Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002866

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/57313/2023
LH/08197/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 29th of April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILDING

Between

HAUWA MOHAMMED
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE
HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr B Quee, Legal Representative
For the Respondent: Ms H Gilmour, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the remaking decision in this appeal following my decision of 10 November 2025 that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal [‘FTT’] fell into error and was set aside. A copy of my error of law decision is appended to this judgment.

2. Whilst no anonymity order has been made as per my Order in the error of law decision, I keep the identities of the children involved in this case anonymised, as with their mother [‘NS’] to avoid jigsaw identification. I continue to consider that the children are unlikely to be identified through the Appellant’s [‘A’] identity.

Background

3. A is a national of Nigeria, she is in her 60s. She has been in the UK since 2014, with periods of time were she had leave to remain, and others where she did not. Her application was refused by the Respondent [‘R’] and she appealed. Her appeal came before First Tier Tribunal Judge Greer [‘the Judge’] on 24 April 2025 in the virtual region. The Judge allowed her appeal on, human rights grounds predominantly on the basis that hair removal would likely have a negative impact on two children to whom she gives some semblance of care and support.

4. A’s appeal was allowed by the Judge, R appealed and I set aside the Judge’s decision. The matter was relisted for re-hearing before me.

The hearing

5. I heard evidence from A and from NS. They updated the situation since the hearing in the FTT, NS said that she had not yet had the surgery that the FTT had been told was imminent, as she needed to lose weight for the surgery. Her elder son [‘Child B’] attends college. Social services remain involved, providing respite care for her younger son [‘Child A’]. C2 has an Education, Health and Care Plan [‘EHCP’], and currently attends a specialist autism school. Whilst no documentation has been provided of this, I was told that social services provide 10 hours a week in respite care which is given at weekends. NS is still out of work and reliant on state benefits, and she remains in local authority housing.

6. Both parties made submissions for which I am grateful. Ms Gilmour submitted that nothing substantial had been submitted which impacts the preserved findings. NS cares for her two children with A’s help as and when, however is in receipt of social services support. Both children are away from home during the day, Child A attends special school regularly, and is provided transport. Child B is attending college and whilst A assists sometimes taking him to the bus, her support appears limited.

7. The evidence is that NS has respite care for Child A at weekends which allows her to spend time with Child B, there is little evidence as to the A’s role and it appears the evidence as to her support and role is exaggerated. At the highest A is a friend providing ad hoc assistance, the decision to remove A is a proportionate one.

8. Mr Quee relied on his skeleton argument, the support A provides to both children and to NS is essential and allows NS to navigate the difficulties around them. It would be in the children’s best interests for A to be allowed to remain in the UK and her removal would be disproportionate.

Decision and reasons

9. I am sorry for the time it has taken for this decision to be promulgated. Whilst I was clear in my mind when the hearing had finished what my decision was, unfortunately other professional commitments have meant that the decision has taken longer than usual to be drafted and released. I have considered the documentation provided by both parties, along with the oral evidence and careful submissions from both representatives to which I am grateful.

10. I have considered carefully to the evidence presented by A and NS, and considered the submissions on A’s behalf. I find A’s removal would be proportionate, my reasons for doing so are as follows.

11. I adopt the preserved findings of the Judge, whilst I set them out in the error of law decision, I do so again for ease of understanding my reasons for dismissing this appeal.

7. As a general observation, I found the Appellant to be a generally unreliable witness who was prone to exaggeration. When asked about her involvement in child A’s life, the Appellant initially said that Child A had never been to school prior to February 2025. She said that she had been homeschooling him between 2016 and 2025. However, her evidence was directly contradicted by NS, who said that Child A had in fact attended primary school but ceased attending school for 3 years due to COVID, and difficulties securing Special Education Needs provision in local secondary schools. It is also inconsistent with what NS told Richard Boni (recorded at 7.3.2 of Mr Boni’s report).

