Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002885

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68228/2023
LP/06697/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SINGER

Between

SM (BANGLADESH)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Sowerby, instructed by Sentinel Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. SM appeals, with permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt, against the decision of the First‑tier Tribunal Judge (“the FTJ”) promulgated on 30 April 2025, dismissing his appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 19 December 2023 refusing his protection and human rights claims.

2. At the error of law hearing on 22 January 2026 at Field House, the Appellant was represented by Mr Sowerby, and the Respondent by Mr Sheikh. I had a composite electronic bundle of 566 pages (“CB”).

The Appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal

3. The Appellant is a Bangladeshi national, who entered the UK on a domestic worker visa on 13 November 2021, and claimed asylum on 23 February 2022. In summary, he asserts he has a well‑founded fear of persecution for reasons of actual or imputed political opinion arising from his membership and activities with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”), for which he states he became a local publicity secretary. He claims repeated assaults by Awami League/BCL activists and, after he left Bangladesh, the filing of a politically‑motivated criminal case culminating in a charge sheet and an arrest warrant. He also relied on sur place activity and medical/mental health concerns.

4. In support, he produced (inter alia): a letter from a Bangladeshi advocate on its face confirming a pending case and an arrest warrant (CB p.45); translations and certified copies of an FIR, charge sheet, court orders and entries, naming him as an accused in case in relation to an allegation of a violent incident of public disorder said to have happened on 6 January 2022 (i.e. when he was not in fact in Bangladesh on his case), (CB pp.47–92 and following); and a translator’s certification (CB p.46). Other court materials were provided in relation to two other cases said to relate to marital matters (CB p.93-154). An expert country report on Bangladesh was also relied upon (CB p.438-486).

The refusal letter of 19 December 2023 and the Respondent’s position before the First-tier Tribunal

5. The Respondent accepted identity and nationality but rejected the core account, asserting that SM was internally inconsistent and vague, that there was a lack of reliable corroboration, noting concerns around the provenance and reliability of Bangladeshi documentation generally. The Respondent did not accept that there would be any risk on return. SM’s sur place activity was also not accepted as placing him at risk. His medical claim was assessed as not reaching the Article 3 threshold and his Article 8 ECHR claim was also rejected.

The FTJ’s decision

6. The FTJ rejected SM’s credibility at paragraphs 19–26, setting out what was held to be vagueness and inconsistency concerning SM’s claimed BNP membership and role, and knowledge of their aims. On that basis, the FTJ held that SM was not a member of the BNP, nor was he politically active as claimed, that SM had not been targeted, and his family were not at risk.

7. The FTJ then set out the documentary evidence at paragraphs 29–31, describing the FIRs, the related documents and the advocate’s letter as “self‑serving” and attaching “limited weight”. The expert report of Mr Tushar was acknowledged, at paragraphs 34-35, but considered not to advance matters given the adverse credibility findings. Sur place activity was rejected and objective evidence was dismissed as immaterial given the adverse credibility findings, at paragraphs 36–38. The protection and the Article 8 ECHR claims were dismissed; and the medical evidence was held not meet the Article 3 threshold at paragraphs 63–65).

The grounds of appeal and submissions before me

8. Although refused by the First-tier Tribunal, permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt on 28 August 2025, on what he considered were the only arguable grounds, albeit he considered that materiality was doubtful, given the changed country situation, but nonetheless arguable. At the hearing both parties agreed that the grant of permission was silent on what was pleaded in paragraph 6 of the grounds, and that consequently all of what was argued (at paragraphs 6-8 of the grounds of appeal) was in play, namely

(i) whether the FTJ adequately considered all material evidence in the round,
(ii) whether the analysis of the documentary evidence was flawed, and
(iii) whether the decision adequately addressed the change in country situation.

9. At the hearing, Mr Sowerby submitted the FTJ “put the cart before the horse”. He argued that, having first rejected credibility, the FTJ then summarily discounted the documents as “self‑serving” without the requisite forensic analysis. He also submitted that there was no reasoned evaluation of the advocate’s qualifications or reliability, or clear findings thereon. He further contended that the expert report and the evolving country position were not engaged with in substance, and which still pointed to SM being at risk despite the fall of the Awami League from government.

10. Mr Sheikh submitted that the FTJ’s credibility findings were sustainable on the totality of the evidence. He argued that that the FTJ’s approach, although not citing Ahmed (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan* [2002] UKIAT 00439, (hereafter "Tanveer Ahmed"), expressly, conformed to its substance; and that the sequencing did not fatally infect the reasoning. He contended that the FTJ was entitled, given SM’s lack of credibility, to attach limited weight to Bangladeshi documents and to note the prevalence of concerns about such material. He also relied on the Respondent’s CPIN regarding changes in Bangladesh and contended that, even if there were any error, it was not material.

