Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002883

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/52481/2024
LH/07936/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27 January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

JANE NJERI NJUGUNA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Eaton, Counsel instructed by Harding Mitchell
For the Respondent: Ms Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. By a decision issued on 27 November 2025 the Upper Tribunal (Judge Hoffman) set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal with no findings preserved and directed that the decision will be remade in the Upper Tribunal. I now remake the decision.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Kenya who entered the UK in 2007 as a visitor and did not leave when her visa expired in 2008. She has remained in the UK for a very significant time without any lawful basis.
3. The appellant is a widow: her husband died in 2004. She lives with her daughter, Mary; and Mary’s two sons: Daniel (born in 2009) and James (born in 2015). Mary, Daniel and James are British citizens. Daniel has autism and challenging behaviour. He is currently excluded from school.
4. In December 2022 the appellant applied for permission to stay in the UK on the basis of her private and family life. On 20 February 2024 her application was refused. The appellant is appealing against this decision on the ground that the respondent’s decision to refuse her human rights claim is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
5. The appellant acknowledges that she does not fall within the scope of the Immigration Rules. She argues that she should nonetheless be granted leave to remain on the basis that refusing her leave would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for her and her family and therefore would violate Article 8 ECHR.
6. It is not in dispute that the appellant has established a private life engaging article 8 in the UK. The two principal issues in dispute are: (a) does the appellant have a family life that engages article 8 ECHR with her family in the UK; and (b) would the appellant’s removal constitute a disproportionate interference with her family and private life in the UK such that the consequences would be unjustifiably harsh.
Findings of Fact
7. In making my decision, I have considered all the evidence that was before the FTT; the additional evidence submitted to the Upper Tribunal; and the oral evidence of the appellant and Mary.
8. Although the respondent did not accept some of the appellant’s evidence (Ms Keerthy maintained that the appellant and Mary were exaggerating difficulties in Kenya and the appellant’s role in Daniel’s life), much of the evidence was not in dispute.
9. The following significant facts were not disputed:
a. The appellant has lived with Mary and Mary’s children for many years, and is financially dependent on Mary. The appellant is a constant in the lives of Daniel and James, having lived with them for the entirety of their lives.
b. Mary is a single parent who is unable to rely on the children’s father for support (either financial or practical).
c. Daniel has autism and has been excluded from school. He currently spends his days at home attending lessons remotely. Mary works outside of the home four days a week (as a social worker) and on the days she is not at work the adult in the home supervising Daniel is the appellant. If the appellant was not available to supervise Daniel another adult would need to take on this role and currently there is no one other than the Mary in a position to do this.
10. It has not been necessary to make findings on disputed issues because the undisputed facts are sufficient to establish the appellant’s case, for the reasons explained below.
Analysis
11. The first question to address is whether the appellant has a family life with Mary (and her grandsons) that engages article 8. This is a high threshold to meet, given that family life is ordinarily limited to the “core family” (spouses and children); and for family life to exist in this context there would need to be “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”: see IA and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516.
12. The appellant has lived together with her daughter and grandsons for many years. In fact, Daniel and James have lived their entire lives in the same home as the appellant. The appellant is also entirely dependent on Mary for financial support. This lengthy period of the appellant living with Mary (as part of a single household, where the appellant is dependent on Mary financially) goes far beyond the “norm” between adult relatives. This is, in my view, a clear case of there being additional elements of dependence such that there is a family life engaging article 8.
13. I now turn to the most significant area of contention, which is whether interference with the appellant’s family and private life, by removing her from the UK, would be disproportionate. I approach this by adopting a balance sheet approach.
14. Weighing against the appellant is that there is a strong public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration controls: see section 117B(1) of the 2002 Act. I consider this public interest to be particularly significant in this case given the lengthy period during which the appellant has flouted immigration law.
15. On the other side of the scales, weighing in the appellant’s favour, are the following considerations:
a. It is, in my view, firmly in the best interests of Daniel and James for the appellant to remain in the UK given the important role she plays in their lives and that, in her absence, Mary would be a single parent without the support of a grandparent living in the home. The significance of this is particularly strong in Daniel’s case because he is currently excluded from school and the family depend on the appellant’s presence for the home-based education to function. I consider it more likely than not that, if the appellant is removed, Mary will have to cease work, or reduce her hours, in order to be able to provide the support that Daniel needs for his home-based education. The disruption to the family that is likely to flow from this is likely to be significant; and that disruption is likely to negatively impact both Daniel and James. The best interests of Daniel and James is a primary, but not paramount consideration. I give it weight, but in doing so recognise that it can be outweighed by other considerations.
b. The appellant has developed a private life in the UK over a considerable period of time through involvement with her church and the friendships she has made. Having regard to section 117B(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act, I give her private life little weight as the private life was established either when the appellant was in the UK as a visitor or in the UK unlawfully.
c. The appellant is an integral part of Mary’s family, with a close relationship to her two grandsons, with whom she has lived throughout the entirety of their lives. The appellant’s relationship with Mary has developed, however, when she was in the UK either as a visitor or unlawfully. In these circumstances, I give the appellant’s relationship with Mary little weight.
d. I accept that the appellant will face challenges returning to Kenya and accept that she will not have the support of (and may feel threatened by) her husband’s family. However, she is familiar with the culture and society in Kenya and can live in a different area to her husband’s family. I attach little weight to the difficulties the appellant claims she will face in Kenya.
16. I treat the public interests in the appellant speaking English and being financially independent (as set out in sections 117B(2) and (3) of the 2002 Act) as neutral, as the appellant speaks English and is financially dependent on Mary, not the state. See paras. 51-57 of Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 58.
17. This is a case where there is a strong factor on both sides of the balance. On the one hand, the public interest in effective immigration controls strongly weighs in favour of the appellant being removed. However, on the other hand, the best interests of Daniel and James are a strong factor weighing on the other side of the scales, given the disruption to their lives (and in particular Daniel’s life) that is likely to occur if the appellant ceases to live with them. The case is finely balanced. Having carefully considered all of the factors I am (just) persuaded that the best interests of Daniel and James outweigh the public interest and that this is a case where the consequences of removing the appellant are unjustifiably harsh.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside by Upper Tribunal Hoffman. I now remake the decision and allow the appellant’s appeal.

D. Sheridan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21. 1. 2026