8. The Appellant initially said that she had commenced the process of becoming the legal guardian of the children, but, when pressed as to what stage she was at, she changed her evidence and accepted that she had no formal, legal role as the children’s guardian. She initially said that she was named as the next of kin for the children, and would be the primary contact if the school needed to speak to a parent or guardian. NS said that this was not the case, and that she, NS, was the primary contact. The inconsistencies in the Appellant’s own evidence undermine the weight that I can attach to her claims.

9. The Appellant’s claims were not supported by documentary evidence where the Tribunal would expect such evidence to be readily available to the Appellant. If, as she claimed, she was the primary carer of Child A and Child B, this would most likely be recorded on Child A’s EHC plan. Mr Quee candidly accepted that the documentary evidence in respect of the children was limited to a GP’s letter of 2nd November 2024 and a social work report of Mr Richard Boni dated 20th April 2025. I find that it is appropriate to draw an adverse inference from the absence of documentary evidence relating to Child A’s schooling. The EHC plan and the child’s school reports would both be relevant to the child’s current circumstances and to their best interests. This weighs against the Appellant.

10. Both the Appellant and NS told me that the children were known to the local authority and had a social worker. Their social worker would be well placed to describe their current care arrangements, and what is in their best interests. But there was no evidence from the social worker before the Tribunal. NS said that this was because the social worker was unwilling to provide a report for these proceedings. This consideration must weigh against the Appellant.

11. The Appellant claim to have been involved in the lives of Child A and Child B is one that was made for the first time in 2023. This is significant because The Appellant’s claim is that she has been involved in the lives of the children for a lengthy period of time before then. The Appellant did not mention the children at all in her application of 4th May 2022, in her affidavit of 29th July 2022 or in her Solicitor’s letter of 15th August 2022. That the Appellant did not mention her involvement with the Children until after the refusal of her application weighs against her.

12. Taking all of these considerations into account, I have treated any claims made by the Appellant which were not supported by direct documentary evidence with severe caution.

13. The Appellant relies upon an Independent Social Work report by Mr Richard Boni of 20th April 2025. I find that Mr Boni is in fact an expert who is entitled to comment on the best interests of a child. This is because he has qualifications and work experience in that field. However, the report has a number of severe limitations which limit the weight that I can attach to the expert’s opinion.

14. Firstly, the expert’s opinion is based on a limited examination of the family’s circumstances. The Appellant told me that the social worker met with her and the children on a single occasion, for a duration of around 2 hours. This being the case, the Social Worker’s opinion is based on a snapshot taken on a single day. It is wholly unclear how it is that the expert is able to proffer any opinion as to the consequences or effects that the Appellant’s removal might have on their “general academic curriculum” if they have not spoken to the children’s teachers or seen their EHC plans.

15. Secondly, the Expert has had limited access to other potentially relevant information in respect of the family’s circumstances. The social worker says at 4.3 that they have seen 2 expired passports and the GP’s note of 2nd November 2023. That letter says nothing about the Appellant’s involvement in the children’s lives, aside from a very broad assertion that it would be in the Children’s best interests for the Appellant to remain in the United Kingdom. The expert has not reviewed the Child’s EHC plan and has not taken into account the views of the social worker regularly involved in the lives of the children. This, in my view, is a significant deficiency in the report.

16. Thirdly, the expert trespasses upon the province of the advocate by making a submission in respect of the weight that should be attached to, “administrative considerations” at 9.1.7, and at 9.2.1, arguing that the Appellant should be granted leave to remain. This leads me to conclude that he expert is acting as an informed advocate for the Appellant rather than an independent expert witness.

17. Fourthly, the report does not include a copy of the letter of instruction and does not contain a statement of truth.

18. All of these considerations severely undermine the weight that I attach to this report. Nonetheless, the report is relevant to the extent that it records what it is that the children told Mr Boni about their relationship with the Appellant.

19. I have stood back and looked at all of the evidence in the round. I have carefully considered what weight I am able to attach to the evidence before the Tribunal. The Appellant is an unreliable witness who is prone to exaggeration. The expert witness is in fact an expert, but one who has acted as an informed advocate rather than an expert witness in this case. NS is a generally reliable witness, but I have treated her claims with some reservation given her motive to help her relative. Having made those observations, I make the following findings of fact.

