considered matters in the light of the updating evidence. Although it is correct to state that past persecution (or to reframe the issue – past failure to protect) is a relevant issue, the assessment of sufficiency of protection must be in the present. Despite the continual assertions of the reach and efficiency of the OCG and their intent on attacking the appellant, it appears that he has not been assaulted since 2023.
29. The appellant’s own evidence was that the reach of the OCG was effective in the UK and in Albania, (indeed he gave evidence that the UK police when he did report something ignored it because he was an ex-convict). Bearing in mind it was maintained by the appellant that the OCG could track him down anywhere and even in the UK, I do not find that the threat persists, as the appellant asserts, for the following reasons.
30. First, the FtT judge in his finding at [33] concluded ‘At times I believe that his account of repeatedly seeing members of the OCG in close proximity to his home is exaggerated, and it is difficult to accept that police and Home Office interpreters have breached confidentiality by reporting aspects of his case to the media, though I conclude that these aspects of his case are probably borne of the paranoia that his poor mental health entails’.
31. Thus, the judge found the appellant was exaggerating in his account albeit accepting the historic claim.
32. Secondly it was noted by the FtT judge that ‘He had now lived with the children for two years and eight months. Previously he had not lived with them before 2018’. The appellant maintained that he did not live with this family prior to this because of the risk to them from the OCG. The appellant told the probation manager who compiled the OASys report on 4th April 2022 that he did not live with his wife and children in order to protect them from the OCG. In his evidence before me he confirmed that he had moved back in with the family in December 2022 and continued to live with them. The appellant must have considered the risk very significantly abated to both himself and his family. He has now lived with his family for more than 3 years. More tellingly is that the appellant gave oral evidence that he moved in with his family after probation and social services approved the move. I do not accept that his reunification with the family would have been approved by social services, bearing in mind his background, if there was considered to be any risk from an OGC.
33. Bearing in mind the asserted power of the OCG both in Albania and the UK, if it was intent on causing the appellant serious harm, it has had ample time. I conclude that any OCG with the reach and power they are said to assert, would be easily able to track him in order to inflict harm even in the UK. Both the appellant and his wife gave evidence that the appellant would go out everyday with his daughter and take her to school. If the appellant seriously considered he would be attacked, I simply do not accept that he would be out on a regular basis, to the gym, to clubs and to school with his daughter over the past years. There was no assertion of problems on that basis. The appellant asserted memory problems, but his domestic activities were confirmed by his wife.
34. Even if the above were wrong, I turn to sufficiency of protection. It is not only the fear test but the protection test which is relevant and the present protection at that. The sufficiency of protection test in Horvath [2000] UKHL 37 is set out by Lord Hope of Craighead as follows:
“As regards the third issue, the answer to it also is to be found in the principle of surrogacy. The primary duty to provide the protection lies with the home state. It is its duty to establish and to operate a system of protection against the persecution of its own nationals. If that system is lacking the protection of the international community is available as a substitute. But the application of the surrogacy principle rests upon the assumption that, just as the substitute cannot achieve complete protection against isolated and random attacks, so also complete protection against such attacks is not to be expected of the home state. The standard to be applied is therefore not that which would eliminate all risk and would thus amount to a guarantee of protection in the home state. Rather it is a practical standard, which takes proper account of the duty which the state owes to all its own nationals. As Ward L.J. said at p.44G, under reference to Professor Hathaway’s observation in his book at p.105, it is axiomatic that we live in an imperfect world. Certain levels of ill-treatment may still occur even if steps to prevent this are taken by the state to which we look for our protection. I consider that the Tribunal in this case applied the right standard when they were considering the evidence.
Conclusion
Where the allegation is of persecution by non-state agents, the sufficiency of state protection is relevant to a consideration whether each of the two tests – the ‘fear’ test and the ‘protection’ test – is satisfied. The proper starting point, once the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has a genuine and well-founded fear of serious violence or ill-treatment for a Convention reason, is to consider whether what he fears is ‘persecution’ within the meaning of the Convention. At that stage the question whether the state is able and willing to afford protection is put directly in issue by a holistic approach to the definition which is based on the principle of surrogacy”.