Legal principles

11. I remind myself of what was said by Lady Hale at paragraph 30 of SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49. What was said there about the restraint which must be exercised on appeal has been repeated in other cases, including HA(Iraq) and others v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 at [72]. The approach I adopt to the First-tier Tribunal’s findings reflects that and what was said by Lewison LJ at [2] of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:

i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.

ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.

iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.

iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.

v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the FTJ failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the FTJ's conclusion was rationally insupportable.

vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.

Analysis

12. At paragraphs 29-31 of the decision the FTJ stated:

“Documents

29. The Appellant has submitted First Information Reports (FIR’s). The Appellant states that these are false allegations and that he will be at risk on return owing to the same.

30. Having carefully examined the documents and in view of my findings above, wherein I do not accept that the Appellant was a member of the BNP nor politically active as claimed, I find that the documents provided by the Appellant are self-serving documents and I therefore attach limited weight to the same.

Letter from Md A H, Advocate

31. I have also examined the letter from Md A H and in view of my findings above, I find that this letter is also self-serving and I therefore attach limited weight to the same.”

13. In Tanveer Ahmed, the IAT stated at paragraph 31:

"31. It is trite immigration and asylum law that we must not judge what is or is not likely to happen in other countries by reference to our perception of what is normal within the United Kingdom. The principle applies as much to documents as to any other form of evidence. We know from experience and country information that there are countries where it is easy and often relatively inexpensive to obtain "forged" documents. Some of them are false in that they are not made by whoever purports to be the author and the information they contain is wholly or partially untrue. Some are "genuine" to the extent that they emanate from a proper source, in the proper form, on the proper paper, with the proper seals, but the information they contain is wholly or partially untrue. Examples are birth, death and marriage certificates from certain countries, which can be obtained from the proper source for a "fee", but contain information which is wholly or partially untrue. The permutations of truth, untruth, validity and "genuineness" are enormous. At its simplest we need to differentiate between form and content; that is whether a document is properly issued by the purported author and whether the contents are true. They are separate questions. It is a dangerous oversimplification merely to ask whether a document is "forged" or even "not genuine". It is necessary to shake off any preconception that official looking documents are genuine, based on experience of documents in the United Kingdom, and to approach them with an open mind".

14. And at paragraph 35 the IAT stated:

“35. In almost all cases it would be an error to concentrate on whether a document is a forgery. In most cases where forgery is alleged it will be of no great importance whether this is or is not made out to the required higher civil standard. In all cases where there is a material document it should be assessed in the same way as any other piece of evidence. A document should not be viewed in isolation. The decision maker should look at the evidence as a whole or in the round (which is the same thing).

36. There is no obligation on the Home Office to make detailed enquiries about documents produced by individual claimants. Doubtless there are cost and logistical difficulties in the light of the number of documents submitted by many asylum claimants. In the absence of a particular reason on the facts of an individual case a decision by the Home Office not to make inquiries, produce in-country evidence relating to a particular document or scientific evidence should not give rise to any presumption in favour of an individual claimant or against the Home Office.”

15. I remind myself that in Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367 the claim for asylum was based on the Appellant's account that he had been captured in the Democratic Republic of Congo by Rwandan-backed rebels, who had tortured him. The Appellant produced a medical report on his injuries, together with a report by a country expert. The Court of Appeal held that the adjudicator who dismissed the appeal had disregarded both expert reports in concluding that the Appellant's case lacked credibility. She had only turned to the reports after making the adverse credibility finding. Both reports were regarded by the Court of Appeal as detailed and impressive documents. In his judgment, Wilson J said:-

"23. In the light of my view as to the proper despatch of this appeal, it would be wise for me to keep my own views about the effect of the evidence to a minimum. The basis of the appeal is not that the weight of the appellant's evidence, coupled with that of the two experts, should have driven every reasonable fact-finding body to accept his account and to uphold his appeal but that he has been the victim of a flawed fact-finding exercise on the part of the adjudicator and that the tribunal fell into legal error in failing to recognise it and to remit the appeal for redetermination. In this regard Miss Braganza relies heavily upon the way in which the adjudicator folded the doctor's report into her enquiry only at a point after she had reached her conclusions and upon the way in which she jettisoned the focussed comments of the professor.