20. I find it is more likely than not that the Appellant lives with NS and the children. This arrangement is likely to have started at some point between the Appellant settling her witness statement on 5th November 2023 and the present day because when that statement was settled on that date, she was living somewhere else. This would explain why she is able to accurately describe the arrangements for Child A’s schooling at the present time, but was unable to accurately describe his primary education.

21. I find that it is probable that the Appellant does play some role in the lives of the children. This is because NS confirms this to be the case, and when the social worker visited the home he observed that the Appellant and the children knew each other. The most likely explanation for this is that she knows the children because she has been helping to look after them.

22. I reject the Appellant’s claim to be the primary carer for the children. NS specifically denied this in her evidence and it is not what Mr Boni observed when he visited the family home. I do nonetheless accept that the Appellant has a particularly close caring relationship with Child A. I find that the Appellant lives in the same home as NS, Child A and Child B and assists NS in caring for the children. This includes doing the, “school run” with Child A. Although I do not accept all of the Appellant’s claims, there was unanimity between the witnesses over this involvement with the family.

23. I find that Child A has what is described as severe autism. He is enrolled at a special school for Autistic children. He experiences meltdowns and becomes aggressive as a result of his autism. I find that the Appellant has developed a strong emotional bond with both children.

24. I accept that NS struggles to look after the children by herself and is otherwise socially isolated. This is because of her own medical conditions associated with her weight (set out at supplementary bundle, page 31), and the complexity of the children’s special educational needs (set out at supplementary bundle, page 29 and hearing bundle, page 48). They are children who require a great deal of care and NS has a number of conditions that impair her mobility. I note what Mr Boni says about superstitious beliefs towards those suffering from disabilities (at 6.10) and, given that this observation is supported by reference to academic research, and I find that this likely contributed to NS’s isolation and reliance upon the Appellant.

25. I accept that NS will shortly undergo weight loss surgery. This is because I have seen a doctor from her GP confirming this to be the case and her evidence was not challenged. She told me, and I accept, that she has investigated whether she would be eligible for additional support from the state as she recovers from her surgery. She gave unchallenged evidence, which I accept.

26. I accept that NS has found it difficult to secure appropriate support from the local authority for Child A’s care and education. This is consistent with the fact that Child A was out of school for 3 years while a suitable school can be found. I accept that NS and her children will probably be the recipients of some form of substituted car service in the event of the Appellant's departure from the United Kingdom. NS says that she was told by the local authority that her children would be taken into care while she is recovering from her weight loss surgery.

27. Given the state of the evidence, it is not possible for me to make any finding more extensive than that Child A, at most, may benefit from some modest increase in the limited state funded services which he receives at present. The lengthy period of time that Child A spent outside of school is an illustration of the difficulties that NS has encountered in the past in seeking to obtain appropriate support for her children.

28. Having made these findings of fact, I now assess the proportionality of the Respondent’s decision.

12. The preserved findings do not determine credibility matters for me, however I share the Judge’s observations that A is an unimpressive witness, she has maintained the position of her providing essential care for Child A and B, but has provided no updating evidence to support this position. I agree with Ms Gilmour that both A and NS exaggerate A’s role in the children’s lives because it is convenient to, but that her role in both children’s lives is more limited.

13. Both children attend school Monday to Friday, Child A is in respite care at weekends. There is no reliable evidence that A provides any essential support to either of the children such that she is even approaching being their primary carer, as was advanced in the FTT. I accept that before the Judge the evidence showed some social isolation of NS, I am less convinced on that in the evidence before me. This is because I find it of concern that the evidence as to NS’ claimed surgery appears to be changing. Before the Judge it was said that she was soon to receive weight loss surgery, before me she said she had not had her “bypass” surgery due to her having to lose weight, which she had not managed to do. This is a glaring inconsistency and calls into question the reliability of NS as a witness of truth. Whilst I have no doubt NS feels socially isolated due to her weight issues and having two children with significant needs, the evidence as to whether she in fact is socially isolated is limited.