35. The Country Policy and Information Note: actors of protection 2025 on Albania confirmed at section 5.2.6 that the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime published a report in November 2024 which identified that
‘The Albanian state police is a well-structured law enforcement organization that is regulated by a relatively comprehensive legal framework and system of internal regulation. There are specialized departments that deal with specific areas of law enforcement, including an anti-corruption sector, yet overall power within the organization is centralized in the hands of the general director’.
36. Corruption was addressed at Section 5.4 onwards and it was noted that it persisted but there were identified measures in place to tackle corruption and impunity (5.4.8).
37. At section 7 of the CPIN it was recorded that ‘‘The legal framework for the fight against corruption is largely in place, but preventive measures and law enforcement need to be improved institutional roles and coordination for prevention.’ This, however, also referenced Specialised Structure for Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime ‘SPAK’ – a special anti-corruption body and it was noted at 7.2 that
‘‘Spak is made up of a special prosecution office, the national bureau of investigation, and special courts dealing with corruption and organised crime’.
38. I note the activity of SPAK in work against corruption in Section 7. Also identified were reforms to strengthen judicial efficiency such that 245 judges and prosecutors were dismissed as a result of the vetting process by the end of 2023. Section 7.3.4 referenced that the continued implementation of vetting had had a positive impact on the fight against corruption in the judiciary.
39. Section 7.4 identified that police reform continued with reference to a report dated July 2024 which recorded Albania cracking down on misconduct within the State Police and that allegations of illegal activities, law violations, corruption, and unprofessional behaviour had prompted swift action from authorities.
40. I accept, on consideration of the evidence overall, the points raised by the Secretary of State at [61] of her reasons for refusal letter and which included that:
‘External evidence states that the law provides criminal penalties for corruption by public officials and prohibits those with criminal convictions from serving in government positions. External evidence further states that the Special Prosecution Against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) have secured the conviction of several ministers for corruption charges and abuse of office. Albania’s track record of corruption has vastly improved since you left Albania in 2015 and has received international praise for the success in reducing judicial corruption.’
41. The current CPIN February 2025, acknowledges inefficiency, inadequate training, corruption and political interference in the security forces but the CPIN realistically included qualifying statements. For example the CPIN records that although AD v Sweden recognised the continual challenges faced by the Albanian judicial system it notes that ‘ … Essentially from all the reports quoted above dating from 2021-2023 …it appears that corruption continues to be a widespread problem….Nevertheless the Court also recognises that Albania…has made concerted efforts to address these issues….The reports also note that although some problems remain, progress has been made.’
42. Referring back to Horvath, there can be no absolute guarantee of protection.
43. Moreover, the conclusions at [70] and [71] of AD v Sweden consider the position as to the current protection that could be offered by the Albanian authorities.
“70. Nevertheless, the Court also recognises that Albania, a member of the Council of Europe and a Contracting State to the Convention, has made concerted efforts to address these issues. The reports quoted above describe several reforms which have been introduced and measures taken to improve the capability and integrity of the law enforcement authorities. The reports also note that, although some problems remain, progress has been made. For example, specialised bodies working against corruption and organised crime have been set up and are operational, vetting processes for judges and prosecutors are ongoing, regular police operations against criminal organisations are carried out and there are examples of investigations, arrests and convictions in cases relating to corruption and to organised crime (see, in particular, paragraphs 39 and 41-44 above).
71. In the light of these recent reports, which postdate the decisions in the domestic proceedings, the Court considers that the Albanian authorities’ capacity to protect their people cannot be regarded as insufficient for the general public in Albania. Nor can it be regarded as generally insufficient for all persons who are targeted by criminal organisations (compare J.K. and Others v. Sweden, cited above, § 121)”.
44. AD v Sweden makes clear an individualised assessment is required. It is not merely a question of what the OCG can do but the focus needs to be on whether the authorities are unable or unwilling to obviate the risk faced by the appellant. I underline the underpinning conclusion that AD v Sweden specifically found in relation to those who were targeted by criminal organisations (OCGs) that the Albanian protection system could not “be regarded as generally insufficient for all persons who are targeted by criminal organisations”.