24. It seems to me to be axiomatic that a fact-finder must not reach his or her conclusion before surveying all the evidence relevant thereto. Just as, if I may take a banal if alliterative example, one cannot make a cake with only one ingredient, so also frequently one cannot make a case, in the sense of establishing its truth, otherwise than by combination of a number of pieces of evidence. Mr Tam, on behalf of the Secretary of State, argues that decisions as to the credibility of an account are to be taken by the judicial fact-finder and that, in their reports, experts, whether in relation to medical matters or in relation to in-country circumstances, cannot usurp the fact-finder's function in assessing credibility. I agree. What, however, they can offer, is a factual context in which it may be necessary for the fact-finder to survey the allegations placed before him; and such context may prove a crucial aid to the decision whether or not to accept the truth of them. What the fact-finder does at his peril is to reach a conclusion by reference only to the appellant's evidence and then, if it be negative, to ask whether the conclusion should be shifted by the expert evidence. Mr Tam has drawn the court's attention to a decision of the tribunal dated 5 November 2004, namely HE (DRC - Credibility and Psychiatric Reports) [2004] UKIAT 00321 in which, in paragraph 22, it said:

"Where the report is specifically relied on as a factor relevant to credibility, the Adjudicator should deal with it as an integral part of the findings on credibility rather than just as an add-on, which does not undermine the conclusions to which he would otherwise come.""

16. Buxton LJ agreed:-

"30. … The adjudicator's failing was that she artificially separated the medical evidence from the rest of the evidence and reached conclusions as to credibility without reference to that medical evidence; and then, no doubt inevitably on that premise, found that the medical evidence was of no assistance to her. That was a structural failing, not just an error of appreciation, and demonstrated that the adjudicator's method of approaching the evidence diverted from the procedure advised in paragraph 22 of HE, set out by my Lord.

31. Further, though perhaps less obviously, I agree that if an expert's view is to be rejected in the conclusive terms adopted by the adjudicator in this case, then proper procedure requires that at least some explanation is given of the terms and reasons for that rejection."

17. While it is correct to observe in SM’s case that, the FTJ, at paragraph 7, said they had considered all of the documentary evidence relevant to the appeal, and that the FTJ had to start the fact-finding somewhere, in my judgement the structure of the decision shows that the FTJ’s adverse credibility findings at paragraphs 19–26 were made in isolation and were already settled, before the FTJ only thereafter turned to the assessment of the documentary evidence at paragraphs 29–31. It is clear, from what the FTJ stated at paragraph 30 (“in view of my findings above”), that, because the Appellant was already found not to be credible, the documents were “self‑serving” and deserved “limited weight”.

18. In R (on the application of SS) v SSHD ("self-serving" statements) [2017] UKUT 00164 (IAC) it was held in the headnote:

“(1) The expression "self-serving" is, to a large extent, a protean one. The expression itself tells us little or nothing. What is needed is a reason, however brief, for that designation. For example, a letter written by a third party to an applicant for international protection may be "self-serving" because it bears the hallmarks of being written to order, in circumstances where the applicant's case is that the letter was a spontaneous warning.

(2) Whilst a statement from a family member is capable of lending weight to a claim, the issue will be whether, looked at in the round, it does so in the particular case in question. Such a statement may, for instance, be incapable of saving a claim which, in all other respects, lacks credibility.”

19. In my judgement the FTJ’s approach was contrary to that required by Mibanga. Credibility should not be assessed in isolation and then used to marginalise potentially corroborative material; rather, the Tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence before reaching credibility findings. I find that the structure of the FTJ’s reasoning here fell foul of that artificial separation and structural failure, such as that it renders the earlier credibility assessment unsafe, and renders the giving of only limited weight to the documents unsafe.

20. Here, what was asserted to be the FIR, charge sheet, and court orders included detailed particulars and purport to be court or police documents bearing official markings and references (CB pp.47–66 et seq.). The FTJ did not engage in a detailed analysis of the documentation; nor was there an express finding on the reliability or qualifications of the author of the advocate’s letter. It is of course correct that the country information evidence, in particular the Respondent’s CPIN on Documentation, discloses relevant and serious considerations regarding the ease with which false or fraudulently obtained documents from Bangladesh can be obtained by corrupt officials, lawyers and others, but that needed to be considered in the round, as with everything else. The claimed advocate’s letter gave the same case number as that on the arrest warrant, and elsewhere in the documentation, and confirmed that there was an arrest warrant (CB p.45). The FTJ’s treatment of this material was in my judgement really only confined to labelling it “self‑serving” and giving it “limited weight” (FTT §30–31), without a forensic evaluation of provenance, internal consistency, plausibility in the light of background evidence, or the author’s independence or standing; nor was there any clear finding on whether the person claiming to be the advocate was reliable. That, in my judgement, fell short of what Tanveer Ahmed and Mibanga required, and is akin to the error also identified in PJ (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1011, of rejecting potentially probative documents by assertion rather than analysis.

Materiality

21. I remind myself that, according to Lord Nicholls in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL 11 at [15]:

“Insufficiency of reasons ordinarily leads to the case being remitted for a rehearing … Such a direction is not appropriate if there was no evidence on which a properly directed tribunal could have upheld the claimant’s application.”