14. R does not dispute that Article 8 is engaged in this case from a private life perspective, A has been in the UK for over 10 years, in that time she will inevitably developed a private life here. Whilst she is not the primary carer for either child, she has lived with NS and the boys for several years, and whilst the evidence does not show they enjoy a family life together, they are a part of A’s private life.

15. There plainly will be an interference with that private life were A to be removed, notwithstanding that she was in her 50s when she arrived in the UK from Nigeria, she has developed a life here, and that, in particular with NS and the children, not be easily replicated in Nigeria. I find that Article 8 is engaged for the purposes of Article 8(1).

16. Turning to the proportionality of A’s removal, I apply the statutory considerations in s117B(1) – (6). I address them in turn. The maintenance of effective immigration control [s117B(1)] is plainly in the public interest, whilst A has had periods of time of leave to remain, I cannot ignore that she came to the UK as a visitor at which point she would have satisfied the Entry Clearance Officer, and on arrival an immigration officer that she intended to return to Nigeria. As such whilst the limited periods of lawful status in the UK are relevant, she knew at all material times that her entry to the UK was predicated on a pre-condition that she intended to return.

17. A speaks English, this is a neutral matter when it comes to weight.

18. It is also in the economic interests of the UK to be financially independent. A does not work, she is dependent on NS, who in turn is reliant on State support. A is not financially independent. I find this a weighty matter.

19. Little weight should be given to a person’s private life when someone is in the UK unlawfully [117B(4)] and precarious [117B(5)]. A entered as a visitor, she then was granted a period of leave for a short period of time between August and November 2016. Both periods of lawful residence were precarious. The rest of the time A has been unlawfully in the UK. The starting point therefore is little weight is to be given.

20. In this case I consider that some additional weight can be given to her private life, whilst she has exaggerated her relationship with the children, she clearly has some sort of a relationship with them which goes to her private life. Indeed the ISW report suggests that she is part of their lives and so I accept that there will be a degree of disruption were A to be removed. However I consider that the weight which can be given to this private life is not much more than the statutory starting point on the basis that she is not either child’s primary carer, and the children spend the majority of their time outside the home and not with A, or for that matter NS.

21. I have considered the impact of A’s removal on NS, she clearly assists to some extent, however NS is a British Citizen and already has social services involvement. It seems to me that if NS requires more support she would be able to receive that, or at the very least explore with social services what that support could look like. That has not been done in this case, indeed very probably because of the involvement already in place of A.

22. No other evidence was provided pointing to a more integrated or wider private life in the UK, in fact I consider that the evidence was extremely limited as to her private life. In my judgment A’s removal would be proportionate, the public interest outweighs her private life that she has established in the UK. No arguments were advanced that there are very significant obstacles facing her to return to Nigeria.

Notice of Decision

The Appeal is dismissed.

Judge T.S. Wilding

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Date: 26th April 2026

ANNEX ERROR OF LAW JUDGMENT

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002866

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/57313/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILDING

Between

HAUWA MOHAMMED
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE
HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr B Quee, Solicitor
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

An anonymity order was made by the First-tier Tribunal Judge, that has in all the documentation continued to date. I do not agree with the Judge’s reasons for issuing such an order. The Judge was right to identify that the case involved young children, and he anonymised them appropriately. The appellant is not the parent of these children. In my judgment the principle of open justice outweighs the Article 8 rights of the appellant. I consider naming the appellant is unlikely to readily lead a reader to discover the identity of the children.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal brought by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, to avoid any confusion the parties are referred to as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.

Background

2. The appellant is a national of Nigeria, she is in her 60s. She has been in the UK since 2014, with periods of time were she had leave to remain, and others where she did not. Her appeal came before First Tier Tribunal Judge Greer (‘the Judge’) on 24 April 2025 in the virtual region. The Judge allowed her appeal on, human rights grounds predominantly on the basis that hair removal would likely have a negative impact on two children to whom she gives some semblance of care and support.

3. The Judges reasons for allowing the appeal are lengthy and require setting out in full below given the nature of the appeal brought by the respondent.