45. One of the applicants in the case of AD v Sweden was in fact himself a police officer, and Ms Akinbolu suggested that the appellant’s case differed from that considered by AD v Sweden in that the police officer had high ranking contacts in the police force, unlike the appellant. However, first there is no guarantee of protection by any state. The focus is on the ability of the state as to sufficiency of protection and there are recorded improvements in the vetting processes and the fight against impunity and corruption. There are various organisations now in existence in Albania fighting corruption.
46. Secondly, the protection accepted to exist in AD v Sweden in Albania was against an OCG. I do not accept that the fact of being a former member of an OCG outweighs that of being police officer but moreover, the ECtHR did not find that the protection only existed to those who had contacts and indeed the extract cited above makes reference to the fact that the Albanian governments capacity to protect the general public was not considered insufficient and nor regarded as insufficient for all persons targeted by criminal organisations.
47. AD v Sweden reviewed a variety of reports dating to November 2023 and the judgment was handed down in May 2024. The strong measures against corruption were also identified. It is inconceivable that any report of moment contradicting or undermining sufficiency of protection would not have been presented to the court prior to its deliberations and judgment. Although AD v Sweden was presented as not binding, I find that the judgment is highly pertinent and particularly persuasive.
48. The reports cited by Ms Akinbolu largely relied on reports which themselves predated AD v Sweden, which in turn does acknowledge the corruption and inefficiencies in the security systems in Albania but nevertheless and overall the ECtHR having reviewed a considerable amount of material as referenced from [39]-[44] concluded that there is sufficiency of protection even from OCGs in Albania owing to the improvements.
49. The Migrant and Refugee Legal Unit report dated from 2023 and gave little detailed up to date information about sufficiency of protection and was based on statistics up to 2022. Again, the Trafficking and organised crime in Albania report dated May 2024 was largely based on material prior to 2022 and this referenced an ASylos report dated May 2024; that again was based on more elderly material. The Freedom House Nations in Transit 2024 report although again concentrating on pre 2022 material in fact identified the success of SPAK.
50. The report Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime: Integrity and Independence of Criminal Justice Institutions in the Western Balkans: Police and Prosecution was dated 2024 and covered the whole of the Western Balkans but even then, acknowledged the robust legal and institutional framework to counter corruption and organised crime in Albania albeit identifying delays and a lack of co-ordination.
51. Although the evidence in the report European Commission: Commission Staff Working Documents Albania 2025 Report postdated AD v Sweden, it was largely geared to economic development and measures and the legal framework underlying democratic structures. I was taken by Ms Akinbolu to section 2.2 on the rule of law and the statistics for performance within that sector and it was acknowledged that the quality of justice and training needed to be improved. The report also identified the track record in the fight against corruption had improved for high level cases and slightly deteriorated for non high-level cases. This report also noted that the state police remain highly vulnerable to corruption, but the law had been revised and an institutional framework for the fight against corruption was recognised as in place and that SPAK had delivered positive results. Finally, it stated that
‘In March 2025, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) finished the fifth round compliance procedure for Albania, concluding that 18 out of 24 recommendations had been satisfactorily addressed.’
52. The report also concluded that Albania provides adequate legal guarantees on the prevention of torture and ill-treatment and the follow-up of cases is adequate.
53. I do not find that anything cited in the reports presented undermined the overall assessment in AD v Sweden or that the appellant could not avail himself of protection.
