Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002876
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65337/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 August 2026

Before

MR JUSTICE LAVENDER
President of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

and

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA
Principal Resident Judge

Between

AI
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Mr T Jebb, Counsel instructed by McIvor Farrell Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Royal Courts of Justice (Belfast) on 23 March 2026
Decision and Reasons
(1) Anonymity
1. This appeal concerns a claim for international protection and the best interests of children. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
(2) Introduction
2. The appellant is a national of Somalia. He left Somalia in May 2014 and, having spent various periods in a number of different countries, he arrived with his wife and two children in the UK on 29 November 2021. He made a claim for international protection the following day. There were two strands to the appellant’s claim. First, he claimed that he would be at risk upon return because he is from a minority clan, the Shikal clan, a sub-clan of the Looboge clan. The appellant claimed that he would be at risk of ‘clan revenge’ after his brother was involved in an accident in which he ran over a member of Al-Shabaab. Secondly, the appellant claimed that his daughters, now aged 4 and 5, would be subjected to female genital mutilation (“FGM”).
3. The claim was refused by the respondent on 28 November 2023. The respondent accepts that the appellant is a national of Somalia and a member of a minority clan. However, the respondent does not accept that the appellant would be at risk upon return from Al-Shabaab or that his daughters would be at risk of FGM.
4. The appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Hutchinson (“the judge”) for reasons set out in a decision dated 12 May 2025.
5. The respondent was not represented at the hearing before the FtT. Nevertheless, the judge heard oral evidence from the appellant. The judge found the appellant’s account of events in Somalia to be vague and lacking in detail. The judge rejected the appellant’s claim that his father was killed in 2015, even though that was not a particular matter upon which the appellant relied. The judge found the appellant’s account of the accident which the appellant claims that his brother was involved in to be equally vague and inconsistent. The judge rejected the appellant’s claim that his brother had been involved in such an accident and it followed that the judge rejected the appellant’s claim that he, his mother or his brothers are at risk in Somalia from Al-Shabaab.
6. As far as the appellant’s claim that his daughters would be at risk of FGM on return is concerned, the judge referred to inconsistencies in the appellant’s account as to whether he would be able to prevent his daughters being subjected to FGM and concluded that the appellant will say whatever he thinks will be most advantageous to his claims, in an attempt to remain in the UK, with no regard to the truth. The judge said that, in reaching her decision, she had considered all the evidence in the round, including the background material. The judge referred to the respondent’s country policy and information note (“the CPIN”), which contains evidence of conflict-related sexual violence, entrenched gender-based inequality and the incidence of FGM. The judge referred to the guidance set out in AMM and others (conflict: humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM) Somalia CG [2011] UKUT 00445 (IAC) (“AMM”). The appellant had claimed that the risk of FGM arises from a girl’s parents and grandparents. The judge found that: the appellant and his wife are opposed to FGM; the appellant’s wife has no family remaining in Somalia; the appellant’s mother is in Kenya; and the appellant is not in contact with his paternal uncles in Somalia. The judge was satisfied that the appellant and his wife would be capable of eliminating the risk of FGM.
7. In the alternative, the judge found that the family could relocate to Mogadishu, having had regard to the guidance set out in MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC) and OA (Somalia) CG [2022] UKUT 0003 (IAC). The judge found that the appellant is still a young man, who has prospects of securing a livelihood on return to Mogadishu. He could be assisted by his family in Canada and elsewhere and, in any event, he would have the possibility on return of at least some assistance with accommodation from a minority clan in Mogadishu, if required. The judge concluded that there were no substantial grounds to conclude that there would be a real risk of residence in an IDP camp or otherwise a risk of Articles 2 or 3 ECHR being breached. The appeal was therefore dismissed on all grounds
(3) The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The appellant claims that the judge failed lawfully to apply the relevant country guidance. The appellant also claims that the judge made irrational findings regarding: (i) the societal pressure and socio-economic circumstances which would be faced by the family: and (ii) the extent to which parental opposition to FGM can mitigate the risk in a context where societal pressure is pervasive. The appellant further claims that the appeal raises complex legal issues regarding the interpretation and application of the relevant country guidance case law (i.e. AMM) and its interplay with the specific factual circumstances of this case.
9. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato on 4 August 2025.