4. The Judge considered the documentary and oral evidence that was before him coma which the appellant relied on in order to make good on her claim that she was the primary carer of Child A and Child B. These two children are the children of her relative known only as NS. In relation to the evidence before him the Judge found as follows:

7. As a general observation, I found the Appellant to be a generally unreliable witness who was prone to exaggeration. When asked about her involvement in child A’s life, the Appellant initially said that Child A had never been to school prior to February 2025. She said that she had been homeschooling him between 2016 and 2025. However, her evidence was directly contradicted by NS, who said that Child A had in fact attended primary school but ceased attending school for 3 years due to COVID, and difficulties securing Special Education Needs provision in local secondary schools. It is also inconsistent with what NS told Richard Boni (recorded at 7.3.2 of Mr Boni’s report).

8. The Appellant initially said that she had commenced the process of becoming the legal guardian of the children, but, when pressed as to what stage she was at, she changed her evidence and accepted that she had no formal, legal role as the children’s guardian. She initially said that she was named as the next of kin for the children, and would be the primary contact if the school needed to speak to a parent or guardian. NS said that this was not the case, and that she, NS, was the primary contact. The inconsistencies in the Appellant’s own evidence undermine the weight that I can attach to her claims.

9. The Appellant’s claims were not supported by documentary evidence where the Tribunal would expect such evidence to be readily available to the Appellant. If, as she claimed, she was the primary carer of Child A and Child B, this would most likely be recorded on Child A’s EHC plan. Mr Quee candidly accepted that the documentary evidence in respect of the children was limited to a GP’s letter of 2nd November 2024 and a social work report of Mr Richard Boni dated 20th April 2025. I find that it is appropriate to draw an adverse inference from the absence of documentary evidence relating to Child A’s schooling. The EHC plan and the child’s school reports would both be relevant to the child’s current circumstances and to their best interests. This weighs against the Appellant.

10. Both the Appellant and NS told me that the children were known to the local authority and had a social worker. Their social worker would be well placed to describe their current care arrangements, and what is in their best interests. But there was no evidence from the social worker before the Tribunal. NS said that this was because the social worker was unwilling to provide a report for these proceedings. This consideration must weigh against the Appellant.

11. The Appellant claim to have been involved in the lives of Child A and Child B is one that was made for the first time in 2023. This is significant because The Appellant’s claim is that she has been involved in the lives of the children for a lengthy period of time before then. The Appellant did not mention the children at all in her application of 4th May 2022, in her affidavit of 29th July 2022 or in her Solicitor’s letter of 15th August 2022. That the Appellant did not mention her involvement with the Children until after the refusal of her application weighs against her.

12. Taking all of these considerations into account, I have treated any claims made by the Appellant which were not supported by direct documentary evidence with severe caution.

13. The Appellant relies upon an Independent Social Work report by Mr Richard Boni of 20th April 2025. I find that Mr Boni is in fact an expert who is entitled to comment on the best interests of a child. This is because he has qualifications and work experience in that field. However, the report has a number of severe limitations which limit the weight that I can attach to the expert’s opinion.

14. Firstly, the expert’s opinion is based on a limited examination of the family’s circumstances. The Appellant told me that the social worker met with her and the children on a single occasion, for a duration of around 2 hours. This being the case, the Social Worker’s opinion is based on a snapshot taken on a single day. It is wholly unclear how it is that the expert is able to proffer any opinion as to the consequences or effects that the Appellant’s removal might have on their “general academic curriculum” if they have not spoken to the children’s teachers or seen their EHC plans.

15. Secondly, the Expert has had limited access to other potentially relevant information in respect of the family’s circumstances. The social worker says at 4.3 that they have seen 2 expired passports and the GP’s note of 2nd November 2023. That letter says nothing about the Appellant’s involvement in the children’s lives, aside from a very broad assertion that it would be in the Children’s best interests for the Appellant to remain in the United Kingdom. The expert has not reviewed the Child’s EHC plan and has not taken into account the views of the social worker regularly involved in the lives of the children. This, in my view, is a significant deficiency in the report.

16. Thirdly, the expert trespasses upon the province of the advocate by making a submission in respect of the weight that should be attached to, “administrative considerations” at 9.1.7, and at 9.2.1, arguing that the Appellant should be granted leave to remain. This leads me to conclude that he expert is acting as an informed advocate for the Appellant rather than an independent expert witness.