54. Throughout the assessment of the evidence, I have factored in the mental health issues of the appellant. He experiences generalised anxiety disorder, depression and panic disorder and anxiety. I have considered the GP reports which identified that the appellant has diabetes, alcohol withdrawal symptoms and refers to an ‘overdose’ in May 2022. He is on prescribed medication such as Sertraline and thus being treated. The GP reports appear to end in August 2023 which is over two years ago. The OASys report dated April 2022, reported that he had withdrawn from drugs, reported no mental health problems and did not have any thoughts of self-harm or suicide (Section 10.8). Again, it was confirmed later in the report that there were no concerns as to suicide. Approximately only two to three months later the appellant advised Dr Hameed in June 2022 that if he was removed he ‘might’ commit suicide. I take Dr Hameed’s report into consideration, but I consider this to be speculative particularly in view of the OASys report. As Dr Hameed stated those seeking asylum are presented with an uncertain future which can be linked to mental health problems. The appellant’s medical and mental health conditions can be addressed in Albania where there are existing healthcare facilities and the threshold identified in AM (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17 and AM (Article 3, health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC) simply has not been reached. I note from his wife’s witness statement dated 21st January 2024 that he manages to take his children to medical appointments. There is no reason why he could not do the same for himself.
55. Trafficking was not one of the risks raised in the speaking note by Ms Akinlolu (although it was referenced as having previously occurred). Even so I do not accept, even identifying factors raised in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC), which predominantly relates to women, that the appellant would be at risk of re-trafficking. I realise that a positive conclusive grounds decision was made in relation to his modern slavery claim but on 17th May 2024 it was determined no leave was granted. He is more mature male in his mid-forties and had some education in Albania. He retains family there. I have no doubt he can locate work should he wish. Indeed, there are services and facilities in Albania to assist. I appreciate he has had some mental health issues (and I enlist my reasoning elsewhere), but I do not find that these conditions are of such significance that they would prevent him from employment or accessing health care. They did not prevent him from working in the UK. No evidence was provided to demonstrate that the appellant would be unable or unfit to work (either medical or in terms of job statistics). According to the OASys report the appellant worked for a construction company cleaning in the UK. There is no reason why he could not resume that type of work.
56. Overall, I do not accept the appellant would be at risk of inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 3) should be returned to Albania.
57. With reference to article 8, Section 117C of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 sets out the following:
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.
58. Taking the exceptions into account further to s117C(4)(a), the appellant has not been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life and indeed entered illegally in 2015. Further to s117C(4)(b), I do not find that he is socially and culturally integrated in the UK. He has adopted various identities and after a matter of a few years embarked on criminal offending. He spent most of his younger life in Albania and only arrived in the UK in 2015 aged 36 years old. He has been here just over 10 years. Further to s117C(4)(c), I do not accept owing to my findings above (including in relation to his health conditions) and below, that there will be very significant obstacles to his integration in Albania. In accordance with SSHD v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, I have made a broad evaluation of whether the appellant on return to Albania could be an ‘insider’ so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships. He was educated and grew up in Albania and speaks the language. He is familiar with the culture. He can also, according to his witness statement speak Greek [w/s 22nd January 2024]. He has family in Albania and has, in my view from the evidence, has the ability to work there and would become re-integrated within a reasonable time.
59. The requirements under exception 1 are conjunctive and therefore on any one of those grounds he does not fall into exception 1.
60. In relation to section 117C (5) and exception 2 and separation from the wife and children, the Supreme Court in KO (Nigeria) v SSHD [2018] UKSC 53 has approved the following direction as authoritative guidance on what is ‘unduly harsh’ as follows:
"'unduly harsh' does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. 'Harsh' in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb 'unduly' raises an already elevated standard still higher."
61. I appreciate that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his children and wife. He walks the older child to school. None of the evidence, neither oral or written, persuaded me that the effect on the children with whom the appellant has lived intermittently over the years, and only recently since he was released from prison, would be unduly harsh.
62. The children were born in 2011, 2016 and 2024 were doing well and had no significant educational or health problems. Overall, the best interests of the children are to remain in a stable environment. They have lived with their mother all their lives and during the incarceration of the appellant. The children are British citizen children; it will no doubt be important for them to remain together and with their mother as they have done throughout their lives. She appears to be the stabilising factor. The two older children are at school and appeared to be doing well and there were no reports, such as social worker, medical or school reports, to suggest that separation from their father would severely undermine their wellbeing or engage ‘undue harshness’. The youngest child born in 2024 had no even started formal school. None presented with any health difficulties.
63. His wife’s statement confirmed he is a loving and attentive father and that he was involved in their lives, but it did not illuminate why it would be unduly harsh for either the children or the wife to be parted from the appellant.