10. At the outset of the hearing before us, Mr Jebb confirmed that the appellant does not challenge the judge’s decision that he is not at risk in Somalia from Al-Shabaab. The focus of the grounds of appeal and the grant of permission is upon the alleged risk that the appellant’s daughters would be subjected to FGM and, in particular, the application of the guidance set out in AMM.
11. Mr Jebb submitted that the Upper Tribunal confirmed in the headnote to AMM, at [16] and [17], that the incidence of FGM in Somalia is universally agreed to be over 90% and that the societal requirement for any girl or woman to undergo FGM is strong. The Tribunal concluded that, in general, an uncircumcised, unmarried Somali woman up to the age of 39 will be at real risk of suffering FGM. The Tribunal said that, where both parents are opposed to FGM, the question of whether the risk will reach the requisite level will need to be determined by reference to the extent to which the parents are likely to be able to withstand the strong societal pressures. The Tribunal concluded that, unless the parents are from a socio-economic background which is likely to distance them from mainstream social attitudes or there is some other particular feature of their case, the fact of parental opposition may well, as a general matter, be incapable of eliminating the real risk to their daughters that others (particularly relatives) will at some point inflict FGM on them.
12. The starting point, therefore, Mr Jebb submitted, is that the appellant’s daughters will be at risk of FGM. Parental opposition is relevant, but the judge placed undue wight on the fact that the parents oppose FGM and that the paternal and maternal grandparents are no longer in Somalia. The fact that the appellant belongs to a minority clan is relevant to their socio-economic background and the risk arises from the societal pressures which the family will face in general in a society where there is a high expectation for .girls or women to undergo FGM. Mr Jebb submitted that, on a proper application of the country guidance, the Tribunal should have concluded that the appellant’s daughters would be at risk of FGM on return. He submitted that the judge’s decision discloses an error of law and should be set aside.
13. Mr Wain adopted his skeleton argument, dated 19 March 2026. He submitted that the appellant simply disagrees with the decision of the judge, who applied the relevant country guidance. It was open to the judge to dismiss the appeal for the reasons which the judge gave. The judge found that the appellant was not a credible witness. She found that the appellant had embellished his account regarding the risk of FGM which he claimed would be faced by his daughters. The judge recognised that parental opposition to FGM was not, on its own, enough to prevent the risk. However, the judge went on to consider whether the parents were likely to be able to withstand the strong societal pressures.
14. The judge considered the parents’ socio-economic background and whether there was some other particular feature of their case which was capable of eliminating the real risk that others (particularly relatives) would at some point inflict FGM on the appellant’s daughters. At [37], the judge properly noted that in interview the appellant was clear that the risk only arose from a girl's parents or grandparents. In any event, the judge said, at [38], that the appellant had not established that he was not from a socio-economic background in Somalia which was likely to distance itself from mainstream social attitudes. The judge referred to the family’s ability to fund their departure from Somalia and the support available from a relative in Canada, the appellant’s mother and his uncle. The judge rejected the appellant’s claim that his mother had had to ‘sell her property and belongings’ to pay for the appellant’s journey. Mr Wain submitted that the judge therefore had proper regard to the relevant factors and had reached a decision which was open to her on the evidence.
(4) Decision
15. We accept that a failure to identify and apply a relevant country guidance decision without good reason might amount to an error of law, in that a relevant consideration had been ignored: R (Iran) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] Imm. A.R. 535; [2005] EWCA Civ 982. However, as Mr Jebb accepted, this is not an appeal in which the judge was being asked to depart from the relevant country guidance by reference to other, more recent, background material. The criticism made by the appellant is that the judge, having correctly identified the relevant guidance, misapplied it.
16. In reaching our decision, we also remind ourselves of the restraint which an appellate body must exercise when considering an appeal against the decision of a specialist judge at first instance. In UT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [19], the Court of Appeal reminded appellate courts that:
“It is not the case that the UT is entitled to remake the decision of the FTT simply because it does not agree with it, or because it thinks it can produce a better one. Thus, the reasons given for considering there to be an error of law really matter. Baroness Hale put it in this way in AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department at [30]:
"Appellate courts should not rush to find such misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently."”
17. In cases (such as the present) where the credibility of the appellant is in issue, tribunals adopt a variety of different evaluative techniques to assess the evidence and the risk on return. The tribunal will, for instance, consider: (i) the consistency (or otherwise) of accounts given to investigators at different points in time; (ii) the consistency (or otherwise) of an appellant's narrative case for asylum with his actual conduct at earlier stages and periods in time; (iii) whether, on facts found or agreed or which are incontrovertible, the appellant is a person who can be categorised as at risk if returned and, if so, what is the nature and extent of that risk (taking account of applicable country guidance); (iv) the adequacy (or paucity) of evidence on relevant issues which, logically, the appellant should be able to adduce in order to support his or her case; and (v) the overall plausibility of an appellant's account.