17. Fourthly, the report does not include a copy of the letter of instruction and does not contain a statement of truth.

18. All of these considerations severely undermine the weight that I attach to this report. Nonetheless, the report is relevant to the extent that it records what it is that the children told Mr Boni about their relationship with the Appellant.

19. I have stood back and looked at all of the evidence in the round. I have carefully considered what weight I am able to attach to the evidence before the Tribunal. The Appellant is an unreliable witness who is prone to exaggeration. The expert witness is in fact an expert, but one who has acted as an informed advocate rather than an expert witness in this case. NS is a generally reliable witness, but I have treated her claims with some reservation given her motive to help her relative. Having made those observations, I make the following findings of fact.

20. I find it is more likely than not that the Appellant lives with NS and the children. This arrangement is likely to have started at some point between the Appellant settling her witness statement on 5th November 2023 and the present day because when that statement was settled on that date, she was living somewhere else. This would explain why she is able to accurately describe the arrangements for Child A’s schooling at the present time, but was unable to accurately describe his primary education.

21. I find that it is probable that the Appellant does play some role in the lives of the children. This is because NS confirms this to be the case, and when the social worker visited the home he observed that the Appellant and the children knew each other. The most likely explanation for this is that she knows the children because she has been helping to look after them.

22. I reject the Appellant’s claim to be the primary carer for the children. NS specifically denied this in her evidence and it is not what Mr Boni observed when he visited the family home. I do nonetheless accept that the Appellant has a particularly close caring relationship with Child A. I find that the Appellant lives in the same home as NS, Child A and Child B and assists NS in caring for the children. This includes doing the, “school run” with Child A. Although I do not accept all of the Appellant’s claims, there was unanimity between the witnesses over this involvement with the family.

23. I find that Child A has what is described as severe autism. He is enrolled at a special school for Autistic children. He experiences meltdowns and becomes aggressive as a result of his autism. I find that the Appellant has developed a strong emotional bond with both children.

24. I accept that NS struggles to look after the children by herself and is otherwise socially isolated. This is because of her own medical conditions associated with her weight (set out at supplementary bundle, page 31), and the complexity of the children’s special educational needs (set out at supplementary bundle, page 29 and hearing bundle, page 48). They are children who require a great deal of care and NS has a number of conditions that impair her mobility. I note what Mr Boni says about superstitious beliefs towards those suffering from disabilities (at 6.10) and, given that this observation is supported by reference to academic research, and I find that this likely contributed to NS’s isolation and reliance upon the Appellant.

25. I accept that NS will shortly undergo weight loss surgery. This is because I have seen a doctor from her GP confirming this to be the case and her evidence was not challenged. She told me, and I accept, that she has investigated whether she would be eligible for additional support from the state as she recovers from her surgery. She gave unchallenged evidence, which I accept.

26. I accept that NS has found it difficult to secure appropriate support from the local authority for Child A’s care and education. This is consistent with the fact that Child A was out of school for 3 years while a suitable school can be found. I accept that NS and her children will probably be the recipients of some form of substituted car service in the event of the Appellant's departure from the United Kingdom. NS says that she was told by the local authority that her children would be taken into care while she is recovering from her weight loss surgery.

27. Given the state of the evidence, it is not possible for me to make any finding more extensive than that Child A, at most, may benefit from some modest increase in the limited state funded services which he receives at present. The lengthy period of time that Child A spent outside of school is an illustration of the difficulties that NS has encountered in the past in seeking to obtain appropriate support for her children.

28. Having made these findings of fact, I now assess the proportionality of the Respondent’s decision.

5. In light of these findings the Judge then moved on to consider the proportionality of the decision to remove the appellant to Nigeria:

29. It is here that I perform a balancing exercise, weighing the public interest in the Appellant’s removal from the United Kingdom against the interference that the Appellant’s removal would cause to her enjoyment of a private life. The maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest. I have kept the considerations at Part 5A of the 2002 Act at the forefront of my mind.