64. The best interests of the children are no doubt to live in a family unit together with their father as well (I do not accept that the children would be at risk owing to a risk to the father from any OGC for the reasons given above) but although their interests are primary, the children’s interests are not a trump card. I am sure that separation will be sad and difficult but overall, nothing presented to me suggested that being separated from their father would be unduly harsh. I am not expecting the children or wife to relocate to Albania. The wife and mother was presented as having refugee status in the UK although there were no details to underpin that assertion and I note her British Citizen passport. In terms of exception 2 bearing in mind the length of time he had already been parted from his wife previously, even having considered her evidence, I find it would not be unduly harsh on her for him to relocate to Albania without the wife and I received no formal reports to the contrary. She has experienced considerable time without him when they were separated for about 9 years according to his oral evidence which included when he was in prison. The family were able to provide for themselves whilst the appellant was in prison. There was no report that she experienced significant health or financial difficulties. She was resourceful enough to obtain support from the Salvation Army and to care for the children as a single parent.
65. I find that it would not be unduly harsh for the appellant to remove to Albania on his own.
66. Turning to s117C (6), the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above exceptions 1 and 2 (or the applicant can point to features of his case under these heads which make his claim especially strong). This has been held to be an extremely demanding test.
67. The Supreme Court has explained in Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60 [50] and
“The critical issue for the tribunal will generally be whether, giving due weight to the strength of the public interest in the deportation of the offender in the case before it, the article 8 claim is sufficiently strong to outweigh it. In general, only a claim which is very strong indeed - very compelling, as it was put in MF (Nigeria) - will succeed”.
68. I have factored in the considerations on exceptions from above and made an assessment holistically and considered the factors set out at [51] in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, such as the nature and seriousness of the offence, the length of his stay in the UK, the time elapse since the offence was committed and the appellant’s conduct, the nationalities of the individuals concerned, the family situation, the children (which are a primary factors), the seriousness of the difficulties the appellant would encounter and the solidity of the social cultural and family ties with the UK and Albania. I factor in my findings from above and do not simply repeat them all save to state that the offence was very serious as reflected in the sentence of six years in prison; the appellant has only been in the UK for just over 10 years and his residence in the UK has always been unlawful; he has not committed offences since his release; he has a genuine relationship with his British citizen wife and children and their best interests would be for the family to remain intact but that is not a trump car and his deportation would not be unduly harsh; there would be no very significant obstacles to the appellant’s return to Albania.
69. The sentencing remarks of the judge noted that the appellant had received a five-year sentence for narcotics offences in Albania. The OASys report dated April 2022 recorded that his risk of serious harm score OVP as low but rising from 9% in the first year to 16% in the second year. Although he was also classified as having a low risk of proven reoffending the same report recorded that he was of high risk to the public (page 41) and also medium risk to the public as to serious harm. I have notwithstanding used the final predictor scores and note that the OGRS3 risk of proven reoffending was low but rising from 15% in the first year to 26% in the second year. He was to be managed at MAPPA category 3 level 2.
70. The appellant has not been convicted since his release but as stated in HA (Iraq) at [58] and Binbuga [2019] EWCA Civ 551 at [85], simply being rehabilitated with no further offending carries little weight in the balance because ‘rehabilitation involves no more than returning an individual to the place society expects him to be’. HA (Iraq) at [139] confirms that an absence of reoffending ‘will not generally be a factor carrying great weight’.
71. S117B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 emphasises that private life established when a person is here unlawfully is to be given limited weight. I accept that the appellant has family life with his wife and children. The appellant may be able to speak some English, which is a neutral factor, but there is no indication that he is financially independent. The factors under s117B however do not account for much weight either way when making an overall assessment.
72. I realise that the public interest is not a fixity, but this appellant has been convicted of a serious crime, and the relevant legal authorities have stressed the importance of significant weight being attributed to the public interest. I find there are no very compelling circumstances. Nothing presented to me has undermined the public interest in deportation.
Notice of decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds (both article 3 and article 8).

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18th March 2026