18. Notwithstanding the best efforts of Mr Jebb to persuade us otherwise, we have no hesitation in concluding that the judge reached a decision which was open to her, having identified the relevant guidance and having made key findings upon the principal issues between the parties.
19. In AMM the Upper Tribunal recognised, at [549], that in a country with such high rates of FGM, the societal requirement for any girl or woman to undergo it is strong. There was evidence before the Tribunal, recorded at [549], that, if a woman opposed circumcision, it would “still almost certainly happen at the hands of female family members who would put pressure on the mother and even resort to having the girl circumcised when the mother is temporarily absent.” There was also evidence that “cutting is arranged by a child’s grandmother, aunt or other family members regardless of the attitude of the mother.”
20. The judge addressed the appellant’s claim that his daughters would be subjected to FGM at [20] to [39]. The judge referred, at [22] and [23], to the appellant’s claim in his asylum interview that it is the parents and grandparents who are responsible. The judge noted, at [24], that, when interviewed, the appellant said that he could prevent his daughter from being subjected to FGM. The judge referred, at [25], to the appellant’s subsequent claim in his witness statement that he would be “powerless to stop it”. The judge found, at [27], that, when giving evidence, the appellant had further embellished his account. She explained, at [27] and [28], the inconsistent accounts given by the appellant as to the whereabouts of his mother and of his wife’s family. Although he claimed at the hearing of the appeal that his wife’s family were in Somalia, the judge noted, at [28], that, in interview, he had claimed that his wife’s parents had both passed away and that she did not have any family members. The judge concluded, at [29], that the appellant would say whatever he thinks will be the most advantageous to his claims in an attempt to remain in the UK without any regard to the truth. The judge made it clear, at [30], that, in reaching her decision, she had considered all the evidence, including the background material.
21. The judge referred, at [31] to [33], to the CPIN and, in particular, to the prevalence of FGM in Somalia. The judge made it clear, at [34], that she had considered the guidance set out in AMM. The judge noted, at [36], that, on the appellant’s own account, he and his wife were opposed to FGM. Importantly, she said, at [36], “I accept that is not the end of the matter”. It is clear, therefore, that the judge had in mind, in accordance with the guidance in AMM, that the simple fact of the parents opposing FGM is insufficient, on its own, to mean that there would be no risk of the daughter undergoing FGM.
22. At [37] and [38], the judge noted that the appellant’s wife has no family remaining in Somalia and the appellant’s mother is in Kenya and that the appellant’s own case was that he is not in contact with his paternal uncles in Somalia. The judge was right to note, at [37], that the appellant had claimed in interview that the risk arises from the parents and grandparents. The judge referred, at [38], to the appellant’s socio-economic background. She referred to the appellant being a member of a minority clan, but also had regard to other relevant factors. It was plainly open to her to conclude that the appellant had not established that he is not from a socio-economic background in Somalia which is likely to distance itself from mainstream social attitudes. In other words, the appellant is of a socio-economic background likely to distance itself from mainstream social attitudes, including those regarding FGM. The judge gave perfectly adequate reasons for reaching the conclusion that the appellant and his wife would be capable fo eliminating the risk of FGM of their daughters.
23. A fact-sensitive analysis was required. The findings and conclusions reached by the judge were neither irrational nor unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, nor were they findings and conclusions which were wholly unsupported by the evidence. Contrary to what is said in the grounds of appeal, it cannot be said that the judge's analysis of the evidence is irrational or perverse. True it is that the judge placed weight upon the parents’ opposition to FGM and the absence of grandparents in Somalia, but the judge did not consider irrelevant factors and the weight which she attached to the evidence of the appellant and to the background material, either individually or cumulatively, was a matter for her. The conclusions reached by the judge are based on the particular facts and circumstances of this appeal. Where a judge applies the correct test, and that results in a harsh decision, it does not mean that it was erroneous in law.
24. Having carefully considered the decision of the judge, we find there to be no error of law in that decision.
25. It follows that we dismiss the appeal.
(5) Notice of Decision
26. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
27. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hutchinson dated 12 May 2025 stands.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia
Principal Resident Judge

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 July 2026