30. On the one hand, as Mr Quee accepted, the Appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules. The maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest. That the Appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules must weigh against her.

31. This case is not one involving illegal entry, benefits or passport fraud, illegal working or criminality of any kind. Whilst the Appellant previously overstayed and has made a number of unsuccessful applications, her overstaying was “book-ended” by the grant of leave to remain on account of her relationship with her terminally ill sister. As such, the Appellant’s is towards the lower end of the scale in terms of immigration offenders, and the weight to be attached to the public interest in her removal due to her immigration history is limited.

32. The Appellant speaks fluent English and this is a neutral consideration. The Appellant has provided no evidence of her finances at present, though she told me that she has been forced out of the family business and it is recorded in the papers that she has exhausted her savings. NS does not work and is in receipt of state benefit. From this I infer that the Appellant is not financially independent. This must weigh against her.

33. The Appellant has had precarious immigration status throughout her time in the United Kingdom. Thus, the Private life that she has developed whilst in the United Kingdom it qualifies for the attribution of little weight. I consider that the Appellant's case lies at the upper end of the notional "little weight" scale. This is because she has lived in the United Kingdom for a period of time and, aside from short visits to Nigeria, has not lived in Nigeria for a significant period of time. She is likely to take some time to refamiliarize herself with life in Nigeria after she returns.

34. The Appellant’s caring relationship with Child A and Child B. If the Appellant were to leave the United Kingdom, this is likely to have a negative impact on the children, particularly Child A. As I have found, NS is socially isolated and is unlikely to be assisted by anyone other than the Appellant. I find that it is likely that if the Appellant were to leave the country, NS would be unable to care for the children. Her difficulties in arranging appropriate schooling for Child A for a lengthy period of time is an illustration of his difficulties. I accept her evidence that she will be unable to care for her children while she recovers from her surgery and the only option available to the children would be for them to be separated from their mother and cared for in a residential setting. This would be damaging to their best interests and I attach weight to this and balancing against the public interest in the Appellant’s removal.

35. I have weighed the material considerations against one another extremely carefully. On the one hand, there is a public interest in the Appellant’s removal from the United Kingdom because she does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules and she is not financially independent. I attach the appropriate amount of weight to this consideration. On the other hand, The Appellant will lose the private life that she has developed in this country. Her removal will also occasion significant interference to the private life of Child A who is at risk of suffering a significant regression in his social communication and behavioural management. Weighing these considerations against one another, I find that the public interest in the Appellant’s removal from the United kingdom is outweighed.

6. This satisfied with the above the Respondent applied for permission to appeal, permission was initially refused by the 1st tier tribunal, however upon renewal permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Canavan in a decision communicated on 13 September 2025. Permission to appeal was granted on all grounds.

The hearing

7. I heard submissions from both representatives. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Hulme, relied on the grounds of appeal and submitted that the Judge had made two material errors of law. Firstly the respondent submitted that the Judge failed to properly take into account that given the children, both of whom have special educational needs, were known to social services, the Judge failed to properly take into account that if there were any circumstances to which the children required adequate or additional care then social services would be able to provide it. As a consequence, so Mr Hulme submitted, the Judge materially erred by finding that the children would not receive adequate or appropriate care were NS to be in a position which she would not be able to care for her children. As is clear from the decision, the Judge considered this was a potential issue given that Ms NS was due to have an operation reasonably shortly after the hearing.

8. Secondly the respondent complained that the Judge made perverse or irrational findings on matters that were material to the outcome of the appeal. In particular taking into account the credibility findings, which broadly went against the appellant, the respondent submitted that it was in those circumstances irrational to conclude that the appellant had shown, on a balance of probabilities, that her removal would be disproportionate.

9. In reply, Mr Quee for the appellant, submitted that the Judge had not erred in law as advanced by the respondent. The Judge had made a clear finding that the children needs would not be met if NS was not available, and if the appellant was not present in order to assist NS with their care. That was, at the date of hearing, something that was reasonably likely to arise given that NS was due to have an operation associated with weight loss. Consequently the Judge made a lawful finding that in the circumstances it would not be proportionate to remove the apparent.