[emphasis added]

22. Here, the FTJ noted the expert report or Mr Tushar at paragraphs 34-35 of his decision, but treated it as not taking the Appellant’s case much further, because of the adverse credibility findings. Because SM’s credibility had already been rejected, the FTJ did not engage in a reasoned analysis of whether, if the documents were reliable, the extant criminal process and local actors (including non‑state elements) might still create risk (notwithstanding the Awami League no longer forming the government of Bangladesh).

23. It is relevant that Mr Tushar’s report noted at paragraph 40 that the interim government had made an announcement that all cases filed based on the student movement from 1 July to 5 August 2024 would be withdrawn, and at paragraph 42-43 made the point that cases filed outside of that period (i.e. potentially the claimed case lodged against SM) were not covered in that announcement. Mr Tushar’s report went on to set out why that could put SM at risk. It is relevant that at 13.3.5 of the CPIN of December 2024 (which post-dates the report of Mr Tushar) entitled “Bangladesh: Political Situation” is capable of being seen as consistent with what Mr Tushar said about cases filed in July and August 2024 being dropped. It also however speaks of the interim government taking steps to restore judicial independence, and changes to the police, so that is not to say that the Respondent’s position (that SM even if credible would no longer be at risk) would be without merit, but I am at this stage considering whether the FTT if properly directed could have reached a different conclusion. In that regard I also observe that the actors of protection CPIN at Chapter 5 (CB pages 162-202) detailed prison conditions in Bangladesh, noting overcrowding, corporal punishment in prisons, insufficiency of food, and a lack of knowledge about the size of the cells which held upwards of 25 people in. The Odhikar Human Rights Report 2023 (CB pages 300-302) also noted human rights violations in prisons, also before the fall of the Awami League. Torture and other human rights abuses in police custody were noted in a Human Rights Watch report from December 2018 (CB page 352) – again, before the interim government came to power.

24. I remind myself that in Muzafar Iqbal v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 02239, the Tribunal summarised how asylum claim based on a fear of prosecution amounting to persecution should be dealt with. Although it is not the purpose of the asylum determination process to judge guilt or innocence, nonetheless a factual evaluation as to whether there is a real risk that the claimant faces injustice rather than justice must be made. Whether prosecution amounts to persecution is a question of fact, and all relevant circumstances must be considered on a case-by-case basis. The criminal justice process in the country of origin must be looked at as a whole, with possible harms considered cumulatively and not separately. Whether prosecution amounts to persecution must be analysed by reference to international human rights norms. Prosecution does not amount to persecution unless likely failures in the fair trial process go beyond shortcomings and pose a threat to the very existence of the right to a fair trial. When considering whether there is a general risk of persecution to any person subjected to the criminal law process in a given country, it is important to establish the scale of relevant human rights violations, particularly in relation to mistreatment in detention and the right to a fair trial, and, using Article 3 ECHR as a benchmark, it is useful to ask whether the level of human rights abuse rise to the level of “consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.” This approach of the Tribunal in Iqbal (above) was approved by the Court of Appeal in Hariri v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 807 and Batayav v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1489 (with Sedley LJ sounding a note of caution to the effect that the need to show a “consistent pattern” of human rights violations was “intended to elucidate the jurisprudential concept of real risk, not to replace it.”).

25. In my judgment there was some evidence upon which a properly directed Tribunal could have found that SM on his particular facts was still at risk, subject to an assessment of SH (prison conditions) Bangladesh CG [2008] UKAIT 00076 and whether or not it was necessary to establish there were very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence to depart from it. An FTT judge could have had sufficient evidential basis, (if SM were credible and the threat of arrest and detention reliable), to find that notwithstanding the removal of the Awami League from power, there was still a real risk to SM (1) from non-state actors, and (2) being detained on the warrant in respect of at least one charge that had been falsely lodged against him, be subjected to violence and other human rights abuses in detention, and face injustice rather than justice.

Disposal

26. I canvassed disposal with the parties at the hearing. In my judgment, this is not a case where I can simply re-make the decision for myself, without hearing evidence, because there must be significant fact finding undertaken regarding the credibility of SM’s account as well as a careful evaluation of risk in accordance with the relevant country guidance authorities and country information evidence. Applying the principles in Shamoon (above), AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I have carefully considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements. I took into consideration the history of this case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made as well as the fact that the nature of the errors of law in this case meant that SM was deprived of fair consideration of this protection claim appeal. I have decided that, given the nature and extent of the errors of law, the matter must be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal because there remains significant fact finding which must be made. I further consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. Because of the nature of the errors of law set out above, and mindful of what was said by the then President, Lane J, in AB (preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 268 (IAC), I have concluded that none of the credibility findings can be safely and fairly preserved.

Notice of Decision

The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.

The appeal is remitted, de novo, to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by a different First-tier Tribunal Judge.

R Singer

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
9.2.26