10. I reserved my decision. It became clear at the hearing that NS has had the operation since the Judge’s decision, and that she is now back at home.

Decision and reasons

11. I have carefully considered the oral and written submissions that I heard. As well as taken careful account of the Judges reasons for allowing the appeal. In my judgment, however, notwithstanding the careful reasons that the Judge has given, I find that he nevertheless materially erred in law in allowing the appellants appeal.

12. The Judge clearly was aware that social services have had some involvement with both child A and child B. That much is clear throughout the determination given the two children's respective diagnosis of autism, and where the Judge notes in particular that there had been a period of time when at least one of the children, child a comma had been out of school for three years whilst the local authority identified and placed that child in a suitable school.

13. The Judge then however errs because he makes clear that one of the deficiencies in the appellant's evidence, at paragraph 10, is the lack of evidence from social services, in particular the families designated social worker, who in the Judges view would be well placed to describe the children's current care arrangements and what is in their best interests. The Judge rejected the explanation given by an AAS which was that the social worker was unwilling to provide a report for the appeal proceedings, and absent any further explanation the Judge considered that this must weigh against the appellant.

14. In those circumstances it is difficult to understand why the Judge came to the conclusion that he did in paragraph 34 that if a NS were to find herself in a position unable to care for the children, then why would social services not be in a position to assist. I consider the finding that NS is socially isolated and is unlikely to be assisted by anyone other than the appellant, to be a finding which is contradicted by the fact that the local authority know the two children, and their mother, and have been involved in the two children's lives. It also appears to me to ignore the evidence that the social worker was unwilling to provide any evidence for this appeal, which the Judge has said counts against the appellants. In those circumstances in my Judgement it is difficult to understand the basis upon which the Judge has found that NS would not be able to find support were she unable to care for the children.

15. A further point arose at the hearing which was of course that since the Judge’s decision and NS has had the operation that she was waiting for, whilst this is not in and of itself a matter which goes to whether the Judge erred in law or not, it is peculiar to see that given the Judge places significance on NS’ pending operation, that he did not familiarise himself on the face of the determination on when her operation was, and the respective recovery time. It is clear from the limited documents that there are that the recovery time was a matter of weeks, and in any event NS has since had the operation.

16. For the avoidance of doubt, I consider both grounds are made out. I consider given the findings that the Judge has made in relation to the credibility and the care with which the appellant is said to give the two children, that the outcome the Judge came to on the basis of the findings that he has given are irrational. What I mean by that is they make no rational sense when set against the negative credibility findings, in particular the finding that the apparent is not the primary care of the children and that in the Judges view the appellant was not only a general generally unreliable witness but also was someone who was prone to exaggeration.

17. In all the circumstances I consider that the Judge’s decision has to be set aside on that basis. Given the passage of time, and in particular that the two children have particular needs, I consider the best way forward to be a rehearing in the Upper Tribunal. The findings of fact that the Judge made from paragraphs 6 to 28 are preserved.

18. The rehearing will be focused purely on the consequences of those findings, and whether the appellant's removal would breach her family or private life. As an aside, and whilst not pleaded by the Secretary of State in the grounds of appeal, an additional difficulty I have with the determination is that the Judge preceded on the basis that the appellant's removal would breach her private life that she had established in the UK, there is no finding as far as I can see that the apparent has established a family life with the two children. That may have some significance in the overall assessment, and I put that observation here so that both parties address it in re making.

Case management directions

19. As a result of my decision I make the following directions:

a. The findings of fact made at paragraphs 6 to 28 are preserved.
b. The appeal is to be re listed in the Upper Tribunal, on the first available date.
c. The parties are at liberty to provide any updated evidence, if any updated oral evidence is being called any witness must provide a supplementary and updated witness statement No later than 14 days before the resumed hearing.
d. Time estimate 3 hours it is unclear from the documents before me whether the appellant or any witness would require an interpreter. If an interpreter is required then one must be requested.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the Judge is set aside on the basis that he materially erred in law.

Judge T.S. Wilding

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Date: 18th November 2025